


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
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
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**THE**

**IRRATIONALISM OF INFIDELITY.**



THE  
IRRATIONALISM OF INFIDELITY,

BEING

A REPLY

TO

“PHASES OF FAITH.”

—κ

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Ὁ μὲν τοι στερεὸς θεμέλιος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστηκεν, ἔχων τὴν σφραγίδα ταύτην,  
“Ἐγὼ Κύριος τοῦς ὄντας αὐτοῦ,” καὶ, “Ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πᾶς ὃ ἠνομά-  
ζων τὸ ὄνομα Χριστοῦ.”—2 ΤΙΜ. ΙΙ. 19.

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LONDON:  
GROOMBRIDGE AND SONS, PATERNOSTER-ROW.

M.DCCC.LXIII.



TO

MR. FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN.

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You will not be at a loss to discover the author of this attempt at a reply to your last publication, so strangely entitled "Phases of Faith;" nor to recognise one once well known to yourself.

I have had no thought of sparing your book. You have denied and dishonoured in it the Lord that bought me, to whom I owe everything a soul can know in blessing, and God reveal in grace. I have no sympathy with cold indifference in such a case. It is a duty to feel. Not to feel, proves we have never felt what it seeks to pull down.

With yourself the case is somewhat different. Not that I can distinguish, as some do, between a book and its author. If the book is a guilty one, its author is guilty of it.

But there is another feeling arises as to the author, which does not as to the book. To the book, I can measure out, without a pang, unmingled feelings of disgust and contempt. To the

author I could not. The thought of him awakens sorrow, regret, pain, a thousand feelings which the evil I find in his work, the thoughts as to Christ once expressed by him and supposed genuine by me, and my own love to souls however feeble—as alas! it is—contribute to produce. I do mourn; and hence it is I add these few prefatory words.

I have known you, supposed you loved Christ, took for granted, as one unsuspectingly does, you believed in Him, heard a testimony from yourself to your spiritual delight in Him, as the joy, the food, and delight of your soul. Was all a delusion? Is not your present book? Did you feel these things? Were they, as you thought, livingly linked up with a Christ known to yourself? Does your book prove a greater moral elevation? Forgive me, if I think that, independent of all dogma, it proves frightful descent from what at least restrained your steps, your lips, then, if it did not possess your heart. Can you compare what then expressed your joys with the feelings and manner of thinking (I am not talking of views or groundwork of judgment, but of their effects) which your book betrays, and feel happy at it? Take some of your own letters, and say. I have some which, of course, I cannot quote here for these expressions of your feelings. But what a difference when I read them. I cannot bring myself to believe that there was nothing real in them. My soul looks out for some gleam of such thoughts in the book your infidelity has produced; but I can only find a miserable nature let loose by it. Who can tell how deep something else may be buried by such a mass of

nature's ruins and filth, which the mighty grace of God may yet disencumber and make grow, and thus the old serpent lose its natural and congenial haunt ?

But I write that you may at least feel, that my attacking your book is as far as possible from bitterness towards you. I have no desire to spare your book. I am dealing with a book—with principles and with minds that may be affected by it.

I believe it a dishonour to yourself ; but as regards your book, you are but a name attached to the moral condition of mind contained in it, and there presented to the public. I am not dealing with you about it, but with it before God and my reader. The thought of yourself which intruded itself necessarily upon me in reading it, was one of deep sorrow, I trust of gracious feeling. My answer to the book was not the place to express it. I can here assure you of it. If you read my book, you must expect no concealment of a severe, I believe a just, judgment of your publication.

You have here the unfeigned expression of what I feel as regards yourself—not in its strength, as this must be public (and I hate published feeling), but at least the true character of it—pain—sorrow—I trust Divine love—and a lingering clinging to the hope that, however low he may have fallen, it is impossible that one who has expressed the feelings you have in by-gone times, could have done so without some reality.

May the Lord, who alone has power to blot out and overcome our wretchedness, and new-create the

heart, make you—as in other ways He has me—a monument of his almighty and infinite grace!

I remain, as one well known to you, and desirous of remaining unknown to others,

Yours with earnest desire in Christ.

## SYNOPSIS.

	PAGE.
<b>PREFACE</b> . . . . .	xi—xvi
<b>INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.</b>	
How and how far can God be known by Man. . . . .	1—28
Principles on which the Examination is carried on . . . . .	29—34
Animus of the Examination . . . . .	34—36
God is excluded . . . . .	36—70
<b>OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.</b>	
General Principles . . . . .	70—78
<b>PARTICULAR OBJECTIONS.</b>	
Genealogy in Matthew . . . . .	79—89
Alleged Mistake in Acts vii. 16 . . . . .	89—92
Discourse of Gamaliel, Acts v . . . . .	92—96
The Slaughter of the Infants . . . . .	96—97
Zacharias, son of Barachias. . . . .	97—104
Names of the Apostles . . . . .	104—105
Harmonising the Gospels—An Illustration . . . . .	105—107
The Rivers in Paradise . . . . .	108—110
The Sentence on the Serpent—Serpent Worship . . . . .	111—116
Two Accounts of the Creation . . . . .	116—118
Opinion of Dr. Arnold of Rugby . . . . .	118—119
The Longevity of the Patriarchs . . . . .	119—122
The Entrance of Death—The Fall—Objections dependent on "Science" . . . . .	122—127
The Song of Deborah . . . . .	127—132
The Sacrifice of Isaac . . . . .	132—138
Mr. Newman's Notions of Inspiration . . . . .	138—150
The Deluge . . . . .	150—152
Abraham and Sarah, and Isaac and Rebekah in Egypt—"Small Phrases"—Quotations from the Old Testament . . . . .	152—157
The Prophecy of Enoch . . . . .	157—163
Paul's Recognition of the Old Testament—The Introduction to Luke's Gospel . . . . .	163—168
Demoniacal Possession . . . . .	168—172
Character of John's Gospel—Star of the Magi—Herod's Massacre of the Children—Character of Luke's Gospel—Cures effected by Napkins—Catching away of Philip—Curse on the barren Fig-tree—The Tribute-Money . . . . .	172—180
"Useless Miracles"—Divine Sympathies—The Rending of the Veil, the Earthquake—The Miracles of Elijah and Elisha— The Death of Uzzah—Abimelech—Abraham's Visitors at Mamre—Elijah's Ravens . . . . .	180—187

	PAGE.
"Elohistic" and "Jehovistic" Sources of Mosaic History—The Psalms—Jonah—"Difficult Narratives"—Noah, and the Flood—Pharaoh and Abimelech . . . . .	188—197
"Double Accounts" of Circumcision—of the Name of Isaac, Jacob, named Israel—Bethel—Beersheba—The Name JEHOVAH, ELOHIM, EL-SHADDAI—Twofold Miracle of the Quails—The Water, Aaron's Rod, The Rock, Meribah . . . . .	197—203
"Double Consecration of Aaron and his Sons"—"Double Promise of a Guardian Angel"—Death of Aaron . . . . .	203—208
Joshua, the Sun and the Moon—Book of Joshua—Song of Moses—Fragments of Poetry . . . . .	208—212
The Book of the Law found by Josiah—The Samaritans—"Hezekiah's Prophets"—Dean Graves—"Sham Science"—Mr. Newman's "Hebrew Monarchy"—The Apocalypse—Mr. N.'s view of chap xvii. . . . .	212—222
The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews . . . . .	222—227
The Song of Solomon—Esther—Insignificance and Significance—Paul mis-represented . . . . .	227—231
<b> GROUNDS OF FAITH PROPOSED IN SCRIPTURE:—</b>	
The Testimony of Christ—Revelation of God—Paul's Reasonings like Gamaliel's—Plato, Philo, Targums—John's Testimony—"Faith at second-hand"—Divine Truth communicated by God—Adequate Proofs . . . . .	231—243
<b> HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS.</b>	
Conquest of Canaan—Purification of the Temple—Assumption of God speaking from without—"Without" and "Within"—Simon Magus and Demas—Christians under Constantine—Prophecy, St. John's Gospel, Tongues, and Paul's Conversion—Acts xiii. 33-35—Isaiah lv., li., liii.; Psalm xxii.; Zech. xii. xiii.—Dan. ix.—Matt. xxiv. 32, xxv. 30—Dan. xii. —Blindness of Israel—Coming of the Lord—Desolation to the Time of the End—Four Empires . . . . .	243—279
Books of the Bible—Prophecies of the Pentateuch—The Old Testament, a continuous History—The Gospels—The Discourses of the Lord—Special Views of Christ's person—John's Account of the Raising of Lazarus, and of the Healing of the Man born blind—Characteristics of John's Testimony . . . . .	279—296
Observations on Miracles—Mr. Newman's Remarks on Tongues—Paul's preaching of a glorified Christ—Peter's witnessing—General Remarks—"Modern Logic" . . . . .	296—312
<b> MESSIANIC PROPHECIES</b> . . . . .	313—335
<b> FACTS AS TO MR. NEWMAN'S CONNECTION WITH OTHER CHRISTIANS</b> . . . . .	335—342
<b> CLOSING REMARKS</b> . . . . .	342—365
<b> APPENDIX</b> . . . . .	366—383

## PREFACE.

---

I HAVE no pretension to learning or leisure, yet I have written and now present to my reader a book, the size of which, when I see it complete, alarms myself: it may be asked why I undertook such a task when I knew that I had neither.

My answer is this:—When any one loves, confides in, is deeply indebted to another (and in this case the debt is infinite), he will seek to defend—if he has any heart—the beloved object when it is attacked, without perhaps exactly measuring his power to be fully successful in its defence.

One qualification (none is of any value if God be not with us) I may boast of—profound, unfeigned (I believe divinely given) faith in the Bible. I have, through grace, been by it converted, enlightened, quickened, saved. I have received the knowledge of God by it, to adore His perfections—of Jesus, the Saviour, Joy, Strength, Comfort of my soul. Many have been indebted to others as the means of their being brought to God—to ministers of that Gospel which the Bible contains—or to friends who delight in it. This was not my case. That work, which is ever God's, was wrought in me through the means of the written word. He who knows what the value of Jesus is, will know what the Bible will be to such a one. If I have, alas! failed it, in nearly thirty years' arduous and varied life and labour—at least such, as far as the service of an unknown and feeble individual usually leads—I have never found it fail me. If it has not for the poor and needy circumstances of time, through which we feebly pass, I am assured it never will for Eternity. "The word of the Lord abideth for ever." If it reaches down even to my low estate, it reaches up to God's height because it comes thence: as the love that can reach even to me, and apply to every detail of my feebleness and failure, proves itself divine in doing so. None but God could—and hence it leads me up to Him. As Jesus came from God and went to God, so does the book that

divinely reveals Him, come from and elevate to Him. If received, it has brought the soul to God, for He has revealed Himself in it. Its positive proofs are all in itself. The sun needs no light to see it by.

This, indeed, has made me hesitate as to how far it is to the purpose to go through much of the matter of this book—that part, I mean, which takes up the objections to Scripture. My only reason is, that they are thrown down before a multitude of minds, as every one knows in these days. A heartless and sickly age, which finds its refuge from the cold and desolate waste of infidelity and human wilfulness, in the more pleasing imagery of imposed superstition. The Man of Intellect produces human infidelity. The Man of Imagination will give us human superstition, coloured over with the haze of antiquity, for fear what it really is should be too clearly seen. Both give me Man. The Scriptures alone give me God. Hence the peculiar form of modern infidelity is attack on the Written Word—the Scriptures. Superstition takes exactly the same ground. The cry of “Bibliolatry!” sounds alike from the intellectual and from the superstitious infidel. Both have the same object of attack. Both are infidels. One an intellectual—the other an imaginative one. *Both would persuade me that the Bible cannot itself command my conscience and oblige me to faith as coming from God.* Do they not both seek to do this? Is it not infidelity? Doubtless through the sinfulness of man’s will, without Divine Grace, he never will really receive the word, as it is in truth—the word of God. But is that his fault or the word’s? Infidels and superstitious persons will both tell me that the word itself has not divine authority over my soul—that I cannot receive it as such on its own authority without something more to prove it. It is hard to say who is guiltiest here—he who denies it is the word, or he who, not denying that it is, declares that what God has said cannot bind the conscience of man unless validated by some authority other than its own.

I should not certainly have entertained these objections even in order to reply to them, but they had already done positive mischief to many, and shaken the comfort, and agitated the minds, more or less, of many accustomed to confide simply in the word with real faith. Most Christians

have met with examples. One which came in a painful way under my own observation, led me to read, and in result, to answer the book. Some who have read the MS. have desired that it should be printed. It was not like a book of edification, which, if it failed to attain its end, came simply under the negative charge of being profitless or stupid. It was worse than this to occupy the mind with questions, if there were not positive good to be done by it. The book is meant for those who have been already occupied with these questions. Knowing that to feed on the Word is what the soul wants—not to discuss it—I have no desire that any should read it before whose mind the subject has not *already come*. But how large, alas! this class is now, is well known to most interested in these subjects.

I desire to add one remark here, in reference to inspiration. I beg to avow, in the fullest, clearest, and distinctest manner here, my deep, divinely-taught conviction of the inspiration of the Scriptures. That is—while, of course, allowing, if need be, for defect in the translation and the like—when I read the Bible, I read it as of absolute authority for my soul as God's word. There is no higher privilege than to have communications direct from God Himself. I say this, because, in reasoning with infidels in the body of the book, I have sometimes done so on their own ground, to show how untenable their positions were—how unreasonable their complaints, even setting aside inspiration. Indeed, had it not this claim, no one would dream of calling in question the authenticity and evidence of Scripture. Such a method might lead some unguardedly to suppose hesitation or want of depth of conviction on my part. My joy, my comfort, my food, my strength for near thirty years, have been the Scripture received implicitly as the word of God. In the beginning of that period, I was put through the deepest exercise of soul on that point. Did heaven and earth, all visible church, and man himself, crumble into nonentity, I should, through grace, since that epoch, hold to the word as an unbreakable link between my soul and God. I am satisfied that God has given it me as such. I do not doubt that the grace of the Holy Spirit is needed to make it profitable, and to give it real authority to our souls, because of what we are; but that does not change what it is in itself.

To be true when it is received, it must have been true before it was so. And here I will add, that although it require the grace of God and the work of the Holy Ghost to give it quickening power, yet Divine truth, God's word, has a hold on the natural conscience, from which it cannot escape. The light detects "the breaker-up," though he may hate it. And so the word of God is adapted to man, though he be hostile to it—adapted in grace (blessed be God!) as well as in truth. This is exactly what shows the wickedness of man's will in rejecting it. And it has power thus in the conscience, even if the will be unchanged. This may increase the dislike of it; but it is disliked because conscience feels it cannot deny its truth. Men resist it because it is true. Did it not reach their conscience, they would not need to take so much pains to get rid of and disprove it. Men do not arm themselves against straws, but against a sword whose edge is felt and feared.

Reader, it speaks of grace as well as truth. It speaks of God's grace and love, who gave his only-begotten Son that sinners like you and me might be with Him, know Him—deeply, intimately, truly know Him—and enjoy Him for ever, and enjoy Him now; that the conscience, perfectly purged, might be in joy in his presence, without a cloud, without a reproach, without fear. And to be there in his love, in such a way, is perfect joy. The word will tell you the truth concerning yourself; but it will tell you the truth of a God of love, while unfolding the wisdom of his counsels.

It is because I have found it all this—feeble and unworthy as I am—and because it is the Scriptures that have made God thus known to me through grace, that I have ventured on ground to which I am not much accustomed; from which I gladly retire, to use the Word which I here in a particular case attempt to defend. I have sometimes feared I might be a little like David with Saul's armour on. I have done it, I trust, in love to the Lord and to the souls of others; yet with some reluctance. Let me add, to my reader, that by far the best means of assuring himself of the truth and authority of the Word, is to read the Word itself.

In fine, I would say, that as I am conscious I have no claim to, so I neither pretend to nor desire, literary honour. I hope I may have been, in general, sufficiently clear to be under-

stood. I would only beg my reader kindly to remember, that the subjects are sometimes somewhat abstract; and while he who publishes anything must expect, of course, to be criticised, if what he writes is indeed worth it, I would so far claim indulgence as one may who has snatched from hours of rest almost the whole time occupied in composing what the reader has before him; service in ministering amongst souls from day to day, and other labours in the Lord's field, needless to mention, fully occupying all ordinary hours of toil. If I am useful to any, and the Lord accepts it as service done to Him, I am content. I think one or two points are twice referred to, from being connected with different subjects. It is not very material. If it be so, the reader will excuse what other labours forbid my now correcting.

I draw the attention of my reader to one point, on which this whole question of revelation greatly hangs in the reasoning of those with whom we have to do. I have noticed it in the body of the book, from feeling it was really the basis of their reasonings. I have since seen it laid down as the foundation of them, by a French writer of this class in his attacks on Scripture. It is this, that man is not capable of other ideas than those his own mind can create or produce. These may be awakened by some occasion, but they must exist, in an abstract sense. This is true, as to mathematics, because they are the expression of the relationship of quantity, or form, and these are perpetually inherent in what is subject to the mind of man, and what he has the capacity of pursuing to all its consequences. But in moral facts it is quite otherwise; every being who has a superior moral nature to mine will produce acts of the influence of which I am susceptible, though quite incapable, in virtue of being morally inferior. Nay, so true is this principle, that the same act done by beings of a superior nature or position, has an entirely different moral character and effect. If that nature and position are infinitely superior, the difference is infinite, the obligation quite of another character: yet the act may be quite intelligible, even by my wants. I do not measure it, but I know a love, if the act be one of love, which is beyond my measure. Thus Christianity tells us, that "God was manifest in the flesh" to fulfil a work of self-sacrifice for me. A man's sacri-

figing himself for me would present the highest human claim on a grateful heart; but God's doing it, that new, lovely, yet infinite fact, capable of filling the whole moral world, puts all that world in a new condition. Again, take the moral difference merely; man could die for a benefactor, perhaps, but he is not capable, in true, simple-hearted love, of unostentatiously dying for an enemy. God's becoming a man to do it silences the heart, and creates, by the sovereign title of love, a new order of feeling. The result is, that the notion that new moral thoughts which no human investigation could reach, cannot be produced, cannot be communicated, is utterly and stupidly untrue; and of these truths man is abstractedly incapable of judging but by the effect and thoughts produced by them. He becomes capable of estimating them by the change which takes place in his state in virtue of them, and not by pre-existing thoughts; he receives the new moral ideas from the objects, and grows up into them. This is eminently true of Christianity, as an unexampled divine act, for and in man. I reserve the answer to the French rationalist for another occasion, if God permit. He has stated more definitely the basis of the argument, and, consequently, the gross absurdity of the system is more palpable. The heart and conscience, then, is capable of impressions, of effects, which neither could produce; because beings in a higher order of moral nature can act on principles, and with rights entirely above man, and yet can act on and towards him, in things he was wholly ignorant of before, which meet his need, but which no moral effort could, by any possibility, have produced, because they proceed from a nature superior to his. It is a false assumption, that man is so constituted that he is not capable of a certain impression by an act of which he was wholly incapable of forming an idea before it was accomplished by another. He knows it as so accomplished by the superior being, in the effect produced in his heart by it. I do not doubt that there is a divine work wrought in communicating the knowledge of it; but on that ground I do not enter here.

## ERRATA.

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Page	2, lines 23 and 26, <i>for immerge, read emerge.</i>
„	21, line 24, <i>for He would, read Would He.</i>
„	34, „ 15, <i>for Soul, read Phases.</i>
„	41, „ 31, <i>for propagation), read propagation.</i>
„	„ „ 32, <i>for years; read years);</i>
„	44, „ 22, <i>for and those, read and by those.</i>
„	51, „ 33, <i>for has, read have.</i>
„	72, „ 11, <i>for there, read them.</i>
„	81, „ 2, <i>for as, read is.</i>
„	86, „ 5, <i>for Εμμορτου, read Εμμορ του.</i>
„	101, „ 4, <i>for to, read so.</i>
„	109, „ 24, <i>for “ Jehovah (Elohim,) read “ Jehovah Elohim.</i>
„	124, „ 22, <i>for dijecta, read disjecta.</i>
„	159, „ 25, <i>for and that the, read and the</i>
„	192, „ 18, <i>for in, read in the.</i>
„	209, „ 7 of note, <i>for deeds, read words.</i>
„	216, „ 8, <i>for in, read on.</i>
„	„ „ 2 of note, <i>for received, read be received.</i>
„	222, „ 26, <i>for A.D. 96, read A.D. 69.</i>
„	259, „ 7, <i>for could, read would.</i>
„	268, „ 8, <i>for dispensatorial, read dispensational.</i>
„	277, „ 32, <i>for it is, read is it.</i>



THE  
IRRATIONALISM OF INFIDELITY,  
ETC.

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“CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?”  
JOB xi. 7.

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WHEN a man makes his own mind the measure of his knowledge of good, he soon sinks to the level of that by which he measures it; indeed he is sunk there, morally, already.

This is the case with Mr. Newman. He judges of what God ought to be, of what a revelation ought to be, if there was one, by his own mind and feelings.

A book presents itself as a revelation from God, and he judges that it is not one. By what rule is his judgment formed? By what his own mind is, independent of revelation, which he subjects to the test of his own thoughts, when the book is presented to him as such. He can do this only in virtue of the competency of his mind to judge what a revelation ought to be, before he has received it. That is, his own mind; and even his own mind, in its present state, is the measure by which revelation is to be judged of. Were it so, then the mind of God must be on a level with the mind of man. But the fallacy of such a principle, as well as the excessive self-sufficiency of it, is evident.

First, the measure of what the Divine Being ought to be, or require (for if it be a revelation by Him, it must declare what He is, or what He requires), will vary with the moral condition or the natural disposition of each individual who seeks to form a judgment.

More than this, it will vary with the circumstances in which a man is placed, with the age of the world in which he lives, with everything through which he has passed in emerging out

of the state of natural ignorance of all things in which he began his life, and which have exercised an influence in forming his character.

It would be mere folly and ignorance of human nature, blindness to the most obvious facts, not to recognise these influences in the forming and moulding of the human mind, and thus their power in colouring its judgment of all around and above it. Does Mr. Newman think he has not profited by the influence of the Christianity he rejects? He miserably deceives himself if he does.

But to do him justice, he does not do so. In another volume of his (it is well the confession is absent from this), he avows (speaking of the New Testament, with the devotional parts of the Old, and declaring his intimate knowledge of it), "to it I owe the best part of whatever wisdom there is in my manhood" (Soul, p. 242). But of this further on.

He will not suppose that he soars entirely above the ken of the moral discernment of others as to his own condition, since he accounts himself capable of judging what God and a revelation ought to be. He has profited, he tells us, by the wisdom and piety of this false Messiah; but he thinks he has emancipated himself from the trammels of a revelation which he does not believe, and immersed into the truthful results arrived at by the logical and philosophical workings of the human (let us say the word)—of his own mind.

But have all immersed alike into the same thoughts of God and moral truth?—Have these philosophers, these rare men, few and far between (for the mass have followed stupidly some religion or other), this *élite* of the human race—have they all formed the same estimate of good and evil, of God and his relationship with men? Have Stoics and Epicureans, Platonists and Peripatetics, come to the same result? I might almost say, "Have they come to any?" Are the rationalist infidels of Dr. Paulus' school (of which Germany is well nigh tired), or the spiritualist infidels of Dr. Strauss's (of which it has been, for the moment, enamoured), the true interpreters of what they are agreed to doubt about, and cast off. Is the "desolating pantheism which is abroad" (ib. preface xii.) the same as Mr. Newman's objective relationship with a God whom he

knows as a personal Deity by specific sense, but of whose mind he knows no more "than a dog does of his master's" (Soul, pp. 119, 121).

Mr. Newman and others tell us of "following truth" (Phases, p. 116). What is the truth they are following? Where is it? The truth they are following is *truth they have not got*. What is it—this truth they are seeking? They do not know. If they knew, they would not be following it.

Mr. Newman may object, here, that he arrives at this conclusion, that God has sympathy with individual man (ib. p. 201). Now the sympathy of God with individual man is rather a vague word. God does not sympathise with sin, with lusts, with passions, with ambition, avarice—with violence. I suppose, Mr. N. will not deny that there are such in the world. Alas! that they largely prevail in the world in general. Indeed, he tells us elsewhere (The Soul, p. 44), that there is "prevailing wickedness." The sympathy of God is a lovely word, a gracious thought: but what is this sympathy, if it cannot be exercised in reference to so very large a portion of man's moral existence, in the state in which it is actually found? Mr. N. shall tell us. "The Christian advocate," he says in the same page (Phases, p. 201), "assumes that God concerns Himself with our actions, words, thoughts—assumes, therefore, that sympathy of God with man which (it seems) can only be known by an infallible Bible." Is this the sympathy of God with individual man? He "concerns Himself with our actions, words, thoughts." No doubt He does; but this *may be* in the way of a Judge, mere responsibility on my part, as well as sympathy on His. The law of England concerns itself about my actions and words, at least, without much sympathy. In what way does God do so? That is the serious question. Now I believe there is a consciousness in man that God does concern Himself about our actions, words, and thoughts. But then, in spite of clothing this with the graceful name of "sympathy," what I am concerned to know is, Who and what is the God that does concern Himself about them? Is He a righteous Judge? By what rules does He judge? Is He love? When my conscience tells me I have sinned; when some vile wretch feels in bitterness what he has

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done; what resource is there for him? How is his conscience to be purged? How is he to get happy with the God he has offended? In a word, what is the God that does concern Himself about my very thoughts? This is the important point to know. All religion assumes what Mr. N. says it does, as he explains it, because all consciences feel that God does so concern Himself about our actions, words, thoughts. But in what manner? What is He who does so? For that we need revelation; that Mr. N. denies us altogether—the only thing I want; because we have this consciousness that God concerns Himself about us. Revelation does not tell me that I have a conscience and aspirations: it gives me the answer to them, and that is what I want; and not to be told I have got such. I do not want a book for that: I want a certainty of what God is, to answer this need of my soul. I know what He is by His revelation of Himself in Christ. Of this, Mr. N. can tell me nothing; and he deprives me of that which tells me everything. There I find perfect love to me as a poor sinner, and thus have the possibility of truthfulness and honesty in a sin-conscious soul. There I find that love consistent with God's maintaining that absolute righteousness and hatred of sin, which my soul has learnt He *ought*, which my heart (now renewed in knowledge) *desires* Him to maintain; and could not own Him as the God I desire, if He did not maintain. In Christ I am (I will not say restored to Him, but) brought to know Him in perfect peace, as nothing else could make me know Him, love Him, walk with Him as a known God who loves me.

Would I exchange this with Mr. Newman's aspirations and thoughts of God? Can he give me this? Doubts he can give me: this is easy work; difficulties in Scripture, doubtless; uncertainty as to everything I supposed to be truth. Philosophers (like Mr. N.) think that they can prove, that what has made my heart divinely happy, has made me bless God, because of a goodness I never dreamt of till I knew it in Him; that what has consecrated the hearts and lives of thousands, and changed, where the heart was not consecrated, the whole condition of the world (for men are ashamed of doing in the light what they would do in the dark, though they are not

changed in heart);—they think, I say, that all this has been done by a fable, an imposture. Poor human nature! Aye, the reader will see that Mr. N. thinks this of himself. But the truth they are following—Where is it? What is it? Why, they are following it: how can they tell you what it is till they get it? True, they cannot, and I must wait.

“*Rusticus expectat dum defuauit amnis; at ille  
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*”

Is this all? Not quite. They are the only really honest people, save some blinded persons who are led by others, as Mr. N. once was, in an honest delusion. They are honest, because they believe nothing, and are following—following they cannot tell me what. Their honesty is in following without believing anything, and in trusting all the conclusions of their own mind, in rejecting what they supposed they did believe. And their descending steps in this are called—“phases of faith”!

But, perhaps, the age is enlightened. Be it so; though in philosophy and moral apprehension it may, perhaps, be doubted. But be it so, I repeat. Is the age’s opinion of itself to content me in my measure of God, and of what a revelation of Him ought to be? Millions in previous ages have believed in a revelation—in the Revelation which Mr. Newman rejects: enlightened men, too, philosophers, even wearied with searching after a truth they never found. They are all wrong. But why am I to think we are arrived, just in our day, at the perfection of the human mind, so that we are exactly right now? Mr. N. will tell me that they were superstitious ages. The age in which Christianity was introduced, or made progress among the Gentiles, was very far otherwise. Witness the various forms of mind, the Philos, the Celsuses, the Porphyries, the Alexandrian School of the Neo-Platonists, the Lucians, and others, whose reputation is publicly known (without any pretension to learning), to say nothing of earlier Grecian philosophy, which led the way. But suppose it was superstition; what does that prove but this, that the theory that man’s mind is the measure of revelation and of what God ought to be, makes truth and error, and the very character which God ought to have, depend on the age a man lives in. I speak of facts. Men, and men of able intellectual minds, have received

the revelation which Mr. N. rejects as being unworthy of God. They have thought it very worthy of Him, have adored the God revealed there as alone worthy of adoration, as supremely worthy. I am not now seeking to prove that they are right. But the fact cannot be denied. They had minds enlarged by stores of knowledge, they were of a philosophical turn of thought, they had considered all, or almost all, the objections which Mr. N. presents in his book; for on this head there is little or nothing new in it. His objections are mostly as old as the Celsuses of the first centuries, and other such objectors, and, in spite of all, they have bowed before the God of the Bible as supremely good, supremely just and wise. Mr. N., applying his mind as the measure of it, thinks it all utterly unworthy of the God which his mind has pictured to itself: for what other has he? Now, to say nothing of the heathen, who had gods to please their lusts, for lusts men have after all, nor of those who made God a kind of soul of the world, or who do, as there are many, with a "desolating pantheism," make Him an all-pervading power or influence, so that everything is God; but to take such men as Mr. N., Sir Isaac Newton, Pascal, Paul, Justin Martyr (Mr. N. loves such associations), I must either judge that Mr. N.'s mind and judgment are the sole true measure, or that the human mind is not a competent measure of what God ought to be, or what should characterise a revelation from Him. Nay, should I think Mr. N. and his school alone right, I should not have gained much, for I should then have to consider all *other* minds incompetent; and he would, if he has not a revelation, be himself a Deaster, i.e. the sole revealer of truth. What does Mr. N. think?

I beg the reader to remark, I am not here supposing Sir Isaac Newton or Paul to be right, I only show that they differ from Mr. Newman in his idea of what a revelation ought to be, *Quot homines tot sententiæ*; and that I learn thus that the human mind is not a competent measure of a revelation. Mr. N. and his school will surely forgive me, if I do not think they stand alone in their competency to measure what becomes God. How can I tell that the author has arrived at the end of his phases? I humbly conceive, from his own statement, that he never has had faith at all (unless in the Irish clergyman).

Would I could believe he had, how gladly would I commit all this to the fire! He may alter yet once more, light may break in upon his mind, he may learn to see a beauty in Jesus he has never seen yet. The Lord grant it may be so! What a joy to think it is true that all (even his writing against that Blessed One) would be freely forgiven! And O how does the thought of Christianity refresh the heart in the midst of all the cold logic of infidelity, if logic such confusion can be called! But all his previous estimates were false, were "*phases*" of the state of his own mind. And can he assure me this is not one which some subsequent illumination ("*movement*," p. 233, is the word) will throw into equal discredit? The Lord grant it may be so! Nor is this without example in history, as to men in general. Where superstition has bound down the will, and degraded religion below the standard of natural conscience, it awaits only an adequate impulse from good or from evil to break the chains. I leave aside the good now. But the working of the mere will of man, under the impulse of evil, brought about such an event in the French revolution. The Bible was not there as a restraining power, nor as formative of human enquiry and thought. Superstition and a hollow state of society came down with a tremendous crash, and all reverence for God was buried in its ruins. Man had emancipated himself, to have—what? Uncertainty in everything, and a ruin from which he found no resource. Conscience and the Bible, under God's good hand, had emancipated at the Reformation, imperfectly, perhaps, but really. Man's will, without the Bible, at the French revolution. In the country in which it burst forth, superstition had continued; and society, as it was, was attacked with it. But man is a dependent creature; and, when he pursues his own will, like a naughty child, he, ere long, tires himself, and is not always agreeable to his neighbours. Its energy is a feverish and feeble thing.

Men, as they are in general, that is, man, as such, must have something certain to lean upon; he tires of uncertainty, tires of wandering he knows not whither. He is feeble, he wants rest; and, after a certain effort, he *will* have it. What has resulted in the case we refer to? Men have gone back, alarmed, disheartened, and weary, to the superstition which at

any rate clothed itself with the certainty of Christianity; and, as far as they dare, impose on conscience, for peace' sake, what never satisfied nor purified any conscience before the God with whom men have to do. They have given an outward stability to what pretended to certainty, and had sufficient influence to make it available, sufficient remains of Christianity to deck itself with its name, that they may have what, at least, can be called certain, and may so far give rest to society, if not to conscience. The will broke loose; the will of tired man would have rest somewhere. Corrupt Christianity was better than nothing.

It will be said, "This will not endure." I believe, undoubtedly, it will not.

But we are seeking the certainty of the human mind; and, whether this enlightened age can afford me the rest which the soul seeks after: we are enquiring into its competency to measure truth—if its present phase is really a resting-place. And even for what this age does possess of what is morally superior to every preceding one—to what is it indebted? To Christianity. Activity of intellect was not wanting, nor acuteness either, in other times. If ever a tongue shewed nicety of thought and mental cultivation, it is the Greek. Nor was elaborate and striking speculation on the soul and on God wanting, nor development of systems of large theoretical conceptions of what is hidden from material observation in the Godhead. Philosophers will tell you that the Christian scriptures (such as the Gospel of John) borrowed, as to their highest elements of thought, their ideas from some of these. Civilisation was not wanting, nor study. Yet who can deny that, where Christianity is received, you would find, in the mass of mankind, truer notions of God, and of right and wrong, beyond all comparison, now than then? Yea, that peasants and beggars have a truer knowledge of God, and more real, more holy, more instructed affections when its doctrine has taken effect, than the most elevated philosophical mind in the Academy at Athens, or its imitators at Rome? This is due, Mr. Newman tells us, to an enthusiastic imposture, an imposture of a most audacious character; for Jesus pretended to be Son of God (Son of man according to Daniel vii.), an imposture ill-reported

too. Is this credible? Does man want an imposture to bring him out of mental and moral degradation, and make him know God? Such is Mr. N.'s theory. Nay, as we have seen, he owes most of what his manhood knows of wisdom to this imposture.

But does not the nature of the effect produced, as to the knowledge of God where Christianity has existed, or even Judaism, and that even where no aspirations after God exist, where the heart is not practically changed, prove that there was a *revelation of God*? For it is in that point there is such amazing general progress. It is really the statements afforded by this revelation, which have drawn out Mr. Newman's aspirations: this formed his boyish mind, this communicated his manhood-wisdom. Can I believe, then, his theory? Why should this ardent piety which now attracts him, these energetic statements about God which have drawn out his soul, have sprung up among these narrow bigots of ordinance-bound Jews, rather than from the finely-cultivated understanding of an Academician, if there had not been a revelation of God so as to produce them?

The world moralised by imposture and enthusiasm! What a world it must be! And such a mind as Mr. Newman's gets almost all his manhood-wisdom from it! What an imposture it must be! Let us consider other religions. Mohammedanism has borrowed much from revelation; but it has met the lusts of men as on God's part, who, as He is there represented, will and does satisfy them:—Christianity, not even in thought.

Let us turn our eyes in another direction.

So exceedingly strong, even according to Mr. Newman, is the moral power of Jesus's character, or the effect produced by His agency, that the very attempt to portray it in pictures has given an entirely different tone to the ideal of those pictures, and imprinted on them a grace and expression of which the highest and most perfect works of art are otherwise entirely destitute, and such a tone of moral loveliness as was conducive to moral improvement all through the dark ages. This result he connects with the effect of the highest moral qualities of man, the absence of which in heathen statues deprived them of this power. These were wholly wanting, he says (see Soul,

pp. 20, 21): "meekness, thankfulness, love, contentment, compassion, humility, patience, resignation, disinterestedness, purity, aspiration, devoutness." He does not say these were in Christ; but he is speaking of what was wanting in the Apollos and Mercuries of antiquity, in contrast with the pictures of the Saviour, conducive during centuries to the spiritual improvement of men.

Let us now turn to see what Jesus was in his judgment, what He was in whose imperfect portrait these graces more or less shine forth.

"The cause of all this [the mischief of present Christianity] is to be found in the claim of Messiahship for Jesus" (Phases, p. 225): "he selected '*Son of Man*' as his favourite title, which is a direct annunciation to us that he based all his pretensions on the seventh chapter of Daniel, from which that title is adopted. On the whole, then, it was no longer defect of proof which presented itself, but positive disproof of the primitive and fundamental claims" (ib. p. 198). "My positive belief in its miracles [those of Christianity] had evaporated" (ib. p. 187). "He [Jesus] had receded out of my practical religion, I know not exactly when. I believe I must have disused any distinct prayers to Him, from a growing opinion that He ought not to be the *object* of worship, but only the *way* by whom we approach to the Father; and as in fact we need no such way at all, this was (in the result) a change from practical di-theism to pure theism. His mediation was to me always a mere name, and, as I believe, would otherwise have been mischievous" (ib. p. 188).

"Thirdly, while it is by no means clear what are the new truths for which we are to lean upon the decisions of Jesus, it is certain we have no genuine and trustworthy account of his teaching. If God had intended us to receive the authoritative dicta of Jesus, He would have furnished us with an unblemished record of those dicta" (ib. p. 213). Mr. Newman, then, has acquired nearly all his manhood-wisdom, aye, their highest moral tone, from (the Lord forgive even the thought in one's mind) a bold impostor, one who, having found a spurious prophecy (which, however, must have been pretty ancient to be so used), pretended to be the object of it, pretended to work miracles which he never wrought, and sent others to pretend

to work them, he and they being alike incapable of doing so—whose deception was deliberate and intentional; for, speaking of riding on the ass, he says, it was “a deed which Jesus appears to have planned with the express purpose of assimilating himself to the lowly king here described” (Phases, p. 195). What kind of piety and wisdom which attracts and adorns his mature and manhood-thoughts, must Mr. N. have learnt from such a one? Yet this is philosophy; this is logic! The philosophy of one who has been in the East, and can tell what *majnūn* means!

It was the character of Paganism that their deities had nothing to do with conscience, unless it were a future gloomy Pluto.\* They were the helpers and satisfiers of their lusts and wishes. Christianity alone acts directly and immediately on the conscience, puts God in connexion with it—an immense benefit—and yet takes away fear by revealing love; and unites perfect love and perfect righteousness in the *character of God* in the doctrine of an atonement, so that the conscience and heart may be elevated to the height of God Himself—a God known in love.

What the human soul never did before for itself, what it never could do, nay, what it never ought to have supposed, Christianity has done.

Another thing characterises it as introduced into the world—its activity towards souls. Others may have since imitated this. It is not the activity of souls about God, come for money who may to learn, but the activity of God about souls. Hence it is what has (as far as that has been done in spite of human nature) moralised the world; nay, Mr. Newman himself. It acts on man for good. Who and what does this? Mohammedanism is active. Ambition is active. Corruption is active. But what is that activity which has *permanently* moralised the world, taken in the mass of men, and elevated their notions of God? Whence did the activity flow?

Mr. Newman has attempted to compare the progress of

\* I find the remark has been made elsewhere, that the only moral part of heathen mythology was the infernal part of it. What a tale that tells! Conscience will tell its tale whatever lusts may seek; but it will never draw to God.

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Christianity with that of Mohammedanism, by introducing the wars of Constantine, and the Saxon conversions by the sword of Charlemagne. But the Mohammedan conquests were the avowed principle of the religion from the beginning. The conduct of Constantine and of Charlemagne was contrary to its principles and to its practice for three hundred years. But Mr. N. is feeble, in spite of himself, here. Constantine used the Christianity which existed, and which was (though suffering up to that hour, as is well known—for Diocletian's persecution had not long since been raging) strong enough for a competitor for the throne to secure his pretensions by. Mr. N. says, that Constantine's Christian army established Christianity. Perhaps on the throne it did; but how did the Christian army come there?

But there is another ground on which to rest the proof of man's incapacity to measure what God and what a revelation ought to be. Men have lusts, passions, ambition, avarice. Alas! though restrained by Christianity so that society is altered, yet the heart of man is still influenced by all these evil principles. Now all this must dim the spiritual perception, and render it more or less incapable of rightly judging of God and a revelation! How is it to get the thought of God which is to set it right? Christianity has no need to be ashamed of its axiom, "Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God." How are the impure to be capable of judging? Mr. Newman has no revelation to act on them. Is the soul, as having, as a fact, corrupt *lusts* (that is, corrupt desires, perhaps habits) capable of judging? If not, this large class is incompetent to form any estimate of the Scriptures. These lusts will not correct them. What is to be done for them? They may sink, on Mr. N.'s plan, to the level to which their lusts may carry them. In fine, in whatever aspect we view man, all is uncertainty, if man's mind be the measure of truth. But you will say, This is undermining everything; it is the Pyrrhonism of a Pilate.

No; the Christian believes *God has spoken*, has been active in love towards man, and he bows; He is not a judge, but a receiver of truth. He desires, as a new-born babe, the sincere milk of the word, that he may grow thereby, having tasted

that the Lord is gracious. I am not saying he is right or wrong in receiving it, or on what ground he has done so. I am only showing that he is not on the same ground on which he who considers man's mind to be the measure of truth is. He has said, "Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth." "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" He has bowed to what he believes to be absolutely certain, and to be the truth, absolutely such. He may have a great deal yet to learn of it, but he believes it is there revealed by God. "He who hath received His testimony, has set to his seal that *God is true*; for He whom God hath sent speaketh the *words of God*." Faith, then, has certainty, because it bows to Him who cannot lie, and receives His word as the truth itself.

And here is the real question. Mr. Newman takes the soul's thoughts, and excludes wholly God's making Himself known; the believer brings Him in, and this changes everything. On this I shall enter into some detail further on. I merely state the real point in question here. There is not a greater fallacy, a more impudent presumption of man's self-sufficiency, than that it is the capacity of the organ (as men speak, that is, of the soul) in itself, which is the measure and limit of its knowledge; embracing, even, in the word "capacity," all knowledge acquirable by its own powers, and all affections acted on by objects known within these limits. It can be *acted on* by that which it has no intrinsic capacity to acquire; as light enters into the eye, and gives a capacity of seeing by acting on it; as medicine or even food on the body. A susceptibility of being acted on so as to have effects and even powers produced, is not a capacity in oneself to measure or acquire. The entering in of the word giveth light, and understanding to the simple. Now this is the operation of a revelation where it is really received. No doubt it is adapted to man in every sense—to his conscience—to his actual state—to his heart; but it is nothing acquirable by man as he is. God is active in communicating to him what operates *on* his soul, but which is true whether it operates or not, and which has no place in it, nor ever will, nor its effects, unless it be positively communicated. Evidently a revelation has this for its proper character, though it may enforce known responsibilities by sanctions known only

by that which is revealed, or by the authority of the revealer, whose perfections and claims are made known. Has man no need of such communications? Has God nothing to communicate which may be a blessing to man, which may morally and spiritually elevate him? Is He incapable of doing it?

And this leads to another very important point.

Morality, properly speaking, is relative: that is, it flows from relationships in which we stand to others, and in which we owe such and such things to them in virtue of the claim upon us which their position gives them. I do not mean by this, that intrinsic purity of heart is not to be sought, and the subjugation of passions in their workings within us. No Christian could question it for a moment. It is peace in itself. We ought to be pure; it is a good in itself, and it is the practical condition of communion with God. "Be ye holy, for I am holy;" and, as it is stated in a passage we have already cited, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." This claim of purity distinguishes Christianity as revealing God. No other religious system knew it; for none associated man with a God known to be light, and who called us to walk in the light as He is in the light. Love, also, in exercise where it is not relatively due, is the proper characteristic of the Christian: and these two distinguishing characteristics flow from this blessed and glorious truth—that the Christian partakes of, and hence is called to imitate in practice, the Divine nature. "That eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested to us," as John teaches us, in Christ, so that He should be an absolute practical example to us, is also "true in Him and in us," whose life He is, "because the darkness is past, and the true light now shineth."

This is the Christian life. Without disputing about words, I do not call this morality, though it be really that which is the spring of and accomplishes it; because the proper and natural display of life in us is not properly obligation, though that life may, in this display, fulfil those obligations. Now morality, I apprehend, is, properly speaking, the maintenance of obligation. Of this latter we will now speak. In its nature, and by the force of the term *obligation*, it is, as I have said, relative. Before entering on this point, I would notice

the connexion, as stated in the Scriptures, between the two; that is, between our "partaking the Divine nature," and our fulfilment of moral obligation.

"Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Here, this principle of the Divine nature communicated to us does accomplish what would be a moral obligation enforced by the law; but the two things are distinguished; and then love goes farther also, because there is positive active energy in it, where there is no relative obligation. On the other hand, having this nature, I clearly have it to *live in it*, and so also please God, which itself is the highest obligation. Hence, "he that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." So the Lord Himself united both, even to the giving of His life. "But that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me commandment, so I do." The precepts of the Gospel are the guidance of this nature, according to the perfection and perfect wisdom of Him who is its Source; they are needed by us in the obscurity of our feeble nature and distracting passions, and giving (as it ought to be, as it was in Christ) to the movements of the Divine nature in us the additional character of obedience.

It remains, then, true, that what is called, generally and properly, "moral obligation," is necessarily and in its nature a relative thing. And hence the measure of it is the claim of the being in relation to whom I stand, in virtue of that relationship.

In this sense it is, though the expression be very incorrect, that morality is eternal. If we consider as morality our own (or, to use the modern word, our subjective) state (to which the term is hardly properly applied), the love and holiness which become a man are the communication of the nature of God Himself, and are eternal in their source and character. And morality, properly so called, drawing its source from the claims attached to certain beings with whom I am in relationship, is as unchangeable as the relationship itself. For "eternal," in this case, has only the meaning of *absolute* and *unchangeable* when the relationship exists; that is, the relationship being known, the duty attaches to it essentially.

But this shows the importance of a revelation.

As to the first (that is, our likeness to the divine nature), it is absolutely necessary; for God is unknown in His real perfection without it.

In the latter (that is, moral obligation properly so called), it has equal importance in another way, namely, that the revelation which God makes of Himself *creates* an obligation commensurate with that revelation. If the Son of God has died for me, is my Saviour and my Lord, it is clear He has a claim morally upon me, according to what He is as so revealed, and what He has done. That is, a revelation creates a part of morality, just as a woman's marriage does by her entering upon a new relationship with her husband, with this difference, that the obligation of marriage is abstractedly known in itself, whereas what is newly revealed then first begins even to be known as an obligation. The obligation takes its origin from it.

Some remarks may be added here. The mere capacity of nature to enjoy or stand in certain relationships does not constitute a base of morality, the relationship itself must exist. An orphan may have a nature susceptible of all the feelings and obligations of a child towards a parent. The moral tie does not exist, because the claim of the parent cannot be there.

Next, holiness, in its nature, and love, as we speak of it here, suppose sin. Innocence is not holiness; it is ignorance of evil. God is holy, for He knows good and evil, and is perfectly good, and evil is perfectly abhorrent to Him. We have the knowledge of good and evil: hence naturally our conscience is bad; but if holy, and as far as holy, we abhor the evil we know, and know as such, when present, in the measure of our holiness.

Love, too, as we know it in God, is exercised in respect of evil; for evil exists and exists in us, and He loves us in that state.

Now, the understanding of perfect holiness by a sinful nature is, as to its own capacity, impossible. Conscience may so far understand it as to see its opposition to sin, and angrily or in terror dread the consequences: but an unholy nature

does not comprehend or know a holy one in its separation from evil, as to affections—will—delight; for it has contrary ones. So, indeed, of Love. “He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love.”

To say that a man is not a sinner, is mere folly and insensibility to good and evil, and the strongest possible proof of ignorance of God and hardness of conscience. “Thou thoughtest,” says he whose piety Mr. Newman declares he delights in (Phases, pp. 223, 232), speaking in God’s name, “that I was altogether such a one as thyself; but I will reprove thee, and set before thee the things that thou hast done.”

To say that he is a sinner,\* is to confess his incapacity of knowing God, or judging of Him, or the revelation He gives of Himself, unless sin, that is, an opposite moral nature in thought and desire—in insubjection, too, of will—be the capacity to know Him.

But if we consider morality, properly speaking, as grounded on relationship, it is clearly and easily evident, that man cannot, and ought not, to suppose in his own mind the only thing which God can be to his comfort. For that for which man is responsible to God, he has failed in. I ask not the cause. I am willing here to take the ground Mr. Newman takes, proof as it may really be, as I shall show, of indifference to God’s presence and favour. I will suppose that sin is come in neither by following Adam, nor inheriting his fallen nature; that it is all the pure fruit, without other cause, of man’s own individual will.

He has failed in the relationship to God and man in which he stood as a responsible creature, and that by his own proper perverseness. He needs mercy. He needs, then, forgiveness. He needs a God of goodness, who cannot hold the guilty for innocent, and yet forgives iniquity; but if a person has sinned against one to whom he owes so much, his taking it for granted that he is to be forgiven, as a matter of course, is hardness and impudence of heart.

If my child had been very naughty and offensive to me (and it is nothing compared to sin against God), and he were

\* Mr. Newman teaches that man *cannot* grow up sinless, but must be a sinner (pp. 100, 101).

to say, "Of course my father will forgive—forgiveness is a proper thing that suits his character—is becoming conduct"; would not his state be really worse than his offence—his conscience shown to be hard? Conscience—right feeling—thinks of what we have merited from those good and gracious, when we have offended them, and judges itself, though it may be attracted by grace. The heart which coolly expects it, because it suits the character of Him we have offended, is in a state which unfits it for receiving it.

If God reveals it, it does, indeed, suit Him; and I bow in thankful adoration when He has shown Himself such (but this is revelation): to expect it is to be insensible to it, to be unfit for it.

And here I may take up Christianity itself, because I only show that, being what it is, there must be a revelation to communicate it; the sinner's mind ought not and could not judge it, or appreciate it, or suppose it, unless it were revealed. It declares a love of God which gave his only-begotten Son, One with Himself, the object of his infinite delight before the world was, for vile and polluted sinners. It declares that the Son came, in the exercise of this same love, giving Himself for them, to put away their sin and bring them to God—thus known to be perfect love to themselves, and with a conscience which knows that He imputes no sin to them at all (without diminishing, nay, giving a far deeper sense of his holiness), because his character had been perfectly glorified about it.

The Father did not spare his Son, but delivered Him up. He freely and in the same love gave Himself for it, to glorify God and save us. Could a sinner expect such a dealing? Would it not have been a presumption which increased his offence, and showed his pride and the naughtiness of his heart? Revealed, it is a love which nothing else could manifest, and the glory of Him who has love for his nature.

That is, not only the human mind, as such, is incapable of appreciating, in itself, God and the revelation of Him—but, seeing we are sinners, it cannot, morally, it ought not to suppose it such as it must be, if of any use to him, seeing he is such. The supposition constitutes unfitness to enjoy and profit by what is supposed. Known by revelation, grace is the

perfection of God as He manifests Himself. The expectation of it destroys its nature (for it would not then be mere goodness), and debases still farther him who expects it.

All these considerations show that the mind of man, and specially of sinful man, is incapable of estimating what God ought to be, and what the revelation which He would give of Himself should be.

Hence utter uncertainty in the soul as to what He is. This is, indeed, an unquestionable fact—He concerns Himself about our words, actions, thoughts. Solemn thought! for if He does so, it is because He has a right and a will to do so. But what is He who does? Here all is solemn or irritated silence, or an effort to believe Him good, so as to set the conscience easy and the will free.

Mr. Newman would take away what I have, if he could. He will give me his thoughts instead, but no revelation of God. I must take *his* thoughts (worse than second-hand faith), or my own, or everybody his own:—that is, everything beyond the thought that God concerns Himself about our actions, words, and thoughts—and Almighty Power and Godhead—are the sport of every man's mind, and of the fancies which a sinful will may have about the God men have to say to. For what else than his own notions can Mr. N. give them?

And does Mr. Newman deny this horrible uncertainty, this incapacity to judge of revelation?

He cannot, and he does not. I am not here supposing that he does not give us his thoughts about God: these we may examine, in a measure, hereafter. But we are here examining his views of revelation. On this head all is avowed uncertainty and incapacity. "There is no imaginable criterion," he tells us, "by which we can establish that the wisdom of a teacher is absolute and illimitable" (Phases, p. 213).

Now this is not a statement that the Bible is not a revelation of God, because of what it is; but that *no* revelation can be established as certain to man.

If there be no imaginable criterion by which it can be established, man is incapable of judging of the certainty of a revelation; for he has no criterion to judge by. I do not deny that some might be proved to be false by evident

contradictions, or such other proofs as are within the measure of man's appreciation, for which he has a criterion. If a pretended revelation declared there were many gods, and of the basest immorality and born in time, such as Jupiter and Venus,\* and the like, it could not be a revelation of the one true God, whose "eternal power and Godhead" men ought to know without a revelation given by inspiration (Rom. i.). But for receiving a revelation as certain in a positive way, man has no criterion; that is, he is incapable of judging of it. It cannot be pretended that God cannot reveal anything; that is, state anything with certainty as to the past, as to the future, or as to what is unseen.

Only man, according to Mr. Newman, has no criterion by which to judge that it is such; that is, man is incapable of judging with certainty of it: he is capable of uncertainty in such a case, and that is all.

A poor condition to be in if God be capable of giving such a revelation! Mr. Newman tells us (*Phases*, p. 212) it would be very "undesirable;" but he cannot say in principle that God has not revealed, and does not reveal anything, for he has no criterion to judge by in order to assure himself of it.

But let us measure this proposition a little more accurately. It affirms very clearly what I have stated as to man's incapacity, supposing him to be the judge of revelation. He is a totally incompetent one.

But morally it goes something farther; for it assumes that man's criteria are the only means of the certainty of a revelation; and, in doing that, it affirms that God is incapable of giving a revelation which can bind the conscience of man as

\* Yet, in fact, men not having desired to retain God in their knowledge, they were received as gods, because man's passions, and habits, and imaginations, and associations of country, of the religion of his fathers, wants connected with his passions, are stronger in the immense mass of mankind, than any calm reasoning about God from the display He has made of Himself in nature, or the workings of man's natural conscience. The Socrates's would be treated as atheists and the despisers of their country's gods, till an indifference which demoralises everything made polytheism ridiculous, and independence of God as convenient for men's passions as imaginative gods that favoured or thwarted them.

being his revelation to him. I say morally, because I admit that sinful corrupt-minded man is an incompetent *judge* of a revelation. But Mr. Newman admits no other way of its reception than the *a priori* moral competency of man; and on this ground his proposition really declares that God is incapable of so revealing Himself to man as to make Himself known, or bind the conscience, or assure the heart, by such revelation.

For if there be no imaginable criterion by which man can be assured certainly of its authority, and man's judgment be the only way of receiving it, God in no imaginable way can communicate his mind or will so as to make it certain to man as such, and thus binding on him, or a comfort to him. This is a bold proposition. It is always well to know what men do really mean; sometimes it is enough to state it, to see its falseness.

This statement declares God's total incapacity to communicate with man. He must remain, as far He is concerned, an unknown, perhaps an epicurean, i.e. an indifferent, God. Any expression of love to his creature He is debarred from, as well as that of righteousness. For any revelation of his character to instruct man He is incompetent. He has made man in such a way as that all communication to him on his part is forbidden. Would He elevate man to any increased knowledge of Him? He cannot. He would manifest any love to him in his sins and sorrows:—He must resign Himself to be silent, shut up in his own perfection—if perfection, an inactive love, incapable of telling itself to the one it loves, can be called. Such is the theory of Mr. Newman. But this is not all.

For if God cannot reveal Himself to man, man's thoughts of God must be entirely within the limits of his own mind. I shall just now show Mr. Newman's theory false as to fact, on ground not yet noticed, but I take it now as he states it.

Now if God be brought within the limits of man's thoughts as such, if by searching Him man can find Him out, then is He really not God at all, or man is. At least, his *mind* is equal to the divine infinity; for when it comes to power instead of presumptuousness, the difference is soon found out.

I remember (for I have also had my phases of faith) when first awakened to serious and, in some measure, continued

moral thought, I was reading, partly through desire of knowledge, partly, alas! through the vanity which likes to possess it, Cicero's Offices, and I came to the passage, nearly the only one which remains to me unobliterated by an active life, "subjecta veritas quasi materia," that is, "truth subjected as a material" to the mind. I said to myself (or rather the divine truth flashed across my mind), "This cannot be in the case of God, for my mind must be superior to the matter which is subjected to its operations; if it be, that which is so is not God. Faith alone can put Him in his place, which, if He be God, must be above me, as much as God must be above man."

Is not this true? But then there must be a revelation of God in some way, or I (deplorable condition!) remain in total ignorance of Him. I am not saying man is so; but that he must be so, *if* there be *no revelation of God*. I believe conscience knows that there is a God—Mr. Newman's conscience, my conscience; but it wants something more than it knows: for conscience knows responsibility, and it knows sin—sin lying on itself—on him who has the conscience of it.

Argumentatively, it is an absurdity to make man's mind the measure of God.

Morally, it is a horrible iniquity as well as a folly.

But perhaps the reader will consider it unjust in argument, and even morally, to impute such a thought to Mr. Newman; as the Psalmist, whose piety he admires, puts into the mouth of God, as inspired so to do, as a charge against the wicked, "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thyself."

But Mr. Newman has reasoned out his principles too boldly to their consequences to conceal them. Any God known by revelation is too entirely excluded from his thoughts to make him fear to bring out his God such as He is according to his theory. He tells us, indeed, that we must regard Him as morally more perfect than man. Still his conclusion on the whole matter is, that "the perfections of God are justly called a projected image of our own highest conceptions"\* (Soul, p. 41). That

\* I must be allowed to put the reader here on his guard against misapprehension, as if highest conceptions were the same thing as highest qualities. The expression does limit God's perfections to man's

is, as a fact, God is more morally perfect than man, which is not, indeed, saying much; but, adding boundlessness to our idea, our highest conceptions are the moral measure as to kind, though it be a projected, enlarged image of them.

Now, the mental absurdity of this I am not answerable for; nor is it surprising in logicians and philosophers meddling with God's nature, and measuring it by their own. Absurdity is the necessary result.

But it is evident that the addition of boundlessness changes everything morally, so that the application of a limited nature to judge of a boundless one by, is moral nonsense. If boundless love and boundless power go together, the result must be entirely different in kind from the responsibility by which I judge my conduct, who have but very limited power.

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conceptions. All the poison of such a thought is there in full. But most of men's good qualities are inapplicable to God as belonging to a creature: awe, reverence, gratitude, admiration, love to a superior, all that concur in adoration are necessarily excluded from the notion of God. When we partake of the divine nature, through a grace which has set *us in perfect peace as to ourselves*, we can love in a divine way, and love righteousness in a divine way. Otherwise we cannot. We must have a justly loveable object to call out a correspondent affection, or it will be an idolatrous passion towards an unworthy one. To love, in supreme sovereign goodness, is an absolutely divine quality. "*God is love.*" Hence, at once, the apostle says—"He that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God;" he derives this from Him, and He is the supreme object of it. This characterises the divine nature as communicated to us. I can also understand and delight in righteousness in itself and holiness, being made partaker of His holiness, and renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created me in righteousness and true holiness. But while conscience *has anything to say*, I cannot love it simply, though that conscience may see it to be right and good, because I cannot, and ought not to love to be condemned, nor be content to be defiled, supposing goodness to be as great as may be.

The truth is, all this attempt to project God out of our conceptions is confusion, just because we are creatures, and excellence in a creature is a different thing; and hence there is incompetency to see what God ought or must be; though I may, in a measure, know what He may approve in me, which is another thing, but which will never carry us up to the being which approves. Secondly, we are sinful creatures; hence what God can be to us ought not even to be estimated by us. And lastly, no conception of mind can estimate love. "He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love." It never can be said, man is

The title to use goodness sovereignly is a different thing from obligation under which I lie to God (if, indeed, Mr. Newman admits any); for I am bound in my use of that by the obligation. Infinite goodness, coupled with infinite power, is free to act from itself.

But with this point I am not here concerned. I cite the passage from Mr. Newman's other book, to show that his system does establish our mind as the moral measure of what God is, though we may attach the idea of greater degree to it.

Such is the necessary result of the exclusion of inspired revelation.

I have said, however, that it is really false, in fact. Man does not, nor ever can, form his idea of God without his mind being acted on in the way of revelation, though it be not a direct inspired communication from God. He is surrounded by a system altogether beyond his power and control, which witnesses a Being that rises in divine supremacy beyond all his thoughts, which tells of a creating God. He sees around him a confusion—a disorder in the condition of those set as masters over the lower part of this creation, which tells a tale of their moral position before God which no wit of his can solve; too

love; a creature cannot be, he is bound to something else which bars him from supreme love. He may know it in supreme love to him as a sinner; and thus, but thus only, rise to its source. He knows it supreme and infinite, because it reached him; supreme, because there was nothing lovely; infinite, for nothing is so far from supreme love as enmity against it, and that was the condition of his proud heart. So even Mr. Newman confesses, for he admits an antagonist will. And what else is that but open moral opposition against supreme good, and a refusal to bow to it? How is that to be loved, and if loved, is it to be sanctioned; or how reconcile entire condemnation of it, and yet perfect love to him that is in it? This the cross has solved, but not Mr. N. He has known too much of Christianity not to make absurd all his system by that which he has introduced into it, as it was, without this, by all it left out.

The cross, Mr. Newman will tell us, is not just. No; it is love. But it is love exercised in such a condemnation of sin as makes its exercise consistent with righteousness, that is, the necessary and desirable display of God's opposition to evil. Christ was willing to offer Himself up, that God might be thus known and man saved.

bad to be such as it ought to be, with too many signs of God having to say to it, of goodness and mercy, to think it possible it should not be a system of responsibility, with which God has to do, with which He will deal otherwise than he does as yet—which put Tartarus and Elysium into the minds of the heathen, a vague and anxious future into the breasts of all: the very insoluble enigma of which shows some mighty moral relationship in disorder, proving, by its very greatness, that it must refer to God, and hence that it is only His coming into it which can give the key to all, or set it right, in fact.

Mr. Newman admits “prevailing wickedness” (Soul, p. 44) in the creation of a Being of perfect goodness. How strange! He tells us, with cold calculation which one would think had never visited man’s sorrows, that sorrow is needed to perfect man morally. A poor comfort to thousands of despairing souls, writhing in misery and complaining of God because of it! A poor answer to millions worshipping stocks and stones, and, according to Mr. N., a supposed devil,\* through fear! Is this necessary for Mr. N.’s philosophical happiness and moral perfecting of man? If Christianity had produced all this, what would he have said? Had it done so, that would not alter the fact. There it is, for cold-hearted, drawing-room philosophers to pronounce it necessary at their ease.

Mr. Newman tells us, indeed, that had we had it all to arrange our own way, man could not have done it better. Man could not have done it better! Is that all he has to say? Could God have done it no better? is the question, if we are to take it up, as Mr. N. does, as being the original ordered system of God. Is prevailing wickedness, as the necessary result of all a supremely good God could do, the projected image of our highest conceptions? I dare say it is; but does it not then betray the true nature and competency of these conceptions? Mr. N. also declares there is an antagonist will in man. Is this also necessary to his moral perfecting?

But further, while lamenting that the actual state of the world, as evil, is finite and transitory, Mr. Newman thinks

\* “How could I believe in that painful and gratuitous imagination—the devil?” (Phases of Faith, p. 189). Mr. Newman’s assertions in that place will be considered elsewhere.

that in prevailing wickedness, however intense and whatever misery it causes, there is nothing to inspire rational doubt of the Divine goodness (Soul, p. 45). Is this all the soul and its aspirations can give us? The chance that evil will be transitory taking away rational doubts of God's goodness, when what is intensely the contrary prevails, and that goodness is almost universally unknown! Is this Mr. N.'s highest conception, projected as an image with boundless proportions of abstract goodness?

The Christian has no such difficulty; he believes that there is (alas!) an "antagonist will" (Soul, p. 47), a rebellious and sinful nature, with all the miserable consequences of its "intense wickedness" (ib. p. 45); but he believes that God has come into the midst of it to win man's heart away from this perverse and miserable enmity to God by surpassing goodness, and to make Himself known to man as love in the midst of the fruit of his ways; yea, finding in all the misery and sin the occasion of showing it, and at all cost of love to himself. He does not rationally suppose God is good because, in cold philosophy, man's sorrows are necessary to his moral perfecting. He sees in the sorrow (such as none ever had—for who could have such?) of God, come down to carry man's, and redeem and bring him out of it, the proof of that love which makes God known, alike in its greatness and its nearness, in its height above sin and its condescension to those sunk in it; according to that grace which could reach from the throne of God to the vilest of sinners, yea, to be made sin for them, and so bring up the heart, by reaching it there where it was, to the throne from which that grace had descended, and the God of whom it was the perfection. For the highest exercise, or at least display, of that perfection which dwells on the throne of heaven, was that which visited the lost sinner upon earth, linking his soul to itself, and making known God as He is. Yes, there was a revelation, a revelation of what man wanted, and which God alone could give, and which made Him known.\*

\* How much is known of God, on Mr. N.'s principles, is avowed by himself: "It is axiomatic, that man can no more understand the mind of God, than a dog that of his master" (Soul, p. 119).

But I must return to the point I was upon. A certain revelation of God is necessary, and exists, and is the basis of all Mr. Newman's reasonings, that is, "the things that are made" (Rom. i.). From these Mr. N. deduces design, a designer, and so on. No doubt Christianity fully recognises this. But this is only one way of God's revealing Himself; the lowest way. It reveals his eternal power and godhead. No doubt traces of goodness are infallibly seen; but while order reigns in the material world so as to leave no doubt of One of infinite wisdom who designed it—in the moral, such is the "intense wickedness," the confusion, and discontent, that, if a man attempts to unriddle, he falls into a labyrinth from which there is no way out. A mind which feels that God has to say to the world, cannot, with the flippancy of philosophy (turning despot in its despair), say, Evil is only transitory—hang the man that troubles society (as Mr. N. would do)—and from the reasonableness of this deduce, that God may leave the majority of mankind in such a state that even the heart that could reason thus "laments" over it, yet count it good enough after all (Soul, p. 43; the whole passage will be quoted hereafter as characteristic). It cannot say it is a part of the *perfection* of beasts of prey be cruel and destroy; therefore the misery of the destroyed is intelligible, because it may say, "How is it they have such a kind of perfection? What is come in, that, in proportion as created being approaches man, evil begins to manifest itself; that where creation is without a will, all is material order, all lovely where man cannot reach; where will comes in, where man meddles, all is misery and sin? How is it that, if the beast's furious passion passes away with its occasion, man uses his intellect to perpetuate and perfect his vengeance? Is this for moral perfecting?" The Christian does see that there is a revelation of God in His works which are seen, such as leaves man without excuse in not owning His eternal power and Godhead. He sees, plainly enough, that Mr. N.'s highest conceptions did not, and could not, take a step without it. But he sees that he wants something else from God to explain the riddle of the moral confusion which exists, since there is a God; and that as God has to say to it, and evidently it has to say to God (for His creatures surely have something to say

to Him\*), God, and God alone, can give the key and the answer to that in the midst of which his soul groans. He sees that such as Mr. N. depend on a revelation of God as much as any, only, that in order to maintain man's importance, they take the lowest, the one morally inadequate to solve the grand question of the eternal interests of a soul with God, and reject that which would reveal God fully, and make man dependent on Him.

Why, if God has partially revealed Himself in his works, is it impossible He should reveal Himself in some other way? Is that the only possible one? If God can give in mere nature infallible evidence that it is He, why cannot He reveal Himself in some other way with adequate evidence that it is Himself who does so? This, we have seen, Mr. Newman declares Him incapable of doing. But who will take his highest conceptions as an adequate guide to God? Why is he to use a partial revelation in which God has not left Himself without witness, if haply man might feel after Him and find Him, and deny all other? Mr. N., while using Christianity really to elevate his account of what God is, would reduce us to that which God's revelation points out as true, but as of the lowest kind. That is all his books amount to. The Christian revelation recognises this testimony; but it shows from the plainest facts, which Mr. N. very wisely passes over, that such a testimony, though it left man without excuse, had been perfectly useless, through man's perverseness, to elevate man above the corruptions of his own heart; that its existence had even left idolators revelling in abominations not fit to be named, and making gods to themselves to help them in them. Christianity owns the testimony, and shows that man's soul with it sank into the utmost degradation. Mr. N. avails himself of Christianity, from which he avows he has got almost all his manhood-wisdom, to prove the competency of this previous partial revelation to lead man up to God, and render all other unnecessary, and to deny the Christianity which has given him the results and ideas, the other never as

\* Mr. Newman admits "that the God of nature is the God of our consciences, and that all wrong doing is frowned on by Him" (Soul, p. 65).

a fact led man to. Which is the most philosophical, the most logical, the most true?

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But the real object of Mr. Newman's book is, to destroy the Christianity from which *he* gained almost all the wisdom he has. It is not very kind to others. Would he be the only depositary of it in some improved shape, into which it has been refined in his mind?

Our task now must be to examine Mr. Newman's reasonings as to the revelation he rejects.

And here, at the outset, I stumble on what proves the whole course of his argument, from one end of the book to the other, to be utterly illogical and unsound. His enquiry really is as to the truth and certainty, and hence the authority, of the revelation, which the book called pre-eminently "the Bible" professes to give. Is it a credible, authoritative revelation from God? Now, by his own confession, he has conducted this inquiry upon a principle which makes it impossible ever to receive any revelation at all as such. That is, he begins his inquiry and carries it on, on a principle which shows the whole inquiry itself to be absurd and useless. The conclusion was come to before he began, it being contained in the principle on which he set out. He inquires into the authority of a revelation on a principle which in itself denies such authority in any case.

"*We cannot build up a system of Authority on a basis of Free Criticism*" (Phases, p. 213). This, Mr. Newman puts in italics, as the grand result he comes to. Why then inquire if such or such a one be authoritative by free criticism? Effectively, if my mind is superior to the object it is exercised upon, it cannot have, morally, authority over me.

But this only shows Mr. Newman's book to be an illogical absurdity; and that he assumed his conclusion in principle before he set out.

Mr. Newman states, as to what practically amounts to this same principle, "Perhaps I could not have gained this result by any abstract act of thought, from want of freedom to think: and there are advantages, also, in expanding slowly under great pressure, if one *can* expand, and is not crushed by

it" (Phases, p. 200). Now it is possible his mind had to get through a long process, before it could divest itself of the outward influence of revelation. But when he had discovered that his inquiry was absurd (for it is absurd to inquire if a revelation is authoritative on a principle which denies the possibility of any being so), why should he communicate this absurd process of his own mind to others?

Not to show justness of logical reasoning to those who had power to estimate its justness! That is a clear case. Had truth been really his object, he would have stopped and said, "Whatever results as to details I may have arrived at, my inquiry has been carried on on an illogical, absurd principle; and as the principle involves the impossibility of an authoritative revelation, my inquiry must be, Is there no other means of ascertaining whether there is one or not? Is free criticism (I speak of it such as Mr. Newman presents it) itself the just means of trying the question?" But this would not have been Mr. N.'s book, nor answered Mr. N.'s purpose.

But now I ask, What does Mr. Newman mean by "free criticism," such as, in its nature to exclude all possible authority? It means the absolute supremacy and competency of man's mind to judge everything. *God is wholly excluded.* And this is the grand principle of Mr. N.'s book: for to judge God, if He be there, is absurd and impossible. His authority and word must prevail; if He be there, He must be perfect and right; but judges and cannot be judged, or He is not there as God. Mr. N. supposes a man judging whether something be of God or not; but if criticism excludes authority, it certainly excludes God Himself. It supposes the absence of God and His word always. It means—I exclude God, and judge of all for myself without Him; and I will never do anything else. So thought Job, till he met with Him, and found his own littleness. But this is the whole of Mr. N.'s principle. He will in no case allow God to come in; for then, surely, criticism ends. This stated here in principle, is found in every page of the book. Bring God in, in thought—and all is false. But for man to exclude Him is always false. It leaves out the grand spring, test, and key-stone of all moral truth.

If man says, "What, then, is to be done? Must not I judge morally before I receive anything as of God—otherwise I may receive Hindooism or Mohammedanism?" I will tell you what to do, if this be really so. *Confess that you are away from Him.* Is that the normal state of man? You are away from God, ignorant of God, or you would not need to use all this effort to know whether anything be of Him or not. I add, if you are away from Him, then confess your need of Him. But that would suppose a revelation or ruin. And such is the truth, and the efforts of free criticism involve it.

But, taken as a just human instrument, criticism, in the true sense and legitimate use of it, does not destroy authority. I admit that, morally, God's grace is necessary, because a corrupt, an "antagonist will," is to be dealt with; but, in the human sense, criticism does not exclude it. I may ascertain that a letter of my father is really his. When adequate evidence is acquired of that, his letter assumes at once his authority over me. Now the only thing that makes a difference in a Divine communication is, that man is incompetent to judge of God, and has an antagonist will which will not receive Him. But this proves the necessity of a revelation and of Divine grace—that is, of Christianity—unless man is to remain ignorant of God and opposed to Him.

The real secret of Mr. Newman's book is, that he desires to destroy confidence in Christianity. It is a common, very common, misfortune, through the weakness of our corrupt natures, to find invaluable moral truths mixed up with the grossest human corruptions. The divinely-wise man separates "the precious from the vile," and he becomes as God's mouth, being subject to truth from God. The self-confident man rejects all together, because his intellect is capable of seeing the corruption, and incapable of valuing the truth.

Such has been Mr. Newman's case. One knows it to be the case of millions who wear a transparent garb of Popery, or, if bold enough or honest enough, have cast it off, and languish often in true and unsatisfied aspirations. How many have I met with in this state! How many, whom true Christianity made tell their thoughts of Popery—aye, and the sorrows of their own hearts too—though they might not have

the courage, that is, were not spiritual enough, to find the motive to be anything else!

But is there not this will, this desire to destroy Christianity and all revelation? The whole book witnesses it; and often the speech of the author bewrays him.

Thus, in a passage I shall permit myself to translate: "O false-named theology! O may the last part of so long a life remain to me, and energy (or breath), and whatever may be sufficient to tell your deeds!" (Phases, p. 138). Is there no will here?

Again: "If by independent methods, such as an examination of MSS., the spuriousness of the chapter could now be shown, this would verify the faculty of criticism which has already objected to its contents: thus it would justly *encourage us* to apply similar criticism to other passages" (ib. p. 108). Encourage us! What does that mean?

These show the animus of the book.

Let my reader allow me here to make a few remarks on the moral sentiments connected with a rejection of Scripture. No doubt prepossessions of any kind warp the judgment; but indifference to what ought to have a place in the affections, if true—indifference, that is, to its truth, shows a heart, incapable by moral defect (while in that state) of judging justly in a moral question.

I have long, I suppose, looked at the portrait of my mother, who watched over my tender years with that care which a mother only knows how to bestow. I can just form some imperfect thought of her looks, for I was early bereft of her; but her eye fixed upon me the tender love which had me for its heart's object—which could win when I could know little else—which had my confidence before I knew what confidence was—by which I learned to love, because I felt I was loved, was the object of that love—which had its joy in serving me—which I took for granted must be, for I had never known aught else. All this which I had learnt, and which was treasured in my heart and formed part of my nature, was linked with the features which hung before my gaze. That was my mother's picture. It recalled her, no longer sensibly present, to my heart. A retailer of pictures comes in, and tells me

that, from the painter's name and style, it could not be my mother's. The date proved it. It could, at best, be an unlike drawing from memory. Is the quiet indifference of criticism here the proof of a right state of mind? I am astounded. I may be forced to acknowledge my mistake, to give up the much-loved memorial that brought her back to my thoughts; but I shall groan in heart—turn away—wish it were not so. Indifference would prove, not a good critic, but a worthless heart. Is Christ's picture in the word less precious to me? He was taken early from man's sight, to whom He had shown this tender love. I have found—thought I found—his traits in the word. I know I have loved Him, and felt his love. That word recalls his love, gives me the expression of it. It is, has been, his look of love to me. Shall I feel "encouraged" to pursue criticisms which are to prove it all a fraud? He who has never tasted his love may; not I. Were I forced, I would cast it by with sorrow, lingeringly, if I must: I have lost what brought known love to my mind, what re-awakened thoughts and an image I had difficulty to recall. Be it so; his love may be true; but I sit down in sorrow. To pursue the criticism which "picks holes" in it I cannot. I lay it aside, I forget it, I do not trust it; but I shall not forget my sorrow. Did I take it up, it would be associated with my affections to what I know is true. I leave it, therefore, and admit it is better not to associate mistake with affection. But the loved Object I know of undoubtedly in my soul. *That* Mr. Newman does not, never did, if I am to take his own account. The picture is gone, by what he supposes is sound criticism of these connoisseurs of pictures, and *all is gone with it*; for he had but the picture, and nothing else: and why should he not judge a picture, which is nothing else? worse than nothing, therefore, if a false one. For him Jesus is gone, with the written revelation of Him. He will believe enough of the history, indeed, to set Him down as an impostor, but has seen no trait of beauty in Himself which makes him regret to find Him such.

He has only degraded his own mind by the process, to the point of considering an impostor *among* the most excellent of the earth.

Mr. Newman must forgive me if I do not think he has gained by the process which has produced this result. I do not believe that he, when a professed Christian (though we know that where there is mere profession, men may be very wicked—away from God—and that we may all fall, though sincere), or any one who professed Christianity, would have associated with inquiries about God and His truth, the low-minded insinuations which are found in Mr. N.'s book, and which certainly I shall not copy. I am but a poor sinner, I well know. Real Christians are inconsistent beings. The reality may be wanting when the doctrine is professed; but no one, even merely professing it, would have connected God's name and truth with filth. It is for an infidel to do that. That I may not seem unjust to Mr. N., I shall mention the pages where it is found, and no more (Soul, pp. 129, 150).

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Before examining the details of Mr. Newman's book, I would make a general remark.

The kind of opposition men make to Christianity proves its truth in the main, proves the consciousness of a real claim of God in it on the soul.

No doubt men have attacked Paganism as false. They have resisted Mohammedanism, though its sword was its principal argument, so that there was less of this.

But the constant and laborious exercise of free criticism, the close and sifting examination the Bible has gone through for ages, the anxious research after errors or contradictions within, proves anxiety to show that it is not what it pretends to be. Why all this anxiety? Those not immediately under the influence of Mohammedanism, are long satisfied that it is false, and leave it there; but these minute researches after a flaw in the Scriptures continue—are repeated—renewed. Men take it up on every side. Astronomy and geology are called in aid. Geography is ransacked; history, antiquity, style, manuscripts of all kinds, foolish writings of the fathers, absurd writings of heretics, apocryphal imitations of its contents; nothing left unturned to find something to discredit it; wise writings of philosophers to prove they could do as well, or were the source of the good, or even of the alleged absurdities of

doctrine; every other influence sought out which could have moralised humanity, that it may not be supposed to be this. Why all this toil? Why, if it be a doctrine like Plato's, should it not have produced its effect, and our philosophers be as cool about it as about other things? It has—their conscience knows it has—God's claim and God's truth in it; and they will not allow that the true God, that Christ is the source of it; for then they must bend, and admit what man is.

And this shows itself in the most curious way. Though they pretend to think nothing of Christ, or that he was an impostor, they will not allow that the authorised books of his religion give a true account of the doctrines of the religion. If I read the Koran, I am satisfied to take it as the account of Mohammedanism, absurd as it may be; and I say Mohammedanism is absurd. So of the Vedas and Purañas.

But when the Christian books are in question, they are no doubt charged with error, contradiction, etc.; but the free critics will not even allow them to teach the real Christianity after all. They are not a true, not an authentic account of Christianity. Why (if it be a mere fable, an imposture) so difficult about the exactitude of the account of it? Surely the main propagators can give a sufficient account of the imposture and its doctrines, for anything that concerns us. But no. There is the consciousness that God is in Christianity. The conscience, in spite of the will, knows it has to do with God here; and it wants a true revelation, a real and authentic account of what that God is. It is right. But though curiosity and a favourite subject may absorb many for a time, or an individual all his life, men are not so continuously, so perseveringly anxious to get at the *truth* of a fable. They do not reject the sacred books of any other religion, as not being a true account of that religion. They take them as they are, because they know they are a fable. Or even if it be known to be the work of men's minds, it is the same. A stranger to Lutheranism takes the symbolical books of Lutheranism as being Lutheranism, let him agree to or dissent from them. Why not the Christian books as stating Christianity? An infidel cannot let God and his truth alone, because it is his truth. He is a zealot against it; for his will is engaged. He

is a bitter zealot, because his conscience is uneasy. He will laugh at a Mohammedan carpenter, who thinks he only has the true religion; he will curse a consistent Christian who thinks he has, and denounce and abhor such if they do not let him amongst them when he denies their Lord, and only wish for energy and all needed to proclaim their deeds. Why this difference?

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In running through the contents of Mr. Newman's book, I shall first notice that the grand object, as the grand fallacy of it all is, the getting rid of God. And this whatever the subject may be. Only introduce God, and argument after argument crumbles and disappears. If there be only man, the difficulty may be great. Let God be acknowledged, and all is necessary and plain. If this be so, the real meaning of the book, what its reasonings are worth, will not require much other argument. The consideration of the passages I shall refer to will show, I think, that all real knowledge of God, all sense of his value, was wholly absent from Mr. N.'s mind.

Here I would remark, that when we are reasoning on the force or meaning of a Christian doctrine, we are entitled to receive it, hypothetically, as true. This does not prove it to be so; but if I can shew it to be right and consistent with other truths, assuming it to be true, this removes the difficulty alleged against it on the score of what it means.

In Phases, p. 8, he says, "I certainly saw that to establish the abstract moral *right* and *justice* of vicarious punishment was not easy."

Now, I will first say, no one dreams of the abstract moral right or justice of vicarious punishment. He who undertakes it does so in love, not in justice. If I pay another man's debts, it is love. Kindness makes me do it. When it is done, it is then just in the creditor not to exact the discharge of them from the debtor, and the latter owes it to my love. The doctrine of Christianity is, that Christ gave himself, offered himself, was willing to suffer, to make good his Father's righteousness and glory, and to redeem guilty men. There is no idea of compensation, properly speaking, in it. Sin dishonoured God in the sight of the whole universe.

his holiness, his truth, his justice, his majesty, all were compromised; and the simple exercise of love to the guilty would have been acquiescence in the evil, frightful disorder in the universe. Christ willingly gives Himself, that God may be perfectly glorified. On the cross all that God is is perfectly and infinitely glorified, and so is Christ, in the highest way. "Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in Him." God's majesty is vindicated. What could have so done it? His just judgment against sin is shown—his perfect love to the guilty, is displayed in a higher manner than could be otherwise conceived—his truth, which had pronounced death against sin, established in the highest way.

In the garden Satan had persuaded man that God was not good, had kept back this wisdom-bearing fruit lest man should be like Himself; he had persuaded man that He was not truth, that man would not die, God would not execute the judgment.

Had God executed it simply against man, there was no love; had He not, there was no truth nor righteousness. But Christ gives Himself up an offering for sin. God does execute judgment in a way amazingly conspicuous in its moral character, so that angels desire to look into it. His truth is displayed, his despised majesty vindicated, his perfect love exercised, and that in a way far surpassing all possible thought of ours. If we say, But He gave up another to the suffering; no doubt it is love to me, but how love and justice to him given? I answer, He gave Himself in the same love, and it is his highest glory, that in which a motive-bond of love has its source even between Him and the Father. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life that I might take it again." Here, too, death, and the power of death, and he who had it, were overcome, to the divine glory and our perfect comfort; so that death has wholly lost its sting. Now, leave God out of this, and what does it all become? To make out the fact of any "compensation" was "harder still" (Phases, p. 8).

Mr. Newman's friend argued, that "carnal reason could not discern that human or Divine blood, any more than that of beasts, had efficacy to make the sinner as it were sinless" (id. ib.).

Human or Divine blood no more efficacy than a beast's! But shedding blood is giving his life. And for us death, morally, is man's plague, Satan's power, and God's wrath.

So, according to Christianity, Christ underwent it. Is that nothing more than a beast's dying? If Christ was "God manifest in the flesh," was the love in it nothing? Was the bearing wrath nothing? For such is the Christian doctrine as to it; and it is that we are now considering. Is it nothing that the Son of God does and bears all this even to death? No more than a beast's being killed? The author could not, then, quite receive it; because, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the sacred writer "seems to expect his readers to see an inherent impropriety in the sacrifices of the law, and an inherent moral fitness in the sacrifice of Christ" (Phases, p. 8). It is not fitness but value that is in question. And is there no more value in the death of Christ, "God manifest in the flesh," who attached the value of Divine goodness and a divinely perfect will (which yet was perfectly obedient), of a Divine Person, to every act He did as man—than in the death of bulls and goats? instructive, no doubt, as figures, and a witness to the universal sense of need which the conscience of man feels of an expiation.

Am I not right in saying that God is left out? He who knew divinely infinite love, knew infinitely Divine wrath; and He who was the "Holy One" felt, in the proportion of that holiness which is beyond *all* measure, what it was to be made sin before the God of holiness. I know carnal reason (that is, philosophy) has no capacity to understand this: but that is not the fault of Christianity, but of the "antagonist will" which needs it while it rejects it.

Again, on another important point, speaking of the Athanasian Creed and the Trinity, the author says: "It came distinctly home to me, that, whatever the depth of the mystery, if we lay down anything about it at all, we ought to understand our own words" (Phases, p. 13). Now this seems very plausible; but bring in God, or anything connected with Him, and if it be meant we ought to be able to define them, it is necessarily and wholly false, because God is in another order of being from that to which words belong. They express man's

thoughts in the way of definition—can do nothing else; but man's thoughts are finite, and God is infinite; and therefore it is impossible, in the nature of things, that human language can be an adequate (or, properly speaking, a just) expression of what God is. Yet almost all Mr. Newman's growing infidelity sprung from this evident fallacy: any real faith in God or knowledge of Him, became impossible the moment he laid down this absurd and really illogical rule. Illogical, if we admit there is a God. Take Mr. N. himself as witness. He says, in another work, "Concerning the Divine nature, we know that our metaphorical language *must* be inaccurate; but it is the best we have got: to refuse to speak of God as loving and planning, as grieving and sympathising, without the protest of a *quasi*, will not tend to clearer intellectual views [for what can be darker?], but will muddy the springs of affection. Metaphorical language on this whole subject is that which the soul dictates; and therefore must surely express our nearest approximation to truth, if the soul be the eye by which alone we see God. Jealousy to resist metaphor, does not testify to depth of insight" (Soul, p. 39).

Now, it is true he speaks here of metaphor alone; but why is it used? Because of the incompetency of the human mind to use, as to God, the language of exact definition. It flows from the fact that man is man, and not God, and his language the expression of his nature, be it in its affections or its intellect. Hence it must speak as man speaks, *i. e.*, use the expressions suited to the measure of man's nature, because he can do nothing else. If these are used as definitions of God's nature, they are necessarily inaccurate; if as means of communicating particular thoughts about Him, they are true, though inadequate. But if it be insisted that a man should know what he meant, that is, define his ideas, he cannot. Our language as to God, not merely our metaphorical language, must be inaccurate. It is, as Mr. Newman professes it to be, our nearest approximation to the truth. It will be said here, "I do not ask you to define God, but the words you use about Him." But the definition of the words, by Mr. N.'s admission, makes them inaccurate, for they are to express something about God. But in exactitude of meaning they

*must* be inaccurate. To this exactitude Mr. N. seeks to reduce them. Nor let the reader be alarmed at this. It is the case with all the ideas he is most certain of, or most delights in. Let him try to define a straight line, a right angle, beauty, love, one's country, home. Yet these words convey either most accurate or exceedingly powerful ideas.\*

Again, as to Christian evidences, whether miraculous facts or moral character were the basis, Mr. Newman finds that neither system went to the bottom of human thought, or showed what were the *fixed points* of man's knowledge (Phases, p. 41).

Now this ground takes man's mind as the measure of evidence, to the exclusion of God. Can God, if He comes in (and the object of a revelation is to reveal Him)—can God give no evidence of Himself demonstrative of His presence and testimony, which is entirely beyond any previously fixed points of man's knowledge? If there be a revelation of God it must do so. It may make man morally responsible by that which it brings.

Besides, Mr. Newman's reasonings here only show narrowness of apprehension; because two proofs of a distinct order

\* I was going to give the old attempt to define a straight line, namely, "the shortest between two given points," which, evidently, is no definition at all. It is a mere quality of a straight line. But I judge something of an accurate definition may be given, as being that described by "a point moving always invariably towards, or in the direction of, the same point." A curve is a line described by a point which always leaves the direction it last followed. But this attempt does not affect the proof, that a true and even powerful impression may be produced by an idea not defined. Neither truth nor power is in definition, important as that may be in its place. Moral power and truth are, in the bringing home to the soul the real relationship in which we stand to anything, and the obligation resulting from it, in the way of revelation of the character and conduct of that to which we are related, and hence the motives which flow from it. How this is brought home is another question. As a Christian, I believe it will only be by a new nature and divine grace. But this is not my subject here. Christianity reveals enough of God to make Him known to us in this way, and elevate us to Him by it. It does not pretend to define Him as He is. Creeds may be useful as contradicting false notions, but are, to say the least, most imperfect and unsatisfactory as communications of truth. I judge the matter of the Athanasian to be, perhaps, the least objectionable.

may corroborate each other, and make the truth of what they attest certain, when one only would leave it uncertain, though it might not prove it false. Thus a miracle to sustain the doctrine that there were many unholy gods whose business was to please men's lusts, might test and try the heart and spirit, but could never prove the message to have the authority of one holy God—nay, a miracle by itself might be an inadequate proof of the authority of a message which was not in itself grossly inconsistent with such a being. On the other hand, though moral truths are, perhaps, even a surer, if not so striking a kind of evidence, yet they may not (though they may go very far towards it) prove the mission of any one to be what he asserts it to be. But when plain and evident miracles, such as the restoring sight to one born blind by a word, making a man with crippled feet of forty years' standing able to leap and jump before all immediately, the man being well known by all previously; or such as the raising the dead, are accompanied by a doctrine which has morally (as nothing else ever before it had) the stamp of goodness and holiness upon it, and of a divine knowledge of human nature, not of its lusts and character so as to use them, but of hearts so as to judge them; when these things go together, they may, by being united, afford a proof which unbelief of will may surely resist, as it will everything, but which will make it guilty and prove it such, if the testimony be rejected.

Mr. Newman loses, too, in a measure, sight of the fact that these evidences, as given, were before the eyes of men. They are not before our eyes; but we have undoubted historical proof of the effect produced by them then—of the character of the witness—the wide spread of Christianity which resulted (though no human force was used for its propagation for three hundred years); and we have the moral doctrine which produced this effect still subsisting, not only in the documents which profess to contain this revelation, but which are cited by friends and foes during all this period, as containing the authentic instructions of the religion the one professed and the other attacked. This counter-check of evidences of a different and independent character, in the way of proof, will be found to pervade Scripture and to be characteristic of it, and a

principal safeguard of the minds of the simple and true against subtle or fanatical pretensions.

If it be conversion, Mr. Newman had never any thought of God's acting.

"How," he asks, "could such moral evidence become appreciable to heathens and Mohammedans?" (*Phases*, p. 43, and so on to p. 45).

Again, in speaking of the very being of God, he proves, in referring to the Athanasian Creed, that the compiler "did not understand his words;" because, had he spoken of three *men*, he must have meant three persons (*ib.* p. 48).

But what is this but excluding all idea of God even from Godhead, and reducing our thoughts of the Divine nature to the limits of our own circumscribed one? Can there be any more entire exclusion of God from a person's thoughts? Besides, there is a gross fallacy even in the terms of the reasoning. Language is formed on thought. The word "God" being one and distinct in nature from all else, means not only a *being*, but a *nature*. "*A God*," save metaphorically, or in heathen mythology (*ein Gott und die götter*), revolts the moral ear. When I say, "the Word was God," I use "God" for a nature which none else can have but the true God; but I use it as speaking of His nature. When I say, "God created," I speak of a Being who did so. "*A God*," speaking of the truth of Divine existence, is nonsense. But if I say, "the Father is God," I say that He is ineffably possessed of everything that belongs to that nature which partakes it with none else: for none is God but God. Now I could not say, God is the Son; because then I should speak of Him as that one only Being, and exclude the Father and the Holy Ghost from the term "God" in my phrase. This is perfectly plain in English; the Greek distinguishes these two uses by the article—*Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. *Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς. Ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν*.

Now Mr. Newman overlooks entirely this double use of the term in English, and confounds all ideas on the subject by the use of the senseless term "*a God*."

Having the unity of the Godhead constantly asserted in Scripture, the manner of the Divine existence is a subject of

mere revelation. There I find that the Holy Ghost wills and distributes: the Father sends, the Son is sent; and yet He and His Father are one. I find that the "Word is God," that the Son is "the true God," that "all things were created by Him." If it is said of the Holy Ghost, "All these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit," I read in the same passage, "It is the same God that worketh all in all." Now, I have no better word than "person" for one who is sent, who wills, who distributes, who sends, and so on. It cannot give me that circumscribed idea of "person" which the word applied to man does; for then one existence includes another; but I have no reason whatever to impose the limits of my manner of being on God's, but rather the contrary. Now all Mr. Newman's reasoning is merely the reducing the Godhead to the strictest limits of creature-nature, which is a mere absurdity, and a miserable exclusion of all above us, and a levelling of God to man; the necessary degradation of man too, for he is elevated in knowing God.

I remember I always regarded with indignant contempt Mr. Hume's argument against miracles—that it was contrary to experience that a miracle was true, but not contrary to experience that testimony was false. It was really no argument at all, because the use of the word "experience" in itself excluded the idea of miracle, and the question was if the testimony *was* true, not whether the testimony *could* be false, otherwise I should believe nothing I had not experienced. But making man's experience the limit of knowledge and of the elevation of man's thoughts, was a mixture of insolent self-sufficiency and degradation at the same time, which did not deserve reasoning about. It was degrading nonsense, making itself the limit of all possible power and knowledge. It was sufficient to state it to despise it, and all that flowed from it.

I add, that the Christian has a knowledge, by the Holy Ghost dwelling in him (not of course of the manner of union in the Godhead in any adequate way, but), of such a union as gives him a competency to understand that God can indwell in a way wholly above any creature-communication; and hence he knows what he knows is beyond his knowledge.

“ In that day, “ that is, when ye have received the Comforter, “ ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you.” “ He who searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to God.” Is this the saint’s heart or the Holy Ghost? Both. It is my groan, the real groan of my heart; but it is the Holy Ghost dwelling in me gives me the feeling, and the groan too, according to God. And it is His intercession. This is, indeed, God’s sympathy with man. I am well aware that philosophers may mock at this. Of course, as such, Christianity supposes them not to have it, to be ignorant of it. “ Whom the world,” says the Lord, “ cannot receive, for it seeth Him not, neither knoweth Him; but ye know Him, for He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you.” Hence it is no proof for them *in the way of argument*. But it is for those who possess it in a way beyond all argument; and a way of understanding, too, that which argument will never teach. I cannot make a prayer to God without the whole Trinity. “ Through Christ we have access by one Spirit to the Father.” It is the hourly exercise of the Christian’s faith, and better known there than in the Athanasian Creed, and those who never knew what Trinity or Person meant. For definitions are poor things. What can be defined is not *God*, for God is *infinite*.

Mr. Newman takes this same ground as to the Spirit’s personality (Phases, p.52). I do not go over it again. I only remark, that he always had a repugnance to it; that is, he had never known it. Now, if I see willing, distributing, coming, teaching, guiding, being sent, I have no better word than “ Person ” to use. I have no attachment to the term, but the true Christian believes this of the Holy Ghost, and he knows Him as a divine person dwelling in himself. God’s love is shed abroad in his heart by the Spirit given to him. Now, supposing that the “ Spirit of God ” meant in the New Testament “ *God in the heart*,” as Mr. N. (id. ib.) says, is not God a real being, that is, a Person, in a real though inadequate and imperfect use of the term? I believe the New Testament means often by this expression “ God in the heart ”; and if the Holy Ghost be such, He is God; and, according to the New

Testament, He is what is best expressed by the word "Person," for He is sent by the Father, and from the Father, *another* Comforter on the Son's going away. I repeat, I have no better language than "Person" when I have another who wills and acts. And what is Mr. Newman's question here? "Who by logic or metaphysics will carry us beyond this?" (p. 52). Could any one more nakedly confess how God was shut out of his mind even when the subject was God's presence in the heart — a doctrine he admits to be taught in the New Testament; and then turns to logic and metaphysics, to carry us farther in the knowledge of it.

So, in his conversation with an infidel, he has no thought of the possibility of God's acting (Phases, p. 54).

Even on the question of his reception among Christians, of which we will speak historically in a moment, he never suspects that it can be of any importance that he should hold the truth about God and His salvation. He was to be received upon some personal qualities, or, at any rate, without any truth as *to God* being material. He calls this "dogma." What he was, was sufficient; what God was, immaterial (ib. p. 59). And again (ib. p. 60), he never supposed union was on the ground of intellectual propositions. Is God an intellectual proposition only to him, then? So as to our thoughts and comments on Scripture, he "most rigidly demanded a clear, single, self-consistent\* sense" (ib. p. 65); that is, not a living, perhaps imperfect, communication of Divine truth—but something fully reduced to the level of man's mind, and not in anything passing its limits. It must be a human truth. Now it is just this human singleness which distinguishes human from Divine truth. Have I human thought? I have it; my mind measures it as it is: I have it all within my own limits. Afterwards there is nothing new. When I get the word, the communication of Divine truth, I get what is linked with God as flowing from Him: it is part of infinite Divine knowledge

\* This is far from having been really the case; for he used the word "Jehovah" then, and does that of "God" in the book I am answering — important terms, I apprehend — in quite different senses as applied to Christ or the Father.

into which I am introduced; and though I know only in part, I am introduced into that which is infinite in itself, infinite in its relations and bearings. If I am a man, I am a man. Everybody knows what that means. But if God becomes a man, I know it. Yet is it now limitable by my notion of a man—my just, single, self-consistent notion? So to limit it would at once destroy it altogether; would falsify, by its pretension, the whole truth with which I am come in contact. How endless are the consequences, in love, power, dominion, grace, obedience, communion, righteousness! The very character of everything is altered. Such is Christianity. It is the bringing in of this in the midst of the world of misery in which man's heart is plunged, and from which he sees no exit. And your philosopher would reduce me again to his one single, self-consistent sense of the word "man."

Christianity may be true, or it may be false; but such a way of taking it up is not power, but imbecility. It professes to bring God in as a resource to the misery of man—a misery which is there whether it be true or no, and much greater where it is not received. And the philosopher tells me to take God out of it, and then it will have a single, self-consistent sense—then it will be intelligible. Will it? How will leaving God out of it make His coming in intelligible? Who by logic or metaphysics will carry us beyond this?

The reader may see, too, how Mr. Newman (*ib.* p. 71) sets cultivated understanding as a purifier of religion, *i. e.*, above it.\* Now what does this mean, if God be not excluded from religion? Is the human understanding to purify the truth of God? Would one who thought of the living God in religion dare to speak so? I am aware that Mr. N. may say that your religion is not necessarily God's. But he does not say "my religion," but "religion"; adding, that religion and fanaticism are the same in embryo. Do they not come from man, then—entirely from man? Are they not a passion, a phrenological bump, a propensity which understanding is to correct the

\* His words are—"Religion and fanaticism are, in the embryo, but one and the same; to purify and elevate them, we want a cultivation of the understanding."

uncertain tendency of? Is it possible more entirely to exclude God even from religion? for certainly, if any religion comes from God, man cannot purify it.

Hence Mr. Newman naturally concludes that "morality is the end, spirituality the means, religion is the handmaid to morals" (Phases, p. 72). That is, man and his conduct is the end, anything of God (for where am I to find Him if not in religion?)—a mere means. God comes in for his share, because the love of morality proves his excellence, who "is the embodiment of it to his heart and soul." But this exclusion of God is thus summed up—"It was pleasant to me to look on an ordinary face [*i. e.*, not evangelical], and see it light up into a smile, and think with myself:—*there* is one heart that will judge of me by what *I am*, and not by a Procrustean dogma" (ib. p. 73). Now, I conceive that making man what man is as morally amiable, to the total exclusion of any importance in what God he owned, what he thought of God, whether he denied one faith or every faith, whether he had any, could not be more clearly stated. That is, God is totally excluded. It is indifferent what a man thinks about Him, if he is amiable towards me.

Again (ib. p. 75), even when he speaks of worship. He "worshipped [he says] in God three great attributes, all independent—Power, Goodness, Wisdom." That is, he worshipped some ideas. He did not worship God Himself as his God, but certain qualities which he approved of: these he must discern, and then he would condescend to approve of God, and admire qualities; for as to worshipping qualities it is nonsense. We worship somebody.

That is, really, though he attached a name to certain qualities, though this name embodied these ideas of his own mind, God Himself was not owned at all.

Again, as to sin; he "saw that it was an immorality to teach that sin was measured by anything else than the heart and will of the agent" (ib. p. 78). Elsewhere he boasts of discovering that morality was eternal, of eternal ethics. A strange way of having them so, for they vary with every heart and every will. But how is God excluded here? Man's heart and will are the only measure of his wrong! Morality is eternal, as already

explained; but its measure depends on the relationship which creates the obligation, and hence is measured by the claim of the Being with whom we are in relationship. That, in grace, ignorance may be a real occasion of mercy is true, but the sin is not measured by it, if I would elevate my soul to any real morality, to what it is in itself; or morality changes with caprice. I should not treat a Hindoo widow as a professing Christian, if she burns herself; but her ignorance does not make the measure of sin, though I may have compassion on her because of it: otherwise the grossest and most cruel superstitions become the measure of sin. But God is excluded, and hence man's heart and will become Mr. Newman's measure of sin, too.

And see the practical consequence. A man, degraded in seeking the satisfaction of his own lusts, is for Mr. Newman "a good-humoured voluptuary" (Phases, p. 81). How was he "to think that he deserved to be raised from the dead, in order to be tormented in fire for a hundred years?" Give an account of himself to God! This is all nothing to Mr. N. His morality is far better than Christian truth. The voluptuary may go on in his good humour without troubling himself. Sin is only measured by a man's will and heart. God need not be in all his thoughts. And this is correcting and improving on Christianity! See this character treated in his contempt of and indifference to the misery of his fellow-man, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. But I proceed—

As to relationship of the Divine Persons, there is the same reducing everything to man's level in speaking of "begotten." It must signify a beginning of existence, since it does with man. Scripture warrants another use of it. "I will *make him my first-born,*" is said of Solomon; and, "Israel is my son, my first-born." "Only-begotten Son" is a term of relationship, not a low, carnal, human idea of begetting; the use of which, in respect to God, only proves the degradation of thought of him who so uses it, when referred to Godhead. And what is Mr. Newman's way of reasoning here? A doctrine which could not be proclaimed in English cannot be true! That is profound philosophy! Yet he admits what we

say of God as loving, repenting, etc., must be inaccurate, cannot be a single, self-consistent idea. The want of it here raised unspeakable loathing. A man who could not define a circle which everybody can understand and see, would define the manner of Divine existence by terms which should have the precise, definite sense which they have when applied to man.

It may be seen how entirely he has lost the idea of God, when he affirms that it became clear to him "that polytheism, *as such*, is not a moral and spiritual error, but, at most, only an intellectual error; and that its practical evil consists in worshipping beings whom we represent to our imaginations as morally imperfect" (Phases, p. 89). Otherwise, also, if a man "made the angel Gabriel a fourth person in the Godhead, to worship him would be no degradation to the soul, even if absolute omnipotence were not attributed—nay, nor a past eternal existence" (ib. p. 89).

Could one more clearly state, as to oneself, the loss of all real knowledge of one true God? To suppose the possibility of these "gods many," shows that the idea of one true One has lost its place in the soul—that one has not the knowledge of God. One may admire qualities as one may in man, or any one else; but a God who begins, must begin somehow, and owe his existence to the creative will of another, and hence be under obligation to a superior. True Godhead would not be there. Could any one who knew God, speak of there being many not eternal, not omnipotent, as indeed they could not if there be many? Does not the mind of one who knows God feel at once there must be the one true One behind all these?

Am I not right in saying God is unknown to Mr. Newman; is excluded by his reasonings?

Hence it was a question, solved only by other considerations, whether the doctrine of Christ's having a superior nature was not an indifferent thing. If His nature was a good one, and He only a man, why not worship Him? Can God be more completely excluded? (ib. p. 90).

Again, take the Fall. "Adam fell by the first temptation; what greater proof of a fallen nature have I ever given? I

was surprised to discern that there was, *à priori*, impossibility of fixing on myself the imputation of *degeneracy*, without fixing the same on Adam?" (Phases, p. 96). Now this assumes the truth of the Mosaic account of the fall for the sake of the argument. Now, is the enjoying God's benefits in innocence the same thing as the actual "antagonistic will" which Mr. Newman has? Is the existing alienation from, and enmity against God of a carnal mind nothing? Take the history. Adam abandoned God, was turned out of His presence. Mr. Newman begins there. That is all nothing to him till he commits a sin, because God is nothing. Adam falls; he falls—all is one, says Mr. N., accepting the history.

Adam was with God, Mr. Newman was not. That this makes any difference does not enter into his mind. Liability to fall in a creature, he understands, it regards man's condition; being in the presence of or absent from God does not make even a part of his inquiry, or subject-matter of his reasoning. Why?

Again (for he is speaking of a period when he professed evangelicalism), as to the person of Jesus, he says, "So if any one dwelt on the special proofs of tenderness and love exhibited in certain words or actions of Jesus, it was apt to call out in me a sense that, from day to day, equal kindness might often be met. The imbecility of preachers who dwell on such words as 'Weep not,' as if *nobody else* uttered such, had always annoyed me" (ib. p. 102). Could anything more mark the total absence of any sense that God was there? Other men were fully as kind as Jesus!

Again: "If one system of religion may claim that we blind our hearts and eyes in its favour, so may another; and there is precisely the same reason for becoming a Hindoo in religion as a Christian" (ib. p. 114), Now how totally does this deny the fact, that God can bring in that which can enlighten man. Christianity and Hindooism lie there, and "the moral and intellectual powers of man must be acknowledged as having a right and duty to criticise the contents of Scripture" (ib. p. 115).

Is it impossible, then, for God so to reveal Himself as to command the responsibility of man? Is He incapable of enlightening the mind by His truth? Must He remain the subject

matter of man's judgment, according to a human standard previously possessed, as much as Hindooism? Can anything more entirely deny God, and shut Him out from revelation itself? Again this is thus expressed:—"If we are to blind our eyes in order to accept an article of King Edward VI., or an argument of St. Paul's, why not," etc. (*Phases*, p. 119). Now, if God reveal anything, as Christians believe God did by Paul, this argument applies just as much; that is, God is absolutely excluded from all authoritative revelation whatever. He must not interfere.

Again, as to proofs given: "Why should I look with more respect on the napkins taken from Paul's body (*Acts* xix. 12), than on pocket-handkerchiefs dipt in the blood of martyrs" ? (*ib.* p. 130.) Is it forbidden to God for man's sake, and to overcome his incredulity, to "confirm the word by signs following" ? God acts by one, He does not by the other. One was a divine act, the other a human. It is not a comparison of a napkin and a handkerchief—Paul's body and a martyr's blood—but of God's acting or not; but this does not even enter into Mr. Newman's mind.

See, too, his remarks on miracles and "useless miracles," such as Christ walking on the sea. Useless? to whom? to man? Was it useless to learn Christ's power over creation, and the way faith could use it, and unbelief lose it? "What was to be said of a cure wrought by touching the hem of Jesus's garment, which drew physical virtue from Him without His will?" (p. 131.) Was it nothing to show that humble trembling, unfeigned faith, could find resource in Jesus when all else failed, and find health and blessing there, approach ever so timidly? It is all nothing to Mr. Newman. But what does that prove? That such proofs of divine presence and goodness, such cheering encouragement to those whose trembling but unfeigned confidence might otherwise stay far off, has no charms for him. Intellectual power to judge God, if He ventures to show Himself—that is all well: Divine goodness; health and cure for the poor and otherwise failing heart, so as to knit it to God; the assurance that it can surely get the blessing, there is no "moral dignity" in. What a judge of it!

Again (*ib.* p. 143), he treats the distrust of one giving up all

revelation of God in Scripture, as proving the existence of an artificial test of spirituality. Are, then, the largest and most intimate communications from God nothing? Is the fact of His so communicating with us, treating us, as Jesus expresses it, as "friends," by telling us all that can be divinely communicated to man, nothing? Is its existence, and the reception of it, a mere artificial test of spirituality—a small hanging *branch* gone, and all as well as ever? Is this Mr. Newman's value for communications from God?

We are not now discussing whether these are genuine, but whether their rejection is of any consequence. For Mr. Newman it was of none, a mere artificial test of spirituality. That is his estimate of communications from God. What is his value for Him who makes them? Did I treat my friends so, *i.e.*, if I were indifferent to having them or not, what would it prove as to them?

Mr. Newman, indeed, states this indifference as to God, in connection with His word, with singular clearness:—"Meanwhile, I sometimes thought Christianity to be to me like the great river Ganges to a Hindoo. Of its value he has daily experience: he has piously believed that its sources are in heaven, but of late the report has come to him, that it only flows from very high mountains of this earth. What is he to believe? He knows not exactly, *he cares not much*: in any case, the river is the gift of God to him: *its positive benefits cannot be affected by a theory concerning its source*" (ib. p. 153).

The title of Mr. Newman's fifth period is remarkable, "Faith at second-hand found to be vain." This sounds well. Faith must surely be in God Himself. "Abraham believed *God*." But is every one to have God so speaking to himself that he is infallibly directed by it? Each communication being absolutely limited to the one who receives it and excluded from going farther, all communication of truth being impossible. If it passed the one who had the vision, it is second-hand faith in the sense of Mr. N. And the favoured and exceptional visionary or auditor of God Himself cannot even be known, for then others would receive it as a revelation of God; but that would be believing at second-hand. Any one, therefore, receiving moral truth, or any truth which concerns men, would

be an impossibility; for if confined to himself, it would not be such. That is, again, all possibility of any communication from God is denied.

He looks for a broader foundation for his creed than any sacred letter. Creed he had none yet; that is, he believed nothing. But the result is, that it is impossible to believe anything. You may reason out a god of your own mind, as a spider the cobweb out of its bowels; but believe you cannot: for who is to tell you anything to be believed? You may be taken in the cobweb of Mr. Newman's spinning, but God must hold His peace. Can God be more wholly excluded?

"Without caring on what grounds they believed, though that is obviously the main point" (*Phases*, p. 146).

"An ambitious and unscrupulous *Church*, that desires, by fair means or foul, to make men's minds bow down to her, may say, 'Only believe, and all is right. The end being gained—obedience to us—we do not care about your reasons.' But God cannot speak thus to man" (*id. ib.*).

It is obviously the main point to know on what grounds we believe. "God cannot speak" as "an ambitious and unscrupulous *Church*."...."Only believe, and all is right." Well, if God speaks, I should think he must say, "Only believe, and all is right." If He speaks, the ground for certainty is, that He is speaking. That He will and does, in the most gracious way, give adequate proof to make man know it is He that speaks, I undoubtedly believe: it is worthy of his grace. But if He speaks, rejection of His word is rejection of Him, of his authority, of his truth. That is, it is the condemnation of him who rejects it. An ambitious *Church* doing so has not the same effect, because it is not God. God's speaking and man's speaking is not the same, has not the same claim, nor the same consequences. For Mr. Newman it has, because God is not in his thoughts. Bring *Him* in, his reasoning is not worth a straw. Suppose I ascertain clearly that the ambitious *Church* speaks—a matter hard enough, it is true—what then? Nothing: men have spoken. Supposing I ascertain God has spoken; is the consequence the same? The grounds of faith that God must give—the only ground of *Divine* faith,

*i. e.* of certainty—is, *that He has spoken*. If man reject His word, what can he be but condemned?

The ambitious Church does not say, Only believe God: it says, "Only believe," *i. e.* "Believe me." God says, "Believe me." Is that the same? Yes, says Mr. Newman. He says God cannot speak thus. How else should He speak?

But it is merely this—God is excluded from his thoughts.

"A question of logic, such as I had here before me, was peculiarly one on which the propagator of a new religion could not be allowed to dictate" (p. 147).

What else could God do? He may afford proofs that it is He, and so He has; but if it be He, He must dictate.

But what is Mr. Newman's only idea? "Let Hindooism dictate our logic" (p. 147). Think of such an idea as God dictating logic! you have the measure of the "moral dignity" with which Mr. N. measures miracles or any of God's gracious dealings—that is, of God Himself. How dreary to the heart to deal with such reasoning! He has not a thought beyond logical notions—"If logic [he says] cannot be a matter of authoritative revelation [he cannot get beyond man's mind], so long as the nature of the human mind is what it is," etc. (p. 147).

Now, even speaking logically, introduce God and it cannot be commensurate with the human mind, because God is not man; and reasonings deduced from what God is cannot be according to what man is. The premiss is an unknown one, and incommensurate. Adapted in grace to man if you will; but grace is not logic. Thus Mr. Newman reasons it is not just one should suffer for another. Perhaps not; but if God becomes a man and gives Himself, what logic can solve that? There is no grace in mere justice, no love; and God is love, yet He is just. Paul's reasonings, that is, the Holy Ghost's, are drawn from what God is, and Mr. N.'s from what he is himself. Can we be surprised that they are different? From what else does Mr. N. derive them?

"He that spared not his own Son, but delivered Him up for us all: how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things?" There is the glorious and divine logic which draws its reasonings from the actings of immeasurable divine love.

So, "if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son; much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life." How do these truths come home with divine power to the heart, as founded on the bright and glorious display of what God is, and His ways, as interested in us! It is logic of invincible power, founded on what God is, known by faith. Mr. Newman may tell me it is not suited to man's nature as it is; not to his evil to sanction it, but to his wants it is. It is suited to the knowledge of God. If He means to man without it, no more is the light of the sun to some creatures; but it does not prove the daylight to be evil to those who have eyes for it, but that the animals are themselves owls or bats. They cannot see in the light while their nature is what it is. Be it so. I dare say it is so. Thank God, in man's case, we may hope for a change.

As regards the means by which Paul was convinced, it is to me, as to conviction, quite immaterial. The point for me is, that I should have proof that it is a divine revelation. Supposing my conscience is reached by a word "sharper than any two-edged sword," and all my secret thoughts revealed to myself, so that I see I am worthy of judgment, and in the presence of a holy judge; that I am conscious, as a defiled being, I am in the presence of God. Supposing I search long-known prophecy, and find it made good in what meets my need; supposing the notorious facts of Christ's life put the seal of truth and divine goodness on Him and his testimony, and make the allegation of imposture moral nonsense; supposing this word which searches my heart, accompanied by miracles which in their number and character leave no room for anything but an "antagonist will" to reject them; that I have seen a known blind man restored to sight, and a dead man raised: I get proof, then, in every way, that God is now interfering and dealing with me, and that he who bears this this message bears God's message and commission. What is it to me, save as an interesting collateral subject, how he came by it, how he was convinced? *I am*, by adequate evidence, and that is the point. It is not second-hand faith to me; it is I who believe a present word of truth, which I believe to be God's. I see, moreover, by the fruits when it is so received,

that God's power is in it. Lusts are overcome; habits, long cherished, changed; peace given, the love of God shed abroad in the heart; joy, happiness, intelligence, moral capacity, the knowledge of God flow in. Activity of love ensues; the whole man is morally a new creature, and knows God as love. Mr. Newman may be without this evidence. Others are not. He is not without it in its external parts. The process of the teacher's receiving has nothing to say to the matter. The proofs with which he delivers it are what concern me. To set a number of sinners to analyse the manner of a divine revelation, is certainly the last thing the God who gave it would set them to do. To give them the adequate proof to conscience, that it is one to them, is worthy of Him, and it is what He has done. Nothing can be more absurd than Mr. N.'s reasoning here. In principle, Mr. N. is only shewing what the Saviour tells us, that the mind and will thus acting and criticising, can receive nothing from God. Mr. N., having refused all else, ends, as we have already seen, in this gross absurdity, the incompetency of God to communicate in any way with His intelligent creatures.

He then takes the visionary acts of prophets, used to represent the iniquity of Israel and God's patience, as an injunction to practise immorality; taking, moreover, his inward judgment as the only valid rule. Now there is a natural conscience, a knowledge of good and evil; but it is a gross mistake to suppose that it cannot be corrupted, or that it is, in fact, an adequate measure of it; which Mr. Newman always assumes. But this point I reserve for the questions of objections to Scripture. I only remark in this part, as connected with my present subject, that, where he objects to Christ's making the whip of small cords, and asks, Would a miracle "authorise me to plait a whip of small cords, and flog a preferment-hunter out of the pulpit?" (Phases, p.151), the Divine authority, and divine authority of righteousness, which respected God's acknowledged house is wholly overlooked. If a church or chapel were owned of God as His house, and men were making a riot in it in time of service, any one would be justified in arresting the scandal with a high hand. But I notice here, that all this is leaving out God. Jesus did it with the declaration, that

“one greater than the temple was there;” that if they destroyed “the temple of His body, He would raise it up in three days.” He was Jehovah.

I will take up the grounds of faith further on.

Mr. Newman says, “The New Testament teaches that God will visit men with fiery vengeance for holding an erroneous creed” (Phases, p. 168). One could understand his objection if God were but an opinion of the brain of man. But it does not teach any such thing; save as for Mr. N., God is nothing. It teaches that man will be condemned for rejecting God manifested in the most gracious way as the light itself, to which He had called man; by every means grace could devise—prophecies, promises, John Baptist going as a herald before to summon man’s attention, miracles. It says they are condemned; or, to use the very words of Scripture, “This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil.” Christ says, “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: now they have no cloak for their sin. If I had not done amongst them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father.”

But God is a mere opinion in man’s head, for Mr. Newman; to reject Him, because we have an “antagonist will,” is consequently a mere erroneous creed. God is not in all his thoughts.

Again, he says, “As for the Old Testament, if all its prophecies about Babylon, and Tyre, and Edom, and Ishmael, and the four monarchies, were both true and supernatural, what would this prove? That God had been pleased to reveal something of coming history to certain eminent men of Hebrew antiquity. *That is all.* We should receive this conclusion with an otiose faith” (ib. p. 170). That is all! Is it nothing, then, that God does speak to man, interest Himself in his affairs? Had He no purpose in it? Is it connected with no moral relationship with these persons, with this people? Is it no proof that He meant men to give heed to the course of events He spoke of, the system in the midst of which the revelation was given, and to which it referred? Is otiose

faith the suited feeling when God is admitted to have spoken? Is such stupid insensibility to such an immense moral principle as God's communicating His intentions or the future in any case to man, really "moral dignity?" God has spoken, and "that is all"! How does this betray the real state of mind—of what value God and His thoughts are to Him who makes such a remark! What immense consequences flow from it! God can reveal, it seems. Nay, He has revealed. He can demonstrate to the mind that it is He who speaks. It has been proved to be a revelation by the event. Then He interests Himself in man in the way of revelation. Is it with no purpose, no plan, no special thoughts as to man, his destiny, the world's destiny—all to us, without this, in dark and enigmatical clouds—that He has made these revelations? Do God's thoughts confine themselves to some petty interest of Tyre or Edom, and leave all else to darkness or to fate? Is this logic? Were such a lightning-flash to shine in a sunless world, it would make a living mind desire a general permanent light. Does it not lead me to say, Can there be such prophecies of private interpretation? or if "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," surely God's thoughts, God's interest, must go farther than this? Why to them, why to Hebrews, rather than to others? Has He no purpose in it? Is there no Divine future? No, "that is all"! Mr. Newman will shut out God if he can; if he is forced to let Him in, he will make God's own voice as unimportant to others if he can, as it is to himself. "We should receive this conclusion with an otiose faith" (*Phases*, p. 170). That is, *you* would; but it proves far more of what your mind and heart and will are morally, than of the value of the fact that God has spoken to man. If He has, O what a field is opened to the heart of those who have any! He does come in to speak to us. He has spoken. He can prove it is He who has spoken. What has He said?

In speaking of John's gospel, he assumes this absence of God's inspiration. "Is it possible for me to receive them [the miracles] *on his word?*" (*ib.* p. 175.) Perhaps not; perhaps yes. But the question is, Is it God's word? I am not here saying it is God's word, though I need hardly say I fully and thankfully believe it, and bless God for it, as the best treasure of my

soul; but I say that is the question, and saying "How can I believe on his word?" is begging the question. You are seeking to prove it cannot be inspiration; the reason you give for it is, that you cannot believe it on his word. But the whole question is, Is it on his word? That is, you exclude God. And I here recall to the reader, that what Mr. Newman calls faith at second-hand, is alone faith at all, unless each person is to receive a message from God immediately. Again, Mr. N. says—"It is with hundreds or thousands a favourite idea, that they have 'an inward witness of the truth of (*the historical and outward facts of*) Christianity.' Perhaps the statement would bring its own refutation to them, if they would express it clearly. Suppose a biographer of Sir Isaac Newton, after narrating his sublime discoveries, etc. . . . to add, that Sir Isaac . . . was himself carried up to heaven one night, while he was gazing at the moon, and that this event had been foretold by Merlin:—it would surely be the height of absurdity to dilate on the truth of the Newtonian theory as 'the moral evidence' of the truth of the miracles and prophecy" (Phases, p. 199). Now, what does the reader think of this argument? That Mr. N. is ignorant of all internal evidence of Christianity, we may, alas! take on his own word. But I avow my esteem for logic is not heightened, if Mr. N. is to be taken as a specimen of what it is. The history and facts of Christianity are identified with a public claim, that the subject of them was God manifest in the flesh. Have the doctrines and truths, of which He was the revealer, nothing to do with the proof of that historical fact? Supposing the case of a wife; that is, a mere historical fact, a legal question. Does the husband merely know by the register that it is his wife? Is relationship with God less real, less known, less important? Doubtless they are to Mr. N., but not to those who enjoy them. But he leaves God out; He is not in his thoughts, however he may commend his present state of piety, which, he tells us, is as bright and real as ever.

The logic is no better. Sir Isaac's going up to heaven has no connection with the truths he has discovered, one does not depend on the other. They remain true, whether Sir Isaac

be in the moon or not. And if Sir Isaac be in the moon, it does not depend on the attraction of gravitation.

Is that so of Christ? If He be not ascended up on high, if His miracles are all wilful impostures, does not that affect His doctrine? And is not the revelation of relationship with God such as none else ever made, a "speaking that He knew?" Has not His "testifying of what He had seen"—a discovery, in a word, of things belonging to God which none other even approached—something to do with His coming from God, and tend to validate His declaration that He was going there? Where is the absurdity? In the Christian who sees the connexion, or in Mr. Newman who sees none? The Christian has an inward witness, not of the historical facts of Christianity, as Mr. N. says, but of "eternal life" in his own soul, "and that life is in Christ." He knows it in daily enjoyment, and knows Him better than Mr. N. knows his best friend. How does Mr. N. know the sympathy of God he speaks of? Is it a sympathy never exercised? If it be exercised, God can make Himself known to the soul. The Spirit, he says, is God in the heart. Well, the Christian so knows Christ. Does that afford no proof of the truth of what is said of Christ when he finds Him in the record given of Him; when every feeling of his soul is identified with the Christ he sees there? The facts, in a great measure, make the Christ he knows, because they are the revelation of Him, the expression of what He is. Mr. N. sees "historical and outward facts," because he leaves God out. God's presence would be an historical and outward fact. Would His words, doctrines, revelation of what He is, action on the heart, unfolding relative truths, have nothing to do with the proof that it was He? What is Mr. N.'s argument but a total insensibility as to what God is, a leaving Him out in his own mind?

To say no more, is this logical, when the whole question is, Is it a true revelation of God?

It is the logic to which nothing can be compared in absurdity, because nothing can be God but Himself; and to leave Him out when I am inquiring after Him, is to leave all void of the only thing I am looking for: how should I find

Him then? This only is an infinite mistake, an infinite absurdity? A child would settle the duties to parents in the world, by denying there are any; because if there are, the child could not reason for himself to know what he owes them.

Man reduces himself to his own measure to judge if there be a God, because letting God in would not be logical (not leave it in the measure of man's competency), which must be allowed if a man is to judge; and, having made this famous step, he discovers that on this ground God cannot be known, and then writes a book to show this, and calls it logical, and thereupon rejects revelation, and says it is only a question of history and outward facts.

But if the outward fact, or pretended fact, be that God Himself was manifested among men, he who would say that the truths taught, sublime discoveries of God, remarkable doctrines, were no proof of this fact,—this great miracle unfolded in a thousand others,—would prove—whose absurdity? The word is not mine; I borrow it from Mr. Newman. What I am showing is, that Mr. N.'s book is a mere universal leaving out of God, when the revelation of Him is the matter in hand. Could there be a plainer proof of it? Nor can you separate the claim of the divine person from the whole miraculous history. "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." What does the Lord here make of His resurrection, the grand fundamental miracle of Christianity? His body is a temple. God is there, and He will raise it up again. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," when He had healed the paralytic. So in Matthew, He is "Emanuel," that is, "God with us." He is called "Jesus, for He shall save His people from their sins."

Again, when Mr. Newman was a Christian by profession, his belief "assigned an intellectual creed as one essential mark of this people" (ib. p. 202), the people of God. Is that so when the subject matter of the creed is a person, our relationship with whom involves the highest obligations? Supposing I were to say, that Mr. N.'s wife being such was a question of historical facts, proofs in a church register, and legal definitions; that the possibility of any owning her as such must depend on

the historical proofs of the celebration of his marriage; would it remain an intellectual creed his believing that fact? Yet there are these proofs. Now, whenever a fact implies an obligation, the acknowledging the fact is not intellectualism; it is morality. If Christ is my Saviour, if the Holy Ghost the Comforter be sent, if the Father has not spared His Son, who is one with Himself—to own all this, is not a mere intellectual creed (though, of course, anything *may* be held intellectually); it involves the highest obligations, obligations paramount to all others. Everything is changed relative to goodness and piety themselves, unless God have nothing to say to either: and this is really the force of the argument of Mr. N. “To judge rightly about it is necessarily a problem of literary criticism” (Phases, pp. 202, 203); “to judge wrongly about it may prove one to be a bad critic, but not a less good and less pious man” (ib. p. 203).

Mr. Newman may state it in the lowest way as a question, whether Jesus, the Jewish teacher, be the Messiah; but every one knows that the question reaches to what I have said, and much farther, too. Infidels are as pious as Christians, according to Mr. N. But if they are, the knowledge of God has nothing to do with piety—a very singular proposition, at any rate, which cannot exist where God is known. But Mr. N. leaves *Him* always out. Even supposing the Christian is got into an entire delusion about God, that his notions of God’s justice have destroyed a right estimate of His goodness, that his thoughts of Christ’s expiation have nurtured a cruel idea of God, that mediation has done him much mischief, as Mr. N. tells us, will his piety remain uninjured? Is it a mere affair of literary criticism, all this? But surely it is the question in Scripture? No, no. Mr. N. would not have written his book—nay, his books—if it had been a problem of literary criticism. Does he not think it more than that? Does he wish for energy while life lasts to expose its deeds as a problem of literary criticism? Does he believe what he says? No; he knows that if Christianity be true, he has lost a Saviour; if it is false, I am leaning on a false one, on an impostor, for my soul’s salvation.

I am well aware that Mr. Newman thinks that piety may

be nourished by an imposture; nay, that in them that believe in it as the true revelation of God that piety is found; nay, that this imposture itself, the Bible, "is pervaded by a sentiment, which is implied everywhere, viz., the intimate sympathy of the pure and perfect God with the heart of each faithful worshipper," and that this is found "in Christian writers and speakers," and "is wanting in Greek philosophers, English deists (except, of course, his own school), German Pantheists, and all formalists" (Phases, p.188). But this intimate and exclusive connection of deep piety and imposture, though, of course, logical and beyond criticism, seems singular to some; or how so monstrous an imposture, as pretending to be Messiah and the Son of God, is pervaded by the sentiment of the sympathy of the pure and perfect God. Is it not the time to say, "he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand?"

The next discovery Mr. Newman made, as to the happy effect of the "positive disproof" of Christ's claim, was that of being delivered from the selfish theory, "that his first business must be to save his soul from future punishment" (ib. p. 203). Now, here again, I find God really left out. Is the sense that I have so sinned against God, that I have ruined myself, that, like a prodigal, I have turned my back on my Father, to have my own way more comfortably, and have perhaps been eating husks with the swine, so that I am no more worthy to be called a son; is the sense that I am lost by all this, and that at all cost I must get back to God, if only there be such goodness that I should be admitted on any terms—is this (though in it I am dependent on God for salvation, and fly to His mercy from the everlasting ruin I have brought upon myself), is this, I say, a bad selfish feeling? Such is the view Christianity gives us—I do not pretend to say what Mr. N.'s thoughts may have been—of the prodigal's return to God. It is very right that it should be felt as mercy to oneself. It puts one in a low, helpless, guilty position; the sense of this is right, and really known in no other way. It is not all we shall attain to when we have peace, but we begin rightly there. A child who has grievously sinned against his father, ought to feel that he wants mercy for himself. If he does not, he has not found his right lowly place.

Now, what hinders Mr. Newman from seeing this? He sees only man in the matter; and hence it is only, to him, the selfishness of the man who wishes to be saved. God is not in his thoughts. But Christianity brings Him in: "I have sinned against heaven, and *before thee*." There is the sense of guilt, of having deserved to be shut out from the Father's house, in the soul come to itself. This is perfect, infinite misery; when God's presence is come into the thought, it is perfect infinite misery to be shut out of it. The knowledge of what sin is makes us see that it ought not to be let into His presence. It says, while falling in apparent inconsistency at His feet, not "God is good!" though it would not fall at His feet without some (no doubt, imperfect) feeling of it; but "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord"! It is jealous for what God is, because it knows Him. If I know God, I must desire to be saved from being shut out from His presence for ever, and I know that I have been morally unfitted for it. Mr. N. excludes God, and, therefore, has no other thought but safety from future punishment.

Again, in p. 206,\* the Bible is an evil, because it professes to reveal the will of God, and leaves our own inward powers unexercised. Is conscience, then, never to look to God, never to get light from Him? Is He to be excluded even from declaring His will, from even teaching us what is right? Is doing right to have no reference to God? With Mr. Newman, going into God's presence to know His will, is like going into a priest's. He objects to both alike. "The Protestant principle of accepting the Bible as the absolute law acts towards the same end." I thought a priest mischievous, because he came in between us and God; and that getting into His presence was getting into the light, and that which did exercise the soul and conscience. Mr. N., of course, is independent of any such presence or direction of God. His *αυταρκεια* is morally

\* "In former days, if any moral question came before me, I instantly turned it into the mere lawyer-like exercise of searching and interpreting my written code. Thus in reading how Henry the Eighth treated his first queen, I thought over Scripture texts in order to judge whether he was right, and if I could so get a solution, I left my own moral powers unexercised" (Phases, p. 206).

absolute. Obedience is no part of morality with him. But others find that that word pierces "to the dividing asunder of joints and marrow, soul and spirit, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart;" and that when they found "all things naked and open to the eyes of Him with whom they had to do," they found themselves much morally exercised, could not deny it was right, though in many things it condemned them! Yes, I rejoice in this light; I love to obey it; it is my meat to do the will of Him I serve, and am glad to know it, because it is His; glad He has deigned to communicate it to me; glad to have it perfect as He gives it. Light does not hinder the eye from working, nor is groping without it (though there may be more exercise, in a certain sense) a better position to him who knows what eyes are worth, and what it is to see. I am not exercised in the same way, I walk in happy unconsciousness of difficulty, where without it I should be tormented to find my way; but it leaves me free for a thousand exercises full of joy, and worthy of an intelligent being, which groping in the dark would deprive me of. Assuming the Bible to be the revelation of God's will (and Mr. N. assumes it here), the possession of it is a singular evil. Besides, an antagonist will, a thousand temptations, and the absence of the circumstances in detail in which I am placed, leave abundant room for the exercise of the spiritual powers. Only they are exercised in God's light, instead of in darkness. Mr. N. prefers being without God, and to trust *his* moral powers. But what does this love of God's absence while he finds his way, and confidence in himself, show? That he does trust his moral powers. But the discovery that conscience will be benumbed by being brought into God's light, which manifests and judges everything, and thus fall into disuse, is not such a result of trusting in them as would lead others to do so. At least, it would not me. Besides, Mr. N. is wrong when he says, that "so long as an opinion is received on authority only, it works no inward process upon us" (Phases, p. 206). First, as to God, it is wholly false, because all morality is judged of responsibly in *His sight*. Thus, if I receive, on God's authority, the opinion that I am to be judged for all I do, will that work no inward process upon me? a singular phrase, by the bye; but

let that pass. But even as to man's, it is not true. It supposes no previous inward process, perhaps. I say "perhaps"; for often there may have been very great exercise which seeks a revelation, *i.e.*, another's light when the mind is at fault, the communication of the mind of Him who has light as well as authority; and Mr. N. has no right to separate them even in man: for in submitting to authority (not force), I suppose light may just give that thought which sets the whole confused elements of thought in perfect order, though I receive it, *i.e.*, depend for the certainty of its truth, on the authority which affords it me. Whoever has put in the key-stone, the arch is solid when it is there. Yet I may receive it only on the authority of my teacher; not to say that the bowing of will by it is an inward process.

Thus, suppose the case of a converted heathen from among those who used to get rid of their fathers when too old to be useful; and one working, in thought, as to the foundations of a parent's position and a child's obligation. A missionary, whom he has learnt to trust, tells him that God has told us to honour our fathers and mothers. He receives this solely on the authority of the teacher; he has no other reason to believe God does so order it, but the teacher's authority over his mind. Does the introduction of the idea of God's authority and will into the relationship not produce an immense result, and alter all his feelings towards his father? Ask him why he has received this idea? He can only tell you that the missionary, whom he believes God sent, told him so. Here a vast process is the result in his mind; all his thoughts are fallen into order; God Himself has become the keystone of his whole moral condition in this respect. Yet the opinion is received on authority only. Put the Bible in the Missionary's place; he is more directly in contact with God, no doubt; the authority is in God Himself in his mind, and great good results from this: for whatever brings us near God is a good, even though we should own authority as well as find light. But in both cases it is authority. The mind may be profited by light as well as by exercising itself on it, and more too. But again I say, God must be excluded.

I have already remarked on Mr. Newman's absolute exclu-

sion of all possibility of God's ever communicating anything knowable by man. I now only refer to it as showing how even here the idea of God is excluded from his mind. "All we can possibly discover is the relative fact, that another is *wiser than we*" (Phases, p. 213). Can anything more entirely exclude God from all teaching? "There is no imaginable criterion by which we can establish that the wisdom of a teacher is absolute and illimitable" (id. ib.). Now, supposing it be God who teaches—would not this establish it? Could there be a comparison of wiser, if he whom God had sent spoke the words of God, as John actually says of Christ? No; this is merely saying, *à priori*, that it is impossible for God to communicate anything to man. If He can, Mr. N.'s statement is nonsense. The moment I ascertain *He* has, I have a teacher whose wisdom is absolute and illimitable. But Mr. N. will not have God, nor allow Him to come in.

Again, in the same page, Mr. Newman says, "If we are to submit our judgment to the dictation of some other, whether a Church or an individual, we must be first subjected to that other by some event from without, as by birth, and not by a process of that very judgment which is henceforth to be sacrificed." I have already noticed this, to show that Mr. N.'s whole book is fallacious. I do so now for another purpose. Why, "whether to a Church or an individual"? Why shut out God totally? Will Mr. N. not allow God to "dictate" to him? That is, is God's word, if He speaks, not to have authority with Him? Again, in the most open way, he excludes God out of his supposition: he assumes that it is a Church or an individual—that God never can. If he reply, "I only assume so on the supposition of a man's reasoning;" then I recur to what I said before, "Your reasoning assumes the thing not to be possible which we are reasoning about, and therefore is good for nothing:" or, as applying it to our present point, he assumes as data the exclusion of God as if his speaking were an un-supposable case. Besides, I may ascertain a document to come from a person who has authority, and consequently the document itself, as coming from him; hence a critical examination can result in the ascertained authority of the instrument, though it could never give it. Mr. N.'s reasoning

is in itself false: he confounds giving authority, and ascertaining the fact; which, if true, I must abrogate my criticism, because the person has authority. I may criticise the proofs whether it is He, but not Him when it is proved to be so.

Again, "He will feel that the will cannot, may not, dare not dictate whereto the inquiries of the understanding shall lead" (Phases, p. 219). Surely not. That the will does, is one of the evident moral disqualifications in Mr. Newman's book. But is there nothing but will and understanding? Is there no God at all? Can the knowledge of Him or His mind never close an inquiry? Not for Mr. N. He does not suppose such a case. Is it the wise man who has said in his heart, "There is no God"? This absence of all thought of God from his mind shows itself in a curious shape in p. 223. "The law," he says, "of God's moral universe, as known to us, is that of progress. We trace it from old barbarism to the methodised Egyptian idolatry; to the more flexible polytheism of Syria and Greece, the poetical pantheism of philosophers, and the moral monotheism of a few sages." *God's* moral universe, methodised Egyptian idolatry, and flexible polytheism! Does Mr. N. think this God's moral universe? This is what logic and philosophy afford us, and on which the Bible is to be set aside—a standard of moral judgment in man, which can call the worshipping an onion or a bull, or the making prostitution worship, to be part of a law of God's moral universe! *Ohe jam satis!* Can any one sink lower in mental perception than this? But if the true God be lost, can we be surprised at anything?

I leave Mr. Newman's analogous arguments from the Bible; because, he says elsewhere, he believes the most important part of it invented, or, at least, first authoritatively promulgated in Josiah's reign; and that when he says, "Jesus was needed to spur and stab the conscience of his contemporaries, and recall them to more spiritual perceptions" (ib. p. 223), he has by the force of habit forgotten that he is speaking of an impostor, of whose teaching "it is certain that we have no genuine and trustworthy account," and whose authoritative dicta God never intended us to receive (ib. p. 213).

In pages 228, 229, we have, perhaps, the most complete exclusion of God anywhere. He contrasts the church of the

Romanist first, and the spiritualist who judges it as erroneous; and then the Bible, in which Mr. Newman alleges there are also contradictions, and the Protestant who claims submission to it; and in result declares that "in principle there are only two possible religions: the Personal [i.e. the inward law] and the Corporate; the Spiritual and the External." And is God to have none? Is there only man's or the church's? So it is according to Mr. N. Church or man, God can have nothing to say to it, but as an otiose object, if He be one, of what man may find proper to think about Him, if Him it really is; for, false or true as it may be, that only is possible whether it be old barbarism, or flexible polytheism, or the moral monotheism of a few sages, in whose number Mr. N. of course ranks himself. God must not interfere in religion or communicate a single truth; it is "an unpalatable opinion, that God would go out of His way to give us anything so undesirable" (Phases, p. 212). It "would paralyse our moral powers exactly as an infallible church does" (ib. p. 213). Is not God excluded?

I have omitted an example of this which has its importance. "Each established system assures its votaries, that now at length they have attained a final perfection, that their foundations are irremovable: progress *up* to that position was a duty, *beyond* it is a sin." "The arguments of those who resist progress are always the same, whether it be Pagans against Hebrews, Jews against Christians, Romanists against Protestants, or modern Christians against the advocates of a higher spiritualism" (ib. p. 224). Now what does this really mean? "The advocates of a higher spiritualism" mean persons who exclude revelation, because man is superior to any need of a revelation of God. Now the progress of man, as a means of knowledge, has nothing to do with a revelation, however the latter may cause progress. A revelation may be partial or complete; but it always, as such, has the absolute authority of God, in which there can be no progress, though there may be a further and clearer revelation of his will. But Mr. Newman shuts out God, and hence only speaks of progress in man's condition—progress *up* to man's condition. It is evident such a statement has no place at all, if there be a revelation. That

brings in God. Mr. N. simply excludes Him. Such, then, is the sum of all Mr. N.'s reasonings: God must on no account interfere or reveal Himself in any way. It is unplausible and mischievous. That, after all, there were only a few sages who arrived at Monotheism without it—that those who believe in this revelation have alone the principle of the sympathy of a pure and perfect God with the sincere worshipper, to the exclusion of all others—that is no matter. Mr. N. will use the wisdom he has acquired from it to pronounce it an imposture, and to decide that though an imposture has produced this blessed result, yet a real revelation of God would be very mischievous, and he would engage us to believe his logic and respect his moral judgment—the inward law or spiritual man—as the competent judge of the whole question.

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I now turn to some details. For while the pride of man's heart would have no God (at least, not one who should interfere with him or reveal Himself), he is very anxious really to get rid of one which besets him, which exposes his lusts and his pride, closes in his conscience on every side, and bars his will, and tells him that God does concern Himself in his thoughts, words, and actions, yea, though He do it in love. I turn, then, now to Mr. N.'s objections to Scripture. In treating of objections made to the word of God, it is well to consider what is objected to.

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I cannot here, of course, write a book on the positive evidences of Christianity. But no one is ignorant that there are such, and that the positive proofs of it—proofs such as no event, no system, no person on earth has for itself—have been detailed in the language of every civilised people. Now particular objections leave this all out of sight; yet, where anything has been largely, positively proved, the dwelling on the objections that may be raised, without estimating the positive proofs of the whole system, is a totally unsound mental process. It is a way of judging of the truth of anything which would be admitted in no other case whatever. I do

not object to the examination of every difficulty in detail. In the case of Scripture, the positive proof is that of the divinity of the system as a whole. If the system at large is positively proved, a difficulty attached to it which I cannot solve is a demonstration not of the falseness of the system, but of *my* incompetency to deal with the difficulty. In such a case, a sound-minded man is content to say, "I do not know." The historical facts and documents of Christianity are proved with an evidence such as no other universally-believed event or acknowledged book has any evidence to be compared with, and if proved show that it is divine. It has met with an opposition which made every document and fact to be scrutinised with a closeness which left only what was incontestable uncontested. This was to be expected, because it presented the claims of a holy God, to which the antagonist will of man never would submit. Hostile heathens, philosophical adversaries, heretical corrupters, foolish advocates, elaborate historians, voluminous commentators, every kind of author and character has been occupied with it from the time of its promulgation, and authenticated its history and its doctrines even when opposing them. And this in the presence of the hostility of religions divinely established or nationally and deeply enracinated on the one side, and sceptical scorn on the other. The books on which the smallest doubt could be cast, doubts were cast upon; and their authenticity made a subject of question as they are by objectors now.

The internal difficulties by which Mr. Newman seeks to invalidate the inspiration of the New Testament, or at any rate the greater part of them, were noticed already in the second century, and answered. The Jews were as desirous to prove Jesus was not the Messiah, as Mr. N. could be now. In a word, we are on ground travelled over for eighteen centuries. Old infidelity dressed up in a new form, to be met by increasing light and increasing proofs which God in his goodness affords both internal and external.

The history of Christianity no one attempted to deny, when any denial of it would have been of the smallest value. They hated it, opposed it, sought to destroy it by force, and to subvert it by argument and ridicule; but it was there to be hated.

No man thought of denying that. The documents were reasoned against, and objections made to them; but they, and they only, were received as the authentic documents of the religion professed by Christians, by friends and foes. This is beyond all question. The Jews exist to this day the living witnesses of the truth of this history. They possess the books of the Old Testament, which we do. Their state confirms the Christianity they deny. It is well known that the Talmudists\* confirm the history of Christ's death, his flight into Egypt, and his miracles, though attributing it to sorcery He had learned when there, or, as some say, He wrought there by the means of God's ineffable name, which He stole.

If we turn to the internal testimony, there is no book in existence to be compared to the New Testament Scriptures. Nothing in the least degree approaches its simplicity, power, moral depth and moral purity, profound knowledge of God, adaptation of his love to the heart of man; none that displays God so much, brings Him forward so constantly, without ever committing itself by anything unworthy of Him, brings Him down so near man, and yet only more fully to show Him always to be God; reveals Him in person, in doctrine, in precept, in his ways, in prophecy; and by Mr. Newman's own testimony, it alone has produced the sense of the sympathy of a pure and perfect God with the sincere worshipper. It has done more, it has manifested Him as the Friend of publicans and sinners, a way of which Mr. N. has no idea. For them, and how many are there, he has no God; and yet He is never more evidently God than when we see Him thus.

\* These testimonies are of comparatively late date. They are in the Gemaras, not the Mishna; but this rather confirms the truth. If we receive the Christian records, the Jews were forced to own notable undeniable miracles done before the eyes of the multitude. Comparatively speaking contemporary hostile accounts are silent on the subject (I speak of Jewish doctors), and later ones do not dream of denying them, admit the facts, and attribute them to magic. Celsus (a heathen author, who lived some fifty years after St. John, as quoted by Origen) does not deny the miracles, but ascribes them also to magic. The Talmudists speak of instantaneous cures wrought by the name of Jesus. The passages are quoted by all the authors and commentators who have treated this subject at any length. Lightfoot is the usual book of reference for the English reader.

If with a God of law, the unclean leper must stand off from man as well as God. Jesus will touch the defiled one with a holy power that dispels the evil by which it cannot be contaminated, while perfect suited love is revealed in the act.

Take, again, the account given of this manifestation of God in flesh. There is a divine infinitude in the relationships revealed and developed. We can feel, if, indeed, we can discern God, that we are occupied with what is infinite. Yet he who speaks is so at home in what is infinite, that the expression of it is simple, as God is to Himself—as everything is to Him. There is no bombastical effort to elevate his expressions to what one's heart does not reach; no enlarged and laboured periods to unfold what remains secret and unknown after all, if, indeed, all be not in expression. What produces the inexpressible feeling is stated; but the statement has the simplicity of known and perfect truth. When Paul would sometimes express his feelings as to it, you may see him labouring beyond the bounds of human language, to give vent to the thoughts of a heart which possesses what is too great for it to contain. Yet this is only feeling produced by it.

Take the revelation of the facts, and all is simple. Read the scene with the shepherds, when that great event is announced which brought in reconciliation and the bringing together of a fallen world and God by the incarnation. Can anything exceed its simplicity? Yet what thoughts are unfolded in a few words: "Glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, good-will towards men!" What accomplishment of promises—what revelation of grace—what an untold and ineffable mystery—what a God is revealed in love! Men, angels, Israel, the world are all concerned. Where is there a word that is not characteristic of simple divine revelation; where is there an epithet seeking to elevate what such working of the human mind can only lower? Read all through the New Testament, never will you find an epithet attached to the name of Jesus. He carries his own beauty: others may talk about it, express their feelings about it; it is very right; it has its just and holy place; but Jesus is to *be* the thing revealed, if it be a revelation, not the expression of man's feelings about him. What a testimony is this, that the Holy Ghost, and not

Luke, or John, or Mark, or Matthew, were the real writers of these histories of Jesus. There is a divine stamp on the whole history, the not discerning of which proves, not the failure of the evidence, but the incompetency of him who is insensible to it to perceive that which is of God.

Again, take the whole body of Scripture, a collection of books written by various persons during a period of fifteen hundred years—of about eight hundred, by Mr. Newman's admission. All these develop an immense system. The sacrifices of the old are far the fullest development of every moral truth contained in the historical fact and doctrine of the new, yet comparatively without meaning, till that fact appeared and that doctrine developed its bearing—circumstances and histories full of instruction for our present walk, which in themselves are simple histories of patriarchs or of Israel (the application of them being totally unknown to those who wrote)—a unity of design, a completeness of structure (yet written when the connection of the subsequent part with the former was impossible to be known to man), which proves the unity of the mind of the Being, whose revealing power and controlling thought and knowledge runs through it all from beginning to end.

It may be said that this is natural, where one people has been the scene of the development. But the fact is not so. This people rejected, and has been totally set aside by this development. The law in its own proper nature does not admit the gospel; and the gospel sets aside as a system *in toto* the law, and yet confirms it all as divine, as the law and the prophets all prove the gospel when it arrives.

The doctrine of the church is brought out, of which there is no mention in the Old Testament whatever, yet it alone fills up the gap, and satisfies what these prophecies have revealed. Without it the world would have remained without any direct revealed association with God; for it is heavenly, which the world and Jewish government cannot be; yet these were to be set aside for a long while, and nothing earthly could fill up the gap.

It is revealed when the time is come and not before, because it sets aside the whole previous system of Jew and

Gentile, a revelation which, if made before, would have destroyed all the authority of what existed. Yet it is necessary, when it does come, to the whole order of God's ways, as revealed in the system it sets aside. Now it is alleged, there are difficulties in detail to a vast and wonderful system, externally authenticated as nothing else in the world is, which has internally the impress of its divine authorship in its whole character, morals, doctrine, and structure. If I lose the effect of the positive evidence, I prove my incapacity of estimating the value of the revelation of God, instead of simply my incompetency to solve the objection, as is the case if I accept the whole thus proved, and avow I cannot explain the difficulty, supposing such to be the case; as a man who reasoned what the sun was from an eclipse, and could not see when it shone. Suppose some phenomenon in nature which I cannot explain. That there are such, and even monsters, every one knows. I find around me (Mr. Newman will not deny it) proofs of divine operation, and of a constant law (which is the strongest proof of divine operation) and power,—a vast universe bearing (as a whole and in the minutest part) the proof of the power of God as having created and sustaining it. If it be indeed God, nothing can be hid from this power, the very proof it is his is its universality, infallibility, and constancy, and that what grasps the whole cannot let the minutest part escape its attentions. It is not an outward shew. *That* man could produce in his little measure. Go search within: see the springs, the details. Man's work is but the scene of a theatre, a fair show by dim light, and it is moved by what may fail at any moment. Follow God's into detail. See all his works in scrutinising light. Does He fail anywhere? Has anything escaped Him? How came the monster there then? Is there some Arimanes, some evil Demiurge, that has had at least his share in the work? One failure proves that God is not there! Such is logic; at least the logic of objections. I find some inexplicable phenomenon, some *lusus naturæ* as it is called, some monstrous birth. It is a proof that there is no God, no perfect Creator and Sustainer of the universe. Is this sound reasoning with the proofs I have of it. No, the wise man, sure of the former by irrefragable proofs, says, I do not know why this is. He

knows indeed, if taught of God, that evil *is come in*, and that sorrow and confusion is the fruit of it, evil which he does not attribute to God, save as permitting it externally for correction.

It is in vain to say, I can shew by the order of physical laws how it must have happened. Who made physical laws necessarily producing monstrosities? The sense that it is a monstrosity, moreover, is proof of the conscience of a universal order. Why then is a particular inexplicable difficulty adduced as an objection to revelation, and urged as a proof that the whole is false? There is but one reason. Revelation controls the passions which creation does not. A judgment to come, sin, having to answer to God—these are what revelation treats of. And they are what man does not like. A God of providence he will have and reason about, because he wants him, and he prides himself on having to say to the Almighty as he (man) likes it; but to be judged by Him, or even to own himself a sinner, and to be in so humble a condition as to be loved by Him and to need it—ah! that is another matter. The principle then on which the reasoning drawn from objections goes, is a false and hollow one. Still, as they trouble the mind, I shall refer to them without pretending to solve every difficulty that can be raised. That is merely a question of *my* competency, not of the truth of Scripture. To judge of these we must advert to another principle which affects directly the whole force of any objection to any writing whatever, and that is the object of the writer. If my object is to show the spirit and bearing of a course of action in which many isolated facts have the same moral force, I may neglect chronological order without anything being changed by it. If I were shewing the progress of an individual mind in them, chronological order would be everything. Again, if I am showing that a person's public life had a given aim or object, I select the facts proving it, and neglect a multitude of others, without which, as a personal history, it would be necessarily imperfect and disconnected. But it is not incomplete in the view in which I have written it. If I were showing the filial piety of the same person, and the way he kept up the ties of family to the end, only such parts of his

public life would be related as might shew that, in spite of its importance and activity, this tie was always felt and acted on. And so on.

Take again, as an example, the Code Napoleon. Did I speak of it as a monument of his genius, I might select particular parts in which the bearing of law on society, an intuitive perception of just results in details, and the vast scope of design were manifest, and show that these originated in his mind. Did another history seek to show his power in employing instruments, it might show the very same parts drawn up by men able in their vocation; and a caviller might find difficulty to reconcile the drawing up of all by these instruments, with the originating mind which had set all a-going and directed it throughout. Were I showing the progress of legislation in the world, I might allege these very same parts as the necessary consequence of the progress of society, and that they flowed as the evident consequences from the preceding steps in this process, as one idea leads on to another; and, in appearance, Napoleon's originality would disappear. All these histories might be true—nay, we may suppose absolutely true—yet impossible for one who had only these to reconcile them in everything, because he has not the additional elements and a knowledge which would be really Divine of the whole order of man's mind and history, which would be absolutely necessary to put them together. Is God's history of his Son in the world less vast in conception, less multifarious in the relationships it speaks of, than Napoleon and a code of laws?

Take, again, a scriptural example: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well-pleased." If I quote this desiring to rest his claim to be heard on his being Son in contrast, say, with Moses or Elias, I may quote it. "This is my beloved Son, hear Him." If I was showing the delight of God in Him, I might quote the former part, leaving out "Hear Him." If I refer to his Father's perfect approbation of Him as a reason why He should be the expression of his mind, I should quote the whole passage. These different citations, instead of being contradictions or mistakes, are proofs of the intention with which the statement is quoted.

Now, if God gives us a history, He must have an object. He cannot write a history even of his blessed Son, merely to amuse man with a history of true facts. Hence He will, in a revelation, give what may be quite disconnected as a history. Thus if God be unfolding the character of Christ as Son of man, He will select what does reveal Him in that character, not what presents Him simply as Messiah come on earth among the Jews. Consequently, in selecting the facts, large gaps may be found in the history. The connection will be the character of Son of man and facts really connected together historically in moral consequence, which are not in mere chronological order.

So of other great principles developed in the history of Christ. Many facts may be common to different feature of his character, or necessary to the whole history. Thus grace in every case will shine forth; but not perhaps in the same application. No one can, in fact, read the Gospels, without seeing that Jesus is presented in different characters in them. Matthew gives us his connexion with Israel in his coming; that is, with the promises made to Israel: hence the constant quotation of prophecy. In John He is God Himself come down from heaven. In the beginning he was with God, and was God; then the Word was made flesh. There is no manger of Bethlehem here. His genealogy is Divine, so far as there is any. The Abrahams, the Davids, and the Adams have no place here, save so far as Christ takes one among their posterity by being a man. The Jews are treated as rejecting Him in this character from the first. Luke has his point. The son of Adam is at once on the scene, though his connexion with the Jewish people be historically given. Mark gives us the Gospel-service of Christ, and we have nothing before John Baptist's ministry.

Now I say not that God has given a revelation, however truly I believe it; but that if God does give a revelation, He must have an object, and hence that the revelation must have a character suited to that object, or it would be imperfect and inefficient, the work would be that of an incompetent workman. The objection must lie, if valid, against such a work as pursues thus its object; for God must surely accomplish his

purpose in this manner, if He does give revelation; and hence to prove He has not, the objection must show that the passage objected to is contrary to a purpose so pursued. God's revelation will not seek the satisfaction of man's curiosity in another way, nor to satisfy man at all (save so far as, in grace, not to turn him aside), but to instruct him. Did it do so, it would prove it was not God who wrote it.

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I turn to the particular objections.

The first is, that Matthew was under manifest mistake in inserting fourteen names instead of eighteen, and in saying that there were only fourteen generations. This is a poor objection in presence of the moral power of the Gospels; it shows a mind descended on low ground: but we will consider it. That Matthew has omitted three kings, none disputes; but this does not prove he made a mistake in doing so. The point he is showing is Christ's legal connexion with the throne of David: this, the omission of the three names did not in the smallest degree affect. The descent and the proof of it remain identically the same. Matthew and every one else knew of these three kings. What was his motive in omitting them, may or may not be discoverable; but it does not affect the descent. What he gives is *perfectly* right. Mr. Newman says, "I was struck with observing that the corruption of the two names, Ahaziah and Uzziah, into the same sound (Oziah), has been the cause of merging four generations into one" (Phases, p. 107). Now this is a mere assertion,\* without the smallest foundation whatever. In the genealogy in 1 Chronicles, where the names are found together, there is no similarity in sound or anything else. Uzziah is not used, but Azarias, which does not resemble Ozias in sound or in any way. In the general history there are long chapters of details which absolutely preclude all confusion. Where did this corruption of both names into the same sound exist? Not in the LXX.: there, where brought together, we have *Ὁχοζίας* and *Ἀζαρίας*. Nor is there any confusion between these names. Uzziah is

\* The remark seems borrowed from Wetstein.

called Oziah by the LXX. in the second book of Chronicles. But there is not the smallest ground whatever for saying there is any confusion with Ahaziah. Azariah and Uzziah are much more alike in Hebrew, and even interchanged; but it is Oziah in Greek where it is read Uzziah, and Azarias where it is read Azariah.\* But with Ahaziah there is never any confusion whatever.

This argument is merely one which plays in the ear of the English reader.†

If Matthew used the Septuagint, and it is there Ozias is found, the Septuagint gives no occasion to any confusion. If the Hebrew, Ahaziah and Uzziah could lead to none; they are in different parts of the history, and the letters are so different they could not mislead.

If Matthew, indeed, looked at the genealogies, it could not be mistake; he would have copied the genealogy as he found it. If at the history, then there is no possible ground for confusion. Nor did the circumstances of the history afford any occasion thereto. It is a perfectly gratuitous supposition, without any foundation in fact. Matthew has left them out intentionally, or what he was led of God to copy did; and there is no mistake, he has counted the generations he has given, and he has counted them correctly.‡ Had he put them in and said there were fourteen, mistake might have been alleged. He has omitted the three first descendants of Athaliah—Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah. It is easily to be believed that the spirit of God led Matthew to take the Jewish registers, for such would be the authentic means of proving a genealogy where the public fact was to be proved. To men it would have been even more suited to his purpose than any other, for they could not reject it. To the believer the revelation

\* It is Azarias in 2 Kings xv. 13, 30, where the Hebrew reads Uzziah. In the rest of the chapter the Hebrew reads Azariah, which the Greek preserves here in verses 13, 30.

† 'Οζοζιας and Οζιας are not only different, but are never used together.

‡ Jerome, *in loco*, notices the omission; and says they were left out as being children to the third generation of Athaliah, who was of Ahab and Jezebel's family, Matthew, intending to have fourteen in each lass. It is very possible the Jews had.

of the fact was sufficient; but an appeal to what men acknowledge as a means the Holy Ghost uses continually in grace. No one who has paid the least attention to Hebrew genealogies can have any difficulty whatever: whole families are given under a name, nay, whole peoples, or even under the name of a district, if they were known by it; they are recommenced again, if any one had the character of a new stock; many links are often left out, provided the family relationship is established; little else is generally aimed at. This is evident, on comparing them.

The taking this from the registers would be the natural way, I may say the right way, to authenticate it to the Jews, and to take it as it was there. Faith has no difficulty in it. It believes it on other grounds, as the gospels, also, set it on other grounds of proof. To have departed from the registers would have hindered the testimony, nay, destroyed the effect of this testimony.

Was it anything unworthy of God to use it in grace?

To us it is really of no avail, and evidently unascertainable, and, hence, I may add, a good field for an objection when we wish to find one. That Matthew was familiar with Scripture is evident, unless he is admitted to have quoted it by inspiration; if he did, we need not reason about the genealogy. If he was familiar with it, all this argument about a mistake is perfectly absurd, because there is no ground for it in reading the Old Testament. The histories of Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah are as largely related, or more so, than those of the greatest number of the kings.

The term "begat" is constantly employed in Hebrew for a descendant. But whatever the *motive* of Matthew, there is no mistake. He has left out three kings, the children of an apostate woman, recommencing with him in whose reign the prophecies of Messiah dawned brightly on Israel, and he has counted his genealogies aright. It is very possible that the words "Jehoiakim" and "Jehoiakin" are blended in Jeconias, because this happens in other authors,\* that is, the two names

\* Thus Josephus calls Jehoiakim *Ιωαχιμον*, saying Nebuchadnezzar killed him, and made *Ιωαχιμον*, his son, king. And Clement of Alexandria expressly says, After *Ιωακειμ ὁ δμωνυμος αυτου Ιωακειμ*, reigned

are written the same. But Mr. Newman does not see that this makes no difficulty. Jehoiakim, or Eliakim, was older than Jehoahaz, and is named with his brethren, Jehoahaz being omitted.\* And Jeconias, or Jehoiachin, is spoken of only in Babylon, whither he was carried; or Josias, being the last independent king of David's family, and Jeconias being the one actually carried away, is put forward as marking the epoch, and Josias named as being the last king who had any free place in Israel, for Jehoahaz was carried, after three months' reign, into Egypt, and Judah never after raised its head; hence the whole family is thrown together as the children of Josias, Jeconias being singled out as the person led captive and the fresh royal stock in Babylon. In either case, the descent of David's family remains alike made good.

The reader will remark that the three epochs are characteristic of the state of Israel or Judah, beginning, of course, with

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three months. Irenæus says (lib. iii. 30, end of 21 Bened. edn.) "Joseph, Joacim et Jechonia filius ostenditur."

St. Jerome insists largely on this (in Dan. i.), saying—"Ob hanc causam in Evangelio secundum Matthæum una videtur deesse generatio quia secunda—*τεσσαρα και δεκας*—in Joachim desinit filio Josiæ, et tertia incipit à Joachin filio Joacim. Quod ignorans Porphyrius calumniam struit ecclesiæ, suam ostendens imperitiam, dum Evangelistæ Matthæi arguere institur falsitatem." Jehoiachin is called *ιωακειμ* twice in Jeremiah lii. 31. In 4 (*i.e.* 2) Kings xxiv. 6, it is said, *ιωακιμ* or *κειμ* slept with his fathers, and *ιωακιμ* his son reigned in his stead, and so on in the chapter, and at the end of xxv. I may add, that considering the two Jeconiahs as distinct makes the fourteen more easily reckoned; otherwise David is reckoned twice, as closing the first fourteen and beginning the second. The only apparent difficulty (which Epiphanius settles by inserting *εγεννησε Ιεχονιας*, but he cannot be trusted) is, that it is not said Jechonias begat Jechonias; but this is easily understood, because the captivity intervenes and breaks the thread of the genealogy entirely. The whole history of Israel ceased, and the kingdom. If the reader prefer this solution, I have no objection. It appears that it was rather after the captivity of Jeconias (he was then only eighteen) that his son was born. The reader may see that these objections are as old as Porphyry; and how early, as I stated, everything was minutely examined.

\* The English reader must not consider the expression, "they were carried away captive," as of any consequence; it is literally "of the carrying away."

Abraham. These, objections, then, have not the least weight. No one is called to believe that fourteen is eighteen. Matthew counts the generations he has given in the Jewish style of twice seven.

The Spirit meant to show the legal descent of Christ, so as to inherit the royal title; and this He has done perfectly, by that which was the legal proof of it; and inspired Matthew to do it, and to do it in this way, which was the only right and valid one. It was the proof that Joseph, of whom Christ was heir legally, was descended from David, and so from Abraham.

How was this to be legally done? Not by inspiring a genealogy; but by showing it by the admitted tables. This is what is done. That it is the legal descent or title is evident: for the evangelist does not for a moment leave a cloud on the fact that Jesus was not Joseph's son. He says, "The husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus who is called Christ." He publishes carefully what he is doing, that he is not giving the natural descent. Christ's miraculous birth follows, to make this clear. It is his legal title which is deduced here, and in the legal right and valid way. The designation of Joseph by the angel as son of David, confirms the truth of what I say as to the design of this part of Matthew.

Even if the chapter were spurious, this would encourage Mr. Newman (so he says) to apply similar criticisms to other passages. Would he be glad to be thus encouraged in a classical author?

The very ancient objection of the difference of the two genealogies is then brought forward—a difficulty, amongst others, as old as Celsus and Origen. Mr. Newman settles for his readers (assuming, I suppose, their ignorance) that "neither gives the genealogy of Mary, which alone is wanted" (p. 108).

No one could object to his seeking to prove this, if he wished it; but to state it as an uncontested fact, is merely trading on the credulity of the English public. It is, he says, an undeniable mistake, in spite of the "flagrant dishonesty with which divines seek to deny" it (p. 108). Thus the subject is dismissed. Who can dare answer in face of such a

judgment? Modesty might say, "I cannot disentangle a difficulty which depends on registers we have not got"; but this would not be the *βασιλική ἀτραπή*, the royal road to certainty needed to gain credit as a sceptic. I have no great respect for theology, nor can I pretend to be learned. Still I can say, that this is not quite so clear a matter as Mr. Newman thinks. There is enough to "encourage criticism" on such a decision.

As regards the genealogy of Matthew, it is undoubtedly the genealogy of Joseph, and given as such.

Mr. Newman says, this is not what we want. Now I apprehend Matthew must have known much better than Mr. N. (for I do not assume his inspiration here), what was required in his days, either from the expression of it by others, or the habits of his own mind formed by the same circumstances. The truth is, this was of great importance. If Jesus presented Himself to claim the throne of David, and Joseph had at that time a separate and hostile title in the direct line from Solomon, Jesus's title would have been void legally; and it was material to show Him rightful heir by this title. And we find, in fact, that Joseph never once appears after Christ makes the claim, though we have mother (and remark, confided to another at the cross), brothers, sisters—never Joseph. Jesus had succeeded him in his title, in a Jewish way, to the crown of David and throne of Israel. Matthew, then, gives what was needed in this respect; and gives it suitably: Jesus was the legal heir of Solomon.

Mr. Newman ought to know, if he writes on such a subject, that many learned men think that the genealogy in Luke is that of Mary pursued in the order of nature up to Nathan. I am well aware others have thought it that of Joseph also; and as Salathiel was son of Jechonias, and Zerubbabel his grandson through Pedaiah\*—so also he may have been collaterally, or

\* See 1 Chron. iii. 17, which may give the reader an idea how, while *very carefully* showing of what family a person was, the Jewish records left the rest obscure. No one can tell in what exact relationship those of v. 18 stood, only they were certainly of Jechonia's or David's family: by any of them a descent could have been traced. The leaving out of women so that a man was called son of his maternal grandfather, increased the difficulty.

by his mother or grandmother, descended from Nathan. If there were no brothers of such mother, he would rank as such. They have applied the same reasoning to Eli as regards Joseph.\* The truth is, in these Jewish genealogies, where grandsons are called sons—nephews and cousins, brothers—and children raised up to a man by a brother taking his widow, whose seed is called then after her dead husband, with the registers we have, defective as a mere human testimony, no objection is of much weight, and answers can only be suppositions; but these last are quite sufficient; because when a *contradiction* has to be proved, a case possible by supposition shows *absolutely* there is no contradiction.

\* Wetstein, for instance, considers the genealogy of Luke as the natural or direct genealogy of Joseph; and Matthew, the derivation of the royal title which was in the collateral line. This is a question really of the construction of the Greek phrase; for as we have not the registers to settle which it is, it may be of course, as to the names, either. It does not affect the substantial question as to our blessed Lord in the least. The inspiration of the Gospels and his mission as Son of David, rest on other proofs altogether; and that once proved, and his claim authenticated by his miracles and all other evidence, He is certainly Son of David, and the particular object of the genealogies is an independent question. Mr. Newman has assumed that it was to prove Him really and naturally the son of David; but this is merely his assumption.

Matthew certainly deduces his legal title, not his natural descent. What Luke's is, is a question interesting in its place; but only so for its own merits. The total want of force in Mr. Newman's argument is shown in this, that supposing Luke had given an unexceptionable genealogy of Mary—that is, one to which no objection could be raised—and given it avowedly as Mary's genealogy, what possible proof should we have now that it is exact, but faith in his inspiration, and the absence of proof to the contrary, or his general fidelity as an historian? That is, its correctness must rest on the general proofs of Luke's fidelity or inspiration, which are to be looked for elsewhere. And, in fact, in the Gospels the testimony that He was Son of David was always rested on other grounds; while it does not appear, on the other hand, that the genealogy was ever contested. It is a mere delusion to advance the difference between the two genealogies as an objection, because Matthew's is avowedly the royal legal title in Joseph. Now if the natural genealogy was given in Luke, there would be no kind of necessity that they should be the same. If it be counted from Mary, for the greater part it could not be.

If we consider it as the Lord's genealogy through Mary, it would stand thus. But Jesus Himself was beginning to be about thirty years of age (being, as was supposed, son of Joseph); and *του Ἡλι* may be directly in connexion with Jesus as *Ιουδας Ιακωβου*, or, still more exactly, *Εμμωρτου Συχημ*. This abruptness would result from its being an extract of chronology: *υἱος* may be understood in these cases, as *αδελφος* is in the case of Jude in Luke, and *πατηρ*, in Acts vii. (if we adopt the ordinary reading), and Herodotus vi. 98, quoted by Wetstein on Matt. i. 17. As to abruptness, 1 Chronicles begins with far greater in an analogous case. The *του* refers entirely to the person of Heli, and marks its case as dependent on *υἱος* understood. The use of the article with names is habitual in genealogies, and constant in the gospel. Mark has *τον του Ζεβεδαιου... Ιακωβον τον του Αλφαιου*, and in the whole genealogy of Matthew. So John xix. 25; so that the absence of *υἱος*, and the presence of *του*, is nothing extraordinary. The form of it here is more abrupt. Were I to say, *ὁ Ἰησους ὁ του Ἡλι του Μαθθατ*, it would be an easy and the correct form of speech; but to begin the extract of genealogy with *ὁ του Ἡλι*, after the long interruption, would be extremely unnatural; the rather as he had been said to be supposed the son of Joseph, so that *υἱος* as naturally suggests itself to the thought as it is commonly left out. But the example of many\* Greek genealogies would lead, as Luke generally writes correct Greek, to the supposition, that the connexion of the series is with Joseph. The reader who possesses Wetstein's Greek Testament may see such examples in the notes.

If taken as Joseph's natural descent, this would prove, that the object of the genealogies was not to give Christ's descent according to the flesh by Mary, but, 1st, the natural descent of Joseph from David, and, 2ndly, his being that one of such descendants to whom the crown belonged, Matthew giving the latter, Luke the former. The descent from David, which was only necessary to the accomplishment of Jewish promises, was rested, to the Jews, on their known authentic records and acknowledged principles.

The fact of actual descent, if to be taken in the material

\* Herodotus, however, uses it with simply *του* after the first name.

and not in the legal sense, would rest on the uniform testimony of the Gospels that he was Son of David, such as the angel's to Mary, a testimony resting on the general proofs of their authenticity. There is no mistake, for Luke is as careful to say, "being (as *was supposed* [or *reckoned*]) son of Joseph" as Matthew, so that if it be Joseph's descent, he well knew and meant to express what he was thus proving. It remains to be proved whether, in any accomplishment of such a promise among the Jews, and made to the Jews, any other relationship was needed, and whether such relationship is not to be taken according to Jewish (scriptural Jewish) relationship, and not English. For instance, it is well known the widow's child by the brother was reckoned the son of the dead. This is foreign we know to all our thoughts; but, as a divine national law (for it was merely a national law connected with the inheritance of the land), every Jew did and was bound to count him so. The brother was guilty and despised who did not do it.

Now scriptural language is to be taken as it is given to us in Scripture. It is quite evident, that this legal title was judged important, whatever fancies Mr. Newman may have as to it as an Englishman; important where alone this promise had its proper and peculiar importance *as to its effect*, for Matthew, who especially occupies himself with the accomplishment of such promises, gives this only.

It is certain that in general the Evangelists rest the Jewish part of the question on Joseph's position (see Luke ii. 4). But, instead of being irreconcilable, these genealogies are open to so many explanations that the difficulty arises thence. Thus, if Mary had no brother and was the daughter of Eli, the Lord was descended from Eli; and Joseph would be called *του Ηλι* as heir and representative of Eli. If Matthat and Eli were brothers, and one died without children, then Joseph would be counted the seed of one though really child of the other, and might be heir of both.

Now these show that there is no contradiction; supposing both the genealogies Joseph's, their credit will then rest on that of the writer. Hence different persons,\* as Africanus (whom

\* The reader may consult, if he will, Eus. Hist. i. 7, and *Questiones et Responsiones ad Orth.*, 131, 132, 133, conf. 66, which seem to adopt Africanus's system.

Augustine follows) who pretends to give it from relations of Jesus' family, and others, have adopted different ones. None can be proved: *all* prove there is no contradiction. If the genealogy be Mary's, there is clearly none. It may be however given as Joseph's, who through Mary would be *του Ἡλι*, representative of Eli in the family. In this case Luke would give the union of the legal and natural title, and the structure of the phrase would be according to ordinary Greek genealogies, *ων (ω ε) υἱος Ἰωσεφ, του Ἡλι*, etc., and yet Eli would be the father of Mary, and the genealogy really hers. This would meet another point in the genealogy of great importance in Luke's Gospel, its being traced up to Adam, so that Jesus is Son of man, to which his natural genealogy has more reference. It would make Him also naturally son of David. Thus the natural genealogy would be traced and brought through Joseph, its legal representative; and this I rather apprehend to be the case, but I attach no kind of importance to it. I would add, "according to the flesh," has a broader meaning than mere natural descent [no confidence in the flesh is the descendible privilege, as Phil. iii., "and knowing Christ after the flesh," "of whom as concerning the flesh," "our father according to the flesh"] though founded no doubt in fleshly descent.

On the whole, I am satisfied that the descent itself is Mary's. I may add here, that the apocryphal vision of Isaiah, which is probably of the year 68, declares Mary to be of the lineage of David, as Joseph also. This I refer to merely as showing the popular general apprehension of that day. In Kaye's Tertullian, it is stated, that Tertullian uniformly appeals to the census as establishing the descent of Christ from David through Mary. It is the more likely that it may be so, as the Jewish Talmudists speak of Mary as the daughter of Eli, saying that she is tormented in the other world.

On the whole, then, there are two questions. First, Do the generations contradict each other? This, it is clearly demonstrated, that there is not the slightest possible ground for asserting. With this all objection really falls to the ground. Secondly, Is Luke's genealogy that of Joseph or Mary? It may be legally Joseph's and naturally Mary's. But this is a question for theologians, not for infidels; for whichever the

Lord may have thought proper to have given, an infidel has nothing to say.

The question of inexactitude no human being can settle by any subsisting registers, for there are none.\* To impute it, therefore, is mere wantonness. The question of inspiration it has nothing to say to. The proofs of this rest on totally other ground. Were the genealogy as accurate as law could make it, it would not prove it inspired. Were it inspired, I should have no proof of its accuracy from other sources. I must rest it on inspiration proved in another way.

The fact of Christ's being in every sense Son of David, is rested, in the Gospels, on proofs of quite a different character. On the other hand, his legal title to sit on the throne of David is given in a way in which it was conclusive to the Jews. The fact of *his natural birth of Mary would not have proved it, Joseph being alive*; nor if there were other relations of Joseph, unless He was his legal heir. Even if there were not, the legal title through Eli by Mary might be important to give also, as it was allowed He was not naturally Joseph's son. Thus every way He was heir, and the two genealogies had their just place.

The next objection (Phases, p. 108) is Acts vii. 16: "And were carried over, and placed in the sepulchre which Abraham bought for a sum of money of the sons of Hsmor, the father of Sychem." That there is a difficulty in this passage, is beyond a doubt; and some mistake difficult for us now to solve. There is a name which is inexactly connected with an historical fact in the Old Testament. It is also one of those difficulties long since discussed. But to call in question inspiration because of it, is to put what an error in copying would produce, in competition with all the moral and spiritual evidence of Divine power, manifest in the whole contents of the book itself, and in its effects in the world for ages. It is so falsely measuring the intrinsic importance of evidence, and the

\* The omission of the three kings by Matthew, I have already discussed: it does not depend merely on registers, but on an elaborate and detailed history; so that the question goes beyond registers. I refer here to Luke, adduced as contradicting Matthew.

character of proof, that the person rejecting the Scriptures because of it would prove nothing but his own incompetency to measure evidence. A book two thousand years old, has a mistake in a sentence, which the omission of a word entirely rectifies, without changing anything—a word very likely to creep in. And this is used to discredit what bears the largest, fullest, strongest, positive proofs of every kind, of being the testimony of God; and has produced, and does produce, effects which nothing but the testimony of God could do.

The objection is this—Abraham is said, as the passage stands, to have bought the place of the sepulchre of the sons of Emmor. It was Jacob, if the sons of Emmor be rightly here, not Abraham who did so. The solution of it is, in one sense, exceedingly easy. The only question is, Is it really the true one? The word “Abraham” being left out, all difficulty disappears. “Jacob died, as did also our fathers, and were carried over to Sychem, and placed in the sepulchre which he bought,” etc. Now Joseph *was* buried there; and Jerome states, that Paula saw the sepulchres of the rest; and Wetstein quotes Syncellus and two Jewish writers to the same purpose.\* The omission of Abraham is given credit to by this—that one uncial MS.,† ancient and of good authority, has an addition here which gives strong ground to suppose Abraham to be an interpolation.

I would lead the attention of my reader to another point here. Let him read Stephen’s speech; and he will find a very brief, but most perfect and complete summary for application to the consciences of the Jews, of the history of the patriarchs from Abraham to the end of Joseph’s history; a summary which supposes the most perfect and accurate knowledge possible of the details of the history; a man thoroughly master

\* Josephus says they were buried in Hebron. The Old Testament says nothing of it; and it is contrary to Jewish tradition, which says, “Hebron is called Kirjath-arba, because Adam, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are buried there.”

† I say *one*, because though Laud. and Ven. Bede are quoted in the critical editions of the Greek Testament, the MS. marked E in the Acts is Laud. or the Latin translation; and it appears that seventy-four readings of Bede are found in this MS., so that these are really scarcely more than one authority.

of the whole account given in Genesis, and carrying it in his mind, as all perfectly well-known, so as to give, in few words, the whole moral bearing of all its parts. It would have been impossible for any one, leaving aside inspiration (and if inspired the question is at an end), for any one not perfectly familiar with every part of it, to have given such an abridgment of the history; but it would have been equally impossible for a person so informed, and master of his subject, to have made such a mistake; because the facts were connected with most interesting points in Jewish history, which made the deepest impression on their memory, and connected themselves with their earliest and strongest associations, and are in the history itself too entirely distinct, and accompanied with far too great a detail of different circumstances, to allow of the supposition of any confusion of mind between the two. The supposition, therefore, that Stephen confounded the two, is, in every point of view, the most improbable solution of any one that can be made. This, it is true, is nothing for a sceptic; because he gains his point by it, or at least raises a doubt. That his reasoning is very absurd is no matter to him; because if he can produce a doubt, faith is at an end. Hence he uses arguments which would be absolutely unreasonable in any human inquiry, and at once rejected. Now I am bold to say, that nothing can be more unreasonable than that an author, who could have produced such a summary of the patriarchal history as Acts vii., should make the blunder supposed to be made in verse 16. The mere literal authority would lead to correct it, by leaving out Abraham; but the internal evidence would lead me, I confess, to believe "the sons of Emmor the father of Sychem" interpolated; and it would run thus: "In the sepulchre which Abraham bought for a sum of money." I would add, that the Peschito Syriac reads the verbs in the singular—"Jacob died as also our fathers, and was carried over to Sychem, and laid in the tomb which Abraham bought for a sum of money." The point seems to be, that he had it when Israel was not in possession of the land, Sychem being mentioned as showing God's title over the whole land; for it was now the seat of Samaritanism, a point in Stephen's speech of moment, as was his showing

that the best and most blessed of their ancestors had nothing there at all but what they bought, were still pilgrims and strangers as the saints now were becoming, through the Jews' rejection of Messiah, and the Holy Ghost's testimony in Stephen's own person. It is the whole tenor and bearing of Stephen's speech—the rejection of the lawgiver whom God sent as a deliverer, and the delivering to the Gentiles Him who was their preserver of life, and hence the stranger's place for the true-hearted; Solomon's temple itself being rejected by the testimony of their own prophets. Some one, seeing "Sychem, where Jacob was carried over,"\* and left "Abraham" in the text.

In result, it is fully confessed that a difficulty exists in the text as it stands.

The reason assigned for it by the infidel is the most improbable of any, humanly speaking.

We are not in possession of means to correct with certainty the mistake that exists.

There is a very probable way of accounting for it, without doing any violence whatever to the text as it stands, when one word is omitted, or if the last words naming the persons are omitted; for the account of the transaction, if either be, is perfectly exact: the mistake is in the name only.

This last remark is material; namely, that it is a mistake which a transcriber might make, or a marginal reference to a name introduce: no moral error, no mistake, even in the facts, setting aside the name, exists. The teaching of the Holy Ghost in the passage is in no way in question, otherwise than in the insertion of a name.

The next difficulty presented is from the discourse of Gamaliel, Acts v. (Phases, p. 108). Theudas, it is said, was after Gamaliel's time, instead of before Judas's; and appeal is made to Josephus, whose testimony is considered infallible and complete, because it is not inspired. Valuable and important as the information afforded by Josephus is, the accuracy of this servile worshipper of Vespasian† as the

\* The Syriac reads, "in Sychem"—not, "father of Sychem."

† Interesting as the information furnished by an eye-witness on

Messiah, of an apostate heart, is not so absolute as the author would lead people to suppose. But I do not see reason to call in question his account of Theudas. It happened (according to his account) by comparing the dates in his childhood; and he mentions Cuspius Fadus as the governor under whom it happened; so that there is no reason to suppose that he was not well informed. But Luke is also an historian of extreme and undoubted accuracy. Few give such proofs of it by reference or allusions to a multiplicity of historical and geographical details or customs,\* in which a stranger would betray himself.

Now Josephus mentions a Theudas who rose up after Gamaliel's time; Luke, one who rose up before it.

Mr. Newman assumes that they are the same, and that it is Luke's mistake. He says, "Of both the insurgents we have a clear and unimpeached historical account in Josephus" (Phases, pp. 108, 109). The reader might suppose that there were two insurgents only in those days. The fact is, they hardly ever ceased for forty or fifty years. There were a multitude of them.

It has been shown, that between the death of the first Herod and the destruction of Jerusalem, there were three Judases and five Simons. Lardner makes, I think, four Simons in forty years, and three Judases in ten; one of whom Usher is decidedly of opinion, is the Theudas mentioned by Luke, as to which I do not pretend to offer an opinion. Usher thinks the name the same. At any rate, the name of Theudas was so very common, as well as the change and assumption of names, that an insurgent Theudas is the most easy thing to credit that possibly can be. A statement of "both the insurgents," as if there were only two, and the two

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such a subject as the history of the Jewish war, and of one almost a contemporary with other still more important periods, must be, it would be difficult, I judge, to find an example of a baser human spirit than that exemplified in the History of Josephus.

\* The reader who knows German may consult Tholuck's *Die Glaubwürdigkeit der evangelische Geschichte*; or if only French, an abridged translation of it by the Abbé Valroger, entitled, "Essai sur la Crédibilité de l'Histoire Evangélique." It is an answer to Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu*, u. s. w.

Theudas is the same, is, to say the very least, as unfounded a one as can possibly be made.

Remark further, that Luke, in his account of Judas, is thoroughly accurate. Though generally called Judas Gaulonitis, he was a Galilean; for so Josephus also calls him. It is supposed, that having the means of being thus accurate as to one, he is wholly inaccurate as to another fact, drawn from the same sources. When the whole difficulty is this, which is really none, that in a multitude of abortive efforts of the Jews against Roman power, Josephus has omitted one which Gamaliel mentions, we knowing that he omits many others, the name being a very common one indeed, as Wetstein has shown, and the fact being ascertained that there were five such efforts of persons having or assuming the same name of Simon, and three more assuming another within ten years; so that a second of the same name, and that a very common one, in fifty years, has not the smallest improbability whatever.

Further, the only circumstance to prove them the same is the death of the leader, and the dispersion of his followers; an event which probably occurred in every case of these vain and desultory efforts of partial rebellion. One point in which detail is given may be noticed, to show they are not the same; for Luke gives the number of Theudas's adherents as about four hundred; whereas Josephus says, they were "a great multitude," *τον πλευστον οχλον*. Indeed, though much cannot be rested upon the word, the result was somewhat different; for in Luke they were "scattered," *διελυθησαν*, and brought to nought. Of those under the Theudas against whom Cuspius Fadus sent a troop of horse, many were slain and many taken prisoners, among whom was Theudas, who was beheaded. Now, though, as a general result, dispersion and coming to nothing might be stated, on the whole, the impression is different: and remark, that Luke has evidently accurate information here, for he is able to tell the number of his Theudas's followers as about four hundred. Yet he is an historian who is remarkably exempt from all appearance of pretension or exaggeration.

And here note, that I am not called upon to prove that

Luke is right, but that the objection is an unfounded one. And I judge that what we have seen proves it not only to be unfounded, but unreasonable; and that the expression, "both the insurgents," is an unwarrantable assertion, to say the least.

The truth of the history rests on the general credibility of the historian; for I am not to suppose inspiration here, though the abundant independent proofs of that preclude all these questions altogether. The effort to show it improbable entirely fails. Perhaps the reader may suppose that this is an answer invented now to meet the case. Alas! all these objections have been made centuries ago. This one in particular by Celsus, some sixteen hundred years ago or more; and the Christianity these philosophical heathens tried to subvert then, as the philosophical deists, boasting of their greater spirituality, do now (borrowing their objections from the heathens, and their spirituality from the Christianity they seek to subvert)—this Christianity, I say, has subsisted after all their efforts, and saved millions of souls taught by it, as Mr. Newman has admitted—the sympathy of the pure and perfect God with the sincere worshipper, in spite of the opposition, and in spite of the still more dangerous corruptions which have for the most part disfigured it—has subsisted and produced an energy of love which "philosophical faith" never thinks of, not only because it is the truth of God, but because the God of truth Himself is in and with it, and has proved it in revealing Himself to the hearts of poor sinners saved and made happy by it. What has Mr. N., that he has not borrowed from it? He must not be surprised that we claim the feathers he has decked himself in. He may be assured that my heart would earnestly wish them to be livingly his own. Nor would I, if stripping him of what is borrowed, peck at himself. I would not spare his work, seeking as it does to deprive souls of what alone is blessing and life. I feel my feebleness in commenting on it. What I can I will do, to show it groundless and unreasonable. But I add the proof how ancient this account of Theudas which I have given is.

Origen, who had read Josephus, and gives him the character of truthfulness of research, says, in reply to Celsus, "We say that there was a certain Theudas among the Jews, before the

birth of Jesus, alleging himself to be some great one;" and again, "Judas the Galilean, as Luke has written in the Acts of the Apostles, chose to say he was some great one, and before him, Theudas." Elsewhere he says the same thing. Hence learned men have remarked, that the fathers here constantly refer to these two as the thieves and robbers who came before Christ, shewing that they supposed Theudas did so. This merely shews that they accepted Luke's account as certain, in spite of Celsus's objection already cited.

Eusebius, overlooking all difficulty of date, takes for granted Josephus's Theudas and Luke's to be the same; he places him in the reign of Claudius, that is seven or ten years after Gamaliel's speech, which must have been before the death of Tiberius, or in the beginning of Caligula's reign.

Under the general head of "undeniable mistakes," for infidels must not be expected to fail in hardihood of assertion, we have: "The slaughter of the infants by Herod if true, must, I thought [how easy to think a doubt and find the thing doubted an undeniable mistake!], needs have been recorded by the same historian" (Phases p. 109). Why? Is it so very likely that a Jewish infidel historian should have recorded a particular act of local cruelty, which would have been the strongest testimony possible that Jesus was the Messiah. He must have given some reason for such a very peculiar and specific act of cruelty out of Herod's family, where he was cruel enough, and for which no conceivable reason could have existed, but some extraordinary testimony that the Christ was born in David's city. This would have been too much for Josephus's history, and his heart. Indeed the omission of one local cruelty in a village is nothing extraordinary in a historian. The killing a few children was nothing to the hard-heartedness of Josephus and Herod, if there was no particular reason. If there was, it was the last thing Josephus would mention. It was not his affair to give proofs that the Christ was come. But that the cruelties of Herod at this time referred to some pretension of the coming Messiah, though the slaughter of the infants would have been inconveniently precise, is plain, from a passage of Josephus which though as

obscure as a man avoiding the whole truth could make it, yet very distinctly shews these cruelties to refer to the hope of a miraculous king.\*

Further, the story in Matthew falls in perfectly with Herod's general character, both as to its cruelty, and the jealousy of anything which affected his title and government, which habitually gave rise to this cruelty. The saying of Augustus is well known, that it was better to be Herod's hog than his children.

Further, this story of the slaughter of the infants, though confounded with other incidents, was believed by the heathen as a recognised fact in subsequent ages, as well as owned as such by those called fathers. Macrobius, among the former, Justin Martyr, Irenæus and others, among the latter, are witnesses of this. It is the merest unfounded assumption that there is any mistake whatever here, and only proves the disposition of the one who makes, or rather renews, this old objection.

Zacharias, son of Barachias, is the next. As to mistakes as to names, no Christian would attach any great importance to them, from the fact of their easy introduction in copying from the margin when written there by some one who supposed it be such a one. I suppose, for instance, "from Abel to Zacharias" were in the text, some one adding "son of Barachias" as a remark, it is soon inserted as part of the text. It is not like a part of the sentence, affecting the sense evidently. I say this as a general remark, for it is not necessary to have recourse to such a supposition here. Supposing the name to have been simply Zacharias, nothing could have been more natural than the Lord so speaking. The 2nd of Chronicles being the last book in the Hebrew Bible, it would have amounted to this:—The blood of all the martyrs in your history from Genesis to 2nd Chronicles (as we should say from Genesis to Revelations, without ascertaining the date even of the latter book) will be required of this generation. It imputes no error whatever to the blessed Lord; the martyrs

\* The reader may, if he pleases, consult Lardner on this point. Book II. chap. ii. vol. i. p. 346. 8vo. 1838.

from Genesis to Chronicles were all the martyrs whom Jewish hatred of truth had sacrificed; the Lord does not chronologise their martyrdom, saying, the last of the martyrs. Those who take this view would drop the words, "son of Barachias." This is confirmed by the fact that they are not found in St. Luke, and St. Jerome informs us, that in the gospel of the Nazarenes, an impure and corrupted gospel according to Matthew, as it seems adopted by Judaizing Christians, the reading was "Zacharias, son of Jehoiada." Now I don't adopt this reading, I refer to it as tending to confirm the absence of "son of Barachias."\* Evangelaria and scholiasts give Jehoiada, and the latter affirm that Barachias had also the latter name, such a change being the commonest thing possible amongst the Jews, as is well known; and from Jerome downward this has been the thought of different learned men, the names having nearly the same signification as in the case of Eliakim and Jehoiakim. But I see no need to rest on these details, which, though sufficient to explain it, may be thought to savour of effort. It is not proved that Zacharias, the son of Jehoiada, was slain between the temple and the altar, which is noticed as aggravating the sin in both Luke and Matthew. It is very possible, as he was addressing the people in the court; and he may have fled into the inner court when attacked, and been slain there. The people had no business there; but if it was a violent and riotous murder commanded by the king, breaking through the consecrated limits and profaning the inner court † would not be very astonishing. The Jews attached extraordinary importance to this murder; they say that his blood bubbled up till avenged by Nebuzaradan, who slew ninety-four thousand of rabbins, of their scholars, and of the people. ‡ Their fables are not important, but as shewing how this was

\* Hilary and some others omit all after Abel. Irenæus reads as in our Bibles, but we have only the Latin translation here, which probably inserted the reading of the Vulgate, which has these words.

† Such was the statement of the Rabbins. Rabbi Judah asks Rabbi Achan, whether he was killed in the court of the women or of Israel; he replies, in neither, but in that of the priests, etc.; and then the story of the blood ever after springing up instead of being absorbed as that of victims, is related.

‡ The reader may see the particulars in Wetstein.

on the Jewish mind; and the Lord refers to what was notorious amongst themselves. The presence of the addition, "son of Barachias," would then be easily accounted for, and the reference of the Lord to it the most natural possible. The change of names, according to the notion of Jerome and the old Greek scholiast, would, in Jewish nomenclature, take away all difficulty too.

But there is a circumstance which would tend to make us judge otherwise of this question, besides the all but uniform testimony of MSS., and versions of which the earliest have "son of Berachiah," such as the ante-Hieronymean Latin ones. That is, the Jewish traditions state, that Zechariah, the son of *Iddo*, a prophet and priest, was slain. Zechariah, the son of Berachiah, was grandson of Iddo, and is called twice son of Iddo (Ezra v. 1, vi. 14). Further, Iddo was a priest, who came up from Babylon with Zerubbabel (Nehem. xii. 4). And in the 16th verse of that chapter, we have of Iddo—Zechariah. So that we have these facts. The prophet Zechariah, son of Berachiah, was grandson of Iddo, and is called son of Iddo twice in Ezra. We have a priest Iddo, whose son or descendant is called Zechariah precisely at this epoch, for Zechariah, the son of Iddo, was a chief priest in the days of the son of Jeshua the priest.

The Jewish Targum states, that Zechariah, the son of Iddo, a prophet and priest, was slain in the sanctuary. Further, the name Iddo in Zechariah and Ezra is the same (the latter adding a silent Aleph), and so is the priest in Nehem. xii. (see Keri, and T 4). I am aware some have referred the Targum on Jeremiah to Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada, taking Iddo for this latter name, but there is no relationship between the two names whatever. Not only this, but the way Ezra speaks of Haggai and Zechariah is remarkable; he calls Haggai, in both the passages, Haggai the prophet, but Zechariah has, as his title, Zechariah the son of Iddo, not Zechariah the prophet, though shewn to be such. The reason seems evident. This was Haggai's only distinction. Whereas, Zechariah, the son of Iddo, was a well-known personage, Iddo being a chief priest over his brethren, that is, Zechariah, though a prophet, had a distinct and well-known title by

which he would be designated; he was a priest, and Iddo was a well-known chief-priest, so that he was called his son, though really his grandson. Hence, as the Targum declares that a prophet and priest of the name of Zechariah, the son of Iddo, was slain in the sanctuary—a Zechariah, the son of Iddo, being certainly son of Berachiah, and a priest and a prophet—why should I be surprised if the Lord should say, that Zechariah, the son of Berachiah, was slain in the sanctuary? Has the infidel any proof that Zechariah, the son of Berachiah, the son of Iddo, was not slain so as to confute the statement of Matthew? Absolutely none. It is not stated in Scripture that Zechariah the prophet was so killed. How could it be? There is no subsequent historical book. Is it stated of any other prophet? Of none.\* Yet the Lord—and so does Stephen—charges them with treating all the prophets in general in this manner, so as to add, “It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.” Jeremiah and Baruch, his scribe, had their lives given them as a prey by a special deliverance on God’s part. Why then must the Lord be wrong? Because the infidel thinks he ought to be so. There is really no other reason whatever. The Lord makes a statement which there is nothing to confute. Say Matthew does; because *he* does, it is not to be believed, though, from the general conduct of the Jews, nothing can be more probable. Most generally, persons who do not accept the statement as it is, turn to the history of the son of Jehoiada in the Chronicles, which, from its similarity, they suppose to be here referred to. This is a

\* But this only confirms the authenticity of the Gospel, for we have a statement which seems error, but which on a careful comparison of circumstances, turns out to be just exactly what proves the statement to be that of a person living when the circumstances were well known, or that he knew them well himself, so as not to need care as to apparent probability. Zechariah, son of Iddo, priest and prophet, was, according to the Targum, slain in the temple (and I suppose as Targums are not inspired we may credit them historically), and Zechariah, son of Iddo, priest and prophet, was son of Berachiah,—son of Iddo, as we know from the record itself meaning grandson. Zechariah, son of Berachiah, is said, in the New Testament, to have been slain between the temple and the altar—as the Targum says of Zechariah, son of Iddo, whom Nehemiah proves to be son of Berachiah.

question of criticism which humble inquirers into scripture may listen to, however it may be decided. We are certain, I think I may say, that both Zechariahs were priests as well as prophets; to that the place of their death is not a surprising one. But Mr. Newman rejects all this and the Chronicles with it; yet he uses these books now to prove the inexactitude of Matthew. Now his rejection of them takes away his title to the use of them for this purpose. At any rate, he will not have this history to be the one referred to, so that he has no right to infer inexactitude from it: however, as men have doubted who it was, he will have the New Testament wrong somehow. And he chooses the most improbable, nay, I think I shall shew, impossible supposition, for such only it is, to prove that Matthew, if Matthew it be, has made an undeniable mistake.

Josephus has mentioned a Zacharias, son of Baruchus, killed in the temple, and it is to be he; at least Mr. Newman cannot "shake off the suspicion" (Phases, p. 109) that it is. On what ground, we are left to divine.

In the first place, Baruch and Berachiah are not the same name. Both are used; and neither in Hebrew nor in the Septuagint are they confounded.

In the next place, the Lord addresses the Jews as guilty already, referring to their previous acts, and saying: "Fill ye up the measure of your fathers that this blood may come upon you." This would have no force at all, if it were not a past act of which they were not personally guilty. They would commit similar ones wilfully and *complete* the dreadful series, so that the time of vengeance should arrive, and all the accumulated guilt of past ages as to which God had exercised forbearance (if peradventure they would repent), would bring its accumulated consequences on their head. But this supposes that the Lord refers to the past acts committed by this people, but not by this generation, and to acts of which their consciences were fully aware. If it be said, But the question is, Did the Lord say it? If it were *He*, of course then all objection would be set aside, for it would be a prophecy, if he referred to the son of Baruchus; while Matthew saying so, leaves the argument just as strong, for it arises from the internal force of the words which he could not have put into the Lord's

mouth. Their meaning, be they whose they may, cannot apply to Baruchus.

Moreover, Baruchus was no prophet, nor, for aught we know, a righteous man. Josephus says he was very rich, and a hater of evil men. But Luke, in the parallel passage, makes the Lord speak only of prophets.

Further, Zacharias, the son of Baruchus, was killed by the zealots just before the temple was besieged. Now, according to *all historical* evidence, Matthew was written before that; many think, long before it. The siege of Jerusalem, at which time Zacharias the son of Baruchus was killed, took place in the year 70. Some think Matthew wrote his gospel in the year 41, a date borrowed from Eusebius, that is thirty years before the siege of Jerusalem, and the death of the son of Baruchus; and the common account given in the immediately succeeding period, the first centuries, was, that he left it for the use of the Hebrews, when he went forth to preach the gospel elsewhere. Others, founding themselves on a passage in Irenæus, think he wrote it so late as 61 or 62, and even as 64.\* But this is the latest date assigned by any who have examined the subject. That is, if historical evidence be of any weight at all, the latest period at which Matthew can be supposed to have written his Gospel, was six years before the death of the son of Baruchus; so that if he put it in, he was inspired, which after all is absurd, for he could not by inspiration attribute to Christ what he did not say.

To pretend that Matthew is not the real author, is to deny all historical evidence whatever.

Further, we have Matthew quoted in the Epistle of Barnabas, and quoted as Scripture. The author of this latter book, it is not material to my purpose to know. Its early date cannot, I believe, be questioned.† The Epistle is considered

\* I have no doubt, with many learned men, that there was a Hebrew copy of Matthew's Gospel made for the use of the Jews. It is very possible, too, he left some account in writing, when he left Judæa, in the vulgar tongue of the Jews; while the Greek Gospel we have is that given by the Spirit of God for the permanent blessing of the Church. The Gospel of the Nazarenes or Hebrews, seems to have been some such Hebrew document corrupted and interpolated.

† He refers to the ruin of Jerusalem as just happened. He is himself quoted by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, etc.

to have been written in 71 or 72, that is a year or two after the death of Zachariah, the son of Baruchus, and in his Epistle Matthew's Gospel is already quoted.

Clement of Rome, the companion of apostles, quotes Matthew about the same period. His words may be taken as Luke's, as the passage is nearly the same in both evangelists. Thus we have additional proof of the *extreme* improbability (I may, indeed, say impossibility), historically speaking, of Matthew's Gospel referring to the son of Baruchus, or of its having been written afterwards; for it is quoted as Scripture within a year or two of his death. The consideration of the testimony of St. Luke confirms this more than improbability.

If Matthew refer to the son of Baruchus, so of course must Luke. It is the same person who is alluded to; as no one, I suppose, doubts. Now Luke, in the Acts, refers to his Gospel as a previous treatise which he had written; but in the Acts he closes with St. Paul's imprisonment in Rome; that is to say, the year 65. So that his Gospel was already written in that year; that is, five years and more before the death of the Zachariah of whom Josephus speaks: that is, it is impossible that he can refer to him.

In a word, the supposition or suspicion of Mr. Newman is the most improbable possible, and really impossible to be true; and there is no pretension to any evidence which contradicts the statement of St. Matthew's Gospel as it stands; that is, no proof of any kind that Zecharias, the son of Berachias, was not slain. We have no scriptural evidence anywhere to look for, to confirm the fact that he was, no more than in the case of the other prophets; there is no subsequent scriptural history, nor any complete authentic history, of the times, to relate it; but we have a statement of a Jewish doctor of high-repute, that a Zechariah, son of Iddo, prophet and priest, which is the prophet's exact description, was killed in the sanctuary.

That is, the objection has no foundation whatever, unless the will to object, because of the Divine claim on the conscience, be one. Further, if Zechariah the prophet was martyred, he was the last so martyred, as far as we have any testimony of those who shine in the authentic scriptural

history of the Jewish people; for we know nothing of the sort concerning Malachi, nor indeed is he mentioned in the historical books of the Old Testament.

It is natural for Mr. Newman, when seeking to justify an infidelity which has not been convinced by the Divine power of the word—has not bowed to it as morally evidencing itself to be of God—it is natural for one who has proved his mind to be insensible to the grace and truth contained in it, a grace and truth which bears the stamp of God upon it—to accumulate all the difficulties which the reader, willing to be an infidel, may accept without inquiry as insurmountable; and the unwilling be troubled or perplexed by.

There is, he tells us, an “impossibility of settling the names of the twelve apostles” (Phases, p. 109). Supposing we could not do so—what then? We should be ignorant how some one came to have two names, the very commonest thing of all common things among the Jews. What could that prove? Just nothing at all, except this—that the Gospels are genuine, and not a forgery; for had they been, the forger would not have created a useless apparent inconsistency. Now there is this proof of independence. But the real truth is, though it be perfectly immaterial “settling” them, yet there is no kind of difficulty in it. Levi had also the name of Matthew, as Saul had that of Paul, Simon that of Peter, as numberless others in Scripture. So that if we had even but the two names, no kind of difficulty would arise—Levi would have the name of Matthew also. But we have the particulars of his call given by two of the evangelists, the one of whom calls him Levi, the other Matthew; so that the proof that he is the same is really incontestable by any sober-minded person; and there is nothing to “settle.” One Gnostic heretic, Heracleon, has the names Levi and Matthew in speaking of some of the apostles who, he says, had not suffered martyrdom; but it is supposed he refers to Lebbæus—that is, Thaddæus: if not, it is of very little consequence, as we have the account of his call under the two names. Grotius alone, that I am aware of, fancied Levi and Matthew different persons; founding his opinion on a questionable passage of Origen, who in another clear place treats them as the same, and on the statement of

Heracleon above mentioned. The whole fact is, that some confusion has arisen in one or two minds, from Thaddæus having the name of Lebbæus; but at the most only in one or two instances, and those uncertain: just as his being called son of Alphæus in one Gospel, has made one or two transcribers confound him with James; and some fancy him his brother—of which it suffices to say, perhaps he was, perhaps he was not. But there is no real uncertainty whatever about it, unless a mistake of some careless or ignorant person outside scripture is to make uncertain what is perfectly clear in it, and accepted as certain historically by all well-known authorities who have spoken of it. For there is no doubt they were received as the same in the early Church. Jerome says, *Matthæum cognomento Levi*, “Matthew surnamed Levi,” as an acknowledged, unquestioned fact. How different the spirit of Eusebius! He notices, taking for granted they are the same person, that Matthew, out of abundant modesty, calls himself, when sitting at the receipt of custom, by the name he was known by as an apostle. Luke and Mark give him his apostolic name in the list of apostles, and his previous popular name when sitting as a publican. It is, at least, refreshing to meet with something of the spirit of grace in the midst of such criticism. And how true it is, too, how much it discerns what mere miserable criticism never did and never will! We may remark, that Luke says, “Matthew made him a great feast in his house;” Matthew, only “as he sat at meat in the house.”

There is no other question as to the apostles' names but Thaddæus and Judas, names confessedly interchanged—or rather, as learned men have urged, the very same. Simon, Andrew, James, John, Philip, Bartholomew, Thomas, James, Simon, Judas Iscariot, are the same in all.

As to harmonising the Gospels, it is a great mistake in principle. The Spirit of God has, as I have said, and as is evident to an attentive reader, given in each Gospel what referred to a particular character and particular instructions of Christ; and facts referring to this subject are recorded, and such parts of discourses as apply to them; the connection of

the facts being in many cases the subject,\* and not the historical order—many being related without any date at all, the Spirit of God not attaching any the least importance to the time when, but what was said, in what circumstances. In some respects, there is a progress in the development of certain subjects which is chronological, such as the growing spirit of rejection of Jesus among the Jews, and the substitution of a new order of things. Yet in giving this general chronology (which is seen, for instance, in Matthew very evidently, and all relating to the subject fully developed), the details which point out certain parts and moral elements of unbelief may be classed according to the subject, in order that we may understand their bearing. The same fact may be confirmed by another evangelist and put in historical order exactly, or in some other moral connection. We dislocate the whole purposed contexture of the Gospels in trying to put them into continuous order. It may be in some respects interesting to search it out, but quite subordinate to the general purpose for which they are written. I have tried so to arrange them, and I have not found the thing impossible; but I have found it takes the passages quite out of the order in which they were meant to stand. Besides, we have a very *limited* portion indeed of the facts of the history, which enormously increases the difficulty of putting it together; because the links which connect the facts historically are often wholly wanting. There may be six months between two facts mentioned in one verse, in the same sentence, if these two facts refer to one subject; and these two facts may be dispersed amongst a number of others in quite different connection elsewhere, and if one be morally important on a particular subject it may be put after one chronologically subsequent, without a note of time. This is actually the case; because the object of the Holy Ghost is to give us certain moral pictures of Christ as Son of David, Son of man, and as Son of God, a Divine Person—and of

\* I may remark here, in passing, that the expression used by Luke "to set forth *in order*," applies far more often in Greek to order of subjects (*i. e.* a regular account, not mere notes), than to order of time; the former is its regular meaning, only  $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\lambda\theta\eta\varsigma$  is more commonly used than  $\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\lambda\theta\eta\varsigma$  in classical Greek.

God's ways with men in Him—not to make out a full biography. Such alone, I am bold to say, could have been God's way of dealing.

I put a case, to show how easily the omission of a fact seems to produce contradiction, if the fact be not known. A person desirous of showing my kindness and condescension, states that I accompanied him *from* Reading to Oxford on foot, though it was almost more than my strength permitted, and unfolded my mind to him, all the way enlarging on what I said. Another has a point to prove, namely, that it was on a certain day (which is this self-same day) he was with me, and that I had informed him of a certain event, and he states that he overtook me on the Oxford road going to Reading. This was just half an hour before the other spoke of walking with me. A third states positively that I only arrived in Oxford that day, and never left it afterwards. Now there seems contradiction here; for how could I have been overtaken on the Oxford road to Reading and never have left Oxford that day, and have, on the contrary, gone from Reading to Oxford, not having even strength to go more than one way. Yet one fact makes all easy, which was immaterial to all the parties who had spoken of it. I had forgotten my pocket-book, and turned back again after two miles' walk, and was overtaken a few minutes after going to Reading, and then set out again. And, so far from being a contradiction, I never should have met the person I walked to Oxford with had I not been back to Reading. Now, this is a simple and obvious case; I refer to it to illustrate the danger of reasoning from such apparent difficulties. Judas is called of Galilee in the Acts; Josephus calls him a Gaulonite. Geographers have difficulty how Gaulonitis can be Galilee. Here is a difficulty almost insuperable, "an undeniable mistake"; nothing to impeach Josephus's statement. Luke is an incorrect historian, not an inspired writer. How can we correct it? Simply thus: Josephus has, as the title of his chapter, "Of Judas the Galilean." If it had not been there, what a triumph for critics! Yet they would have been all wrong, on the now united testimony of two accurate and exact historians. Have the geographers explained it? Not that I know of; but

Josephus, not being a Christian, is to be believed, and hence Luke may be? This is not the only such case.

The next difficulty is the geography of the rivers in Paradise. It is "inexplicable" (Phases, p. 110). This is very possible. But I apprehend that the inexplicable thing is the text which speaks of geography, not the geography of the text. If so, which certainly is the case, I should think Mr. Newman had better wait till he can explain, or rather translate, it before he raises an objection from it. The interpretation of this exceedingly brief statement is not easy. If it was explicable, perhaps Mr. N. might find no objection arising out of it. A river went from Eden to water the garden; from thence it was separated, and it became four heads. Now, that there were four rivers is pretty clear, for of four heads, we have two well-known named ones which are rivers—Tigris and Euphrates. The other two are not clearly ascertained. Two systems have been maintained: one that Gihon and Pison were the two rivers which form or formed the mouths of Tigris and Euphrates, which after uniting separated again. But this presents many difficulties. Others who have placed the garden in Armenia, near the sources of Tigris and Euphrates, seek Gihon and Pison in rivers in that country. No opinion has been clearly proved, because the text itself presents serious difficulties as to its meaning.

The first words, "a river going out from Eden," present a difficulty. The general idea that the Garden of Eden was not without this refreshment, is clear; and Tigris and Euphrates give a general idea of the country it was in. Eden supplied this water; that general idea is given. Eden may have contained the general source of waters, hence called *Nahar* generically; but the waters of this common spring-head separated, and four principal streams were formed from them.\*

No rivers had yet been mentioned, though seas and dry

\* It was the *Wassersteine*, strangely become in (at any rate, American) English, "Water-*shed*," a singular example of the difficulties of etymology. I quote from Bryant a description given by Moses Chæronensis of the district in Armenia to which the passage we are

land had. The source of these was the territory from which God had ordered that blessing should flow. Thus *Nahar* would be used generically; as I might say, land in contrast with sea. *Nahar*, river-streams, took their source in Eden. The garden was thus watered. Their freshness all was there; from thence the waters flowed here and there, and surrounded and characterised by their course other countries. Thus the sense would be,—“And a river-source was in Eden, to water the garden; and from thence (Eden) it was distributed, and became four principal streams.” Of these we know two, and two are uncertain, a circumstance not very astonishing; while there are such, and which answer accurately enough to such description. This sense has its perfect place in the general moral bearing of this part of Scripture. *There* were the streams of refreshment found. The primary object was the garden; but thence they flowed around the world which needed it. The context of the passage speaks of the different things that characterised the garden; and this account of the river which refreshed it then comes in. Every reader knows the place which a river holds in every description of what God has established. There is “a river which makes glad the city of God.” “God is in the midst of her.” This last could not be said of the garden.

Here what follows is—“Jehovah (*Elohim*) took the man and placed *him* in the garden;” and then goes on to show the responsibility under which he was placed—a contrast with the security flowing from God being in the midst of her. It was not the holy place of the tabernacle of the Most High; but the place of all those blessings and testimonies of goodness by which He had surrounded man when He placed him under the responsibilities which He must have done, if all the wondrous scene which we know, and which infidelity is ignorant of and incapable of discerning, was to unfold itself before the angels and the universe of God; responsibilities of which we

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speaking of is supposed to relate: “Armenia alta inter omnes regiones revera altissima est; quippe quæ ad quatuor cæli partes fluvios emittit (vol. iii. p. 7, of the 4th edition); “Upper (High) Armenia is really of all regions the highest; for it sends out rivers to the four quarters of the heavens;” and he then goes on to speak of its advantages.

know the consequences—and (if we believe in the Second Adam) the glorious remedy.

Of these analogies and developments and proofs of truth flowing from the link which God's ways and hand in it afford between all the parts of this wonderful book, infidelity, of course, is ignorant, cannot pretend to the knowledge of. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him, and He will show them his covenant." With Mr. Newman, it is a question of geography; as if God, in unfolding the first steps in that wondrous scene which angels desire to look into, was giving us some additional elements to settle a point in Rennel's Geography. I admit Scripture ought to be accurate in everything, without going beyond the forms of knowledge of those to whom it was addressed at the time, or it would not have been suited to them, as God does condescend to suit his instruction to us; as, if we know his grace, we might expect He would. And where is the book which, addressed, in ages earlier than otherwise known history, to a despised people, has stood the test of increasing light as the Bible has on every point? Take the Koran, and see the nonsense that is found in it: yet this was in the seventh century. Take the fathers. Take any book pretending to give an account of what are called fabulous ages, and see how the marvellous prevails; the little grains of fact to be picked out of these large stories; the prodigality of marvellous nonsense, from which we must in a mythical way conjecture some historical idea (if there is any), the only effect of which is, when we have discovered it, to show that what we have as plain history in Scripture is the true origin of the distorted fables we meet with in profane accounts and ceremonies—ceremonies of which the vulgar know nothing but the outside, as the religion of their fathers; but which show, when investigated, that what we have in Scripture is really the world's history—is that which, however distorted, has formed everywhere the basis of the whole system which knit them together as people, and separated them as people too; which acted on their fears and conscience, and impressed their imagination—had been the origin of their different religions, which were but the conscience of having had to say to God in these gradually forgotten wonders of

which Satan had possessed himself, to acquire the veneration and govern the lusts of those who had utterly departed from, and forgotten, the true God who had wrought them.

This leads me, in connection with the next objection, to the exceeding little-mindedness of infidelity.

Mr. Newman sneers (he must forgive me the word) at the sentence on the serpent (Phases, p. 110), the meaning of which is evidently the entire humiliation of the serpent. Going on its belly and eating dust would present this thought to any one familiar with Scripture. The import of the words is, beyond all question, the expression of judicial degradation, and the feeding on it even to death.

Hence his full final judgment is expressed in these words: "And dust shall be the serpent's meat." But this one sentence thus ignorantly scorned, gives the source, explanation, and judgment of what has characterised the universal race of man over the whole globe, to an extent without rival; unless, perhaps, the worship of the sun, which was generally identified with it. Where the polished idolatry of Greece and Rome, with which, I dare say, Mr. Newman is well acquainted, has never penetrated, the exaltation of the serpent has reigned paramount, and even in all its details proved the truth of the Mosaic account of the fall. Indeed, the allusion of Mr. N. here is unfortunate; for the fact that a single verse of simple statement accounts for what has governed the whole world, though it embraces nothing of the corruption that characterised what so governed it, is the strongest possible proof of the divinity of the record we possess.

It is evidently impossible for me here to give an account of the Ophiolatrea, or Serpent-worship. I can only notice some of the remarkable elements of it. It is found in China, Egypt, Babylon, England, France, Ireland, North America, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Scandinavia (*i. e.* Sweden and Norway), Greece, Italy, Africa in its most savage parts, Palestine, India,—in a word, all over the world. It is connected with the principal gods of the East, of Greece, of Rome, and with the most solemn worship of the countries I have mentioned. In Sweden and Norway, and in Macedonia, serpents were kept in the

houses as household gods; in Greece, and elsewhere, in temples, as public ones. They were considered the preservers of Athens, as of Whidah on the coast of Guinea; and the savage of Louisiana carried a serpent and the sun as the symbols of his religion, and tatoored them on his skin.

If we turn to the elements which characterised it, we find it accompanied with a tree, and a naked woman constantly its priestess. In India and Mexico, the deliverer is bitten in the heel by the serpent, which in these and other cases, is destroyed by being smitten on the head. Further, he is worshipped often erect, and not prostrate on his belly, and was fed alive with sweet cakes of honey. We find him frequently associated with a tree, and conversing with a woman. And this in countries, in sculptures, and in heathen accounts which leave no possibility of alleging fraud or intention.

It has been shewn, that the early history of Greece relates to colonies partly from Egypt, but partly from Hivites, serpent-worshippers driven out from Palestine by Joshua, as indeed were the Carthaginians.\* Can any one doubt for a moment of the bearing and origin of all this, and the importance of shewing that that Old Serpent which had elevated himself to be the god of all the world, was, by present ocular proof, a venomous prostrate reptile. There he was, manifested and marked out by his condition under the finger of God. And when we see the whole world full everywhere with these traditions of the serpents, of the worship of the serpent (and of the serpent erect and not on his belly), is not the immense moral importance of this declaration which in one little word explains it all, gives the terrible and real secret of it all, and reveals the ruined condition of the rebellious and disobedient man, evident to any serious sober-minded person. Scripture has not invented these facts; the whole state of the world, as the research and learning of the nineteenth century

\* It may be interesting to the English reader to know, that Stonehenge, other circles at Abury (Wiltshire), and again at Stanton Drew, near Bath, as well as many in Brittany, in France, are temples of the serpent, formed in exactly the same mystic shapes as appear in Egypt: that is, a serpent in a circle, which represents eternity, the Deity, and also the universe, which is also sometimes seen as an egg coming out of the serpent's mouth, or encircled by his folds.

has brought to light, has demonstrated the truth of the account given in Genesis—the divine importance of the key given in a few short words. That is, the whole history of the universe demonstrates the folly of the flippant sneers of ignorant or wilfully blind infidelity, spinning thoughts out of itself, as a spider its web, to catch those who may be foolish enough to fall into it, and neglecting the universal testimony of the world.

I may just add, as curious, that a living serpent was kept in the temple of Esculapius, the god of healing. So serpent-amulets among the Britons were supposed to preserve from all harm. Serpents were carried in baskets by the Bacchanals, Bacchus having in Greek the same name as the object of serpent honour in India, as indeed was the case with another name in Egypt.

Another remarkable fact connected with it was, that the notion of gaining wisdom from serpents was universal. This went even to the notion, that eating their flesh gave it. They gave oracles. The progress of idolatry seems to have been this: Satan seized upon the idea of God in men's minds, and the obscure traditions of what had happened. Where he could, he connected this directly with himself; and serpent-worship was universal as we have seen. Still, the sun being the great and splendid benefactor of man, and in unity, man's heart connected this with the one supreme God. This allied itself with the universe. Thus the serpent and sun-worship, both being intimately associated with the idea of the unity of Deity and the universe, became connected.

Sometimes the worship of the sun drove out the serpent-worship in its grosser form, yet was always connected with it—how should it be otherwise? Thus Apollo, who is the sun, established his worship at Delphi by slaying Typhon, an immense serpent, who was also said to have been cast down from heaven by Jupiter. He then gave oracles in his place; still the serpent was sacred to him, and was otherwise associated with the Delphic worship. So in the Scandinavian mythology, the great serpent produced by the evil spirit, Loke, against the Supreme God, is cast into the sea—he is the enemy of the gods. Thor will destroy him, but he will die in doing it. So

the wolf, produced by the evil spirit, now chained, will in the end break loose and devour the sun.

On the other hand, Hercules, and other such mystic personages answering to Thor in many respects, a kind of god-man, destroys serpents in all manner of fables. And Krishna in India, and Teotl in Mexico, reproduce traditional accounts of scripture redemption, connected with what is said of the serpent in Genesis.\* Cæsar produces, as the doctrine of the Druids, that man's sins could only be expiated by man's death.

Now idolatry, as far as we can say from Scripture only, came in after the flood. Hence we have the next step in idolatry, a vague tradition of a reign of bliss under Saturn, which recalled Paradise; and then his three sons, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, who become the supreme gods of heaven, earth, and sea; the ark being so distinctly remembered, that in the grand procession they carried a statue about in a kind of ship. Indeed, it is very probable that the Greek word translated "temple" is really identical with that of "ship." That is, in a word, the worship of the serpent connected itself with that of the sun and whole host of heaven; and, in cultivated Greece and Rome, merged, though retaining both, into traditions as to Paradise, Noah's three sons, and the flood. The purest of all serpent-worship was perhaps in England.

This serpent-worship retained its power longer than we suppose. In idolatrous Egypt, so judged in Scripture, there was a sect of Gnostics who connected it with their pretended Christianity; and under the name of *Ophites* (that is, "serpent-worshippers"), had a living serpent which was let out to glide over the sacramental elements to consecrate them, it being the source of wisdom; exactly as was done with Isis, the great object of serpent-worship, on whose temple was written, "I am all that hath been, and is, and shall be; and my veil no mortal hath ever removed;" and exactly as the worship in England was carried on in the serpent-temple at Abury and

\* The notion of the serpent biting the heel, and the Preserver crushing its head is retained, in the constellation of the Serpent and Hercules.

other places, as recorded in British bards' writings of that day.

In Brittany, in France, where the remains of these dragon-temples are abundant, it is curious to see the mounts ("barrows" as they are called) where the sun was worshipped with the serpent, now all dedicated to St. Michael, whom the Revelation presents to us as the destroyer of Satan's power. And within man's memory, in a village wake, the serpent-worship was commemorated, though none understood what it meant.

But I have said enough to demonstrate the importance of showing that the serpent was to go on his belly and eat dust. The world has consecrated it, has shown the place the serpent had in this history. The connexion of it with the worship of the host of heaven, is shown in the fable that Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, seized hold of the great serpent that was attacking Jupiter and the gods, and flung it into heaven, where it became the constellation Draco. Indeed, all the constellations are idolatrous gods. And, to this day, the planets known to antiquity are all marked by the symbolical signs connected with this mystic worship—that of a circle and cross.

In a word, while many traditions of truth were preserved, the serpent was deified. The Englishman little knows, when he tends his sheep or ploughs over Hackpen, that the hill he has beneath his feet has for its name "the serpent's head"; for such, in old British, is the meaning of Hackpen; and there was the head of the immense serpent formed by stones, the circle of deity through which it passed being in the centre, and known as Abury, a name which is undoubtedly supposed to recall the universal name given to the serpent as worshipped; nor that Arthur Pendragon is "*Uther* of the dragon's head"; nor that when he calls his mother, he uses most probably one of the names of Isis the Egyptian goddess, which identifies death and the woman; for *Moth* signifies "death."

The reader who wishes to have more details on this, must consult Bryant and Faber; or, if he has not access to these, a work more popular, but with, perhaps, fuller information—

Deane's "Worship of the Serpent." He will find the facts I have only alluded to, and an abundance more, which it is, of course, impossible for me to give here.

Universal testimony renders it unnecessary for me to dwell upon the pain and peril of childbirth; the apprehension of death which so often accompanies it, tells a tale in a woman's heart which a man's indifference (*Phases*, p. 110) to it will avail little against. I am aware that Mr. Newman, who thinks it mawkish sentiment to make difficulties about hanging people for the good of society, and takes evil for granted, must, among other evils, take for granted that of parturition. But one who believes in goodness, though he believes God can bring good out of evil, and that He has attached increase of suffering to seeming greater ease, that men's lot may be more even—one who believes God is good may naturally ask, "Why was suffering attached to the bringing-in an innocent babe into the world? Why was this special suffering attached to woman, and man left exempt from it necessarily and always?" For, whatever the reason, general and universal suffering, more or less, there is in this respect. Were the Bible an imposture as to this, it could only found such an imposture on the universal consent of man's universal knowledge of the fact. There was not such extravagant effeminacy of habits when Moses wrote the Pentateuch. A person who founds his infidelity on an assertion that suffering does not, as a general rule, accompany childbirth, must be wonderfully fond of the infidelity he is sustaining.

The next objection is, "that the two different accounts of the creation are distinguished by the appellations given to the Divine Creator" (*Phases*, p. 110).

Now that God, in the revelation of Himself, employs different names for the purposes of that revelation, which bring out some particular character in which He is pleased to act in the display of Himself, every one who has paid the least attention to Scripture is perfectly aware of.

There are three names especially which constitute so many grounds and bases of relationship with Him. He always was what is revealed in each one; but He was it

not formally in relationship with man, until revealed for that purpose.

*God* is the general name of the Being—*Elohim*.

1. *Almighty* was the name He took as the special protector of Abraham—*Shaddai* :

2. *Jehovah*, as in relationship with Israel, the abiding One, “who was, and is, and is to come,” who will accomplish in power what He has promised and undertaken in grace (see Exod. vi. 3). As this was the name He thus formally took with Israel, to whom these oracles were given, He is careful to show, from the outset, that *Jehovah* their God was the *Elohim Shaddai* (“God Almighty”) of creation and of Abraham; and hence the name of *Jehovah* is introduced from the beginning of any relationship of God with his creatures, though it was not the name of formal revelation and relationship.

3. The third name is *Father*. This is with Christians. Hence it is said in 2 Cor. vi. 17, 18, “Come out from among them and be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you and will be a Father to you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty.” That is, the living God (see verse 16), *Jehovah Shaddai* makes Himself *Father* with those who come out and believe.

Now this is the whole matter in what is objected to. As soon as God begins to unfold his ways with his creation, to be in relationship with it as a subsisting thing, and the ground on which this is based, and manner in which it has been formed, is developed, He reveals Himself as being that very *Jehovah* whom the Jews knew as their God. When it was the mere fact of creation in power, the great thing was to show that God, as such, did it. *Elohim* created, *Elohim* made; but when God is teaching what He was for this creation, and how He took such a place, He takes a name of relationship in which those to whom the revelation was addressed knew Him as their God. He is called not simply *Jehovah*, but *Jehovah-Elohim*, so as to connect the two thoughts, and show the *Jehovah* their God as *Elohim* the Creator, the supreme Source of all things. And this was of the very last importance. Germans and infidels, who are entirely ignorant really of the

whole scope and purport of Scripture, naturally find some reason within the scope of their infidelity (which cannot reach beyond a question of documents), for what is really altogether a perfection, and a pretty evident one for such as are at all attentive to Scripture.

As to Dr. Arnold (Phases, p. 111), the interesting character of whose mind and talent I need not enlarge on here, there was one characteristic trait of his mind which always furnishes a solid ground for distrust of any; that is, its very great confidence in itself. Breaking through the narrow boundaries of an Oxford education, which is more occupied with the means of knowledge than with knowledge, it broke forth into what was to it an unknown region, and soared out not quite aware whither. Amidst a thousand moral benevolent theories, the spiritual right-mindedness of a regenerate mind kept him safe as to what concerned moral foundation for himself; but there was no kind of moral or intellectual measure in his own mind, of the sphere into which he got, nor of man's powers in relation to it. He knew he had broken loose from many things that were mere trammels, which he then despised; but he never knew what the world, into which he had wandered out of the happy valley of the Isis, really was. Hence many a question started, which, to a mind not substantially kept right by spiritual instinct, as his was, became mere infidelity. I should say of this interesting man, that he was one of the most interesting, but unformed, I know within the little circle of my knowledge. He never was in the mature manhood of his mind, which accounted to itself for its own thoughts and their real bearing. Here, for instance, drawing the juice, I doubt not, from much of Scripture, he leaves the husk of infidelity to Mr. Newman. It was immaterial to him what the morass of difficulty was which he thus lightly tripped over, and thought thus to help others over too. To Mr. N. there was the morass of doubt, and that was all. To Arnold "the Mosaic cosmogony" was cosmogony, and that was all. To Mr. N. it was questionable cosmogony, and that was all he found in it.

"The history of Joseph" is "a beautiful poem," only it is

a true one. A wonderful picture of Christ's relationship with the Jews, yet written confessedly centuries, to say no more, before it happened, and by those who could not possibly foresee its accurate application. Nay, it is prophetic, I doubt not, of that which is yet to come. Here, however, Mr. Newman merely suggests there are difficulties, without entering into any detail or proof; so that we are relieved from answering him.

He objects to the long lives of the patriarchs (*Phases*, p. 110); but he does not say why. Nor is there any reason why a man should not be constituted to live nine hundred, as well as seventy years. It is a question of the sovereign power of God, on which mere reasoning is absurd. The longevity of the patriarchs would have rendered the peopling of the earth easier, as well as the communication of true knowledge more secure. But Mr. Newman does not even state the difficulty with any accuracy; for the earth must have been peopled from two persons, or, at any rate, from six since the flood, according to the Mosaic account. After that, five hundred years, four hundred, and so on; and on the division of the earth in Peleg's days, two hundred years were the allotted term of man's life; and, ere long, "threescore years and ten." But if we take the flood as the point of departure, the universal tradition, mythology, and worship of men confirm the account of Moses, and of the existence even of the three sons of Noah.

The statements of ancient Eastern writers, preserved for the most part in Josephus and Eusebius, are as clear and distinct as possible, confirming the account of Moses even to the sending forth of the birds. And the traditional mythology of Egypt, Greece, and all the neighbouring countries preserve the various facts and words connected with the flood, the ark, and Noe; tracing up their history each one to this same personage, making a god of him. And the eight became, in a remarkable manner, the sacred divine number in Egypt (the great converter of Mosaic history into fabular divinities); while he is in many fables represented as hid in an ark from the fury of a mythical representative of the deluge, and coming out by a new birth, and celebrated as the inventor

of wine. A sacred ship was carried in procession in many places. The very word "ark" (in Hebrew, תֵּבָה *teba*) having given its name to many of the places in which these superstitious memorials of it were preserved. The preservation of the ark on Ararat is recorded by the most ancient historical records in existence; and in various places where temples connected with these events were erected, a vast cleft was shown, through which the waters of the deluge are said to have retired.

In the East, the general historical account was preserved more clearly and fully; a very natural result of the fact, that it was from thence, according to the Mosaic accounts, that the various colonies of the human race started: whereas in Greece and places connected by colonies with it, each, though stating it in a way which, even to their own serious writers, proved it a far earlier history, attributed it to the first king of their own colony, and localised it. But they all agree in doing the same, each for his own colony; thus proving its universality, and in many instances acknowledging that their founder came from Egypt, and in one case in a very peculiar ship, thence held sacred—the very one which was carried in procession in the rites of Isis, in which the ark and the deluge were celebrated.

Besides this, the tradition of a deluge is universal all over the world. I may add, that the ablest naturalists, such as Cuvier, allege it to have been universal. Where does this universal tradition come from? Whence its connexion with the author of the human race preserved in an ark, and beginning again the history of man, who had perished by a deluge?

I may add, that there is an ancient medal of a city in Asia Minor, called by the Greek name of the "ark," on the reverse of which you have an ark, with a man and woman in it; the top taken off, and a bird flying with a small bough in its bill, and another resting on the ark: a man and woman are also outside, come down on the dry ground. All these, remark, are heathen notices of the deluge.\*

\* The reader who has the opportunity may consult Bryant, vol. ii. p. 195 of the 4to edition.

Mr. Newman suggests physiological difficulties as to the peopling of the earth (Phases, p. 110).

Some physiologists have thought, on physiological principles, that the earth must have been probably more populous at the time of the deluge than now; but to such mere probable calculations it is really useless to have anything to say. The population of the earth increases so much more rapidly under some circumstances than under others; so amazingly faster, too, in proportion to the space over which the population has to spread; or, on the other hand, diminishes from oppression or misery; that assertions made off-hand as to possible numbers, really prove nothing else than the disposition of the objector. Mr. Newman—who has not confidence in Scripture, because he will not believe it to be God's word, and who has great confidence in these surmises, because he is sure they are man's—considers the latter, of course, certain, the former of no authority, and talks of demonstrations; though as to demonstration, for instance of the antediluvian population, it is a mere absurdity to talk of it. Does he suppose he has any demonstration that there has been no deluge; the testimony to which, and even to the Mosaic account of which, is everywhere, and the proofs of which, according to the authority of such men as Cuvier, are everywhere also? All this shows simply the will to make objections, and the hardihood of objectors.

I would just remark here, that the word "infallible"\* is used by Mr. Newman in a very loose way, in which, indeed, he is not singular. God alone is infallible; for "infallible" means one who can in no case err. The most perfect truth cannot be called "infallible": it is the opposite to error, not to fallibility. This word does not apply itself to anything already expressed. The mass of truth to us yet unknown in Scripture, gives a certain applicability of this word to it; meaning, that we are sure that whatever we do thus find will be truth.† But the moral difference of infallibility and perfect

\* "It was impossible to allege anything so cogent in favour of the infallibility of any or some part of the Scriptures" (Phases, p. 112).

† Hence, when a simple person says, "Scripture is infallible," he is quite right: he means merely, that all he will find there is the truth as coming from God.

truth is very great indeed; because when I judge of the infallibility of Scripture, I am pronouncing on an abstract question about the book. When I reject positive truth that is there, I am facing what acts directly on my conscience. I do not discuss infallibility with an infidel; for, in strict logic, none but one who is incapable of erring in what he *may* pronounce, is infallible; but in Scripture all *is* pronounced: it is truth or error. The business of the infidel is therefore to pronounce that such and such things are truth or error.

I turn to the question of the entrance of death. Mr. Newman examines the present condition of man's body,\* which Scripture declares and every one knows to be mortal; and states, that as it is constituted it must be so, and hence argues that it must have been so in a state which he knows nothing about. And that is called logic! Is it impossible that it should have been in another state? Of course, as it is, it is mortal. But could not God have sustained it? All things subsist by Him. An animal that lives a century or two, or an insect that closes its life with the evening of its birthday, are all constituted so by Him with whom are the issues of life. Could He not have ever sustained the life of him whom He had made in His own image? A heathen, Callimachus, will tell him, that in Him we live and move and have our being. Mr. N. will tell us that the earth could not have held them. Who told him they would have staid there? All this is mere gratuitous supposition. One thing is certain, that some dire and ruinous confusion is entered in; and, whatever Mr. N. may dream in his closet, the misery, the violence, the horrors of the four quarters of the globe proclaim an unintelligible Deity, or a desolated and ruined, because a sinful world. He must be as hard-hearted as the god his imagination would content itself with, or admit that sin has brought in desolation and misery. Death is but the seal and stamp that characterises

\* "To refer the death of animals to the sin of Adam and Eve, is impossible. Yet if not, the analogies of the human to the brute form, make it scarcely credible that man's body can ever have been intended for immortality." His proof is drawn from geology and physiology, such as, "The conditions of birth and growth to which it is subject, and the wear and tear of life," etc. (Phases, p.112).

an existence over which it casts its fear, if thought allows anything but a wilful folly which is worse, and extends its power and gloom over man in spite of folly, so as to make a Saviour weep, though he that denies Him can look at it with indifference, because he can hide it from his heart, till it meets his eye, or—which God forbid—too late, appals his conscience.

But Mr. Newman will teach us more than Scripture. Man is like the brutes that perish, and must have always been so. Death could not have come upon animals. Geology, he says, tells us so. Now I do not pretend to judge this absolutely! The Apostle, in speaking of death entering into *this* world, says nothing whatever of what has happened in others, or with other creatures. He does not even speak of beasts. Now man has not been found in any ancient fossil remains.

What the Apostle says is this: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." Now here he evidently is entirely occupied with the effect of sin in bringing man under death, as the beginning of death declares. Neither in Genesis, nor in Romans, is anything said of the beasts. In both, men alone are spoken of as the specific subject. In Genesis, and to that the Apostle refers, it is a sentence previously pronounced *on man*. When man was created, God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, a thing never said of beasts. Death was pronounced in case of failure. As far as any other testimonies go, the New Testament rather speaks of beasts, as indeed does the Old, as perishing beings. "The beasts that perish." Peter says, "Natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed." Now I grant this does not positively prove anything, because the Psalmist and Apostle may refer to their present condition. But it shews how little ground there is for the objection; for with a holy wisdom, the word of God does not answer our curiosity, but leaves beasts as they are before our eyes. We are told, indeed, that the creature has got into misery and ruin by our fall, and, as a system, will not be restored till we are manifested in glory; and this is true even of our bodies. This was morally important for us to know, that we might be humbled by the sense of the way in which we had dragged down subordinate creation with us, encouraged by the thought

that our glory would be the occasion of the restoration of the blessing. But no further curiosity is indulged.\*

To talk of physiology is mere nonsense, because physiology can only examine man as he is—a state which scripture and all men pronounce to be that of mortality. What he was is the question; and of that I apprehend a dissecting infidel surgeon is about as ignorant as his neighbours; and more so than many, if he supposes that the God who created man could not sustain him in a present immortal condition. No creature can subsist *per se*, that is independently of God. God had constituted man not dying, and then sentenced him to be a dying creature as he is. Why is “wear and tear” (Phases, p. 113) essential to life? *Now* it is, no doubt; but this is not essential to life, but to man’s present state of life. The

aradisaical state is mentioned by Plato in a curious passage; he says: “They lived naked in a state of happiness, and had an abundance of fruits, which were produced without the labour of agriculture, and that men and beasts could then converse together. But these things we must pass over, until there appear some one to interpret them to us.”

It is certainly remarkable, how everything in the Mosaic history is preserved, at least as *dijecta membra*, bits of truth amidst masses of error and superstition corrupted into a mythological system by Egyptians, a fabular system by Hesiod and Homer, a monstrous system by Hindoos, but preserved; while Moses, who certainly did not derive it from extracting it by morsels from Hindoos, Egyptian, Grecian and Mexican fables, or from Plato, who lived centuries after him, has given a concise, simple account of immense moral import, infinitely elevated above the whole range of the heathen fables which pervert its elements, placing the Supreme God—man—good—evil—responsibility—grace—law—promise—the creatures—marriage—all in their place; which short statement accounts for all that we find dispersed over the whole world, of traditionary notions of the primeval history of man; so accounts for it, that with a

\* Besides, the finding fossil remains of an antecedent world, supposing it fully demonstrated, proves nothing of the manner in which death entered into this, even as regards beasts. We have no knowledge of their condition before the fall.

little pains, we can trace all the fables to their source. How comes this? It is God's most brief, but divine account of the whole matter; preserving, by its very brevity, its true character of the moral seed, so to speak, of all that has been afterward developed of good and evil. It was meant to be such and not more. The germ of all was there in that form. It is Divinely given. With further details it would have lost this character. It would have had only its own moral consequences for the parties concerned, like other acts of individual men. But in the Mosaic account, creative goodness, the knowledge of good and evil, conscience, judgment, the way of the tree of life closed, and promise in the Woman's Seed given, all involving immense principles are brought out. We see ourselves that the whole world is concerned in it: the immense drama of which angels and principalities and powers are the wondering spectators, and the conflict of good and evil, the moral of the tale, is opened with those in whose persons it was to be all developed, and the suggestion of His coming in grace and power, who would close in the glorious triumph of good, putting down evil, what had begun in the solemn lessons of a lost paradise. But the drama was a reality—and all was involved in that one man and his failing companion. Yet from her who failed recovery was to spring; for grace was to be brought out and magnified; that is, God in His dealings with man. And these things angels desire to look into.

But Mr. Newman will find faults if he can—old moral ones, for the old ones that depended on “science” are abandoned. We hear no more of the Zodiac of Dendera, or the millions of years of Hindoo chronology, or the more moderate thousands of Chinese dynasties. All these have disappeared before increased information. The Zodiac, on which the Volneys would found the ruin of revelation, by its proofs of the long ante-Mosaic existence of the world, has been proved by the discovery of the meaning of hieroglyphic symbols to have been made in the reign of Augustus Cæsar: the Indian eclipses are proved to have been calculated backwards, and the earliest observation to have been made not earlier than 700 years before Christ, that is, scarcely so early as Hezekiah's reign; and the time is known when all ancient books were destroyed in

China, so that all is fable before. No history exists before the latter part of the history of the Jews; and what is remarkable, all well-authenticated ancient history centres round that people.

Take Herodotus, and you will find that he has no nations with a history to tell you of, but such as were in connexion with the Jews. The Assyrians, Egyptians, and Babylonians, and such like. I name only the earliest. All the rest is vague and dark. Outside this we have some Chinese dynasties and some dark Hindoo traditions, which tend to confirm the early Mosaic accounts, and in monuments which no fraud could have reached. In Egypt, we have pictures of Jews making bricks under the lash; and what is remarkable, we have evidently Jewish overseers, and besides them Egyptian directors, or head-overseers, exactly what is stated in the Book of Exodus. For if infidelity can find doubts to stumble and fall upon, God has given to a simple faith, what even externally confirms its confidence, and confounds the folly of the false science that will not believe. Such proofs are never the foundation of faith: they cheer and confirm it.

Remark another thing, that history groups itself also round exactly that centre which Moses has made the cradle of mankind, while the peculiar people of God, placed at the point of contact of the three parts of the old world, formed the centre-field of active power, as it certainly did for Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt. Persia, Greece, Rome, all are grouped round it. Yet the hivings off of people in all directions, are found to be from the centre in which Moses placed it. It was the real *officina Gentium*. So late as the barbarian inroads into the Roman empire, the invasions were in a great measure determined by advancing hordes from the East. In general, all languages and all records shew that from about Mesopotamia, and the country north of it, as a centre, the world has been peopled. Though of course many of the movements are lost in the obscurity of ages, and secondary colonisations took place subsequently, as Hivites and Phœnicians peopling Greece and Africa, when driven out by Joshua, of which there is very ample evidence; and colonies from Egypt to Greece; and Greece to Italy; from Phœnicia over the whole Mediterranean

at least. But this only confirms the general fact, and that very strongly in some of its details. The Phœnicians went even to Ireland, and the 1st of May is still called in Irish, as pronounced, *Boul tinne*, that is, *Baal teine*,\* Baal's fire, *teine* meaning *fire* in Celtic. I turn now to some other objections.

Mr. Newman's first moral objection is to the song of Deborah; and his objection is, that "the prophetess Deborah, in an inspired psalm, pronounces Jael to be blessed above women, and glorifies her act by an elaborate description of its atrocity" (Phases, p. 113). But who told Mr. N. that Deborah's song was "an inspired psalm"? That the writer of the Judges was inspired to give it to us, I do not doubt; but that is entirely a different matter. I believe in the fullest way in the inspiration of Scripture; but that does not mean, that all that it contains was inspired in the mouths of those who uttered it. We have Satan's words, wicked men's words, human accounts of divers facts *recorded* by inspiration; but not themselves inspired. A revelation should give (it is what it means) the perfect presentation of the Divine mind on the subject of which it treats, to one spiritually capable of understanding it; but in doing this, as to man, as to Israel, it must give me a true, real picture of what man, what Israel, is; and this it does, not merely by a dogmatic statement, but by a large historical development of what man has done, what he has felt, what he has been in various circumstances, under various advantages, and in states of progress through the revelations already afforded him. If the Bible had merely given us God's judgment, we never should have had the same testimony to conscience as we have by its affording us man's actual history, under the various dispensations of God towards him. But to do this, I must have him as he was, his feelings expressed as they were in him; whether without God, or under the influence of piety, yet ill-informed in God's mind;

\* The only question which may be raised is, whether this expression of *Boul tinne* may not belong to the original inhabitants who first peopled the country: but this would only make the proof stronger. In Ireland the tradition of the arrival of the Phœnicians is well known and fully believed.

or animated as to his heart by God's Spirit, yet the result a mixed one, and taking the forms of thought and feeling, which were and must have been such as his state of moral education would have produced. Otherwise it would not have been the true and needed account of man; consequently, not a Divine one.

In the midst of all this, we get positive revelations from God, given in order to act upon men in this state. In this last case, I get inspired testimony of what God's own mind is. Yet even here grace has adapted it to the conscience and spiritual information possessed, and God's dealings with men in such or such a state. If He deigned to deal with them, thus He must have done, in condescendence, for their blessing. He leads them up and onward indeed; but it is them He is to lead. A gracious father speaks to his child according to what suits it; yet never what is unworthy of himself: it is worthy of him to suit himself to them. So has God dealt with men, with Israel. How else could He have dealt with them, if He meant them to be morally developed?

Thus in the Old Testament we have a perfect, divinely-given picture of man, under this gracious process, in the various relationships in which he was placed with God, so as to get his whole condition fully brought out, that by a divinely-given history we might know ourselves, and at the same time the whole course of God's dealings, and what man was under them, till his need of perfect and supreme grace should be manifested, and God manifested in Christ as the supreme grace he needed, and man and God get into the relationship which was in his full purpose, according to the security of the unchangeableness of his nature, and the perfectness of his love.\* When we were yet without strength,

\* I speak of the revelation of it. The effectual means of all grace was Christ from the beginning. "God's righteousness was declared at this time." This last remark shows that the doctrine of development since Christ, is a blasphemous arraignment of the perfection of *God Himself manifested in Christ*, fully revealed by the apostles, or a total ignorance of what Christianity is. Hence John urgently insists, "That which was from the beginning, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have heard, which we have looked upon, which our hands have handled, of the Word of life." That is, he calls back to *what was*

*in due time* Christ died for the ungodly. Hence it is said, "For the forgiveness of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare *at this time* his righteousness." He dealt with them for the full development of his ways. He received them according to his knowledge of the perfect work to be accomplished in Christ.

Now God has given us a perfect revelation of all this; but we should not have the knowledge either of man or of our God Himself, and of his wondrous and all-perfect and patient ways with us, if we had not men at each step exactly as they were; it would not be the truth else. The statement of morality simply by God, would no doubt have shown what man ought to be. That we have in the law. But it would not have shown us what man is; nor that, under the various dealings of God. Now we have this; and, I repeat, to have it, we must have man even when under the influence of God's Spirit, just as he was under it; the effect produced being according to the degree in which his own soul was acted on, the medium in which he lived, and the measure of revelation afforded him.

Such was Deborah's song. It is not a communication of God's thoughts, but of Deborah's feelings. Doubtless her heart was moved by the Spirit in thankfulness for the deliverance of God's beloved people; but there is not a sign of its being a communication from God to that people. Now such a song may vary in the spiritual conformity to the highest measure of light which is possessed—may be more or less mixed with man, and may be coloured by the general condition of the people, and the nearness of the individual's soul to God. It may express much greater nearness, because the mass are far gone from Him—as in Hannah's, whose weakness is entirely cast on God, and hence points vividly to Christ—or Simeon's, whose soul can go in peace, because the hope of his devout heart is fulfilled in the midst of the desolations of Israel—or

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*from the beginning*, as the safeguard against all seduction. It is remarkable, that as soon as he had got thoroughly infidel, Mr. Newman could get on good terms with his brother, who had got thoroughly papist, and not before. This tells a tale few are prepared to believe. It is a sign, too, of the times.

(if God interferes in outward mercy and gives a temporal reviving, because He will not destroy, but make Himself known, and that in mercy to his people), the thanksgiving or the praise will descend to the measure of the present interference, by which God has hindered his people from having their remembrance blotted out of the earth.

Such is, in fact, Deborah's song. It does not rise above it. If I am to know what Israel was then, it ought not—if I am to know the way of God's dealing with them, it must not—pass beyond it. Israel gradually sunk; and the character of deliverers and deliverances sunk, till God had to come in afresh in Samuel and David, when "He had delivered his strength into captivity, and his glory into the enemies' hand." How am I to learn this, and know what the real condition of the people and the truth of God's dealings were, if I do not have them just as they were? A song of David, of Simeon, or of Hannah, would have been morally out of place to celebrate the deeds of Barak the son of Abinoam, and of the prophetess of the palm-tree in Mount Ephraim. The thing objected to is a perfection in the revelation. I judge many things in the revelation by a clearer light. I learn many things in God's ways. How could I, if they were not there? Mr. Newman neither states the fact correctly, nor reasons justly from what he observes. It is never given as "an inspired psalm." It is only said, "Then sang Deborah, and Barak the son of Abinoam." I pass a moral judgment on many things in the Old Testament, because God has given us the true light, and the darkness is now passed. But how does that show that it is not an inspired revelation that has given me them? I judge them in the perfect light. But it is He who is light who has given me them to judge of, and the light to judge them by. He means to inform my spiritual judgment, and to reveal his ways to me, to show me that He has never ceased dealing with men, that the world has not gone on without his knowledge. He has given me the key to everything, and therefore He has afforded me all these elements with Divine perfectness, on which and by which my judgment is to be spiritually formed, and my senses exercised to discern good and evil, as man has learnt it through ages, or as it has been

displayed and developed in his history; while Christ has given the perfect key by which to judge of it all. Hence Paul says, the Scriptures are "able to make us *wise* unto salvation, through *faith which is in Christ Jesus*." And so when poor Peter would have put Moses and Elias in the same rank with Christ, they disappear, and "a voice came from heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son: *hear Him*. And... Jesus was found alone."

Then I do get direct addresses to the conscience at the time in the prophets, and the directing the eye of the saints, suffering under the evil state of God's people, to that better day, which the Christ who should visit them as the day-spring should bring in, to set all things right. They looked on to it, and were saved by hope, as we are—if not so clear a hope, yet as true, and indeed the same, though only partially revealed, and in its earthly part—yet so as that heaven was necessarily brought in by it. Abraham rejoiced to see Christ's day; and he saw it, and was glad; and, a stranger in the Canaan which had been promised him, he looked for "a city which hath foundations, whose Builder and Maker is God," in the glory of which he will enjoy the blessings of the inheritance of his children in a better and sweeter way than those who shall actually possess them. The Old Testament is gained, not lost, thus; we have it from our God's own hand to instruct us. What happened as proofs of God's present interference in a temporal way to them, which was what suited their state and God's government of the earth, is spiritual instruction for us, *written* for our learning, which is what we want, that by which we can more fully know God; while all He teaches in it is perfect, and from that I learn his ways.

Mr. Newman is false in his theory, and mistaken in his fact. I can "pass a moral judgment" (Phases, p. 114). The history of men in the Old Testament is given me for the purpose; and instead of its being lost thereby, or the battle in its defence, it gains all its real value. And as to Deborah's song, his statement is unfounded.

Yet this does not depend on "*my* powers" (Phases, p. 114), save as God may use them; nor "*my* scientific knowledge" (id. ib.), in which, in his own case, Mr. Newman places so

much reliance; nor on "blinding *my* moral sentiments" (id. ib.), because I have the perfection of Christ to judge by. It does depend on my spiritual progress, my moral state, as to being able so to use the word; and this is exactly what ought to be.

As regards the sacrifice of Isaac, Mr. Newman shows here, as elsewhere, his monstrous setting aside of God and his authority.

The act is not given as a rule of morality nor of conduct in any way, but as a special case in which Abraham's faith was put to the test. "It came to pass that God did tempt Abraham." Hence there is no kind of analogy with "those who sacrificed their children to Moloch."\* Men, through a perverse, unnatural, and cruel custom, gratifying the suggestion of their depraved nature, without any command whatever, accomplished of their own will this horrid barbarity, which was done as due to, and as liked and approved by, the god which their nature had pictured to them, as a practice pleasing to him. They got over conscience and affection through the hope of having their lusts and vengeance gratified, so as habitually to treat their children thus. It was their own practice to execute this cruelty—*their state of mind*.† In

\* "Abraham was (in heart and intention, though not in actual performance) not less guilty than those who sacrificed their children to Moloch" (Phases, p. 114).

† I say, it was the fruit of their own heart, and the expression of its state. For the question is on the "heart and intention," which Mr. Newman says was as bad in Abraham as in Moloch's worshippers. I have no doubt that the devil had brought them to this, taught them this frightful worship. "The things which the Gentiles offer, they offer to devils, and not to God." But Mr. N. cannot take this ground, because he believes not in such a work of Satan. If he does, he thinks that the devil can communicate—reveal—a religion to men; but that God cannot. I treat it, therefore, as the simple fruit of man's heart; and thus this voluntary act of atrocious cruelty, in which man's heart did become the maker of his own God, as Mr. N. wishes, and in which this God was the projected image of his heart; this voluntary unnatural depravity to get such a God in some way to help it, to gratify in some way its own lusts, is not at all worse, according to Mr. N., than Abraham's sacrificing his own heart's feelings and everything he could

Abraham's case it was not, nor ordered to be. God had placed the promises in Isaac in a positive manner; and God puts Abraham to the test, to show whether he had such entire confidence in Him, that he would give up all the promises as possessed (trusting that God would somehow and at all events accomplish them, and raise up Isaac again), for in him God had said that the promises of a seed should be accomplished, and obey God in an express command, let it cost him what it would. When this was proved, God suffered not the child to be touched.

What analogy has this with a practice of passing their children through the fire as agreeable to their self-made god, an act done on their own part? There is no kind of similarity in the cases whatever. Would you say, that a man who hazarded his life to save his father (as the young Munro, who was bit in two by a shark), was the same as justifying suicide, or pirates' offering a man every voyage to a shark, to satisfy some supposed impure god of the sea, and gain men's own ends? And mark how the express command of God (Abraham's *sole* motive for doing it) is entirely left out here. In the other case it was the habitual violation of the tenderest and strongest moral obligation, to please a god who, if that habitually *pleased* him, was certainly a devil. Here it is a single case where the supreme and express claim of a God known as sovereign and sovereignly good by Abraham is not cavilled with, however little he could account for such a command.

I am at this moment answering objections; but, in the midst of them, Mr. Newman inserts these conclusions:—

“ 1. The moral and intellectual powers of man must be acknowledged as having a right and duty to criticise the contents of Scripture.

“ 2. When so exerted, they condemn portions of the Scripture as erroneous and immoral.

“ 3. The assumed infallibility of the entire Scripture is a

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lean upon, at the *express command* of a God whose constant love, faithfulness, and power he had known and believed in, and now trusted to give him his son back again: and a judgment such as this is, to Mr. N.'s mind, the proved falsity of Scripture morals!

proved falsity, not merely as to physiology and other scientific matters, but also as to morals," etc. (Phases, p. 115).

I have, in principle, discussed this already; but it is well to notice it here.

Express it thus: The moral and intellectual powers of *all* men must be acknowledged as having a right and duty\* to criticise the contents of Scripture. If not, it is merely the *personal pretension* of some individuals who plume themselves on their own capacity. That is, all men are in a state fully competent to judge of what is becoming to God. That is proved by Abraham's being as bad as Moloch's worshippers! and thousands of enlightened persons having been so far from discovering it, that they thought Abraham a blessed man, and Moloch's worshippers atrocious men and unnatural parents. I should have thought these last, indeed, a proof that men, whatever the reason, were not capable of forming a just judgment of what becomes God. They clearly prove the assertion false; indeed, one has only to state the proposition, to see its falseness. In the first place, the majority have accepted heathen atrocities without a murmur. In the next place, the immense majority of those who have not, have accepted the Scriptures which Mr. Newman condemns, as the most absolutely perfect revelation of God.

They differ entirely from him.

Mr. Newman's statement amounts to this—he condemns certain portions of Scripture as erroneous and immoral. Hundreds of infidels and millions of heathens have criticised the Scriptures, or heard them criticised, and found proof that they are of God. They have examined them as a whole, and seen a perfect development of God's ways with man; the rule of man's conduct given to him, but, the apprehension of the conscience, and the whole system dependent on it being imperfect when God was only partially revealed (*for all depended on the light given*), they have seen the God of supreme patience condescending to deal with men according to the light they have from Him; but always with evidence enough to prove to the

\* I say, *moral and intellectual powers must be acknowledged as having a duty*—a singular phrase, to give Mr. Newman's own idea as accurately as possible.

conscience, by things suited to it where it was, that it was God it had to say to. They have seen that in due time He has revealed Himself perfectly. Mr. N., availing himself of this light, though rejecting it as *an imposture*, condemns the previous state of imperfection by it. God bore with it, "as a father pitieth his" little "children," though correcting and leading them on. Which is worthiest of God? But the fact of man's passing four thousand years\* either accepting some Moloch-god, or considering as perfection the testimony Mr. N. condemns, proves that the supposed moral power of man was not fit to criticise, unless Mr. N. suppose that the true God was made for his happy self and his companions.

He says, as we have seen, that the infallibility of Scripture is a proved falsity. Proved by whom, and to whom? Not to me by a person who can compare the habitual burning of children to Moloch to an extraordinary putting to the test of one who knew God, by seeing if he would give up

\* This is equally true, ever since, because Christians accept the Old Testament as a work of the true God, though the true light did not then shine. Indeed, the doctrine of human progress adopted by Mr. Newman and his sect, is the most heartless and vile idea imaginable. It is just a knot of self-complacent men, who think they have got a good deal of light that nobody else has, coolly consigning, as if by the arrangements of God (not as a dismal effect of sin and departure from Him, as Christians do), all the millions, for six thousand years, to darkness and the horrors of paganism, in order that they may have the light now. And mark the notable arrangement—*their* God (for certainly it is not ours) turns man out of his creating hands in this state of atrocious wickedness, darkness, and brutality, to get on some how, if he can, by gradual discoveries confined to a few philosophers, to some degree of light at the end, when the scene is to cease. It is not the case of a child in the sweet simplicity of guileless confidence, with all to learn. Burning men in immense wicker images of their own form, as British Druids did, is not simple-hearted childhood; nor is cultivated corruption (flexible polytheism is the word), like that of Corinth. The Fall makes this intelligible. But without it, when one thinks of the point of departure, and that we are creatures of God, the system of progress is the most atrocious and absurd one can well conceive. And what progress! It is, that, at the end of six thousand years, a few philosophers can speculate heartlessly on those who have been in this darkness before them. But I shall say a little more on this and other points connected with it, in a few pages of Appendix.

natural grounds of confidence as to possession of promise and trust wholly in the known true God. Such a person seems to me morally incapable of judging of right and wrong, and much too far from God to be able to judge of anything. Not one who can criticise a song as inspired, without giving himself the trouble of inquiring whether it be so. Nor one who can flippantly comment on a verse as ridiculous when it accounted for and judged the most universal evil influence in the world which he had either ignorantly or culpably passed over.

Mr. Newman's moral and intellectual powers have condemned, or his will has sought reason for condemning, certain portions of Scripture carved out from all the rest. But how is this to guide those who only see in such condemnation moral incapacity of judgment in the proofs given, and incorrectness or ignorance as to the facts alleged, or those connected with it.

Mr. Newman cannot pretend he is the only one who has examined scripture. Does he pretend that the immense mass of moral intelligent men have not judged quite differently from him. You will say, this does not prove the truth of scripture. I grant it. But it proves that what Mr. N. says in these three conclusions, is only immense complacency in his own opinion; for the moral and intellectual powers in question were his own. For instance, why am I to suppose Cuvier's and Buckland's powers, who believed in a universal deluge, inferior to or less exercised than Mr. N.'s, who denies it? Can any one tell me any reason Mr. N. has to give me for it except one. Again, take the moral powers of Paul and James, who cite the case of Abraham. They never suspect anything wrong. Were Paul's moral powers unexercised? Mr. N. will say, he did not dare to criticise scripture. Were his moral powers then really numbed by it? Was *he* in the same condition in virtue of believing in Scripture as those who gave their children to Moloch? This is Mr. N.'s theory;\* for he cites as an admirable act, a deed Mr. N. thinks equally bad. It is not referred to as an act pardoned for ignorance' sake, or

\* The truth is according to Mr. Newman's reasonings; he was in a worse one, having taken up a false revelation.

passed over in silence, but adduced as a proof of the power of faith. I have read Paul's works, and I have read Mr. N.'s. Which has the truest knowledge of God, and what became Him? What were the effects produced in righteousness, love, devotedness, self-renouncement, strict holding fast of eternal righteousness and truth, largeness of heart, and flexibility in grace towards all, power of abstraction to embrace combined truth and vast plans in one glance as a whole; power of individuality which concentrated his affections on particular objects as if there were none else. A purity of mind which apprehended right and wrong with amazing clearness—a spirit of obedience which bowed as a child in humility to the Master whom he knew as his Lord and God. We see powers moral and intellectual, exercised in the most various ways; heathen philosophers and poets studied at the renowned Tarsus, and rabbinical lore imbibed at the feet of Gamaliel equally well known—a rabbin among rabbis; and all these acquirements brought into practical exercise and adaptation to men in the most active life by one occupied with every kind of character, eminently real in his power, and yet carrying perfect abstract theory into the reality. All ended in his taking as a choice excellence what was, “if the voice of morality is allowed to be heard” (Phases, p. 114), not less culpable than sacrificing children to Moloch; nay, he quotes it as excellence “in heart and intention” (for there was no actual performance), exactly where Mr. N. finds the guilt. Now, I humbly conceive that Abraham's heart and intention in giving up all, and the promises too (as to present possession) on the true God's own word, through confidence in Him, and counting on Him to restore Isaac, was not the same as an habitual disposition to put man's own children through the fire, as actually and always agreeable to the heart and nature of “Moloch, horrid king.” Moses presents it as a special trial, and the apostle notices it as such.

I conceive that the parallel does not prove the immorality of this portion of the Scripture, nor the superiority of “the moral and intellectual powers” which think they can criticise it; but something very different from that: and that is moral incapacity to judge—and that Paul, who, by divine

teaching, received the Scriptures as from God, had his moral and intellectual powers much better formed and much better exercised by the reception of what was divinely superior to himself, than he has, who, depriving himself of all above him, pretends to criticise what Paul bowed to.

It is well Mr. Newman should learn another truth. We may be morally exercised on that which is above us without calling it in question. Nay, the highest and only really profitable exercise must be of this kind. Ignorance of God is not the best cultivation of moral powers. The highest, best exercise of moral and intellectual powers is on Him; but if I own Him as such, I own Him above me in supreme authority. I do not call Him in question. He is not the subject of criticism, or the idea of God is lost. But we have already seen that Mr. N. shuts Him always out.

He never gets beyond man. But man, what is he? If it is his judgment, it is every man's—it is that of the most deceived. There are millions of judgments: that is, there is none, if we speak of a rule. You will tell me there is conscience, which is substantially common to all. I admit it fully; but, where real, it owns the authority of God, always in His supremacy—owns itself the object of His judgment, and does not pretend to be His judge: conscience ceases to act when we do. Hence, though the will be unbroken, and the passions unsubdued, the word of God, the Scriptures, tell on it, speak to it, make it quail, attract it as good. And, as far as conscience goes, it does not cavil or criticise; for conscience is in a sinner, and it knows the word is holy, and knows it has to say to God in it. It is a subjective element, and is acted on as to responsibility; is aware of it—and the word acts on this. Felix will tremble, though he may say, “Go thy way,” and hope for money, and leave Paul bound.

A few words are also needed here as to inspiration, which Mr. Newman introduces here in passing. He says: “But in what position was I now towards the Apostles? Could I admit their inspiration, when I no longer thought them infallible? Undoubtedly. . . . The moderns have erringly introduced into the idea of inspiration that of infallibility, to

which either *omniscience* or *dictation* is essential" (Phases 120). Mr. N. is so exceeding loose in his way of stating things, that one is forced sometimes to be tedious to bring out clearly what has really to be answered. But as popular notions are often the same, such a process in answering may have a certain general utility. In reasoning on the reality of a Divine revelation, however, such looseness is unpardonable. In popular language it is comparatively immaterial. Thus when men speak of the infallible word of God, they mean that they may rely upon it as having all the infallible certainty of what God says; and they are quite right. But no person speaking carefully, would say the Apostles were infallible. We have one of them rebuking another to his face, so that he did not think so. Thousands of devoted Christians have canvassed St. Paul's vows and purifyings at Jerusalem. No true and sound-minded one has questioned the Divine authority and truth of the Scripture that speaks of it. What I look for in a revelation, as I have said, is a perfect representation of the Divine mind, as to all the ways in which God is pleased to make Himself known in dealing with man. In order to have this, I must have a full display—an exposure of man as he really is—and this being historically and dogmatically given, affords the ground of human conscience and Divine light. Now this is the greatest boon, save the power to use it, that God can give to man (not now speaking of the salvation itself which it is the means of making known to him); he gets the knowledge of himself and of God, and of what God is towards himself, such as he really is; and he is brought into the perfect light, and that in grace.

But for this purpose, how many things very different from God's will and thoughts, contrary to what God would have inspired, and mixed when he has acted on the affections, shall we find? If God shews us the truth, we must have things as they really are. We must have an Apostle's failures as well as all else—man's path, under the highest power of the Holy Ghost bestowed upon him. For this he must often express *himself*. Only with this we need the positive revelation of God's own mind in an unquestionable way to be able to judge, supposing we are spiritual, of all this; and that, the Scriptures

afford us. This human character is, in the New Testament, especially drawn out and unfolded. In the Old, we have the history of man divinely given, and certain oracles imparted with "thus saith the Lord," with comparatively little, save in the Psalms, of the effect of the working of the Holy Ghost in man, so as to produce affections and thoughts in which the divine spring is seen, but the forms of human thoughts, because it was the Holy Ghost working in man. In this latter case, there may be various degrees of spiritual clearness of thought according to the state of the person in whom the Holy Ghost works. It may be such as spiritual men have now, only of course the thoughts conformed to the state of the dispensation. Thus it was, as we have seen in the case of Deborah's song—and if I am to know man and God's dealings, and man under them, I must have this. A person may be filled with the Holy Ghost, and so express his mind, that though it be his feelings, and so given, yet what nature would have produced is absent; and it is only what the Holy Ghost has produced, though in *his* heart. Thus his heart is a proper vessel of the Holy Ghost; and his utterance may be recorded as being really of God and proper inspiration, though in a human heart. Thus the song of Hannah has, I doubt not, this character, though not given as inspired, and expressive of her own feelings and apprehension of God's ways, as such must be to be real. So Elizabeth's song in Luke i.—Zachariah's in the same chapter—Simeon's in chap. ii. In these cases, such outgoings of heart being directly from the Spirit, will be prophecies, properly speaking. Such we have in the Psalms, though they be expressions often of feelings in the writer's heart at the time, and, I doubt not, prepared for the remnant of Israel in the latter day, as giving them Divine comfort in their tried feelings and exercised hearts then.

Of David's Psalms we are expressly informed by himself, the sweet Psalmist of Israel, "The Spirit of the Lord spake by me, and His word was in my tongue."

This kind of working of the Holy Ghost even in our hearts, and that in cases where our minds are not sufficiently taught of God to know what to look for, is spoken of in Romans viii., where he says, "He who searches the *heart* knoweth what is

the mind of the Spirit, because *He* maketh intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered." It is merely saying, that the Holy Ghost can work in the affections where the intelligence may not be sufficiently formed to express itself on particular subjects, or point out the positive answer to these affections. If before-hand, God communicate the answer to a heart so exercised, it becomes real prophecy or inspired truth, as well as divinely given feelings. If even the Spirit gives such expression to the sorrow of the heart that it should be according to God, this may be more than personal though it be such, and rise to the full revelation of that personal or sympathetic sorrow which was, in the heart of Jesus, from the same causes more fully developed, and without counteracting or modifying evil. And this might be without the knowledge in him who uttered it, of what it applied to. Such a principle is clearly recognised in the New Testament; for Peter speaks of the prophets who, by the Spirit of Christ which was in them, testified beforehand of the sufferings of Christ, and the glories which should follow, and they searched what and what manner of time it referred to, and found it was not for themselves but for us. The Jews had the same notion, and as an opinion it was well founded, though they joined unsound notions as to inspiration with it. They taught that there was the *gradus Mosaicus*, or "Moses' degree," the *gradus propheticus*, and the *Bath kol*, or "Daughter of a voice"—the two first founded on Num. xii. 6—8, and the third characterising the *chetubim* or *hagiographa*. This did not touch the authority but the character of the writings. But it is often of deep interest to know the manner of God's speaking to us; though in whatever way He may speak, his word has always the same authority. Not one jot or one tittle can pass from the law, and all that is written in Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms concerning Christ, must be fulfilled. Yet when the Apostle says, "God, who in sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past, has in these last days spoken to us by the Son [in the Son, in the person of the Son ἐν ᾧ];"—is it not of the deepest possible interest to see the testimony of God brought to us in the person of the Son Himself? God Himself speaking there; for he whom God hath sent speaketh the

words of God, "for God giveth not the Spirit [to Him] in measure." Everything there was the expression of God Himself. It was not "Thus saith the Lord," for some precious sentences—and then a man's relapsing into his ordinary though perhaps sanctified existence. All that came forth breathed God—God in human kindness, philanthropy—as the apostle speaks, "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." If He took up a child—if He spoke to a sinner—if He sat at the well wearied, with a yet more weary and desolate heart beside Him, a woman who came alone at that strange time to draw water, one justly in one sense ill seen by men, and yet, however dark, perhaps with secret wants beyond them, a sign to His eye that the fields were white for harvest—if He touched an outcast leper with a gracious and sovereign "I will"—all told that God was there, amongst men—with men, because of men—and gracious words proceeded out of His mouth. Surely they made men wonder; for how long had they been away from God. And if a prophet's words were just as sure because the Spirit of Christ really spake them, yet surely I need not speak of the bright and blessed interest which accompanied the existence of such a testimony as His who spake as never man spake. A Saviour's words came, if indeed heard, with divine grace itself to the ear. It *was* the mercy that it spoke of. "If thou knewest the gift [free-giving *δωρεαν*] of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink [who has come so low as to be dependent on you for a drink of water]; you would have asked of Him [entire confidence of heart in God—such a God!—would have been produced, nor would it have been disappointed in grace or in power to answer], and He would have given thee living water."

This was indeed revealing God. Here we have not a long and dreary because a true picture of man cultivated in vain by the great husbandman, and the testimonies and warnings of God sent to him, or prophecies of brighter days to come through grace. We have perfect gracious man walking before God, for our eyes to rest on and learn, and God walking before men in all the near grace they needed, come to them just as they were, that they might learn what He was,

and by it be drawn out of what they were. It was presented to them in all their distance from God, and in all their misery where grace could be best felt, that they might be drawn out of that misery, and know with joy the God who had done so. It is this that Mr. Newman despises, treats as an imposture. Man *shall* by searching find out God, and boast of his capacity—with such a history as he has—but God neither has nor shall reveal Himself to him. That is an evil, and forbidden by spiritual men! As for unspiritual they may shift for themselves, that is not a philosopher's affair; misery is necessary\* for general development, as hanging is good for society. It is a mere "morbid notion" to object to it!

\* The following are Mr. Newman's statements on this head:—"It is true, that even in the primitive structure of things, we discover much which at first shocks us. Physical pain in many aspects appears not as an accident and an abuse, but as if definitely designed. Fierce beasts are observed to be armed for inflicting misery, and the instincts of one creature are often directed to destroy the quiet and comfort of another, which may seem not to have earned hostility. On this subject whole volumes might be written, as ample arguments have been. Here it may be sufficient to remark, that the difficulty turns on the epicurean assumption, that physical ease and comfort is the most valuable thing in the universe: but that is not true, even with brutes. There is a certain perfection in the nature of each, consisting in the full development of all their powers, to which the existing order manifestly tends; and any one who shall speculatively reconstruct the organized world and logically follow out his own scheme, will probably end in discerning, that the present arrangements of God are better than man could have devised. As for susceptibility to pain, it is obviously essential to every part of corporeal life, and to discuss the question of *degree* is absurd. On the other hand, human capacity for sorrow is equally necessary to our whole moral nature, and sorrow itself is a most essential process for the perfecting of the soul. Not to have discerned the relation of sorrow to virtue, is perhaps the most striking defect pervading all the Greek moral philosophy.

"More permanent disturbance of mind is caused to good men who have no extensive view of human nature, nor habit of mental analysis, from the prevailing wickedness of mankind. It avails not here to say that human goodness is only a relative idea, and that however much better men were, we should still think them bad, since our standard would have risen. In a mere moral view, indeed, such a reply suffices; for all tribes of men have some morality. Those who are ferocious towards foreigners, are often tender-hearted towards their own people; and the difference of savage from civilised virtue is one of degree.

But to return. The inspiration of the New Testament is interesting in another way. The Holy Ghost Himself is come down to dwell in the saints, and to take the things of Christ and show them to us; and He dwells in us as a seal that we are children of God, heirs of all, and joint-heirs with Christ. He at the same time brings all the love of God into the sorrows of the way, enables us to apprehend according to God

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But religiously the case is otherwise; for there is a chasm between loving God and not loving Him, serving Him and not serving Him. We can easily suppose such an improvement in human nature, that though all would of course be still imperfect, yet none should be irreligious: and men will ask, Why does a good God leave so large a part of mankind in irreligion? To many this is an exceeding severe trial of faith, because irreligion has been invested with *eternal* consequences, which binds the understanding in a net absolutely inextricable. But let the Gordian knot be cut: let it be discerned that the Infinite cannot be the meed of the finite;—then, while we lament the actual state of the world, we shall not find it hard to understand that it has necessarily resulted from the independence of the human will, which *must* be left free and capable of resisting the Divine Will, otherwise we should not be men, but brutes or machines. Assuming then that evil is finite, transitory, and only an essential condition towards the attainment of a higher and permanent good, we find nothing in human wickedness, however intense, and whatever misery it causes, to inspire rational doubt of the divine goodness.

“That there is abroad among us an unsound view of supreme goodness (or *benevolence*, as it is called), cannot, I think, be denied. It is akin to that spurious humanity, which so shudders at putting a criminal to death, as to prefer keeping him alive even where there is no human hope of his being recovered to virtue, but every probability of his incurring more and more desperate hardness. The benevolent man is supposed to shrink from inflicting bodily pain on any one, whether for his own good, or as a necessary process for defending others; and where this morbid notion prevails, we must expect people to be much shocked at the broad facts of the natural history of animals, to say nothing of man himself. . . . Pain and suffering are undoubtedly among God’s most efficacious means for perfecting all His creatures, and, not least, man; but they must needs be with Him *means* not *ends*, if we are to attribute to Him in any sense that which we are able to recognise as goodness; and consequently they must be His plans, either partial and subordinate, or finite and transitory. All theology which contradicts this, darkens and distorts the face of God to us” (Soul, p. 43—46).

the present state of things, while it marks out a road suited to those who are one with Christ in heaven, for his members by the way. Hence the New Testament is not, in the *general* tenor of its revelations, a mere testimony of "Thus saith the Lord." It has this prophetic character sometimes; but in general it is the expression of the mind and sympathies of God in all that concerns the saints on earth. It is the Holy Ghost in a man who is a member of the body, communicating all the privileges of the body to it, and entering into all its sorrows, while it reveals the love and wisdom of the Father and the Son leading into all truth, and casting the perfect light of God on all that went before, and showing things to come; in this last having more the character assumed before in prophecy, as we read—"The Spirit speaketh expressly"—"Let him hear what the Spirit saith to the churches," etc. Hence there is—while often rising to the most glorious testimonies of blessing in the revelation of God, and of his designs for the glory of Christ and the church with Him—a familiarity, an entering into detail as to all that concerns the body, and what becomes its heavenly path down here, an expression of the feelings of the instrument who addresses it, which gives the most touching picture of the effect of the presence of the Holy Ghost, and brings down the love of God into the detail and circumstances of man's Christian life. It is not, indeed, Christ Himself; but it is his Spirit lifting his members up to Him by the revelation of Him, and coming down to them in all their trials and conflicts, in all through which they pass, to be the spring of feeling there, through his assured sympathy. Such God would show Himself; and surely all that He says there has the tenderest claim and the perfect authority of Him who speaks thus in love. It is the word of God; the Holy Ghost on earth, in the apostle or prophet, speaking generally in the church; but not an inferior separate Spirit; but as He hears so He speaks, in union with the Father and the Son—the Wisdom of God amongst men.

The Scriptures of the New Testament are the perfect expression of the Divine mind as communicated to, or working in, the Church of God; suited to the relationship in which God has thus placed them with Himself.

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I turn to the nature of inspiration. As to the *apostles* being infallible, no one dreams of such a thing. A truth communicated, as I have already said, cannot be infallible: it can only be absolute truth; and truth is truth. It is nonsense to speak of its failing or not failing. A person only can be infallible. The apostles may have been divinely kept while communicating truth, and thus not suffered to fail while thus used of God. In this secondary sense alone can they be, in any proper use of the word, infallible at that moment; but this is not the real meaning of the word. I do not doubt that God took care that all they have left to us in the Scriptures should perfectly present his mind; but this did not make the apostles infallible. God alone is infallible; that is, incapable of failing.

Mr. Newman says, omniscience or dictation is necessary to infallibility. Neither have anything to say to it. Omniscience and inspiration are a contradiction in terms: for inspiration is the communication of truth or facts; omniscience supposes, or rather means, that all is known already. Nor is dictation necessary either. Suppose, as to historical Scripture, if God acted on my mind or memory so as to call up facts He chose to have related, in the way, the connection, the order in which He chose them to be in my mind, and associated with the feelings which He thought proper to be produced in my soul by it, and the utterance of my memory and the expressions of my feelings to which they naturally gave rise when thus produced, to the exclusion of all distracting or modifying thoughts of any kind, to deteriorate what the Holy Ghost produced in my mind and soul—and that I write this down as thus formed and producing itself in my mind, being full of the Holy Ghost, so that no other idea whatever intruded itself, but such as the Holy Ghost had produced, and that He approved the necessary expression of it, acting on the mind, not on the lips—should not I have and give the perfect mind of God, only through the mind of a man?

Again, if Christ had spoken, and the Holy Ghost recalled to my memory his words, or a particular part of his words, and I write down these words—so of facts. This would not be dictation. Supposing He formed in my soul the substance

of what passed, and I wrote it down, from the perfect spiritual apprehension of it, as He put it in my mind, to the exclusion of all else, I should have the perfect mind of God; yet the Holy Ghost acting in my mind would use it as an instrument, and the communication have the form of the mind it passed through. Why, if God has expressly formed the instrument, can He not then use *it* for the purpose for which He has formed it, according to what He has made it. Now that is style.\* It is merely supposing that the Holy Ghost cannot use a man's mind, such as it is, and govern his words, without annihilating him, and making use of his lips as of the dumb ass's, to rebuke the prophet.

The Apostle does not speak of the mere use of the organ without the intelligence, as the highest kind of inspiration, but as the lowest, and that it was of a higher order when the man was mentally made partaker of what he communicated, and thus did with his own thoughts and feelings engaged (which produces style), though the Holy Ghost produced those thoughts and feelings. The spout which gives a form to the current that flows from it, may transmit the water as pure as it flows in. I do not say the Holy Ghost did not give the words; but that it was not necessarily merely dictation of them. Nay, if he did dictate them, he could do it in the form of mind and thought of the person he deigned to use, so that it should be his style. So that every part of the statement of Mr. Newman is unfounded. The Holy Ghost gave the thoughts, and they were not left to the uncertainty of man's account of them; He caused them to be communicated in words He taught; but why should not He work in a mind according to the form he had designedly given it† (see 1 Cor. ii. 12, 13, 14).

\* "That there was no dictation, is proved by the variety of style in the Scripture writers" (Phases, p. 120).

† This passage attributes three things to the Spirit—the original reception of the truth by the instrument employed, the manner of its communication, and its reception by the hearer. I should translate *πνευματικῶς πνευματικὰ συνκρίνοντες* "using a spiritual medium of communication for spiritual things." This shows how much the mind is connected with the expressions used in communicating truth. The whole question is, Can the Holy Ghost employ the mind, and through it

Human minds were left to the instruments, but they were acted on and used by the Holy Ghost to the absolute exclusion of all other influence, from within or without. If I played every note of a piece of music exactly, not allowing a discordant sound to come in, note for note being settled long before, yet the tone of the instrument on which I played would remain the same. Had I not played, it would have been silent; nor while I play can another note, but what I please, sound at all. God had framed the instrument with that tone, as well as used it. It is merely want of apprehension that the Holy Ghost could act in the mind, and take possession of it for its own purposes, and so govern the words, that leads to the statement I am discussing. Mr. N. says: "Their knowledge [of God's message], however perfect, must, yet in a human mind, have co-existed with ignorance, and nothing but a perpetual miracle could prevent ignorance from now and then exhibiting itself in error of fact or argument" (Phases, p. 121). Why co-existed? Ignorance does not exist, it is a mere negative. Supposing they were ignorant of every other possible idea, they would have given just the inspired message, and it would have been God's sent message being produced in their *minds* exactly in that form. It would have been mingled with nothing else, for there would be nothing else to mingle with. Now that was the practical effect of the Holy Ghost, because He so filled their minds, and with that, that it excluded all else from their minds as much as if it did not exist for them. Every real teacher is inspired in the sense of having thoughts and feelings communicated by the Holy Ghost, but He does not so fill him and control his natural actings, as that his own thoughts or will may not mix themselves up at all; so that he cannot be trusted as giving absolute truth as an authority, though all he teaches may be the truth, and he may spiritually profit his hearers. Besides, I doubt not that all his materials are already revealed in the Scriptures. The Holy Ghost uses them by his ministration of them; but they are revealed, even if not generally known.

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language, to the exclusion of all other influence, or is it forced to leave the mind out and dictate the words. The Apostle speaks of both, and prefers having the mind in use in inspiration.

I do not know what Mr. Newman means by a "perpetual miracle" (Phases, p. 121), to which he objects. The Apostles were not perpetually writing epistles, nor Evangelists histories. If God was communicating truth, He did whatever was needed to secure its being His, whenever He did so. That is a self-evident, necessary, and simple proposition. Mr. N. speaks of "revering" the Apostles' "moral and spiritual wisdom" (ib. p. 121). That has nothing to do with God's word. The Apostle himself distinguishes them. Mr. N. speaks of not obtruding miracles in the Scripture narratives.\* What he seems to mean is this, that when the Scriptural history gives a plain narrative of fact, he is not to make a miracle of it to explain a physiological difficulty.

This has really no force in it. The historians relate a fact—if the fact is out of the order of nature, they relate it as it is. If they are credible, I am to receive it as what it is—something out of the order of nature. If it is not, I consider it natural.

Mr. Newman speaks of their not "showing any consciousness that it [the fact he narrates] involves physiological difficulties." A man that presents himself as giving, by the Holy Ghost, a narrative of what really happened, does not occupy himself with questions, but communicates what is revealed. Did he do otherwise, it would make his "consciousness" of being inspired doubtful. Mr. N.'s remark supposes the thing in question, namely, that it is *their* doing. I do not invent a miracle, I believe a fact not in the general order of nature. It is one of the perfections of Scripture, that it states the fact without any bombastic, or indeed any, comment, on what was done. There is the fact needed for one knowing the truth. It is to produce its impression. The impression produced on the writer's mind, is not the subject of revelation. You will find it in human Thaumaturge's lives, but not in a Divine narrative. It is to produce, not in general to record, impressions, unless these impressions form part of the divine history of man. What is it to my soul what the writer feels about the matter, provided he give me the fact. Mr. N. does

\* "I had slid into a new logical canon—that I must not obtrude miracles on the Scripture narrative" (Phases, p. 122).

not seem to know what the true character and purpose of a revelation is.

But he goes on to the deluge. I have already shown that there are proofs from universal tradition throughout the whole world of this great event. "Geologists," he says, "have rejected it."\* Some do very likely; but it most certainly is not the case with all. Of the ablest there are those who do not. I do not doubt its universality; so that I leave any reply, founded on a contrary idea, aside.

Mr. Newman asserts as to the question, "Whence could the water come"? (Phases, p. 122), that it is represented as coming from the clouds, and *perhaps* from the sea.† Scripture states, that "all the fountains of the great deep were broken up, and the windows of heaven were opened." Now this last may be a figurative expression for a very extraordinary quantity of rain from clouds; but it is either descriptive of what for *quantity* would be a miracle (for it uses an expression never repeated), or else it is some miraculous out-letting of water other than from the clouds. The expression, "All the fountains of the great deep were broken up," if it is not some miraculous outpouring of the sea itself, must mean some outbreak of waters from below, which, as never repeated, is to be called, so far as such events can be, miraculous.

Mr. Newman's statement of what Scripture narrates, is as unfounded as possible. Language never used elsewhere, is used for the purpose of showing that it was an extraordinary, and save in this one case unheard-of, outbreak of waters in some never else known way. Mr. N. says, "from the clouds and perhaps from the sea:" as if clouds were certainly one source of the waters of the flood; and, *if* there were anything else, the thing to be added was the sea. Now something besides the clouds is certainly mentioned. Would any one suppose, from Mr. N.'s words, that if it were not the sea, it

\* "It had become notorious to the public, that geologists rejected the idea of a universal deluge" (Phases, p.122).

† "Secondly, the narrator represents the surplus water to have come from the clouds, and perhaps from the sea, and again to drain back into the sea" (Phases, p. 123).

certainly was some divinely-caused outbreak of waters from some hidden source? He certainly does not dream of a "miraculous creation and destruction of water" (Phases, p. 123). Be it so. But why, then, two words? Does not the narrative speak of some *outburst* of water known on no other occasion? What is the fact? It speaks *neither of clouds nor sea*. But, *besides* rain, it speaks of the fountains of the great deep being *broken up*, and the *windows of heaven opened*. It is never said, the water drained back into the sea; but, that "the waters returned from off the earth continually:" and declares the fountains of the deep and the windows of heaven were stopped, *and* the rain from heaven was restrained. That is, the narrator does present it as having its source and its arrest in the extraordinary intervention of God—call it "miracle," or what you please.

In a word, it is certain that the sacred writer does, in the distinctest way, point out some very overwhelming outbreak of waters from an extraordinary source.

The reader may remember, that when God began to *form* the world, what subsisted as already created was one vast mass of waters, called "the deep:" "darkness was upon the face of the deep," and "the Spirit of God moved on the face of the waters." The earth stood, indeed, by God's power, out of the water; but what unknown mass of waters was engulfed is not stated, nor what were the waters which were above the firmament or expanse. Whatever store of waters there was below, broke forth over the earth, and from above came down upon it. Mr. Newman's statement of the passage is a total misrepresentation of it.

He states, that the ark was not of dimensions sufficient to "take in all the creatures" (Phases, p. 123), more exactly the animal race belonging to the dry land. It has been proved, over and over again, that it was. It has been calculated that it was a vessel of more than forty-two thousand tons, being four hundred and fifty feet long, seventy-five broad, and forty-five high; eighteen times as much as the largest man-of-war, one of which can stow, say, a thousand men, with provisions, for a very much longer time than the flood lasted, besides an immense weight of guns, shot, etc.; so that it is evident that

the ark could easily have received the animals that could not live in the water.

As to the dispersion of animals,\* the discovery of many remains of different kinds, as of large elephant species, embedded in ice in Siberia—hyænas and their prey in a cavern in Yorkshire—has remarkably confirmed the deluge. The extinction of many species and introduction of others in the most unlooked-for way, renders such speculations of no weight whatever.

Mr. Newman objects to Abraham's saying twice, and Isaac once, that his wife was his sister, as being improbable (Phases, p. 124). Now it is stated, that Abraham and Sarah had agreed to do it on beginning their wanderings. Nor is it, therefore, very extraordinary that Isaac should have thus learned it in his father's house.

Mr. Newman alludes to certain "small phrases which denote a later hand than Moses" (id. ib.). There is no reason to doubt that, whatever Samuel may have done, Ezra edited the sacred writings after the return from Babylon: from these sources the expression "to this day" is no doubt drawn. The prophets, Josephus informs us, were the authority on which books were revered as inspired, and that the canon closed in the time of Artaxerxes.†

He notices particularly, that "the kings of Israel are once alluded to historically" (id. ib.). Gen. xxxvi. 31 it is said, "Before there was any king in Israel." So that "alluded to historically," is rather an inaccurate expression; their *non*-existence is alluded to. Edom had kings before Israel had any; that is all that is said. Edom's having any when Israel had had none, was the point wished to be recorded. It was a settled nation ruled over regularly, before God's people

\* "And especially the total disagreement of the modern facts of the dispersion of animals, with the idea that they spread anew from Armenia, as their centre" (Phases, p. 123).

† This, though of course a mere human authority, but a competent one, as far as any are in these matters, falls in with Malachi and Esther being the last books, as to date, of the Old Testament, and the probable epoch of the close of genealogies in Chronicles.

Israel were so. In the chapter before, kings had been promised to arise out of the loins of Jacob. Yet the natural went first in apparent strength: God's people must wait his time. The list of kings in Edom consists of eight. Now Phinehas was the seventh from Jacob, and he was in full activity and vigour in the time of Moses. So that the kings of Edom, as mentioned in Genesis, very possibly did not extend beyond the time of Moses; though data are not given to determine when they commence. The reader will remark, that it is not said, before kings, or the kings reigned, as if it was a history; but, before *a* king or any king reigned, which rather seems to belong to a time when there was none at all that was known. Yet kings had been promised to Jacob, and the pre-eminence; and none to Esau: yet Esau had them when Jacob had none. The contrast is not with kings in Israel and none in a by-gone time, but of kings in Edom when Israel had none.

Mr. Newman next refers to quotations. He tells us, that no "unbiassed interpreter" would have dreamed of applying Isaiah vii. to Jesus (Phases, p. 125). Why not? From Adam's time, the woman's seed was the subject of promise. It was confirmed, with fuller and more specific details, to Abraham, confining it to Isaac's line, then to Jacob's, then to Judah's family, and at last, as is well known, to David's family, in a very definite way, so as to have been the constant expectation of the Jews at the time Christ came—as Tacitus declares in a well-known passage. To the Jews the place where He was to be born was familiarly known. The coming of Christ, then, we know to be the grand object always kept in view in the Old Testament; and on the supposition of God being the Author of the Scriptures, a continual reference to this, accompanying a direct appeal to conscience connected with an already given law, would characterise the books which compose the Old Testament. An "unbiassed" and intelligent reader must expect to find it continually; it is the great object of the book; and to find it particularly in connection with David's family and with the restoration of Israel in a spared remnant, whom David's Son would save. No attentive reader of the Old Testament can dispute this.

Now the seventh of Isaiah begins by alluding to a prophetic and mystic son of the prophet,—a common prophetic figure,—called, “the remnant shall return” (Shear Jashub). Now according to the Old Testament doctrine, this would immediately suggest the thought of Messiah. So we find the pious Simeon and Anna prepared at once for the thought, and the disciples asking, Are the *σωζόμενοι*, the spared remnant, few in number [translated, “few that be saved” (Luke xiii. 23)]. Now Ahaz began the apostasy of David’s family, the last stay of Israel; for, on the people, “Ichabod” had long ago been written, and David raised up, and the peace and safety of the people made dependent on the faithfulness of his family in an express manner (2 Chron. vii. 17—21).

Now Ahaz walked in the way of the kings of Israel, and made his son pass through the fire; he made molten images also for Baalim, and (though perhaps after this prophecy) introduced an idolatrous altar, after a Damascus pattern, into the temple, and set aside the brazen altar for himself to use as an oracle. To him Isaiah comes with his “remnant shall return,” and addressing himself to the house of David, and referring to their unbelief and rebellion, judges it, and gives as a sign from God, the birth of the virgin’s son. Now that\* a virgin should marry and have a child is nothing that can be a sign from God, nor anything particular to do with the house of David. Nor would there be any reason for calling his name Immanuel, that is, God with us. I know it has been said—Mr. Newman does not condescend to say why “an unbiassed interpreter” would not apply it to Jesus,†—that Hezekiah was meant, in whose reign there was deliverance for Israel. Now Hezekiah had been born several years before the date of the prophecy. Thus the application of the prophecy to David’s promised son, is the most natural and only intelligible one of the passage.

\* In the original it is not *a* virgin, but *the* virgin,—an expression not used but with some particular reference. When quoted in Greek in the New Testament the same expression is preserved—*ἡ παρθένος*.

† Mr. Newman’s words are—the thought is a common-place infidel one—“First is the prophecy about the Child Immanuel; which in Isaiah no unbiassed interpreter would have dreamed could apply to Jesus” (p. 125).

“ Out of Egypt have I called my son,”\* may present more difficulty, as supposing more knowledge of the ways of God.

The Son of Man is presented in Scripture as beginning in a new way of grace the whole condition of man. He is called the second Adam.

So is it with respect to Israel. Christ was to begin all Israel's history over again under the new covenant, as the true stock in whom the promises were to be enjoyed, the old vine having been proved worthless. Thus, in John, I do not doubt with reference to this, it is said, “ I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman,” referring to Isaiah vi. and Ps. lxxx. 8, to the end. The disciples thought He was a chief branch perhaps of the old vine, but that was not the true one now. He was the vine, the real fruit-bearing plant of God, and they the branches.

This substitution of Christ for Israel was taught in a very plain and remarkable manner by the prophets. Thus, in Isaiah xlix., the prophet begins with presenting Israel as addressing the nations as being the one in whom Jehovah was to be glorified; then, verse 4, Messiah says, he has, in that case, laboured in vain; and then, verse 5, the Lord places Him with a yet more glorious inheritance in Israel's place, though gathering Israel too to God. He takes the place of servant to glorify God. In the end of the prophecy the faithful remnant are found as the servants.

This word “ servant ” is just the key to the whole prophecy from chap. xl. to the end. First Israel is the servant to show forth Jehovah's praise. He failed. Messiah becomes his servant for it and is rejected by Israel, who thus fills up his guilt; and then the remnant, who, when the body become adversaries, are separated from it, and are the servants, accepted and delivered by Him at His return. Hence Matthew, or really the Spirit of God, applies this passage according to the whole tenor and purpose of the prophets:—this judgment of Israel. Messiah being rejected, and the setting up of the kingdom in Him according to the prophecies, being the great subject of this gospel. Such, too, was the constant judgment of the

\* They are, Mr. Newman tells us, “ imagined by Matthew to be prophetic of the return of Jesus from Egypt ” (p. 125)

Jews in a crowd of passages. It is not spiritualizing.\* Jesus was not brought out of the world in any spiritual sense. He came down from heaven. Egypt is a great deal to Messiah, as taking up the lot of Israel itself.

As to John x. 35, Mr. Newman entirely perverts what is said. He says (Phases, p. 125), "The 82nd Psalm rebukes *unjust* governors, and at length says to them, 'I have said ye are gods,'" etc. In other words, "though we are apt to think of rulers as if they were superhuman, yet they shall meet the lot of common men," and then accuses the Lord of using this "as his sufficient justification for calling Himself Son of God: for 'the Scripture cannot be broken.'"

Now, this is either a good deal of ignorance, or, to say the very least, very culpable carelessness. At any rate, Mr. Newman's paraphrase has nothing to do with the matter. "We are apt to think," is on the face of it a very different thing from Jehovah's saying, "I have said." Further, the Lord is not saying anything to prove what He is, but convicting the Jews of unreasonableness in their blame of Him on the ground of their own Scriptures. What he says is perfect, as surely it must be. In the Psalm, Elohim is judging amongst the Elohim, and declares that he had called these judges,—perverse as they had become, so as to call judgment down on themselves,—Elohim.

Now that is just the fact. In the Pentateuch, frequently, the parties are directed to be brought to the Elohim (as Ex. xxi. 6, 23; xxii. 8, 9, twice), so called, because in judging they were to act in God's stead (see Deut. i. 17).

They have this name particularly in the instructions given from Sinai, for causes to be brought to them—the parties were to make it good according to [the award of] Elohim—God or the judges. Hence the Lord says, "If the Scriptures, which you own have irrefragable authority, give the name of Elohim to persons instructed by the word, how can you call it

\* "This instance moved me much; because I thought, that if the text were 'spiritualized' so as to make Israel mean Jesus, Egypt also ought to be spiritualized and mean *the world*, not retain its geographical sense, which seemed to be carnal and absurd in such a connection: for Egypt is no more to Messiah than Syria or Greece" (p. 125).

blasphemy that I apply the title *Son of God* to one whom the Father has sanctified and sent into the world?" The argument is of the plainest force to shew their injustice, which is the Lord's object.

Mr. Newman has not only misrepresented the reasoning of the Lord, but he has misrepresented what He says.

Mr. Newman then takes in, in the lump, all the quotations of the New Testament: some had always been "a mystery" to him. Now they were clearly wrong; if canvassed, "it may appear that not one quotation in ten is sensible and appropriate" (Phases, p. 126). Then it is assumed, that "it is so manifest that they most imperfectly understood that book," that the decision of the New Testament writers concerning the value and credibility of the Old Testament, is not to be accepted. Thus it is settled. The only answer one can give to an assertion of this kind is, that it is *not manifest*. The only thing manifest, that I see, is that Mr. N. has not the smallest notion of the purport and character of the Old Testament, as clearly expressed in it. The passages he has referred to certainly will not make any "unbiassed" interpreter think so.

It is merely setting up his decision, after having shewn himself to be singularly incompetent to judge, not only above that of the New Testament writers, but above the clear judgment of hundreds, founded on sound reasoning and investigation, and intelligent study of the real bearing of the Old Testament, as the expression of the purpose of God. The decision of one who can turn, "I have said, Ye are gods,"—the plain fact which we find in the Psalms, and in a remarkable part of the Old Testament, applying to the subject—into, "We are apt to think rulers superhuman," is not worth much attention in the investigation of the applicability of passages of the Old quoted in the New.

Mr. Newman next refers to another common objection. Jude has quoted the prophecy of Enoch. He has this excuse, that this is commonly so stated, since Archbishop Lawrence published his book; and Origen has taken it for granted.

But I beg leave to say, that there is not the smallest proof of any kind that he has done so. The fathers are historically

very useful, like all contemporaneous authors; their judgment, and not the least so Origen's, is nothing worth.

Now what proof have we that Jude quoted this book? Just none. It is evident that there was a traditional account that such a prophecy existed. This Book of Enoch records it. Jude authenticates the prophecy as far as his authority goes. But that Jude took it from the Book of Enoch, there is not the slightest proof whatever.

Enoch, all know, was favoured of God; the prophecy ascribed to him is a testimony of a doctrine established by a multitude of passages. Its written preservation in Christian times was more timely, as then Christ's coming in glory was the immediate and proper hope of the Church. While at all times a most solemn, prophetic warning, it was less suited to be preserved as a part of the Divine record, while God was still carrying on his government under the law. Everything is in its place.

It is the simple fact of the existence of the passage in both Jude and Enoch, which is used as a proof that it is quoted, which is no proof at all, because it is evident each may have taken it up if it were current by tradition. And the copying is very much less probable than the latter supposition, because the passage is not the same in both. It is thus given by Archbishop Lawrence: "Behold, He cometh with ten thousand of his saints, to execute judgment upon them, and destroy the wicked, and reprove all the carnal for everything which the sinful and ungodly have done and committed against Him."

Thus it stands in Jude: "And Enoch also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of these, saying, Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard [speeches] which ungodly sinners have spoken against him." Now, that these passages refer to the same prophecy I see no reason to doubt; but I do not see the smallest sign that one was copied from the other. They differ very sensibly one from the other. There is nothing about what ungodly sinners have spoken in the Book of Enoch. No expression, such as "destroy the wicked," in

Jude. The phraseology too in Jude is quite different and very peculiar. I should say, from the language and omissions, that it certainly was not a quotation.

But, further, the doctrine also is very different. The Book of Enoch makes God come to execute judgment *on his saints*. There is no such doctrine as this in Jude. And the Book of Enoch distinguishes particularly executing judgment on them, *the saints*, and destroying the wicked. No such idea as this exists in Jude. Nor is it a mere question of Ethiopic,\* which I certainly could not solve. It is the positive doctrine of the Book of Enoch, "while judgment," it is said just before, "shall come upon all, *even all the righteous*." Thus his executing judgment upon them [the preserved], is the specific doctrine of the passage. It certainly is not that of Jude; for he says, Enoch prophesied of the reprobate. And while speaking of executing judgment on all, there is no such a thought as executing judgment on the saints and destroying the wicked. Jude goes on to speak of his convicting the ungodly for their deeds and their words against him. So that the substantial meaning of the passages is quite different, as one contains what the other does not, and the language is quite diverse too. I conclude, with undoubting certainty, that one was not quoted from the other (unless the author of the Book of Enoch used Jude *in his own way*), and that Jude's is divine, accordant, as it is, with the whole testimony of the word; and that the Apocryphal Enoch's human.

But farther: what proof have we that the book of Enoch was written first? I doubt it exceedingly. Dr. Lawrence takes as his fixed point of departure, in making the inquiry, that the quotation of Jude proves it was written before his epistle. But this is begging the question. I have already shown that, to say the least, it is an assumption without any proof. What can be adduced in the way of evidence proving, as I judge, the direct opposite.

Indeed, the proof that the writer was before Jude, is to me very doubtful.

There are passages which seem to be quoted from the New

\* De Sacy's Latin translation is exactly the same with Dr. Lawrence's. He supposes that the author may have borrowed from Jude.

Testament. Some of them I should not insist upon, because they may have been proverbial, and so used by the Lord Himself among the Jews.

They are the following:—

“It would have been better for them had they never been born.”—“At that time I beheld the Ancient of Days while He sat upon the throne of his glory, while the book of the living was opened in his presence, and [while] all the powers of the heavens stood around and before Him.”—“And He, the Son of man, shall be the light of nations,” this may be from Isaiah.—“But in the day of their trouble the world shall obtain tranquillity.”—“In these days shall the earth deliver up from her womb, and hell deliver up from hers that which it has received.”—“The word of his mouth shall destroy all the sinners and all the ungodly, who shall perish at his presence.”—“Trouble shall come upon them as upon a woman in travail.”—“Before the Son of man, from whose presence they shall be expelled.”

These look very like allusions to passages in the New Testament. But there is another circumstance. The writer says, referring to the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem, “Then I grieved extremely on account of the tower, and because the house of the sheep was overthrown. Neither was I afterwards able to perceive whether they again entered that house.” Now this comes *after* a passage (lxxxviii. 92) where it is said, “I saw, too, that he forsook the house of their fathers and their tower, giving them all into the power of lions to tear and devour them, into the power of every beast,” which refers to the Babylonish captivity; and after he had announced the call of seventy accountable shepherds, which Dr. Lawrence himself applies to the rulers from Nebuchadnezzar down to Herod the Great. So that the destruction here alluded to was under or after the seventy shepherds; whereas their accountable rule began with Nebuchadnezzar: so that this was evidently *another* overthrow of “the house of the sheep.” At any rate, as he gives the Jewish history up to Herod, he must have known they had their house again; indeed, he speaks evidently of Zerubbabel, Joshua, and Nehemiah or Ezra, and of the rebuilding of the temple (113).

This would lead one, then, to suppose that he wrote after the destruction of Jerusalem\* by the Romans, and was thus unable to say that the temple would be restored.

One passage looks very much as if he considered the Christians as a perverse race; but that a remnant would be preserved, to whom the power and glory would be given. At any rate, he speaks of the Jews being perverse at this epoch. These are his words: "Afterwards, in the seventh week [coinciding with that in which Christianity appeared], a perverse generation shall arise; abundant shall be its deeds, and all its deeds perverse. During its completion the righteous selected from the plant of everlasting righteousness [a remnant of the Jews] shall be rewarded, and to them shall be given sevenfold instruction concerning every part of his creation" (xcii. 12). After this they shall execute judgment on oppressors, sinners shall be delivered up into the hands of the righteous, and the house of the great King shall be built up for ever.

That is, he promises, after this week of perverse men, the full establishment of Jewish privileges in a Jewish way.

He speaks much of the Son of man, the Elect, the concealed One revealing the wisdom of the Lord of spirits; but Judaism is set up by power. And the only notice of the Christian week is perverse men doing a great deal.

It would rather appear to me the work of a Jewish writer, who, when Christianity had come in, sought to buoy up the hopes of the Jews in their own expectations, when now given up a prey to the lions and all beasts.

The house was destroyed, perhaps Christianity prevalent. He made use of the name of Enoch as being one of which tradition had preserved some memorial. The Cabbalists seem to have possessed this book from allusions in the book Zohar, quoted by Dr. Lawrence.

There is a difficulty apparently in the twelve shepherds, which Dr. Lawrence applies to the Asmonean princes and

\* In the 104th he turns back to consider the conduct and accountability of the shepherds already spoken of from the beginning; the 103rd having closed the direct history, which would much confirm its being the Roman destruction of the temple.

Herod. But he introduces Mattathias, which I should judge doubtful, and Alexandra, a woman. Take away these two, and you have two shepherds after Herod. Were it not so, it would be merely closing the account of native princes with Herod, after which the state of Palestine was so uncertain, either a tetrarchy or a province, or for a little while again nearly united under Herod Agrippa, that he drops the history of it as a distinct thing. So in chapter lxxxix. After the twelve shepherds, he gives a sword into the sheep's [Jews'] hands to slay the beasts of the field; and the Lord judges. That is, he puts power into the hands of the Jews at the close of this period.

I need not pursue this subject any farther. It suffices to have shewn, that there is no probability whatever that Jude quoted from this spurious book, I may say a certainty that he did not, and that there is great ground to suppose that the book of Enoch was written after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans.\* But if Jude has not quoted it, it is very little matter when a mere spurious book full of nonsense was written. It is useful historically, as shewing the Jews' opinions in those days. I may remark, that he is most distinct in his assertion, that there were openings for the abyss of waters to break forth from beneath for the deluge, and clefts for it in which to run back again, just, indeed, as the heathen shewed at Delos and other places for the retreat of their deluge.†

This objection of Jude's quoting from the book of Enoch I hold to be *totally* unfounded. It certainly is wholly unproved. The ancients supposed it merely,—they give *no* evidence as to the fact.

Mr. Newman goes on to say, that “it does not appear that any peculiar divine revelation taught them that the Old Testament is perfect truth” (Phases, p. 126). They did not

\* This was in the year 70 of our era, how much after I cannot pretend to say, because the dates fail,—he says he could not see if they entered into the destroyed house. After that, there are only prophecies of Jewish deliverance and grandeur.

† It is curious enough, that the book speaks of a modern solution of the cause of the deluge, which I do not think needful to discuss here, when Noah saw the earth inclined, and that its destruction approached.

need one. They knew prophets had delivered it from God as Peter says, and had not spoken by the will of man. But I further answer they had; for the Lord had confirmed this their faith in the Old Testament over and over again in the most explicit way.

Mr. Newman's statement\* as to Paul is wholly unfounded, —worse than unfounded,—Paul recognises the authority of the Old Testament in the fullest possible manner, always using it as conclusive authority. He shows the full authority of the law, but that its action against us was averted by the death of Christ. We are not bound, he argues, by the law of a relation which subsists no longer when a man is dead. But he takes particular care to show that he does not undermine its authority. Christ's bearing its curse (Gal. iii.) is the strongest possible proof of that.

As to the introduction to Luke's Gospel, Mr. Newman's remarks are equally unfounded. "He could not possibly have written thus," he says, "if he had been conscious of super-human aids" (Phases, p. 127); and just before, "He opens by stating to Theophilus, that since many persons have committed to writing the things handed down by eye-witnesses, it seemed good to him also to do the same, since he had 'accurately attended to everything from its sources (*ἀνωθεν*).'" Now, I beg leave to say, he says no such thing. He says nothing like that I may "do the same." These are his words: "Since many have taken in hand † to compose a narration of the things believed with certainty amongst us, as they have delivered them to us, who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and servants of the word;—it seemed well to me, fully acquainted from the beginning with all things [and that] accurately, to write to thee methodically, most noble Theophilus, that thou

\* "So far as Paul deviates from the common Jewish view, it is in the direction of disparaging the law as essentially imperfect" (Phases, p. 126).

† Origen's remark here is, that Luke's words, "many had taken in hand," is a tacit accusation that they had attempted, in their own strength, without the Holy Ghost, to write gospels,—*absque gratiâ Spiritûs Sancti*. But here Matthew, Mark, and John, he adds, did not take in hand to write, but being full of the Holy Ghost wrote gospels.

mightest know the certain truth concerning the things in which thou hast been instructed."

Now this contrasts, whether we accept Origen's interpretation of taking in hand or not, what he had done with what others had, it declares that he had written differently, and with more certainty than the others; in a word, that he had *not done* the same. If the others had given the *ἀσφάλειαν*, the demonstrated certainty of the things as he did, he need not have spoken of them as he does. I do not say that he alleges them to be false; but they were not such as hindered him from giving an account that Theophilus might have positive certainty about the history of the Lord.\*

Further, Mr. Newman translates *ἀνωθεν* "from the sources."† Mr. N. is undoubtedly a better scholar than I; but here dictionaries are adequate authority, and I think I may venture to say that the English translation is correct, and that *ἀνωθεν* has not the sense at all which Mr. N. gives it; *ἀνωθεν* does not mean from the sources, i.e. from some other originals. It has it neither by etymology nor use. It has the sense of from above, hence, from heaven, anew, from the beginning. I have searched Liddell and Scott, Scapula, and Stephens' Thesaurus, and I find no trace of such a meaning. The English translation is the natural clear meaning of the word so used. If by "the sources" is merely meant "from the outset," as tracing a river from its source, it is the same thing,—and why change it—suggesting the meaning of other sources, not inspiration?

But as this preface is often adduced, a few more words here may be justly offered to my reader.

No historical book is edited by the writer with, "Thus saith the Lord." It would have been quite unsuited. The contents were not words spoken as such directly and solely from the Lord to men, but an account of various historical circumstances, often of very bad ones, done by men; and when of good or even perfect ones, as in the case of Jesus, mixed up in a variety of transactions. The business of inspiration then was to secure the writer's giving a true account of what

\* It has been amply shewn that he does not refer to Matthew and Mark. John's Gospel was not written.

† It is fair to mention that Moses Stuart does the same, at least, if I remember right.

passed—to fix his attention on the right objects—and to connect them in such a manner, as to produce the moral picture the Spirit meant to produce. Thus the Lord says, the Holy Ghost should bring to their remembrance what He had said. Now what was thus brought to their *remembrance*, in the form divinely suited to God's object in their history, they so set down. If they remembered it themselves as God would have it set down, God having for their own sakes so impressed it on their spiritual affections, the Spirit had only to lead them to record what they so already remembered. If it was recorded even by some one else already, or recounted by an apostle, if led by the Spirit to adopt such account, the case would be the same. The only thing to be looked for was, that the result produced was, in result as a whole in everything, and in all its parts in their connection, exactly what God Himself meant to give as the history of his beloved Son, or indeed of any other part of the divine history. So in what they saw. If Luke was present when Paul and the disciples knelt down and prayed on the shore, and the Holy Ghost had given him the feeling and impression about it which He meant to act on others by, He put it down in that way exactly, under his power. He knew the thing as an eye-witness. The facts had not to be communicated to him by inspiration, though his manner of presenting them is perfectly according to the mind of God, and comes from Him. Now, every one feels how entirely inappropriate it would be and out of place to introduce, "Thus saith the Lord: Then we went out to the sea-shore and knelt down." In a word, the historical accounts are given under that care of God, by the Holy Ghost recalling if needed, directing in the use of known facts, fixing the attention exactly on the part of a transaction suited to the object of the history (for God must have an object in it), which has produced *God's own history* of the Lord's life, or other scriptural subjects. Now that is exactly what we want. He used men and men's minds for this, and what they used as means for it is perfectly immaterial. God allowed their circumstances to be such as to render the objections of infidel men the height of folly as to the general truth of Christianity. This is not the ground on which the believer receives it indeed.

Taught of God, he enjoys, according to his progress in the divine life, the unfolding to his soul of all the rich truth which God has treasured up there, in a book that unfolds all that lies between the extremes of the sin of man and the love and holiness of God, and all the means which divine love has employed to bring back those who lay in one to the sweet and blessed enjoyment of the other, and that in the development of those divine counsels which attach themselves to the person of Jesus.

But the circumstances in which the writers of the New Testament were, shew the gross absurdity of the infidel on human grounds, so as to leave him without excuse. The truth of Christianity, as a general fact, is established as no other history in the world is, so also are its true character and the details which establish the Divine power connected with it. God has granted an external and internal evidence which confounds the infidel, convicts him of being utterly unreasonable; and, of course, graciously strengthens, as an outwork, the heart of the true disciple. The infidel pretends to know God so much better before-hand than anybody else, that he can shew that Christianity *cannot* be true. But the man that would attempt to show it *was not* true, would prove himself a fool in his wisdom. On no other subject would he be considered of sane mind, if he disputed on such evidence. It is the consciousness, as I have already said, that it is divine; and that it has a claim on the conscience, which is the reason of its being disputed. Were it not, no one would attempt to do it; but man cannot bear God Himself, though he may pride himself on his own thoughts about him, if he can judge Him.

Let not my reader suppose that I have a thought of weakening, in the smallest degree, the fullest highest character of inspiration in the historical books of Scripture. Far from it. I believe it entirely and completely divine. It is the joy of my heart, as the security of my understanding, to receive it directly from God—my God. It is inexpressibly sweet, the thought that He thus deigns to converse with and instruct us. No one can know God, and not feel this.

But I do not allow that dictation, that is, the communication

of words without the exercise of the mind of him who receives it, is the only means of this. God can wield a mind and a heart as He wields lips, and He can govern and produce impressions on them so entirely, that the expression of them, while still that of the heart itself shall be, entirely and without mixture, that of God's mind. So of the memory. The result is the same, with the difference, often very important, of making the heart and mind of the inspired person the vessel as well as communicator of it. Both may be true. He may teach the words (and that even at another moment from the first acquirement of the thoughts), exactly; but He may act in the mind, and make it his instrument in unfolding truth (or facts) as He means it to be unfolded.

Having said this, I turn again to the preface of Luke, to examine its force, which seems to me very simple. Many had taken in hand to compose a narrative of what Christians had received from eye-witnesses. It was a human work, very well intended very likely, and, perhaps, correct in many things, but a work undertaken and executed by men. It was very natural when such wonderful and interesting events had taken place; but God had fitted Luke as a means to use; for this purpose, he had an exact knowledge of all from the outset. The word employed and translated, "having had perfect knowledge," is the same as in 2 Tim. iii. 10, where Paul says, Timothy had fully known everything about him. Now this means, "personal acquaintance with." St. Luke says he had this from the outset: he does not say how, nor do I pretend to say. Others had them from eye-witnesses. This he does not say himself; but only that he had thorough, personal, detailed, and accurate acquaintance with everything from the very outset. This is the force of *παρηκολουθηκότι ἀνωθεν πᾶσιν ἀκριβῶς*. And he writes this, that Theophilus may know the certainty of the things he had been instructed in.

Now, suppose Matthew or John, who were we know personally companions of the Lord, thus gave an account. No doubt this fitted them as witnesses (so the Lord, indeed, says (John xv.), and as to the Lord's person and glory, it was proved in the case of Paul. He could say, "Have I not seen the Lord?") Did this render unnecessary the work of the Holy

Ghost, which should bring to their remembrance what Jesus had said, so as to give it with divine accuracy? Quite the contrary, as the same Lord promises (John xiv. 26; so xvi. 13). Why should it then not be thus with Luke? He had the means of very accurate knowledge of everything. That did not preclude the Divine aid of inspiration—for it is positively promised to those who were eye-witnesses with the same object. And this is what we want. Not that suitable instruments should not be employed—that there is Divine fitness in—but that God should use these instruments so that we should have the word of truth from Him, and really His word. The heart wants it and joys in it. Man's need requires it. It is what is worthy of God. He mixes Himself up, so to speak, with man—blessed be his name!—employs them intimately; often in a way their hearts can feel; but He always remains Himself. We want both these to be thoroughly happy; and God would make us thoroughly happy.

Mr. Newman then takes up (Phases, p. 127) the accounts of demoniacal possession, and brings, as a proof that it cannot be, the belief among the Arabs that it is. This may be very forcible; but I am too blind to see the value of the reasoning. That superstition may be mixed up with it among unenlightened Arabs, is possible; but why their conviction of the truth of it is a proof that it is not true, is beyond my capacity. They believe, I suppose, that God made the sun, and yet that is true, though they have Mohammedan superstitions connected with it. So of many facts of Jewish history connected with Abraham, Ishmael, Esau, the passage of Israel through the desert. As in the case of all nations who derive their origin from those who were at the sources of truth, you see proofs of the existence of that truth mixed up with superstitious traditions. This any one, soberly enquiring into facts, will find to be the universal truth on this matter. But details of facts are disagreeable to infidels.

So of witchcraft, Mr. Newman, founding himself on the popular infidelity of the day, takes for granted that there is no such thing. Now I humbly beg leave to say, that I judge that this is very unphilosophical. I am quite aware that when mere infidelity is established, it is itself a shorter way to

shut God out. But it is a very convenient thing to the enemy in the case of ignorant and superstitious minds, to do that which establishes his authority in a way more suited to their state. And he has done so the wide world over. I grant that nine-tenths of it are priestly imposture; but an accurate examination of facts does not allow the denial of a kind of power, which is not merely human, exercised over men. That when this power is gained, and in the hands of men, it is used to deceive and impose on credulity, no man in his senses, or believing in the word of God, would for a moment deny. But how came this influence all over the world? The devil—*some* mischievous, terror-striking, corrupt being (call him Teufel, or Sammael, or Obo, or what you please)—has got himself worshipped by means of *some* influence over men's minds. That is a fact. Those who have carried on the mysterious influence, and have been delivered from it, have acknowledged the greater part to be imposture; but have also declared, that they were under an unknown influence at times. Take the history of the oracles. I doubt not corruption; but they existed, and there was a mysterious influence. So of various effects beyond human power. The cessation of oracles when Christianity began to prevail, the undoubted deliverance of persons labouring under certain distressing symptoms during and subsequent to the Apostles' days, the fact of man's universal sense of some superior agency, and as shown in terror and evil (no righteous mind will attribute it to the true God)—all concur to prove that there is an evil power exercising a real influence over the bodies and minds of men. I have no doubt of the existence of positive power in witchcraft in England at this day. I do not doubt there is superstition and imposture; but I defy Mr. N. or any infidel to account for facts perfectly well authenticated, on any rational or philosophical principles. I despise the arrogant pretension to philosophy which neglects facts. The world's history shows the existence of an unknown power acting on the minds and bodies of men—a power from which Christianity entirely delivers.

There are various forms of disease. In a general way, all come from the evil one; but in the sense of "possession,"

such diseases may be accompanied by possession or not; *and* so they are treated in Scripture. We find the Lord healing diseases *and* casting out devils. We find lunatics and demoniacs distinguished in the same phrase. And now mark Mr. Newman's way of reasoning. It is genuine philosophy which is a mere popular prejudice after all. Arabians believe in possession. I read a treatise of Farmer which convinced me they were diseases; but not that the evangelists treated them as such. "Nay, the instant we believe that the imagined possessions were only various forms of disease, we are forced to draw conclusions of the utmost moment, most damaging to the credit of the narrators" (Phases, p. 128). Be it so. But we have no proof yet. Then follows—"Clearly, they are then convicted of mis-stating facts, under the influence of superstitious credulity. They represent demoniacs as having a supernatural acquaintance with Jesus, which it now becomes manifest they cannot have had. The devils cast out of two demoniacs (or one) are said to have entered into a herd of swine. This must have been a credulous fiction" (id. ib.). This came upon me by surprise. I had read, indeed, that Arabians believed in genii, and that in Eastern countries possession was believed in. I had read that Mr. N. was convinced, by a treatise of Farmer's, that a belief of demoniacal possession was not a superstition more respectable than that of witchcraft. But to tumble then on—"Clearly, they are then convicted of mis-stating facts"—brought me up, I confess, rather suddenly in the argument. Is it the Mohammedans believing in possession, or Mr. N.'s being convinced by Farmer's book, which clearly CONVICTS the evangelists of mis-stating facts? Logic here has lost its breath by the surprise; and then Mr. N. runs away so tremendously fast, that one has no chance, in such a state, to regain or overtake the argument. It is now *manifest*, that the devils did not know Jesus, and the story of the swine *must have been* a credulous fiction. And then, "at first sight" (it appears, with Mr. N., at last sight too), and no wonder, this acts so as "to impair our faith in his [Jesus's] miracles altogether" (id. ib.). And they are convicted, by Mr. N.'s believing that the imagined possessions were diseases, and by the Arabians believing that

they were not. How easy to settle things by "must have been," when we are convinced! It saves an amazing deal of trouble as to facts and consequences.

It is well known, that in the second century Justin declares to the whole Roman world, that persons living at Rome had been healed, and others yet were healed of demoniacal possession by Christians adjuring them by the name of Jesus; and Tertullian states, in the beginning of the third, that those pretending to prophecy among the heathen or possessed, would confess it was a demon if adjured by a Christian; saying, they had only to bring them before their tribunals, and to try. I would add, that I see no need to call this even a power of working miracles.\*

At any rate, a sober man must have something more conclusive than Mr. Newman's reasoning, to do away with the universal mass of facts not only in ancient but in modern times. See the accounts of the *Angekoks* in Crantz's "Greenland," or Brainerd's account of those whom he met with among the North American Indians. The denial of powers above those of man is, it seems to me, a low, proud, and foolish philosophy. A fancy that nothing can be above oneself, is a ridiculous and suspicious fancy, and that in the presence of facts which show results in good and evil which man has never been able to explain on mere human principles—immense and lasting results too. It was an old and just remark of Tertullian and Justin, that the demons led men into something like the truth in connection with natural conscience, that superstitious minds might think all religious systems equally true, and philosophical ones all equally false; and thus, either way, gain their end. I must be forgiven, if I do not see much to prefer in the indiscriminate rejection of

\* I doubt much, *historically*, that miracles continued after those were gone who were brought into the Church by apostolic ministry. I do not doubt that God may interfere, if He see good, in an extraordinary manner at any time; but this is not a gift of miracles conferred on a person. I believe, inasmuch as He (the Holy Ghost) who is in us is greater than he (Satan) who is in the world, that Satan's proper power ought to be overcome always, however our having grieved the Spirit may deprive us of the power of doing so. I do not think that special answers to prayer are miracles either.

self-sufficient philosophy, to the indiscriminate reception of credulous superstition.

The different character of John's Gospel, noticed by Mr. Newman (*Phases*, p. 129), is deeply interesting; but he relates not only no miracles, but no facts that are not immediately connected with some great doctrine or remarkable discourse.

I am not aware why Mr. Newman (*id. ib.*) places Matthew seventy or eighty years after the fact, as no critic in existence places it at that epoch; the very latest of all is 64; many placing it so early as 38. None of the Gospels were written so late as seventy years after Christ's birth, not even John's. I do not think it needful to make any further remark on this part of Mr. N.'s statement.

Mr. Newman speaks (*id. p. 130*) of the star *accompanying* the magi. It is a common, but very strange, error. The Scripture not only gives no hint of it, but contradicts it. "When they saw the star, they rejoiced with exceeding great joy." They had seen it in the east; and after they had made enquiry of Herod, it appeared again, and pointed out the birth-place of Jesus. I see nothing wonderful,\* if the Son of the Highest was born into the world, that it should be marked out by an extraordinary phenomenon, suited to the wise men's minds, and attracting the attention of all. The presence of the Son of God in the world was much more wonderful than that of the star. It was evidently a local supernatural phenomenon.

Why must Herod's massacre of the children be rejected? I would remark, that Mr. Newman's plan seems to have been a very useless and unphilosophical one. It would have been much more simple to have rejected the New Testament altogether, when it had lost its Divine authority with him. What matter whether the details were true or not? To spend his time in disproving details, when he really did not believe any, was foolish work. It had, indeed, one natural use—to discredit the book with others. It has another—to show the

\* "I now thought of it, only to see that it was a legend fit for credulous ages; and that it must be rejected in common with Herod's massacre of the children, an atrocity unknown to Josephus" (*Phases*, p. 130).

utter groundlessness of what satisfied Mr. N.'s willingly-convinced mind. Now has Mr. N. any reason for rejecting the massacre of the infants? None. Josephus does not mention it: that is all. Mr. N. says it was unknown to him. But that is a mere supposition, an invention of Mr. N.'s. Is it anything extraordinary that an historian should omit a fact which another records? Has Suetonius related all that Tacitus has, or has Tacitus related all that Suetonius has? The contrary is well known. The objection has no force whatever. It is really tedious to reply to such futilities.

But in this case there is more than this. There was the strongest reason if Josephus did know it for not mentioning it; for he must have given some reason for the massacre—an account of what occasioned it—if he had spoken of it. That is, he must have spoken of Herod, whose jealousy as to his government was the principal source of his horrible conduct, having received the intimation, accompanied by such very remarkable circumstances, that the Messiah was born. It was not jealousy of a grown-up competitor, or of a rival son even. To slay a number of infants in a particular place, and that place David's city, where all knew that Christ was to be born, must have had some cause which pointed out an infant there born at that time who claimed the throne; and an infant's claim was not made by himself. It must have been the circumstances that marked him out; hence some extraordinary circumstances which would have designated the child with peculiar evidence as Messiah the King. Was Josephus likely to record this carefully? Roman interests and Jewish national prejudices would concur to close Josephus's mouth, parasite as he was, as to the event itself. Besides this there is some strong reason to believe, that he has attempted to conceal it under a very obscure account of court intrigues just at that moment which he speaks of as occasioning the jealousy and anger of Herod. The passage is obscure, and has something concealed under it of a king to be set up with miraculous power. I do not pretend to decide as to what gave occasion to it. Two passages in his works refer to it; *Antiquities*, Book xvi. last chapter at the end; *idem* Book xvii. chap. ii. § 6. They may be seen in Lardner.

If Matthew wrote his Gospel A.D. 38, as many suppose, living witnesses must have known the truth or falsehood of it; and even sixty years afterwards, it would hardly have been forgotten. Justin, Irenæus, and Origen refer to it as a known fact; and in the fourth century a heathen author, Macrobius, speaks of it; this I mention merely as shewing it was notorious. This difficulty is one for those who will have one.

The next has more appearance of reason in it to a person who does not believe, nor consequently apprehend the bearing of the gospel accounts. It is this:—Matthew states that the Lord was taken into Egypt; Luke, that after they had performed all things according to the law for him, they returned to Nazareth. I cannot, of course, take popular habits of traditional belief in such an inquiry. Mr. Newman of course can take them, and trouble people's minds by an objection to them. Such traditions it may be difficult to reconcile with other facts related, although the soul may sometimes lose little by the difference between the tradition and the history. Such traditions may be a mere careless interpretation of a particular fact. Thus it is assumed that the Magi's visit was at the time of Christ's birth. Who has not seen them from early youth represented amid asses and oxen, kneeling before a mother and a new-born babe with glories round their head! Now, morally, the departure from the history, if such means are to be used at all, is not very material. But there is not a tittle in the history given in Scripture to prove that the Magi came at the moment of Christ's birth, but a good deal to show that they did not. It is pretty evident from Herod's inquiry as to when the star appeared (Matt. ii. 7), that that appearance was at his birth. Now they may have taken their time to prepare to start; they certainly must have taken time for their journey, how much, I do not pretend to say. Some little time was spent at Jerusalem before the visit. Further, Herod sends and kills from two years old and under, according to the time *which he had accurately inquired of the wise men*. Now we may well allow that Herod's jealousy and cruel character would have left margin enough to secure him at all events, and that he was not particular about how many suffered. But, as it is said, according to the time accurately ascertained from the wise men,

it must be certainly rather supposed that Jesus must have been on towards two years, or, at least, not just born. The woman's offering for a male child was thirty-three days after its birth. To kill all from two years and under, after accurately ascertaining that the child was less than thirty-three days old (which must have been the case if their visit was before Mary's presenting him in the temple), would have a character of needless cruelty beyond all reason, particularly when it is said that he did so according to the time which he had diligently or accurately inquired of the wise men. There is a relation between the age of the children killed and the babe's age in Herod's mind accurately formed, and he slays them according to that accurate information. Now, if he had ascertained him to be less than a month old, and killed all under two years old, there was no relation between them whatever. All this shews, that the presenting in the temple preceded the visit of the Magi, and there may have been even ample time to go to Nazareth, return to Bethlehem, for the visit of the Magi; but that it was not in the crowded state of the inn spoken of at the time of his birth, is made probable by the fact, that the wise men came into the house to offer their gifts. There is no appearance of Jesus being then in the manger. Whatever other call they may have had, his parents certainly came up once a-year at the feast of the passover: their being, therefore, again at Bethlehem, was nothing extraordinary.

Now in answering an alleged contradiction, to show that the facts can be reconciled, is a complete answer. Now both the narratives in this way may be true; even supposing Luke is speaking of an immediate departure, it is a very probable thing that, being enregistered and having performed their duty in the temple, they should go home; while the occurrence of such circumstances as accompanied the birth of Jesus, would almost naturally bring them back to David's city, with the Jewish feelings they had; and these poor people had nothing to connect them with Nazareth more than another place. They were in that miserable place perhaps from poverty. It was not, at any rate, a place they had any tie to. If their Son was the divinely-sent Heir to David of Bethlehem, whither would such a thought lead them? The circumstantial

probabilities connected with the slaying of the infants, tend to show some time had elapsed. The birth of the babe in Bethlehem, mentioned in Matthew, connects itself with the regal title associated with that place in every Jew's mind, and not with the date of the event. The important matter was, that He was born there; for so not only prejudice, but prophecy claimed; and it is in this connection it is used in Matthew. But the fact is, the "when," in English, which to the simple English reader is a natural note of time, has nothing to answer to it in the Greek. It is merely, "Now Jesus having been born in Bethlehem of Judea"—a fact of all importance to his history, and to this passage in particular. There is no note of time more particular than—"In the days of Herod the king;" a fact also indirectly material to his history. Hence nothing is more easy than the connection of the facts, without the least difficulty. The objection falls to the ground. At the same time, I must express my conviction that, while Luke says nothing but what is quite consistent with Matthew's history, he does not mean to give any note of time in the passage. The Spirit's object in Matthew was to show Christ's meeting the fulfilment of all that Jewish Scriptures declared of a Jewish Christ, and such a one's rejection: in Luke's Gospel, it was quite otherwise. He was showing a Christ who, connected with Adam by his human nature, though He sinlessly fulfilled all looked for in a Jew, opened the door of faith to Gentiles in spirit; who was, in a word, Son of man.

Hence, having shown Him duly accomplishing what the law required, this Gospel at once transplants Him, neglecting all else, to the position in which all the Gospels place the Lord, as having given up the Jews, considered as attached to the temple and Jewish hopes as a nation, and labouring in despised Galilee, according to Isaiah viii. and ix., in the gathering a remnant by faith. Even if it be chronologically exact, that it was at that moment he returned to Nazareth, as it well may be, still I should judge the object of the Spirit in Luke was not that exactitude, but the moral fact that He did accomplish legal requirements; but that once done, took his place among the poor of the flock, far from Jerusalem. We find an

analogous instance in what follows, in his coming up to Jerusalem at the passover, and being subject to Joseph and Mary; but his true character coming out, though He was not yet to act upon it: He came to be a Nazarene; He came to be about his Father's business. Luke marks this distinctly before He enters on his public ministry, that it might be seen to be connected with his person, and not to depend merely upon his office. He was the Pastor of the poor of the flock in spirit and character. It belonged to Him. He was the Son of the Father, though He might abide God's time for showing it. This is just as much, according to the tenor of Luke's Gospel, as what Matthew recounts is in accordance with the tenor of his.

Luke ii. 39 contains the whole moral history of the place the Lord took in Israel. Of course, Mr. Newman is insensible to these things, because the intention of God in the Scriptures is, by the position he has taken, wholly unknown to him. He speaks of John's omitting the temptation (Phases, p. 130). Of course he did. He was showing the Divine character of Jesus above all dispensation, as God before the world, as the Creator, and the totally new thing He was introducing into the earth, without reference to anything man was before, except setting it aside. Hence his infancy, his temptation, and all relating to his dispensational position on earth, is entirely left out. It begins before Genesis, and gives the origin of the saint's life, its place in Christ before the world. Thus it suffices to say, "He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto his own, and his own received Him not." Those who did, He entitled to take this new position; gave them *authority* to become the sons of God. From that time onwards the Jews are treated as reprobates; and from Nicodemus, as to the new nature, and the cross, and the heavenly things, and the woman of Samaria, and new spiritual worship of the Father seeking such in grace, the new thing is opened out. All is perfectly consistent. And I recall to the reader's mind what I have already said—that if God does inspire a book, it must be with a moral purpose, and not merely to write a history. With that purpose, as gathered from the tenor of each book, all that

Mr. N. objects to it perfectly in keeping. Had it been otherwise than it is, he who had seized the purpose of the book would have been sensible of defect.

The reason why napkins from Paul's body\* had an importance that pocket-handkerchiefs dipped in martyrs' blood had not, is as simple as possible. In Paul's case, God was confirming the word preached by Paul by signs following: in the other case He was not. I must say, if a person has not some more sensible objections to make, it is hardly fair to waste rational people's time with such as these.

That the Spirit of the Lord (Phases, p. 113) caught away Philip, depends of course on the authority of the book otherwise proved. There is perfect consistency, because the whole book is developing the extraordinary intervention of God Himself. His obedient servant had gone into the desert; God miraculously brings him back. The difference between Oriental stories and this, is (to which Mr. Newman seems always insensible), that God was acting here, and in order to make Himself known as interfering in grace, and attesting the words of these men in a way which authorised the setting aside a system which He had Himself established, and the pretension of Jesus to be the Son of God, which He had made to rest on His sending the Comforter, whose presence was now sensibly proved in a miraculous way.

The curse on the barren † fig-tree was peculiarly appropriate. The fig-tree was the symbol of the Jews as a nation, as the vine of them as a religious system. Now the Lord had come seeking fruit, and just at this moment was really passing sentence on the nation. Each part of it, Herodians, Pharisees, Sadducees, lawyers, scribes, priests, come up in turn to question in appearance, but really to receive their judgment at His mouth. Christ takes, therefore, this symbolical tree, and pronounces the curse on it for ever. So it was now with Judaism under the Old Covenant. Hence, it is added, the time of figs was

\* "Why should I look with more respect on the napkins taken from Paul's body (Acts xix. 12), than on pocket-handkerchiefs dipped in the blood of martyrs?" (Phases, pp. 130, 131).

† "Or what moral dignity was there in the curse on the barren fig-tree?" (id. p. 131).

not yet. Many have shewn that there might, notwithstanding, have remained some of the old crop, for it is double on the fig-tree. But Israel was not really to bear fruit under the Old Covenant. All the prophets bear witness, that it is when they are brought back through grace and under the New Covenant and the Messiah, that Israel will blossom and bud, and fill the face of the world with fruit. The Lord had a right to seek fruit as they were; but it was not the time the real crop was to come, though there was plenty of profession, leaves, but no fruit. Nothing could be more significant, or closely applicable in the instruction it afforded.

The tribute-money in the fish's\* mouth again is one of the most beautiful and perfect of the New Testament incidents. Christ had just been opening to his disciples the closing of his career of ministry among the Jews, had forbidden them to speak of his being the Christ to them, for He was going to suffer as Son of man; they must suffer with Him. Then, to three who were to be pillars, he shews his glory as Son of Man, to encourage their faith in seeing Him rejected by Israel and all the religious authorities, and in taking up their cross. Just after this, Peter is questioned in a way which amounted to asking whether Jesus was really a good Jew. When he enters, Christ anticipates him by shewing his divine knowledge of what passed; but while assuming the place of the Son of Jehovah of the temple, so as to be free from the tribute, which kings did not take of their own children, He, with infinite grace, puts Peter, and in him all of us in principle, in the same place as Himself, just what He has done by redemption, when rejected as Messiah: "Then are the children free; nevertheless that *we* offend not." And this He does just when He had shewn his divine knowledge of Peter's thoughts, and what had passed; He then shews, in a way, particularly intelligible to Peter from his occupation, that, far from being a mere Jew debtor to the temple, He disposes of creation though subject in grace to men. And having shewn

\* "And how could I distinguish the genius of the miracle of tribute-money in the fish's mouth, from those of the apocryphal gospels?" (Phases, p. 131). My business is not, of course, to prove that Mr. Newman could distinguish it.

divine power and title over creation as previously divine knowledge, He again associates his poor disciple with Him, saying, "That give for me and for thee." Besides the touching grace of this communication to Peter, see what is brought out — his real character relative to the temple, the setting aside thereby though submitting to the relation in which as a Jew He stood to it — the divine glory of his person in wisdom and power — and yet the power of the redemption He was just going to accomplish to be such (and this was as we have seen precisely the topic in hand) that, viewed as Son of the Lord of the temple, He would set his disciples in the same relationship with God as Himself. What a touching, tender, and yet glorious way, of rebuking the unbelief of Peter, and what a mass of truth is brought out exactly on the point treated of in this part of the Gospels, the transition from the old things to the new. It may be clearly seen in Matthew where the establishment of the church and the kingdom are connected with his being Son of the living God, and then his glory as Son of Man brought out. Then, about to leave the faithless and perverse nation, He opens out in the passage objected to, the full new relationship into which He was bringing them that trusted in Him through the glory of his person and work. There is not a more beautiful and striking passage in every way than this, which is here cavilled at. It affords the reader an example of the capacity of infidelity to judge of the bearing and importance of Scripture facts, and the moral proofs which a believer has which infidelity cannot touch, and which prove that it is ignorant of the elements of judgment.

As to useless\* miracles. What would Mr. Newman mean by a useful miracle? I suppose one that displayed God would be quite useless to him. He does not want a revelation from God. He is too competent to know Him to need it. Useful in his point of view, would mean for some human profit; for moral degradation in reasoning cannot be separated from

\* "What was I to say of useless miracles like that of Peter and Jesus walking on the water, or that of many saints coming out of their graves to shew themselves, or of a poetical sympathy of the elements, such as the earthquake and the rending of the temple veil when Jesus died" (Phases, p. 131).

infidelity, which makes man its end and shuts out God. Now doubtless Jesus *was* healing all that were oppressed of the devil, for God was with Him. But surely it is conceivable that a miracle which shewed that a divine person was come amongst men, and rendering this sensible to them, might have some usefulness in it. All men are not so able to do without God and a positive revelation of Him as Mr. N. is. They have found it useful to them to have Him revealed, a delight to them even to hear his words. They have wondered at his condescension and grace in thus communicating with them. They have understood, that where that power is, a man can walk on the waves of this troublesome world, and are glad to know that, by keeping the eye steadily fixed on Him, they can do it too; they have found it so, and that if forgetful of this grace and power, they begin to think of difficulties they begin to sink. They go out on his word to meet Him. They have been helped when they failed; and they believe that when indeed He shall rejoin his tossed people, they will be at land immediately. They see this all fully developed in the circumstances of the miracle—Christ, acknowledged as prophet, refusing to be king, and going up to be alone on high, the disciples having to struggle on without his presence, but that at last He will return, and all will be rest from labour. They see even that the whole subject of the sixth of John, where it is largely spoken of, shews Christ as the food of his people during this outward separation. He had been satisfying the poor with bread (see Ps. cxxxii.), but the time was not come for his being king; He satisfies the saints meanwhile with far better bread, Himself come down from on high, with his flesh, too, and his blood; so must He be eaten to live by Him. It is again a full development of the new thing preceded by a complete picture of the historical positions Christ would take—prophet, priest, and king—each in its place connected with it. To Mr. N. it is a useless miracle. I am sorry for him—yes, unfeignedly sorry.

Such wonderful testimony as many saints coming out of their graves after Christ's resurrection, surely was not useless to show that death was then overcome. To be such a testimony they must have appeared. Its being "to many," precluded

the idea of its being the heated imagination of an individual, or the fraudulent story of a few favourers of Jesus's pretensions.

As regards poetry, or Divine sympathies, it is not difficult to see that they are foreign to Mr. Newman's habits of thought; but he is certainly unfortunate in his choice of objections to the genius of the extraordinary events mentioned in Scripture. If any be of the most obvious meaning, and at the same time of the highest possible importance, and especially characteristic meaning, it is the rending of the veil. Under the Jewish system, God had conferred benefits, given laws, sanctioned them by judgments; but man had been kept at a distance: God had never revealed Himself. He dwelt "in the thick darkness;" and if He condescended to dwell amongst men, He was within the veil, where none could approach—in a word, unseen. He governed from his throne; but direct approach was forbidden. The thick darkness and the barrier of Sinai, or the veil of an unlighted holy of holies, secluded Him from man. Had He shown Himself in light to a sinful world, it must have been utter condemnation. The darkness had no communion with the light. Unseen, He might, in patient grace, bear much which man's ignorance committed, and govern in mercy. But in due time, when man had been fully proved in all possible ways—without law, under law, under promise, prophecy, government, and even grace in the mission of God's own Son—and proved utterly bad, the time was come for God to show Himself in grace, such as He really was. Had He done so before, man could not have been properly put to the test. This he has been; and now in infinite grace, when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ dies for the ungodly. Now if God came forth merely as light or holiness when man was wholly wicked, his will antagonistic, as Mr. N. admits, He must, in the nature of things, have driven man out of his presence, unless holiness means allowing sin, whereas it means not allowing it. Yet God must be holy; that is, He cannot allow sin when He deals with it, or he would be morally like it, which would be a blasphemous denial of Him. How, then, does He act? In the death of Christ He manifests his holiness in the perfect

taking away of sin, that his perfect love may flow out, never so shown to men as in this act. Now God can fully reveal *Himself* without a veil. His holiness is perfect blessing, because shining out in absolute love, sin being put away. As a sign of this wonderful all-changing change, the veil which before hid Him is rent in twain from the top to the bottom; signifying Christ's death, according to the whole figurative arrangement employed to typify these things. And so the New Testament uses this event: "Having therefore...boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way, which He hath opened to us, through the veil, that is to say, his flesh;...let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith," etc. Again: "Into the second [that within the veil] went the high priest alone once every year, not without blood...the Holy Ghost this signifying, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made manifest, while as the first tabernacle was yet standing: which was a figure," etc.

Now here we have the veil and its accompaniments declared to have precisely this force in the mind of the Holy Ghost. According to the whole system of Scripture, and that in its deepest moral elements, whether of man's relationship with God, or in reference to the peculiar position of Israel, which we know historically was then closing in, the rending of the veil had the most clear and weighty significance. Nothing could have had so much. It was the central expression of the whole change of the Divine way of dealing with man, and of man's relationship with God by the cross. And here I would remark, that I must, to ascertain the importance and "genius" of a fact, take such a system within itself. It is another question, whether the whole system be right or wrong? But within itself—and the veil was a part of, and a central part of, the system—nothing could have such a distinct signification as its rending. It signified, as I have said, the change of the whole relationship of God and man. I must, if I refer to a veil and its rending, consider the meaning of its being there, to know the importance of its being rent. God's being concealed or revealed, is not an unimportant idea; and the rending, at Christ's death, of the veil which concealed his throne

and glory, not difficult to understand. It is a figure of course, as all these parts of the tabernacle or temple were; but a figure of the most intelligible simplicity, and pregnant with meaning. It seems to me that the end of this page of Mr. Newman's book is an unfortunate occasion to ask people, as he there does, to withdraw the charge of being superficial.

As to the earthquake, I cannot see anything out of place in God's marking, by an event peculiarly calculated to attract attention and overawe the mind, the solemn moment of the death of his beloved and only-begotten Son. If there was no God, or if creation was not in his power, it would be another affair; but I should have thought this eventful act of man's enmity against God, and the death of the Lord in the world which was made by Him, passing unnoticed and unmarked by some notable signal of its importance and character, would have been much more surprising. An earthquake was ever felt as showing God's noticing, and solemnly marking that notice of things on earth. Could there be such an occasion of doing so, as the rejection and death of his beloved Son by wicked men, and the accomplishment of his mighty and wondrous work?

If the miracles of Elijah and Elisha, which form the next subject of Mr. Newman's objections, are examined, it will be seen that those of the former are judicial on evil; of the latter (save the case of the children devoured by bears, showing that judgment will accompany, for despisers, the return of blessing), saving, and characterised by grace and life-giving. Elijah, declaring all attempt to bring back Israel useless, passes through each place which characterised Israel's relation to God, until he reaches the place of the curse and the well-known symbol of death, and ascends up. Elisha's ministry does not proceed from Sinai, nor return to it; heavenly glory is its starting-point. He crosses Jordan again, takes away the curse from Jericho, and all his miracles were in saving, healing, cleansing, taking away death, and the like, save the one noticed. One marked out the course of Him whose Spirit they had, under the law, through the curse, up to heaven; and then, the other in life-giving power and blessing, as taking away the curse. This character of Elisha's ministry is closed

and crowned by showing the resurrection-power attached to that which it so vividly represented. When Romish saints do such things, it will be time to discuss the analogy alleged by Mr. N. to exist in this case.

As to Uzzah,\* God did not make Himself known under the law as "the Father of mercies and God of all comfort." He maintained in this particular case his holy majesty, when Israel had grievously forgotten it. They were all in flagrant contravention of the law in what they were doing. It was the consequence of this to which the rash Uzzah exposed himself. He never would, if the open violation of it had not been going on. And this produced a just sense of their being in such a state. David remembered the law, and recognised the neglect of it as having brought on this sad judgment.

As to Abimelech (Phases, p. 132), it was not justice that God was displacing; nor was He in the case of Esau (id. ib.). In that of Abraham and Abimelech, it was Divine care over one He had called out to walk before Him. "He reproveth even kings for their sakes, saying, Touch not mine anointed, and do my prophets no harm." God cares for those He calls to walk before Him. Abimelech had wantonly taken, by tyrannical power, a member of Abraham's family. God shows that He will not suffer his people on earth to be touched with impunity; that He should show Himself careful of those He thus owned. He was made known by it in connection with his people; and this was of the last importance. Esau and Jacob were distinguished, that it might be seen that it was God's grace, and not man's more agreeable character, which made the difference.

The materialism of Mr. Newman's mind is extraordinarily shown out in the two following objections,† as to God's

\* "Uzzah, when the ark is in danger of falling, puts out his hand to save it, and is struck dead for his impiety! Was this the judgment of the Father of mercies, and God of all comfort?" (Phases, p. 132).

† "Could I any longer overlook the gross imagination of antiquity, which made Abraham and Jehovah dine on the same carnal food, like Tantalus with the gods?—which fed Elijah by ravens, and set angels to bake cakes for him?" (id. ib.). I have almost hesitated to copy this low and vulgar scoffing.

visiting Abraham, and feeding Elijah by means of ravens. The gracious intimacy and intercourse of God with Abraham, which gained for the latter the glorious title of "friend of God," to him is nothing but a physical question of eating. It is astonishing how this system debases everything it touches. There is not a lovelier picture to be found, than the gracious condescension (fitted, indeed, to man's childhood in revealed blessings) of God to Abraham. He was unfit to know the high spiritual privileges for which this very condescension prepared the way; but *Elohim* in this did the principal thing. He assured the heart of his servant, in a way in which he could seize and feel it, of his interest in him, his affection, and, I may say, confidence. Now this is everything with us. No doubt this is known now by fuller, more spiritual means; but the assuring the heart of it was the great thing—the assuring it in practical exercises. We see the effect in Abraham's pleading for Sodom. It was the same in feeding Elijah by the means of the ravens; in the famine by which Israel was judged. Would Mr. N. prefer indifference on God's part to those He had called to trust in Him, and who were suffering for Him? Now temporal care was the sign, then, of mercy. So the touching interest shown by angelical ministry to his weary-hearted servant, in the lengthened journey his impatience had cast on him. And here the peculiar fitness of God's dealings is evident. Had he been like Moses or Christ, sustained by a kind of abstraction from a human state, it would have been out of place. Elijah, though a man of extraordinary faithfulness and devotedness, at this moment quailed before the dangers that beset the faithful, and retired to Sinai, to complain to God. It was ordered of God in one sense. Man could not restore the authority of a broken law. Elijah, who sought to bring back Israel to faithfulness, to Jehovah, and his law, has to go to Jehovah, and tell Him it is in vain. No means could be more appropriate than the sense of failure in him who attempted it; yet he returns as a divine witness of it. Hence he comes to God with the peculiar solemn separation from the world, in a measure, which marked the intercourse of Moses with God, and the temptation

of Jesus; but while there was something of this solemnity in the intercourse, yet as he was flying, through failing courage, to God, it was not the moment for unmingled manifestation of power. Was he to be repulsed? No; what he failed in was the adequate sense of God's interest in his people. Hence, if there is not all the peculiar glory of the forty days' abstraction from the conditions of human existence which were found in Moses and in Christ, there was what showed this tender regard of God, and care over the smallest circumstances which concerned his people, and sustained them for the difficulties of the way to come to God. The ways of God are perfect; they have been ever condescendingly suited to men's, in circumstances which spoke great principles to the heart, and were immaterial, save as showing the nearness, condescension, tenderness of God, and his interest in his people; most unspeakably precious, as having this character in a human way, which could alone give the intimacy and the nearness to human thought which was fully realised in Christ. To the infidel it is a question of cakes! This is quite worthy of the system which shuts out God in his gracious nearness to man, and therefore never rises, in judging of circumstances, above the low necessities of the human mind. "Sir, give me of this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw," is the level of an unreached conscience. Conscience must be reached, to get the intelligence which can perceive that it is a prophet, and that there are higher thoughts to be had than these.

Mr. Newman refers (Phases, pp. 132, 133) to Arnold's rationalist thoughts as to Scripture, as confirming his views as to the first three Gospels, and leading him to accept John's at this period of his researches. Arnold meant well, doubtless, in building chiefly on the Gospel of John, as Mr. N. states; but yielding to infidelity never does any good, because it is accepting its title to judge God. If I do, it has an equal right and equal reason to reject John as Matthew, or anything else it likes. It is infidelity; and woe be to it! It will be judged by the word it has rejected, and know that it is God's then, when it is a sword in Christ's mouth, instead of a Gospel.

The statement as to Elohistic and Jehovistic\* sources of the Mosaic history (words which I hope my readers have never heard before, and very worthy of their German infidel source, and which they are happy if they never hear again), is without any other foundation than ignorance and the low German habits of criticism—I say, low habits.† There is, at least in what I have seen, a plodding diligence no doubt to find out something which has the character of human learning, no matter what, but something which will make a book (which somebody else has not made); but then it has all a downward tendency, and never rises above a grovelling pre-occupation with the external means of truth, or the spinning out their ideas of what ought to be. Take even Michaelis, a learned man and attractive by his modesty. When he comes to touch the interpretation of Scripture, it is puerile to the last degree. A child who reads the Scriptures with a little simple intelligence, would smile at the wonders he finds out by Syriac and Hebrew (and, if Marsh is right, often a very slovenly use of them), and the working of his own mind. It is such *naïf* nonsense, and brought out with such good faith, that it produces the kindly feeling one has for the foolish questions of a child which betray his innocence. The mind of God in the passage never seems to occur to him,

\* “For some time back I had paid special attention to the Book of Genesis; and I had got aid in the analysis of it from a German volume. That it was based on *at least* two different documents, technically called the Elohistic and Jehovistic, soon became clear to me” (Phases, p. 133).

† Even Stuart, I judge, on the canon of Scripture, does not escape this. For if we do not read with God, but simply as men, we are already on this low ground. Thus, judging as he and others do, if a book has an ethical tendency for me, what a thoroughly narrow-minded way of looking at it, instead of seeing it as part of an immense and divine conception and communication of the whole history of men, and God’s ways with them. Thus, for instance, Esther. Is the providential care of Israel even during its rejection not a principle of immense importance in God’s dealings with men and his people? It is of the very last importance. Is such a knowledge of God not ethical for me? He could not *reveal* Himself, or it would not be the time of their rejection. All the style of reasoning I am commenting on, I must be forgiven for calling by the well known term of “petty-fogging.” But I anticipate.

though he believes Scripture to be inspired. Now *Jehovah* and *Elohim* are always used each in its own proper sense. The latter as the Creator God, God in his own being as such. The former made known to Israel a personal name in which He dealt with Israel, and even with the world, though they did not own Him. The appropriateness is always sensible to him who seizes the bearing of the passage. When the relationship or work of God known in relationship to Israel is expressed, we have *Jehovah*. When the account is simply historical, God (*Elohim*) is used. In some cases either would give, if not so perfect a sense, yet very little different; since *Jehovah* is the true *Elohim*, and *Elohim* is *Jehovah*; and the use of *Jehovah* in these latter cases amounts to the writer having God as known to himself in his mind. The Psalms notably show the different use of the two terms, as does the Book of Jonah. I will take a special example from the Psalms to shew this—Ps. xiv. and liii. These are very nearly the same; but in one *Jehovah* is used, in the other *Elohim*. In Ps. xiv. *Jehovah* is used, hence it says, “They were in great fear, for [Elohim—God Himself] GOD is in the generation of the righteous.” The relationship, the consequence of this name *Jehovah*, is expressed in the presence of *Elohim* with the righteous, in verse 6. “Ye have shamed the counsel of the poor, because *Jehovah* is his refuge.” Now in Ps. liii. *Elohim* is used; it is the historical fact of what they were in the sight of *Elohim*. Hence we have, “There were they in great fear, where no fear was; for *Elohim* hath scattered the bones of him that encampeth against thee; thou hast put them to shame, because *Elohim* hath despised them.” These Psalms convey the same truths; but the thought of relationship prevails where *Jehovah* is used. Whereas where *Elohim* is used we have the general result as regards the enemy.\*

\* It may be interesting to those who do study Scripture with spiritual understanding, however feeble, to draw their attention to the circumstance, that all the Psalms in the first Book, i.e. to the end of Ps. xli., are addressed to *Jehovah*, except the 16th, in which, as cited by Paul for Christ's partaking of human nature, and Peter as proof of his resurrection, Christ's taking his place with man is most clearly brought out. “Preserve me, O *Elohim*, for in thee [in what God was as such, He having become man] do I put my trust. Thou hast said to Jeho-

Again, look at Jonah, where there is not, and cannot be, the smallest pretence of two accounts. The intercourse between Jonah and God is under the name *Jehovah*. When the seamen learn who his God is that he is running away from, they fear Jehovah, and call upon Jehovah. Where it is a general testimony of repentance to strangers (Psalm iii. 5, to

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vah, Thou art my Adon (Lord); my goodness extendeth not to thee." He takes the place of subjection, not as equal with the Father, "Why callest thou me good; there is none good but *God*. [Thou hast said] to the saints that are in the earth, and the excellent, All my delight is in them." He takes his place now along with the saints, not with Jehovah: as to Him, He takes the place of a servant. How deep and admirable are the instructions of the Word! Now, all these Psalms of the first book suppose the relationship existing as, however deserving rejection and not a people, was the case in Israel when Jesus was amongst them. But in Ps. xlii, i.e. the second book, it will be seen, that they are cast out from God's sight—can no more frequent his temple and worship. Hence we at once find, not Jehovah but Elohim addressed. And so it is through this book, though, of course, He is owned to be Jehovah, and Jehovah as the only true Elohim. I have no doubt that, prophetically, the first book refers to the Jews in the latter day returned to Jerusalem, and enjoying *outwardly* their hoped for advantages there; and the second has its application when they are driven out in the time of the great tribulation mentioned in Matt. xxiv. It will be seen that the third book, beginning with Ps. lxxiii, refers to all Israel (i.e. the ten tribes as well as the two) as such, and not specially the Jews, but only to the clean in heart, however, among them. They are still driven out—the temple pillaged and defaced—and Elohim is addressed, until the last confederacy in Ps. lxxxiii, where the judgment prophetically spoken of introduces Jehovah, known as Most High over all the earth. Then in Ps. lxxxiv. they address Jehovah, and turn and mount up to the tabernacles of Jehovah Sabaoth and his courts, finding that man blessed whose trust is in Jehovah. Thence onward is praise to Jehovah, with contrition and exercise of heart, mercy celebrated in the true gracious or holy one (*Chasidika*) Christ, the true David, which closes the book. I may just add, that the fourth book celebrates in all its bearings, but in special connection with Israel, the introduction of the first-begotten into the world; Ps. xc. giving Jehovah's interest in Israel; Ps. xci. Christ's taking Jehovah the God of Israel as the true Elion Shadai—the names by which Melchizedek blessed Abraham, then celebrates Him in this character, and develops the coming of the Lord to reign, and that in detail from the cry of the needy till He is fully again seated between the cherubim. In the last book, from Ps. cvii, we have the general bearings of it all, and the

the end), it is Elohim. And when we have the general supreme dealings of God with Jonah, to make him shew what He was with man, as God, it is again Elohim. Now, in Jonah, this has peculiar force, because the relationship of Israel with Gentiles, and of Gentiles with Jehovah, is in question. It is the last public direct testimony of God to Gentiles before Christ. And this goodness of God to Gentiles is really what Jonah dreaded, as discrediting his message of judgment, which Jewish pride might like to see executed (see Jonah iv. 2). Hence we have Gentiles brought, in the moment of judgment on the Israelite, to confess Jehovah; and God, as such, shewing Himself good; the faithful Creator, who thought of those who could not distinguish between their right hand and their left, and even of the cattle. At the same time the proper relationship of Jehovah to his prophet, as such, is also fully maintained, and the word Jehovah, his God, more than once repeated. Now, here we have the elements of Jehovah's grace, and Elohim's true character and supremacy: what, in nauseous systematising of ignorance, is reduced to some imaginary\* documents which none of them know anything

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praises and hallelujahs which result from it—a kind of historical comment upon all God's dealings with the world, Israel, the Messiah, and his place while all was going on. Already, in the last Psalms of the fourth book, Christ's government, that, while utterly brought low even to death, He was Jehovah, is brought out in the most astonishing way. The healing of the paralytic in Luke is a distinct allusion to Jehovah's name in Ps. ciii. 3. But I must not go further here on this subject.

\* I would just add here, that it is perfectly indifferent to me if Moses used five hundred documents, provided what he in result gives me expresses exactly, perfectly, and completely, what God meant to communicate to me. I have taken the case of Jonah, because we have the use of Jehovah and Elohim where there is no pretence for this flimsy notion of documents. I may add, that I never found a case in which the use of either of these words did not seem to me precisely appropriate, and this distinctive use is eminently instructive. In the Psalms, this is peculiarly the case. This internal evidence of suitability to relationship, is the strongest possible kind of proof of the genuineness and (the subject being moral and divine) of the divine character of the record, in which this suitability is uniformly found. Thus, not to speak of the Psalms, where it is shown more in detail (see preceding note), the book of Jonah touches on the relationship of Israel

about, but suppose. We have, I say, these two titles brought out in the clearest and most instructive way, as unfolding divine relationships for those who have the heart to delight in them, and justify that wisdom which is the joy of her children. The infidel must imagine and suppose some external cause, because he knows nothing of the real divine force of these things. And I would remark, that I am not here bringing an external proof of the truth of the Jewish system; but, that, supposing its existence, the reason for the distinctive use of the words *Jehovah* and *Elohim*, is fully given within the system itself—is consistent and appropriate. This the infidel ought to have seen, or at least examined; because it is a part of the system he pretends to judge, and there are adequate proofs of its consistency within itself, which make his arguments perfectly futile: for what he finds imaginary reasons for, is accounted for on the plainest principles of the system he is judging; for every one can see that *Jehovah* was a proper name of God to Israel, and declared positively to be such, though the name of the one true supreme God. Now, for the believer, the use of the names of God carries blessed divine instruction, for all His names have a meaning: *Almighty Jehovah, Father*, all have a sense to his soul. But it is not even rational to seek for a reason in imaginary causes when the real reason lies within the system, and makes a clearly stated and characteristic part of it. Now such is the difference between *Jehovah* and *Elohim*.

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to Gentiles; of the peculiar God of Israel with Gentiles; of God, as such, with the latter, with creation, so as to put everything in its place—without an idea of proving anything about it—according to the whole history of the Bible from Genesis to the end of Chronicles:—shews the feeling of a Jew, God's way of looking at it. The proper place of *Jehovah*, in His character of God of Israel, is always preserved, and yet it is shewn that this very *Jehovah* was the supreme God of goodness to men, let them be in the height of their pride, if there was room for repentance, a character which he would not relinquish even towards cattle. Nothing can be more important as a key to the whole question of God being *Jehovah*, and the peculiar God of Israel, and yet the one supreme and universal God, a thought so easily lost, at any rate as to goodness, if not as to power, by Jewish pride. It corrects all that a Jew could draw falsely from his peculiar position.

As to these alleged "difficult narratives," Mr. Newman is very obscure. One might suppose that the double accounts he alleges to exist, are in every case distinguished by the use of *Jehovah* and *Elohim*. This is not the case. But I suppose he uses the fact of these names being employed to establish, at least, the existence of two documents, and their use by the author of the Book of Genesis, from which they are drawn. But even this is untenable ground, because if the two documents were distinctively characterised by these two names of God, an account alleged to be drawn from one of the distinct documents would not, as it often does, employ both of these names, nor two accounts, alleged to exist because the writer copied two distinct documents, employ both of them only one and the same name. Such accounts cannot be referred to two distinct documents characterised by the distinct employ of each.\* Mr. N. slips over all this with a convenient looseness habitual with infidel objectors.

However, none of his objections on this ground (rather a favorite one with German discoverers), have the least validity. It was important in a book addressed to Israel, to shew that *Jehovah*, *their* God, was the one true supreme *Elohim*, the Creator, in contrast with the demon gods of the heathen. Hence, in Genesis, where creation and the Ante-Israelitish history is given, we have these two names brought in together (the force of which is much lost in our English translation), or so used, as to make it clear that *Jehovah* is *Elohim* and *Elohim* *Jehovah*, though this last was taken as a name of relationship only at the Exodus, on which we will say a few words further on. The very creed, as I may call it, of Israel marks clearly the use of these words אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱחָד׃ "Hear, O Israel, *Jehovah*, our God, is one *Jehovah*." "And what nation is there that hath *Elohim*," says Moses, "so nigh to them as *Jehovah*, our *Elohim*, is in all things that we call upon Him for." "Did ever people hear the voice of *Elohim*

\* The reader has only to read Gen. vi. vii., to convince himself of the intermingling of the words God and Lord (i. e. *Jehovah*), though never without reason, to see the futility of the system. I shall cite some examples further on; but it is easily seen by reading these chapters.

speaking out of the midst of the fire." "Or hath Elohim assayed to go and take him a nation from the midst of another nation, etc., as Jehovah, your Elohim, did for you in Egypt before your eyes? Unto thee it was shewed, that thou mightest know that Jehovah, he is Elohim; there is none else beside Him." So the people, when Elijah brought down fire from heaven, cry out,—“Jehovah, He is Elohim; Jehovah, He is Elohim.”

Having thus the undoubted importance of these words, let us apply this clear principle to that part of the history in which it was necessary to shew that Elohim was Jehovah, the Creator, Israel's God.

I have spoken already of the creation. We have first, as a general history, Elohim—God—creating everything in succession; and Elohim rests (Gen. i.; ii. 1—3). Then we have Jehovah Elohim, and the particular condition of things under him. This kind of repetition being universal in Scripture history, when subjects are considered in a new light: as if I give Benjamin's progeny as such, and Saul's royal one, for example, as such. I am not exactly aware of three accounts, as Mr. Newman alleges,\* of man's creation. We have, besides Adam, a special account of Eve's creation. In this second chapter we have a detailed account of the condition and circumstances of man—the peculiar position he was placed in as Lord of the creation—his wife's to him—out of what he was formed—how he became a living soul: all as essential details, when his relationship with Jehovah Elohim was unfolded, as the historical account of Elohim's creating all things in general, among which man had his place, was in its place too.

In this there is only a perfect communication of divine truth, each thing being perfectly in its place.

Let us turn to Noah and the flood.

We have the sons of Elohim (vi. 2). As to them and in connection with His peculiar dealings with man, Jehovah said (ver. 3), “My Spirit shall not always strive with man.” We have “sons of Elohim” (ver. 4), because here the expression is characteristic. “Elohim saw” (ver. 5), because here it was God in His

\* “The creation of man is three times told” (Phases, p. 133).

own nature and character looking at man as such. "Jehovah repented" (ver. 6), because here it is His special thoughts and dealings about man: as his—his feelings in connection with this relationship. Again (ver. 7) Jehovah, and Jehovah in relationship with Noah. Noah (ver. 9) "walked with God": here it was morally characteristic, not his relationship to Jehovah under that name.

"The earth was corrupt before Elohim"—again it refers to God's abstract nature and character (verses 11 and 12). So (ver. 13) Elohim takes up His creation to declare its end to Noah. He had the Creator's title to destroy his creation. Elohim Himself commanded Noah what to do in this case. In chap. vii. we enter into the full relationship of God with Noah as a deliverer; and it is Jehovah, just as we saw with Adam. There Elohim created. Jehovah had to do with Adam in a special way in the garden. Here Elohim is going to destroy his creation, and Jehovah has special relationship with Noah in the ark, as we have seen in verses 3, 6, 7, and 8 of chap. vi., the peculiar relative feelings of Jehovah, not the simple character and supremacy of Elohim. Yet fully to identify the two accounts and connect them, we have in chap. vii. 16, "And they that went in, went in male and female of all flesh, as Elohim had commanded him,\* and Jehovah shut him in." Now here we have the general command of Elohim given in the preceding chapter about his creatures to preserve them, as Creator; and then Jehovah shut him, Noah, in:—that is, in the same verse, the special name of relationship in the case of the chosen and faithful patriarch. Mr. Newman says, "The two documents may indeed in this narrative be almost re-discovered by mechanical separation." Certainly it would not be more than mechanical: for German theology nothing more, indeed, would be wanting. Again, in chap. viii., in preserving mercy we have Elohim's care of his preserved creation, and its deliverance to subsist on the recovered earth again. Then Noah builds an altar (ver. 20), and Jehovah's name immediately appears again, because it was important to show that it was indeed Israel's

\* The connection of the two names here makes the Double-document System absurd.

God that was thus worshipped—God in relationship with man from the beginning. Elohim then (chap. ix.) begins the world, so to speak, again; but the moment it is a question of relationship (ver. 26), we have Jehovah the God of Shem.

I need not pursue this further. One point only remains to be noticed. The twos and sevens of the animals. In the accounts of Elohim's directions for saving the different races of creatures, they are directed to be taken two of every sort, the male and female, to keep them alive. Nothing can be more simple than the meaning of this. When Jehovah is stating his thoughts as to Noah, and giving his directions in respect to his relationship with man and the earth, He directs Noah to take of *clean* beasts by sevens, still two and two male and female. And they all go in two and two, *as Elohim had commanded*, thus identifying, in the text itself, the two names in a way which would make the dissevering them difficult even on the mechanical process. The reason for distinguishing the clean beasts (still two and two male and female) is too obvious to make the smallest difficulty. The twos refer, moreover, to male and female on a general principle. One must be very hard run up for a difficulty, or for a discovery, to find a contradiction here. The fowls of the air, which went in by sevens, are meant evidently clean ones too, as may be seen, chap. viii. 20.

The cases of Pharaoh and Abimelech\* only confirm the remarks we have made. Moreover, in the parallel part of the passage, Jehovah is used in both cases. Jehovah plagued Pharaoh with great plagues. Jehovah had fast closed up the wombs of the house of Abimelech. Only there is added in Abimelech's case, God having known Abimelech's integrity in the matter, that He (Elohim) warned Abimelech in a dream. Now here Jehovah the God of Israel would have been quite out of place; for Abimelech was a Philistine, and Abraham already distinctively called. Yet, as a gracious God in nature and character, Elohim could chastise Abimelech temporarily for his error, and warn him, though He would preserve the integrity of the family He had chosen. Here let me remark,

\* "And here, also, the two which concern Abraham are contrasted as Jehovistic and Elohistic" (Phases, p. 134).

that undoubtedly Abraham was to blame. In the day when God judges the secrets of men's hearts, all this will have its place been God and Abraham; but in his government of the world, all having fallen into idolatry, God was showing his special care over one called out in grace to bear his name, and walk under his protection. Hence that special care of him and his descendants, till there was no remedy, because they respected the name of Jehovah less than a heathen, as was shewn in Zedekiah's conduct with Nebuchadnezzar. He that touched them, Jehovah's called ones, touched Jehovah Himself, who declared He would protect them as *El-Shaddai* the Almighty, such a one touched the apple of his own eye. Jehovah's power as Almighty had to be made good against the apostate and guilty heathen, for the sustaining the faith of his called ones, and the knowledge that there was a God of the earth.

But the statement, that these names are contrasted in Abraham's case with Pharaoh and Abimelech, is unfounded. There is no divine warning to Pharaoh; and Jehovah's care of Abraham, in judging each, is related under the same title—Jehovah.

I do not know what Mr. Newman means by a double account of the origin of circumcision;\* I know of but one, that in Gen. xvii. It is referred to Elohim, but He is called, as appearing to Abraham, *Jehovah*, and yet gives his name as *El-Shaddai*. It was a command connected with the character and nature of God. They were to be a separate people to Him, and the flesh be mortified. This "was not of Moses," who brought in specially the name Jehovah as the ground of relationship, "but of the Fathers," antecedent to the special relationship of the Jews with Him, and connected with the name "God Almighty," that Abraham might be a father of *many nations*.

There are no two reasons for the name of Isaac. God directs his name to be called Isaac—"laughter"—as a term of joy and gladness at this peculiar blessing to Abraham.

\* "A similar double account is given of the origin of circumcision—of the names Isaac, Israel, Bethel, Beersheba" (Phases, p. 134).

Sarah takes up the name when he is born, and says, "God hath made me to laugh"; but this is no double account of his name. God confirms the name of Israel to Jacob; but there is no double account of its origin. On the first occasion, God had a controversy with Jacob; but blesses him, strengthens him to prevail in the conflict, and gives him the name of *Israel*—"a prince who prevailed with God"; yet chastises him, and does not reveal Himself to him. Jacob, after this, goes up to the place where his real meeting with God in blessing was to be, and puts away idols out of his house, knowing he is going to meet Him. Then God begins by revealing freely his name, and confirms to Jacob the title He had given him before. Here there is no kind of pretence for making two accounts—one using the word "Jehovah," the other "Elohim." Jehovah is used in neither. In the case of Bethel, God appeared to him when he left the land of Canaan, and he called the name of the place "Bethel." God tells him, on returning, to go up there, *calling it already Bethel*; and then appears a second time there to Jacob, and Jacob thereupon confirms to it the name of "Bethel." He had a double reason; but it is called, in the second part of the history, Bethel already, before he gets there; so that the case is very simple and very clear, and there is no pretence of a reason to speak of it as two distinct independent accounts which are referred to. The name of "Beersheba" was confirmed by Isaac when he also established by oath his boundaries there with Abimelech, as Abraham had done. These circumstances both gave occasion to this name. Being the *boundary-well*, the engagement was repeated; and both engagements contributed to give it this name. But here there is not the smallest ground whatever for supposing that it was inattention to some other document; for it is stated (verse 18), "And Isaac digged again the wells of water which they had digged in the days of Abraham his father; for the Philistines had stopped them after the death of Abraham. And *he called their names after the names by which his father had called them;*" and then it goes on to give an additional personal reason why the last had the same name.

As regards God's saying, "But by my name Jehovah was I not known to them,"\* the meaning is as simple as possible. The words are—"And Elohim spake unto Moses" (in the previous verses it is "Jehovah," showing how unfounded is the supposition of their belonging to distinct documents), "and said unto him, I am Jehovah: and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty; but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them." Now here we have *Elohim*, *Jehovah*, *El-Shaddai*, all spoken of the one supreme God as different names; and then the Lord declares, exactly according to Genesis, that to the patriarchs He had revealed Himself as *El-Shaddai* (see Gen. xvii.; xxxv. 11). This was the name, the power of which He was specially to make good in their favour, in protecting them in their wanderings, "what time they went from one nation to another people." Now that He was calling his people, He reveals Himself to them by another name, as the ground of relationship and of the expectation of faith on their part, as the existing One "who was, and is, and is to come," though still the Almighty. He who now promised would live ever to perform, unchanged and unchangeable. *Jehovah* was God's proper and peculiar name with his redeemed people. He had never taken this name as the ground of his dealings with Abraham, nor laid it as the basis on which his faith was to act. In the New Testament, God takes yet another—that of *Father*. Hence He says, "I will be a Father, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty." That is, God (*Elohim*), who had the two former names, *Jehovah* or "Lord," and *Shaddai*, "Almighty," now took this special one of *Father* with the saints. From the first calling out of the world to be separate from it, *God Almighty*, *Jehovah*, *Father*, characterised successively the position which God assumed for faith. Nothing can be plainer. I believe He is now God Almighty; but it is not the name by which He is known to me: He is known to me by the name of *Father*. "To us there is one God, the Father." If this be all German

\* "Still more was I struck by the positive declaration in Exod. vi. 3—that *God was NOT known to Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob by the name Jehovah*" (Phases, p. 134).

discoveries are worth, they deserve to be designated by a name which I shall not, however, permit myself to give them. I am sure they are not distinguished by any intelligence of the bearing of the work they are exercising their wits upon, nor the force of the expressions contained in it.

The twofold miracle of the quails\* is, in each case, perfectly in its place, and distinctly dated, and has its own proper moral character. Mr. Newman is pleased to say, one shows unacquaintedness with the other. This kind of assertion is very worthy of the boldness of an infidel, but of no one else. An attack upon such a history as the Scripture, taken second-hand from flippant German assertions (for such, I must say, they are), without really investigating the grounds of them, does not, I confess, shine, morally speaking, to my eyes. God has permitted, though they have done the best they can, that they should find difficulties (and they are obliged to rest in what is apparent—beneath the surface conscience would be set at work); as to which the answer is certain and complete in the text; proving that they are superficial, and have not given themselves the trouble to examine the book they judge. The dates of these two sendings of quails can be accurately ascertained, almost to a day. The only reason Mr. N. has for saying, that one shows unacquaintance with the other, is, that the circumstances of one are different from the other, proving they are not the same.

Quails were given before the giving of the law (Exod. xvi.), immediately after leaving Elim, on the fifteenth day of the second month after leaving Egypt. They stayed a year at Sinai, for the giving of the law, and constructing the tabernacle, etc. "And it came to pass on the twentieth day of the second month, in the second year, that the cloud was taken up ... and the cloud rested in the wilderness of Paran" (Num. x. 11) after three days' journey (see ver. 33). Then came the complaints, the judgment on which gave the name of "Taberah" to the place; and immediately after, they stopped and pitched

\* "Indeed, a fuller examination showed, in Exodus and Numbers, a twofold miracle of the quails, of which the latter is so told, as to indicate entire unacquaintance with the former" (Phases, p. 134).

their tents at a place called, from the judgment that fell on them, *Kibroth-hattaavah*, "the graves of lust." This was their first station after leaving Sinai. We have thus clearly ascertained that a year and eight days, and possibly one or two more, elapsed from one of these events to the other. Their moral character is perfectly in keeping with the epoch at which they happened. If the reader examines the history, he will find that, from the Red Sea to Sinai, all is pure grace. They murmur—and it is said, they shall see the Lord's glory; and they get manna and quails without a reproach. They murmur—the rock is smitten, and they get water, without reproof. Conflict arises—they are made to feel their dependence; but the blessing is maintained, and the Lord is their banner—their conflicts are his.

At Sinai they undertake to obey, and to receive the blessing under the condition of their own obedience; they put themselves under law—the pride of heart which pretends to be able to satisfy God's requirements, and hence is willing to make its blessing depend on its own powers.

The proof is soon given. Before the law is brought down written, they have cast off God altogether. It is broken by them, and Moses breaks the tables.

Mediation comes in; so that they are yet borne with, but put again under law, only that they are governed by patient goodness; and chastening and judicial government comes in—a principle which characterised their history up to the Babylonish captivity. Hence when they murmur again, despising the gracious provision of manna (of which the description is thereon again incidentally given\*), and insist on meat, and persevere in eating it, though Divine power, which they doubted, was shown in sending it, so that they ought to have been ashamed of their request. While thus gratifying their lust without shame, wrath comes upon them. That is, we see, in the most distinct way, the difference of that grace shown in redemption and exercised towards the redeemed in their need, and the effects of proudly putting oneself under law, and finding, not the fruit of obedience, but the just

\* "There is a double description of the manna" (*Phases*, p. 134).

consequence of those lusts which hinder our walking according to it.

Nothing can be more deeply instructive than the double giving of quails. Neither, without the other, would have given the instruction which the different events afford.

Take again the water.\* If the reader reads from Numb. x., he will see grace condescending to lead them; the ark, which by right ought to have been in the middle of the host, goes before for three days' journey, to seek a place for them to rest in—as Jesus goes before his own sheep. This was grace. The Lord serves them as guide, above and beyond the legal relationship. From Numb. xi., onwards we see Israel's rebellion, and the working of the flesh developed in its different forms: Taberah—Kibroth Hattaavah—Miriam and Aaron despising Moses,—despising the pleasant land after sending the spies—the open rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, against Aaron and Moses, priest and king in Jeshurun. How are the people to be led through? Destruction might be just, but could not lead us to the end of our journey. Here then is given a sign of the principle. Aaron the *priest's rod* is to guide and govern them, and that not in judgment, as the use of Moses's had been, but in life-giving resurrection-power—the dry stick blossoms and bears fruit—priesthood with divine power of life. Grace in this way can alone lead us through—Moses' rod of law and judgment cannot. With this, consequently, is given what might seem otherwise out of place—the means of cleansing unintentional defilements unwittingly incurred (Numb. xix., the red heifer), the connection of which with our subject is evident. Murmurs come in again for water, and Moses is told to take *the* rod and speak to the rock, and it should “give forth his water.” There is no need to smite it with the rod of judgment now. But Moses does not rise to the height of divine grace, but, occupied with himself, talks of himself and Aaron, and smites the rock with his rod instead of glorifying God. God rises above the unbelief even of Moses, and gives the water, glorifying Himself; but shews, that on the legal principle, it is impossible to reach the land. Moses

\* “Water is twice brought out of rock by the rod of Moses, whose faith is perfect the first time, and fails the second time” (Phases, p. 134).

is shut out of it. The first time the rock had to be smitten ("and that rock was Christ"), to have the spiritual stream to drink of; but afterwards it was not so, it was only to be spoken to, and it would give its water. That is, under the grace of priesthood, which we need not for redemption, which is already accomplished, but for the weakness of the wilderness, it has only to be asked for and obtained. Thus we have sovereign grace giving freely and gratuitously, then legal condition, and failure and judgment, then priestly care and living grace affording, in spite of failure, the needed supply as the means of carrying the people through the wilderness to the promised land, after every form of the unbelief of the heart had been brought out. I may add, to complete the instruction, that quite at the close the question arises: Can these failing ones enter? The full justifying grace, and blessing too, is brought out, and in presence of the enemy, it is declared, "He hath not seen iniquity in Jacob, nor beheld perverseness in Israel."

Am I going out of Scriptural principles to indulge my own fancy in these things? No; "they happened unto them for ensamples (*τυποί* types—forms of truth), and are written for our admonition, on whom the ends of the world are come." And in these admirably instructive accounts, whose doubling gives them their peculiar character and force, infidelity sees, that is, imagines, two documents. And what more? Nothing? Yes, **UNDENIABLE\*** error. There may have been fifty documents, for aught I know; only, if there were, God has marvellously used the contents for our instruction. *Meribah* means "strife", and the two cases of *striving* were called *strife*.† That is very surprising. As to a second appointment of Elders,‡ I may have easily, it is true, forgotten something; but I know of none. There were rulers of tens, fifties, hundreds, and thousands, probably appointed by the advice of Jethro; but that is quite another thing.

\* "That there was error on a great scale in all this was undeniable" (Phases, p. 135). We have yet some cases of it to examine.

† "The name of Meribah is twice bestowed" (Phases, p. 134).

‡ "A needless second appointment of elders of the congregation" (Phases, p. 134).

There is not a double consecration of Aaron and his sons.\* There is the full detail of all the tabernacle, and along with it the ordinances for the consecration of the priests; and there is the historical account of its being done elsewhere, but there is nothing extraordinary in that. And so perfectly in its place is the account of what was to be done when first given, that the ordinances for the consecration of Aaron come in in Exodus, between those articles of the tabernacle which were the display of God, or connected with the people, and those which the priests particularly used in drawing near as such. These last are described after the priests' clothing, and the ordinances for their consecration. Articles in the same part of the tabernacle are thus separated from one another, and connected with that part of the service to which they belong. To a careless observer, the order seems disorder. The moment you perceive there are the two parts, God's dealing with the people, or displaying Himself in any way; and men—*i. e.* priests—approaching Him; the distinction and order is as clear as possible, and the introduction of the priest's garments and consecration has peculiar appropriateness, and gives a force to all that it could not have without—just as the sacrifice for passing defilements did in the midst of Israel's failings in Numbers. That the consecration should be historically given is most natural; the whole order of Israel depended on it, and circumstances† are mentioned there of the very last importance and largest import.

The statement (Phases, p. 134), that "there is a double promise of a guardian angel," can have weight only with those who do not give themselves the trouble to read the passages. In Ex. xxiii., the Lord says, "Behold, I send an angel before thee to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice; provoke him not, for he will not pardon your transgressions,

\* "A double consecration of Aaron and his sons" (Phases, p. 134).

† It was there the consuming of the sacrifice by God Himself proved His acceptance of the whole order instituted, and led all the people at once to adore. And the acts of Aaron and Moses shew the peculiar position of the priesthood by itself, and the priesthood and royalty united, of the largest interest in reference to Christ.

for my name is in him." God goes before them by angelic power, by what He calls (v. 23), "mine angel." That is, an intervention of God in that way which was really Himself, only in the way of angelic power. Thus Jacob says (Gen. xlviii.), "God before whom my fathers...did walk,...the God which fed me all my life long...the Angel which redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads." So where God, as I AM, manifested Himself in a flame of fire in the bush, He is called "the Angel" in the bush. Where Jacob declares, at Peniel (*i. e.* the face of God), that he had seen God face to face, and lived; Hosea says, "he had power over the Angel and prevailed." So in the case of Manoah, it is said, the angel of Jehovah did wondrously", and Manoah says, "we have seen God, and the words are received as Jehovah's, telling them such and such things. He is called all through the passage, the Angel, Jehovah, as many translate it. Subsequently to what is spoken of in Ex. xxiii., Israel made the golden calf, and the Lord would have refused to go with them; as if, present, He must consume them, and declared he would send an angel with Moses. Moses intercedes, and the Lord says his presence shall go with him. To make of this general promise, and the special dealing in reference to their guilt and God's prolonged mercy, a double promise, is mere trifling. As regards the difficulty arising from the passage in Deuteronomy\* regarding Aaron's death, it is one of those passages which are the strongest possible proofs of, not only the authenticity, but the personal knowledge of the author, because there is apparent contradiction, which is immediately solved when you examine all the details—a proof that it is written by one who knew them, and, having the consciousness of the links which united the parts, was not sensible of the necessity of making it hang together as a fabricated story.

It is quite true, that, in appearance, Deuteronomy x. makes Aaron die *before reaching* Meribah-kadesh, where, according to Numbers, he sinned, and incurred the penalty of death. Mr. Newman's proof is Num. xxxiii. 31—38. Moseroth being mentioned, in verse 31, *before* Kadesh, where Moses

\* "Comprising Deuteronomy within my view, I met two utterly incompatible accounts of Aaron's death" (Phases, p. 135).

sinned; Mosera, in Deut. x., as the place of Aaron's death, which would be thus before coming to Meribah, where he sinned; for in Deut. x. it is said, he died at Mosera, consequently at Moseroth (Num. xxxiii. 31); but in this list of Numbers, this Moseroth is before he came to Kadesh-barnea, where the sin was committed for which he was condemned to die in the wilderness. In one word, Mosera, where he died, Deut x., is in Num. xxxiii. 31 before Kadesh, where he sinned.

Now, if we look at these accounts superficially (Mr. Newman must forgive me if I employ the word he has consecrated to this use), this objection may seem plausible enough. But it is perfectly certain that Israel went from Moseroth to Ezion-geber, back to Moseroth, and again back to Ezion-geber, then to go round Edom. This circumstance, which clears up the whole matter, shows that the knowledge of the facts was of that personal kind, which is not aware of the difficulty of one who is a stranger to them, because that personal consciousness of the whole is a continual explanation of them. If the reader pays attention, the first two places mentioned in Deuteronomy are in inverse order to that in which they are named in Numbers. I may first remark, that they continued in this neighbourhood thirty-seven years; so that many journeys might have been made: but there is something more precise than that. In Num. xxxiii. they go from Moseroth by Bene-jaakan, *Hor-hagidgad*, to Ezion-geber. *From* Ezion-geber they go back to *Hor* (Num. xxi.). After Aaron's death, they go from Mount Hor back to the Red Sea—that is, to Ezion-geber—to compass the land of Edom, and go up the *other side* of the mountain district. That is, we have one journey from Moseroth to Ezion-geber—another back to Mount Hor, where Aaron died—and, as Num. xxi. shows, a journey from Mount Hor back to Ezion-geber. At the end of the second of these journeys, Aaron dies; that is, when they had gone *back* to Mount Hor.

That this last journey from Mount Hor to Ezion-geber was after the death of Aaron, is certain from Num. xxi., because we have the attack of Arad the Canaanite there, and also in Num. xxxiii. 40. So that, after this last verse, we have a journey from Mount Hor to the Red Sea (as in chap. xxi.);

but in chap. xxxiii. we had one already from Moseroth to Ezion-geber, through a district called Hor-hagidgad. Hence they must have gone back from Ezion-geber to the place Aaron died at, still on the west side of Edom; for it is only on the *last* journey they turned round to go up the east side.


The first journey from Moseroth to Ezion-geber was by Bene-jaakan, or "the sons of Jaakan," Hor-hagidgad, and Jotbathah. The second journey was back from Ezion-geber to the place where Aaron died. Now the journey in Deuteronomy is from the wells of the children of Jaakan to Mosera; that is, part of a journey *back along* the road they had come, at the end of which, in Mosera, Aaron dies, exactly as, in Numbers, we have seen them go back from Ezion-geber to Hor, where Aaron died, and thence set out again for Ezion-geber.

But this is not all. We have in Deuteronomy some stations after Aaron's death in Mosera, whither they had returned from Ezion-geber, as in Numbers we have seen they did. They go thence to Gudgodah, and from Gudgodah to Jotbathah; that is, the road back again to Ezion-geber, which is exactly the route spoken of in Num. xxi. and xxxiii. In a word, Numbers gives us a journey from Moseroth to Ezion-geber—one back to Hor—and thence back to Ezion-geber, or the Red Sea, finally to leave the district. At the end of the one back to Hor, Aaron dies.\*

Deuteronomy gives us the last two stations on the second journey, or the one back; then Aaron dies; and then, after his death, we have two stations on the road, which, from Num. xxxiii. 32, 33, we know was the road back to Ezion-geber—exactly the one we know, from Num. xxi. 4, the Israelites took on leaving Mount Hor. That is, there is the most perfect exactitude in the account; yet so given, as to

\* It may be well to refer to the passages together. Num. xxxiii. 31—35, Moseroth to Ezion-geber; 36—48, by Kadesh, from Ezion-geber, to Hor, back on the west of the mountainous district, compassing Mount Seir many days. Then, having compassed this mountain long enough (Deut. ii. 1—3), Num. xxi. 4, they go back again to the Red Sea, and then turn up to the other side of Edom. Deut. x. 6, 7, from Bene-jaakan to Moseroth, and back from Moseroth to Jotbathah. See Num. xxxiii. 31, and then 32, 33—31 is in the opposite direction—32, 33 in the same.

show it must have flowed from personal acquaintance with facts, or it never could have come out in the order it does. Deut. x. gives us demonstrably the end of the second journey, *i. e.* the one back from Ezion-geber, and the beginning of the third—Aaron dying at the end of the second, exactly as Numbers. The only additional circumstance in Numbers is, that Aaron went up Mount Hor to die. Deuteronomy names only the station which must, by the order of the journey, have been in the district of the Hor range. All the details confirm this order of march.



Thus, instead of being incompatible, they are the fullest confirmation that nobody could have written these accounts but one personally acquainted with the facts. I may add, that their passage by Kadesh is omitted in Deuteronomy; but this is no way surprising, as it only gives us the last two stations—Bene-jaakan and Moseroth.

Next, as regards the miracle of the sun and moon being arrested in Joshua x., Mr. Newman says, It “has long been felt as too violent a derangement of the whole globe, to be used by the Most High as a means of discomfiting an army.”\* Long felt by whom? It is a very stale objection of infidels,

\* Phases, p. 135.

like most, for they generally copy one another, so that, in the sense of its repetition *usque ad nauseam*, it has been long felt. But the object was not simply a means of discomfiting the army; it was a public testimony before the world that God interfered for His people, and would answer and put honour upon Joshua. And the sacred writer speaks of it in this way; "The like was never known," he says, "that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man; for the Lord fought for Israel." The miracle is as plainly stated as physically true. But Mr. N., who always shuts God out of everything, forgets that it was as easy for Him who created the world, to stop it as to make it go—to hold it in equipoise for a moment in its place, as to create the laws which kept it in its course. Joshua thought much more of God and his power—Mr. N. (as if there were neither) much more of the earth and its ordinary course, because it went naturally on. It seems to me that Joshua's was a higher, truer, nobler thought than that of Mr. N. The thought which counted on God's goodness to His people and His almighty power, nobler and truer than that which excludes Him out of His own creation and forgets, that, if God did make these admirable general laws, He must sustain their power EVERY MOMENT, and can never abrogate His own rights for a mass of earth. The earth was stopped turning round, and the sun and moon are spoken of just as we do, and as Joshua must have done. We know well it is the earth which turns round, and yet we say, the sun rises, sets, etc.

As to Jasher's being a poet.\* It is a mere copying another's

\* "I for the first time observed that the narrative rests on the authority of a poetical book, which bears the name of Jasher." And in note: "This poet celebrated also the deeds of David. He who composed—'Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou, Moon, in the valley of Ajalon'—like other poets, called on the sun and moon to stand, and look on Joshua's deeds; but he could not anticipate that his deeds would be hardened into fact by a prosaic interpreter" (Phases, p. 135). If the reader looks at the beginning of Josh. x. 13, he will see that there is no ground for taking the apostrophe to the sun and moon ver. 12, as a part of the book of Jasher. The beginning of ver. 13 is clearly a part of the narrative, and it is only the fact which is written in the Book of Jasher, not the poetical summons.

notions without any proof. There is not the remotest semblance of proof that Jasher was a person at all. All this is taken for granted by Mr. Newman; yet his whole argument depends upon it. There is no proof of Jasher's being a poet, nor of the word meaning a person. Mr. N.'s prosaic commentator speaks of the moon\* as well as the supposed poet. If one stopped, the other must too. But in afterwards stating the effect, the historian speaks of the sun, because it was of course the sun which gave its continuous light for the task which Israel had to accomplish. It is Joshua, not Jasher, which gives the order to the sun and moon to stop; and it is the plain prosaic fact recorded by the commentator, as Mr. N. calls him, which is said to be found in the Book of Jasher. It is not said of the elevated poetical appeal. In every particular, what Mr. N. says is totally unfounded. Moreover, it can hardly be doubted, that Joshua was ignorant of the rotation of the earth; and it is remarkable that he should have claimed not the stopping of the sun, but of sun and moon, the necessary effect of that which was wholly unknown to him, and yet he asks for that which, unless indeed God had disturbed the whole creation by unnecessary miracle, must have been the effect of the intervention of his power. Untaught by God, Joshua would have said, Sun, stand still. Taught of God, he asks for sun and moon to do so, which is just what God's power acting in the simplest way would do; He could not have answered precisely as to a man fully taught of God, if Joshua had asked for the sun to stop and not the moon, without a very extraordinary derangement of the celestial system. To make the moon go on in its just apparent course when the earth was stopped, would have put the moon really out of its place. To have stopped the moon unasked, as well as the sun, would not have been the same testimony to Joshua though a wonder. But Joshua is taught to ask both. The rotation of the earth is arrested, and all is done at his word, though Joshua never knew the earth turned round, and that sun and moon would thus stop together.

\* "The commentator could not tell what *the moon* had to do with it, yet he has quoted honestly," i.e. the poet "who composed" the end of  $\psi$  12 attributed to Joshua by the narrator.

As regards Exodus xv.,\* Mr. Newman's statements are without the smallest foundation. He would again persuade us that the historical account is merely drawn from the poetry of chapter xv. But the historical account is one continuous narrative, out of which it is impossible to take this bit without destroying it all. It is referred to in other books, too, continually. Mr. N. says, "This song of Moses *implies no miracle at all.*" The song states the miracle as simply as the history which had previously related the facts; "With the blast of Thy nostrils the waters were gathered together. The floods stood upright as a heap, and the depths were congealed in the heart of the sea." See xiv. 21, 22.

As regards Numb. xxi.† one of the alleged fragments of poetry, is a song of Israel at the well. Nothing very extraordinary historically: a very interesting figure of the refreshing springs found when the wilderness is passed and Jordan approached. The other two are perfectly apposite and important. They are well known records cited to prove that the country in question was in the hands of the Amorites, and not of Moab, when Israel took possession. This was of the utmost importance, because Israel was forbidden to touch Moab, whereas the country of the Amorites was given up to them. Now Israel's statements, of whatever authority for themselves, would have been no record against their enemies. Hence, to maintain the title of Israel to these lands, well known popular memorials of the previous conquest of Moab by the Amorites, and the acquisition of this territory by the latter is given, and of the border as it then was. And this is so truly the case, that the children of Ammon claimed precisely this territory in the time of Jephthah (Judges xi), and Jephthah goes over all this very ground as that which justified Israel in maintaining

\* "As for Exodus xv. it appeared to me (in that stage, and after so abundant proof of error) almost certain that Moses's song is the primitive authority out of which the prose narrative of the passage of the Red Sea has been elaborated. . . . The song of Moses implies no miracle at all" (Phases, p. 136).

† "This presently led me to observe other marks that the narrative had been made up, at least in part, out of old poetry. Of these the most important are in Exodus xv, and Numb. xxi, in the latter of which three different poetical fragments are quoted" (Phases, p. 136).

possession of the country. It was not Ammon's nor Moab's either. Nor did Balak, king of Moab, pretend to it then. The Amorites, he says, were in possession, and Israel dispossessed them. The common records of the country preserved in their popular songs, and the well-known account of the book of the wars of the Lord, were the important point here, and these are preserved in Numbers.

The next point maintained by Mr. Newman, namely, that the book of the law was not found in Josiah's reign, but "*evidently then first compiled*, or, at least, then first produced and made authoritative to the nation" (Phases, p. 137), is too monstrous, I may say audacious, a disregard of all evidence, to bear the light for a moment. All history, all existing testimony concurs in authenticating these books. They were held in honour as sacred books, watched with jealous care. But this is not all. We have prophecies undoubtedly of the reign of Hezekiah.\*

Now I have no pretension to be anything of a Hebraist; but if we may trust those certainly the best informed in the language, the character of the Hebrew of the Pentateuch leaves no doubt as to its being of far greater antiquity than the prophetic writings. Even usages of grammar are different. The use of *Hu*, as being a common gender for the feminine *Hi*, is popularly known as marking the antiquity of the Pentateuch, as is the same grammatical peculiarity as to *Nahar*, a young person.†

\* Mr. N. calls them "Hezekiah's prophets" (Phases, p. 196). There were, indeed, earlier ones, as Joel, and Amos. I shall touch on this hereafter.

† I may be allowed to extract from Eichhorn, a celebrated German rationalist, his judgment of this part of the argument. He wrote in the early part of *this* century, and does not believe in inspiration. I quote the translation given by Mr. Stuart :

1. "They do not arise from the forgery of any one individual. Whoever is endowed with adequate knowledge and investigates with impartiality the question—Whether the writings of the Old Testament are genuine—must surely answer it in the affirmative. No *one* deceiver can have forged them all. This every page of the Old Testament proclaims. What a variety in language and expression! Isaiah does not write like Moses; nor Jeremiah like Ezekiel; and between these and every one of the minor prophets a great gulf is fixed. The grammatical edifice of

This has led Gesenius, rationalist enough not to be anxious to maintain any theory as to the Old Testament, and hence a better witness here, to say: "The point of time at which we should date the commencement of this period, and of Hebrew literature in general, is certainly as early as Moses, even if the

language in Moses has much that is peculiar; in the book of Judges occur provincialisms and barbarisms. Isaiah pours forth words already formed in a new shape; Jeremiah and Ezekiel are full of Chaldaisms. In a word, when one proceeds from writers who are to be assigned to early periods of time to those who are later, he finds in the language a gradual decline, until, at last, it sinks down into mere Chaldaic terms of expression.

"Then come next the discrepancies in the circle of ideas and of images. The stringed instruments sound aloud when touched by Moses and Isaiah; soft is the tone when David handles them. Solomon's muse shines forth in all the splendour of a most luxurious court; but her sister, in simple attire, wanders, with David, by the brooks and the river-banks, in the fields, and among the herds. One poet is original, like Isaiah, Joel, Habakkuk; another copies, like Ezekiel. One roams in the untrodden path of genius; another glides along the way which his predecessors have trodden. From one, issue rays of learning, whilst his neighbour has not been caught by one spark of literature. In the oldest writers strong Egyptian colours glimmer through and through; in their successors they become fainter and fainter, until at last they entirely disappear.

"Finally, there is, in manners and customs, the finest gradation. At first, all is simple and natural, like to what one sees in Homer, and among the Bedouin Arabs even at the present time; but this noble simplicity gradually loses itself in luxury and effeminacy, and vanishes at last in the splendid court of Solomon.

"Nowhere is there a sudden leap; everywhere the progress is gradual. *None but ignorant and thoughtless doubters can suppose the Old Testament to have been forged by one deceiver.*

2. "They are not the forgery of many deceivers.

"But, perhaps, some one may reply, 'Perhaps many forgers have made common cause, and, at the same time, in some later period have got up the books in question.' But how could they forge in a way so entirely conformed to the progress of the human understanding? And was it possible, in later times, to create the language of Moses? This surpasses all human powers. Finally, one writer always supposes the existence of another. They could not then all have arisen at the same time; they must have existed successively.

"'Perhaps, then,' it may be further said, 'such forgers arose at different times, who continued onward, in the introduction of supposititious writings, from the place where their deceitful predecessors had stopped.'

Pentateuch did not proceed from him in its present form." And then he refers to different forms in the Pentateuch as proving it.

Further, the acceptance of the Pentateuch by the Samaritans, even supposing it was in the time of Sanballat, helps to show the absurdity of this invention—a notion which, though quite modern, is, I understand, fast hastening to the tomb of all the Capulets, like other ideas of the "learned Germans," few of which subsist beyond a moth's life; and, indeed, it is well for them they can prove nothing really, for it would entirely spoil the next discovery; whereas, by dying off thus, each leaves a fair field for the next inventor, while it serves just as well to create doubts for the moment; and if the doubt dies out with the objection, a new one has but the better chance. Besides, the whole Jewish polity was founded on the Pentateuch—the Prophets referred to it:—not a sacrifice was offered, not an institution maintained which was not there recorded. And was ever such an absurdity as supposing that Josiah or Huldah could persuade a whole people, and in the presence of watchful Samaritan enemies;—not to embrace a certain system, others have done that,—but that they and their ancestors had always carried on this system, though it was then produced for the first time. The temple was there; and, however they might have neglected its order and their duty, there was not a vessel, nor a pot, nor a flesh-hook, nor a laver, nor a candlestick, which did not bear witness to the previous existence of what the book said did so exist; and note this, there is a regu-

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In this way may all the references to preceding writers be explained; in this way may we explain the striking gradation that exists in all its parts.'

"But: First, how was it possible that no one should have discovered the trick, exposed it, and put a brand upon the deceiver, in order that posterity might be secured against injury? How could a whole nation be often deceived, and at different periods? Secondly. What design could such a deceiver have had in view? Did he aim at eulogizing the Hebrew nation? Then are his eulogies the severest satires; for according to the Old Testament, the Hebrew nation have acted a very degrading part. Or did he mean to degrade them? In this case, how could he force his books upon the very people whom they defamed, and the story of whose being trodden under foot by foreign nations is told in plain blunt words?"

lar history of the Jews uninterruptedly from Moses to Josiah; that of other nations too in connection with them. All had to be invented, as well as the style of the epoch, then *unknown*; and we are to be persuaded this fabulous account of what they were living in, and their fathers before them, and which connected itself with all this history, only now invented in a book, was palmed on them as their own true history, for the book, it is alleged, was now compiled. Was the account of the temple compiled, which it is impossible to separate from it? There were institutions which bore witness to its authenticity. The reproaches of "Hezekiah's prophets" all suppose this history. Their reproaches to the people have, to a great extent, no meaning, if the whole Jewish history be not true. Persuading a people, some fine day, that a detailed voluminous history is their own, demands a credulity to be found only in an infidel, particularly when no proof whatever is alleged of it. Its ground is simply probability. But, it will be said, it was only the book had to be invented to flatter the people with the notion of the antiquity of their neglected worship. But then it did not do so. There was enough to prove the history all true; but the Pentateuch gave the tabernacle, not the temple—one candlestick, not ten; an ark—with two cherubim looking towards it, and no cherubim stretching their wings to either side of the house. To invent something different to please the people by its antiquity, was absurd; and if they took the account in Samuel of the temple of Solomon, they found the oxen gone from under the laver, and they found, moreover, *the authenticity of the books confirmed*, for, in that case, Samuel's book was an authentic account. But, indeed, to suppose a history invented when every existing monument, changed, mutilated or perfect, proved the whole history true from beginning to end, and its comparative dates at the same time; and that, confirmed by well known public history,\* is an absurdity fit only for the credulity of an infidel, who will believe anything provided it be not the truth, for *that* is from God.

\* All ancient heathen writers, and infidel opposers of Christianity, recognise Moses as unquestionably the legislator of the Jews, and their first great leader.

The fact of the introduction of "there it is to this day," is the simplest thing possible. Ezra necessarily re-edited the Old Testament on the return from Babylon.\* And nothing could be more natural, if I were editing an ancient history, when the origin of ancient monuments is referred to, to add, as confirming the history, and there it is still. This is the allusion to subsequent times which is found in Old Testament history.

The reason why Dean Graves † (Phases, pp. 138, 139,) and others take the Pentateuch as ancient, is incomparably stronger than that on which Homer and Hesiod or Cæsar, are received. They have been handed down for ages as such, translated two or three centuries before Christ, being then counted as the undoubted sacred books of the Hebrews. They are connected, successively, with the whole history of Israel, which is confirmed throughout by every kind of collateral proof. The whole history of the world is founded on the statements contained in it. The Jews, who detest Christians, preserve them as authentic books just as we have them: the son of Sirach, Josephus, Philo did the same. The style confirms the dates ascribed to them: ‡ every institution of the Jews is inseparably connected with their truth. The alleged inconsistency is accounted for by a well known fact, recorded

\* If it be asked on what authority any such book or chapter could be received as inspired, the answer is, "On the authority of the prophets." Hence the canon closes in the time of Malachi, the last inspired prophet — his prophecy, and Esther, being the last books. And this answer is as old as Josephus, who gives this reason for the closing of the canon, saying, there were records of what was done since, but that they had not the authority of the others. The feast of Purim, ever observed by the Jews, is an irrefragable proof of the history of the book of Esther, which the Jews value as they do the Pentateuch, saying these two will subsist when all the other books pass away in the days of the Messiah.

† "Dean Graves, for instance, always takes for granted, that, *until the contrary shall be demonstrated*, it is to be firmly believed that the Pentateuch is from the pen of Moses" (Phases, p. 137).

‡ Some question, founded on style, is raised as to the *date* of one or two books, but not so as to affect in any way the general history or truth of the entire. Nor do I believe it, in the least, to be a well founded doubt.

in the book itself. Is it unreasonable to accept these books, historically speaking, as genuine, and answer objections if they are made. The use of the article *ὁ*, in Greek, as a pronoun, proves Homer ancient. The use of the article *Hu* and *Nahar* is a perfectly analogous proof in the Pentateuch.

Where is "*sham science*"\* (Phases, p. 138) really found in this case? As regards the difficulty of supposing that the law had been so neglected that the king's attention had not been turned to it, it is really none at all. Sixty-seven years had elapsed, during fifty-seven of which all fear of Jehovah had been wholly cast off—a captivity had taken place, and all was confusion and ruin—the house of God neglected, and out of repair. Persecution had raged; the images of idolatrous groves had been brought into the temple itself, and idolatry and neglect of Jehovah filled the land. That the Scriptures were neglected, and not known to the young king, is not surprising. He may have known there was such a thing generally, yet never have examined it so as to see the condition Israel was in.

I have looked into the history of the Hebrew monarchy by Mr. Newman, and examined particularly what relates to this point; but I have found, besides some examination of collateral history and dates, nothing but an imitation of the absurd German self-confidence and theories, whose authors, provided they can invent something which nobody else has thought of, are very indifferent as to its credibility.†

Mr. Newman places the prophecy of Joel about 840 years

\* "Oh! sham science! Oh false-named theology!

O mihi tam longæ maneat pars ultima vitæ  
Spiritus et quantum sat erit tua dicere facta" (Phases, p. 138).

† There is one happy result of this, that one infidel theory destroys another, and all are shewn to be merely theories without any proof, and far more incredible than the plain history we have. Mr. Newman's book, setting aside of course inspiration, seeks for probable causes and motives for what the Scripture history makes as plain as possible. Another characteristic of his history is this, that, as he entirely sets aside God, he reduces everything to secondary causes and motives, many of which may very probably have acted on the minds of the persons concerned, the object being, as always, to sink everything to the level of that, and shut out God as far as possible. But, in doing this, the history has to be set aside, and this is done by the most incredible theories, which are really, by their *ir*-rationalism, offensive to any upright sober mind.

before Christ, Isaiah in Hezekiah's reign, and recognises, for this suits his purpose, the destruction of the brazen serpent, the existence of the priesthood and temple. Now the allusions in Joel are all based on the Levitical law, even to the peculiar use of the silver trumpets. Isaiah refers to it in terms, saying, if they spake not according to it there was no light in them. The deliverance out of Egypt is also spoken of several times; in one case, as effected by the rod of Moses being lifted up over the sea. Again, Micah refers to the ordinances of the law as to sacrifices, in express terms: he refers to Moses, Aaron and Miriam, to Balak and Balaam, and the details given as to them in Numbers. Micah, Mr. N. puts in 723 before Christ. Josiah he puts in 651. Yet, in spite of this, he declares that the law was promulgated in Josiah's reign, when, it is pretended, it was found. This being too grossly absurd, he tells us that the first four books of the Pentateuch are to be regarded as a growth, not as a composition. Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers did not now begin to exist, but now received their final shape, and their public recognition in that shape. That is, that the code of religious laws and ceremonies was never made up till the nation, which had certainly subsisted for centuries, and had established an immense system according to the code, was just on the eve of dissolution,\* and mark, the code establishes, as I have already observed, an order of things quite different from what subsisted. It recounts the forming of the tabernacle by Divine direction, according to the pattern made in the Mount. The authority for the change being given in books written, according to Mr. N., too late to be of any avail for the priestly objects to which he attributes the compiling of the Pentateuch; so that the priests invented a divinely ordered ritual and instruments of worship, which left their own existing one quite unauthorised! There is nothing like the excessive absurdities of infidels to show what people are reduced to, when their "antagonist will" rejects the plain revelation of God.

\* And had been formed just during the period in which they were practically abandoning it. Further, if it had been so formed, all Mr. Newman's arguments against its previous existence, because of its being found then in the temple, fall to the ground, as much as if it had been complete since the time of Moses.

I regret to be obliged to add, that the reader must never trust the statements made by infidels as to books, or passages of Scripture, without reading the passages themselves. It is not that there is always an intention to deceive, but a loose general view suits a theory; and when this loose general view is examined, it very often turns out to be wholly unfounded.

Deuteronomy, we are told, favours the Levites rather than the priests: "In the whole book there is not a line whereby it could be learnt that a Levite was not equal to an Aaronite for all purposes of sacrifices." Now it is the people in Deuteronomy who are put into a peculiar place, such as they are in no other book—their relationship with God being made much more immediate. But the priest is definitely distinguished much more than the Levite. The subject is not sacrifice, in any way; but where they are alluded to the priest's part is definitely distinguished. Levi is looked at as the head of the whole tribe, as we know he was. Hence, in the blessing in the close, all is attributed to him, as the Urim and Thummim, which the high priest alone wore. Mr. Newman contrasts the prophecy of Jacob and Moses, as to him, as contradictory. It is, on the contrary, remarkable, how both were fulfilled. Jacob threatens him, for his sin, with dispersion in Israel, for his cruelty at Shechem. And he is dispersed, as Deuteronomy recognises, and has no inheritance as a tribe in Israel. Moses declares that, for his faithfulness under Sinai, the priesthood should be in his family, and so it was.

Mr. Newman's statements as to the contents of the first four books are inexact. He speaks of "the scattering of Israel, by piracy and invasion, into many distant lands," but says there is "nothing at all clear which needs to be referred to later times." Now this is not at all exact; the xxvi of Leviticus speaks of very much more than scattering by piracy and invasion; it speaks of the total desolation of the land, so that it should enjoy its sabbaths, and of its possession by enemies; of the sanctuaries being ruined, and the people pining away in captivity, and promises restoration on repentance! This was not the case in Josiah's reign. He repaired the temple, governed Judea, and it may be almost said, reigned over the

whole land. The Assyrian holds a place in all prophecy, which the Chaldees do not, because the Assyrian attacked Judah when owned of God; the Chaldees held them in captivity when they were not.

Mr. Newman says, "the book [the Pentateuch] is familiar with the tribes of Israel, and their distribution." Now Deuteronomy is put aside by Mr. N. as a distinct work from the rest of the Pentateuch; and to Genesis the expression of the distribution of the tribes has no intelligible application. The only one whose locality is spoken of certainly, never had the one there given him before Josiah's time. Now, it is perfectly incredible, that if a person was arranging the book with the historical facts before him, he should have invented a prophecy which those facts contradict. If we take in Deuteronomy, the same observation applies—Naphthali is said to possess the west and the south, and, in general, no distribution is given which can in any possible way connect it with Josiah's time. All there is on this point proves it could not possibly have been written then from the knowledge of historical facts preceding that epoch. Indeed, if we embrace Deuteronomy, the whole argument is absurd, because we get in that book, especially in chap. xxxii. prophecies which have no kind of reference to any thing yet fully accomplished, and which, so far as they are partially, have no reference to any thing connected with the history of Israel before Christ's time, and yet are positive and absolute assertions.

On the whole, a saint may gather, if he be following God's will, good out of every thing, may turn it to use; but, otherwise, Mr. Newman's book on the Hebrew Monarchy, considered as an examination of Scriptural history, is not deserving of any serious attention; unless theories without proof, idle speculations which lower every thing they touch, assertions as to the records inquired into which show they have never been really or fairly examined, and statements which destroy all rational grounds of historical proof of any thing, be worthy of a sober man's attention and respect. It betrays, also, what we soon find on going farther, the earnest wish to get rid of Scripture. Why was Luther's having repudiated the Apocalypse an interesting fact, but that Mr. N.

wished it? If I am not an infidel, or if I am even indifferent, such a fact is not thus caught at as interesting. I regret it, or I examine it, as affording no *proof* of any thing. As regards the Apocalypse, I leave the question of style, which flows evidently from its being the representation of visions, and many peculiarities of which have been shown to be similar to those of John's gospel. I leave it, because Mr. N. does not insist on it, though for a reason of very little force, and adopted with a view to govern the interpretation by the date. Mr. N. gives no other reason for judging it spurious but that he doubted about it, and had his doubts confirmed by Neander.

He then gives his view of the 17th chapter in a passage which is just an example of the excessively careless and superficial manner in which he treats every subject: "the 17th," he says, "appears to be a political speculation, suggested by the civil war of Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian, and erroneously opines that the eighth emperor of Rome is to be the last, and is to be one of the preceding emperors restored—probably Nero, who was believed to have escaped to the kings of the east" (Phases, p.140). Now I would only beg my reader, learned or unlearned, to read the chapter, it is always the truest way of judging of Scripture, and say if he can find the slightest ground whatever for this interpretation, or for one of the thoughts contained in it, save that Rome, and its empire, was in question, and that an eighth head was a restored one, and even then with symbols that showed that it was shadowed out in ages long beyond John's time—correctly or not I do not now say. Where is there a word of civil wars, or three heads at once? And, further, Mr. N. certainly ought to have more classical lore a great deal than I have, still I do not understand how he can reconcile his statement with universally known history.

This is the succession of emperors:—Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian.

Now, according to this system, John wrote in the reign of Galba, for, he says, five are fallen, one is, and Galba is the sixth, Otho, the seventh, Vitellius, the eighth, and Vespasian,

the ninth—a very curious reason for judging that the eighth emperor was to be the last. If the civil war between Otho and Vitellius is said to be a reason for considering these two as one, then it must be from historically knowing that the two emperors were, or had been, on the scene. A strange reason for saying that the sixth, Galba, was then and the seventh not yet come. In a word, the pretence that this prophecy is taken from subsisting events, is, I must be forgiven for saying, mere nonsense. And here I beg the reader to remark, that all relation to the ten horns is unnoticed by Mr. Newman, yet these were kings which had received no kingdom as yet. Let any one notice, not only the majesty of the statements, but the connection of the beast spoken of with the whole of the latter part of the prophecy, and judge whether the civil wars, from Galba to Vespasian, in any way meet the announcements of the prophecy. If the prophecy were not an inspired book a year's fighting between these three chiefs, and the subsequent accession of Vespasian, do not correspond in any way to what the author professes to unfold in his book.

Galba was murdered, after a very brief period, about seven months, Jan. 15th, A.D. 69, and Otho succeeded him. Otho, beaten by the lieutenants of Vitellius, killed himself, April 16th; Vitellius, his army having been overthrown by Antonius Primus, was deposed, or, rather, abdicated, Dec. 20th, A.D. 96, and soon after was ignominiously killed. The only value of a decision come to against the Apocalypse, on such ground as this, is to show the value to be attached to the judgment of the objector, on such a subject.

Mr. Newman settles, with equal facility,\* the authority, or, rather, the question, who is the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Now, the enquiry, whether a particular book belongs to Scripture, is quite another thing than denying the word of God. It is merely a question whether that particular book makes part of it. Guessing as to it, is folly, on such a

\* "As to the Epistle to the Hebrews, I now saw quite a different genius in it from that of Paul, as more artificial, and savouring of rhetorical culture. As to this, the learned Germans are probably unanimous" (Phases, p. 140).

subject. I have no doubt that the Epistle to the Hebrews is Paul's. The omission of his name has raised a question on it from early days. The Roman Church did not receive it for a long time, but I am satisfied it did at the first. I judge that Clement's epistle, addressed as it is, in the name of the whole Roman Church, is a plain proof of it. The desire to get rid of passages in the vi. and x. chapters, which seemed to favour a peculiar rigidity of discipline, led that church to cast a doubt upon it, on account of the controversies it was engaged in on the subject; the epistle's being addressed, as it evidently is, to Jews connected with Jerusalem and Palestine, making it less known than those addressed to gentile churches. Its inspiration, I hesitate not to say, stands far above all question. It is different in style from St. Paul's familiar epistles addressed in intimacy, if we except that to the Romans, to particular congregations he knew. In this last, also, we find a long course of elaborate argument, and the use of Jewish Scriptures. Still it is addressed to them in a character which extended to those he had never seen. The Epistle to the Hebrews is a treatise elaborately composed as a last warning to the Jews, whose polity was just going to be put an end to, and urging them to have done with it as ready to vanish away, and to go out without the camp. The contrary conduct had been borne with hitherto. Now this was urgent. Who so fit for this as Paul. It was at the close of his career; for he refers to Timothy being set at liberty, and himself as free, and to the saints in Italy.

The neglect of his counsel produced the bastard Christianity, if Christianity it can be called, of Nazarenes, and the still worse sect of Ebionites, whose hatred to Paul, consequently, was most violent. They rejected, indeed, all his writings. The subject of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is of the highest and most elevated character. It affords instruction which no other part of Scripture does, on the personal glory of Christ, yet it confirms, and is confirmed by all. It treats these subjects with a method and reasoning drawn from the depth of divine relationships, and yet possessing perfect clearness, a union which flows from divine inspiration alone, and characterises it. Passages of Scripture, the connection of which with the

whole scope of the Divine mind, as revealed in the word, is brought out when Christ is applied as a key to them, are here quoted in a connection which, when the link of thought is given in Him, has a beauty and evidence which leaves no doubt of the Divine hand that has been at work—a connection which shows, when given, that that alone could be their own full bearing, and yet, without that blessed key, remained locked up to the human mind, the connection thus made plain affording a complete testimony to Christ, and, at the same time, by Him, not only a proof of inspiration, but a divine fulness to the word itself, and such a combination of it as proves the unity of mind in the whole book, and that mind to be God's, who alone could conceive or unfold such a plan.

Now the Hebrews furnish, in a very remarkable manner, such an unlocking and connection of Scripture, and with a power of reasoning and unity of scope and purpose, pursued with an energy of mind and thought, which peculiarly characterises St. Paul. The blessed Apostle is specially occupied with the counsels of God, the divine plan of dispensation, as John with the manifestation and communication of divine life; Peter, with the pilgrim-character of it here, connected with the hope of a suffering and rejected Saviour, the Son of the living God, whom he had known, and knew to be risen and gone up, and hoped for again.

With this dispensational character of Paul's writings the Epistle to the Hebrews clearly classes itself. It has a more finished style, as being an essay. It is, in its contents and reasonings, suited to Jews, because addressed to them. Perfectly satisfied that it is Scripture, and a part of it whose loss would be irreparable, having the stamp of the divine gift upon it, I do not in the least doubt it is St. Paul's, from its character and the details alluded to in it. The reader is aware, that in the 2nd Epistle of Peter it is expressly stated that Paul did write to the Jews. The omission of his name is perfectly according to God. He was not Apostle of the Circumcision. He was a doctor for all that he could teach in the church of God. In the form of the epistle he was in his only true divinely given place in thus writing. The effect of this is seen, and so it ought to be, in the style.

As to the unanimity of the "learned Germans" to whom Mr. Newman alludes, it is very possible. Every one admits, without being a "learned German,"\* the difference of style; it is natural that that of an elaborately drawn up essay should be different from the style of familiar epistles within the exercise of Paul's apostolic office. The question is, what conclusion is to be drawn from it in connection with other far stronger and more important points, which affect the authorship of the Epistle. The doubt of its divine inspiration, whatever Rome may have thought for its own reasons for two centuries, would only excite pity in my mind. There are proofs of inspiration which have a character that infidelity does not touch, being connected with the development of Divine counsels and wisdom in the Word, of which the infidel does not possess the elements, and cannot, because he is an infidel. I admit that these are intellectual proofs to the believer; but they do astonishingly secure and confirm the faith of him who has some acquaintance with these counsels—just as in the case of a perfect tally, or a broken piece of metal, he who has only one piece has no proof as to the other. But he who has both, has not a doubt as to the connection of one with the other. And divine things are yet more certain; for man could imitate, in material things, in some cases—though, in most, doubt would be irrational: in Divine, he cannot. The connection is unknown till discovered.

Difficulties we have seen have arisen as to the Epistle to the Hebrews, from Paul's not naming himself as an apostle. Besides what I have said as to his not being Apostle of the circumcision, there is another point I would notice here. It connects itself with another objection to his being the author; his saying that it was confirmed unto them by those who heard him.

Now, if we examine the manner of presenting things in this epistle; if St. Paul be the author, he could not have introduced himself as an apostle, writing to them as such.

He is addressing the Hebrews, who had already faith in the scriptures, and basing all his argument on them, in unfolding the person and offices of the Lord Jesus Himself. It was not apostolic announcement of doctrine in the way of revelation

\* It was remarked and reasoned on very early indeed by the fathers.

with authority, but application of admitted Scriptures to Christ, to shew that He ought to be such, and be on high according to them; and to shew the necessary coming-in of the new covenant. Old Testament Scriptures were necessarily his authority here; the whole matter he had in hand, to which his apostolical authority added nothing. Nay, their authority was what he had to insist on—using the word of wisdom in applying them.

Now this he does in a manner which entirely shuts out all possibility of introducing his own apostolic authority. He brings in *God speaking Himself* in the Old Testament—an acknowledged truth with the Jews—God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past by the prophets, hath, in these last days, spoken to us in [the] Son; or more nearly, as Son—that is, in the person of the Son. Now this took a ground which left no room for beginning—Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ. God Himself, who had spoken of old by the prophets, had now spoken in the Son Himself. Hence we have that which at the first began to be spoken *by the Lord*. That is, it was the great Prophet Himself, nay, the Lord Himself, who had spoken *to the Jews*. And hence, as referring to what He had said when on the earth, the personal address of Jesus, he speaks of those who had heard Him; God bearing them witness by signs, etc. Now that was exactly the way in which God had dealt with the Jews; and the Christian testimony itself had been appropriately and peculiarly brought before them; and by which the nation had been made responsible, and not by Paul's teaching. But it *was* in writing to them just his place to refer to it; and peculiarly his to unfold the whole glorious position of Christ as mounted on high; as indeed it was given to him only to declare; and how he put Jews in immediate connection with heaven in this way; and thus to pave the way for the passing away of all connected with the old covenant, and exhort them to go outside the camp, as being no longer of God. The great sacrifice of atonement was offered, the high-priest was gone within with the blood, the body was burnt without, the middle holy place of Judaism suited to its day was nought. In spirit we were within; in suffering in the flesh, without; bearing the blessed victim's reproach.

Now the unfolding this was just Paul's place, not Peter's. Yet it was just his place too to refer to that very testimony which made the Jews responsible to do so; which was not his, but which he derives down from God speaking by the prophets; and then as in the person of the Son (*ἐν υἱῷ*). Thus making it God's direct testimony to them; *i.e.*, the Jews with whom He joins Himself, as a Jew, in the most beautiful and gracious way, as He had said *the* fathers, not your fathers; and only bringing in even apostles themselves as confirming it. He does not associate them with God's testimony, or with the Lord's; only they come in to assure it to others; and even then he brings in God bearing them witness; and then proceeds to exalt and glorify Christ's person. In a word, he addresses himself perfectly to Jews as such, yet to bring them out of their Judaism. Had he not been thus above it, he could not have given it the place he does in the character of the testimony given to it. It was taking them high enough up to the source of the testimony to lift them above the system formed beside it. Indeed, prophecy was the link of God with Israel; when in the way of righteousness under ordinances he could have nothing to say to them. He interfered by a prophet to bring them out or back. "By a prophet He brought them out of Egypt; by a prophet were they saved." It was God's sovereign way when there was no other. God's great prophet had now appeared, to lead them out for a better salvation; he was the Apostle of their profession. Peter could not lead them out of a Jewish position. He had ministered to them still in and under it. Paul's ministry as an apostle was directed elsewhere. He graciously makes Christ their Apostle, while owning in its place that of all the apostles among them, yet as hearers of *the Lord*.

I have no remark to make on what Mr. Newman says of the Song of Solomon (Phases p. 140) than that it is just an example of what I have said of the whole system — a bringing down everything to the low level of the writer's mind.

As regards Ruth and Esther;\* the first was of the utmost

\* As to them, Mr. Newman says, "The so-called canon of the Jews could not guarantee to us the value of the writings. Consequently, such

importance, as introducing David's line, on which all hung, in a most touching and instructive narrative; and that in connection with the all-important fact, of a poor Moabitess coming by grace "under the wings of the God of Israel," and being mother of Messiah Himself. The names bear, in the most evident way, a mystic signification on which I cannot enlarge here, allying themselves immediately with the subject: Naomi ("my pleasant one") loses her husband Elimelech ("God is King" or "my King"), loses her sons, and becomes Mara ("bitterness"). Devotedness of heart to her in this state brings Ruth (a poor lost one and a stranger) by grace, to raise up the family of the deceased, through the redeemer ("in whom is strength") Boaz, the Goel; and the child is born to sorrowing Naomi, the widow—though in fact Ruth's.

The importance of Esther is most evident, besides typical instruction. Nothing could be more so in its place. It is the providential care of Israel scattered among the heathen, when God could not own them at all outwardly or publicly. Hence He does not appear in the book. It is His unseen hand that does it in a providential way.

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books as Ruth and Esther (the latter indeed not containing one religious sentiment) stood forth at once in their natural insignificance" (Phases p. 141). All this class of remarks are a *resumé* of German infidelity. I do not pretend to be well acquainted with German infidelity, but I have picked up enough of it to know that Mr. N.'s objections have nothing original in them; but their audacity, and neglect of all attempt at proof, and of all consideration of answers given to the objections, he retails from the great German manufactory. There is considerable skill in the form of Mr. N.'s book in this respect; because, being a history of the course of his own mind, he can say, I gave up this—I gave up that—I was convinced of this, and clear about that—as if it was something satisfactorily proved, without the trouble of telling us how he came to this conclusion. It was convincing, that is certain; so that we are to receive it—for receiving a doubt is abandoning faith—but why we cannot tell. He will allow me to remind him of a point I shall touch on just now—that "an ambitious and unscrupulous Church . . . . may say, 'Only believe; and all is right. The end being gained . . . . we do not care about your reasons' . . . . to a divine teacher [and surely to a human] we should peculiarly look for aid in getting clear views of the ground of faith" (Phases, p. 146)—yet, certainly, in Mr. N.'s book, while giving many objections to promote unbelief "at second-hand," in general "*stat pro ratione voluntas.*"

Mr. Newman speaks then in general of the Old Testament losing its authority. Nothing can exceed the narrow-mindedness and want of enlarged scope of view in all these remarks. There is no perception of a whole;\* no idea of the unfolding of dispensation, of the ways of God, of various parts of His ways; each brought out in its place, by which He was known. If there is not something which is the expression of the petty mind of man, which may suit Mr. N., then it is "insignificant." A star is insignificant to an ignorant person. It is part of an immense system to an enlightened astronomer; which, as a whole, confounds by its stupendous character. The significance of a thing sometimes depends on the intelligence of him who is occupied with it. The Arundel marbles made beautiful lime for the masons of the Earl's house. To them that was all they signified.

We get a famous sample of Mr. Newman's reasoning in this part of his book. He says, "that faith in the book was no part of Paul's gospel, is manifest, from his giving no list of sacred books to his Gentile converts" (Phases, p. 141). I do not know how Mr. N. knows this. Infidels, it is true, do get their knowledge at wonderful little cost, and the advantage of this is so great that one can never get them to acquaint us with the sources from which they procure it. Still, *it is always* "manifest." But there are some difficulties in the way of slower minds in admitting the force of this. First, the list was already

\* I must say that this is also true of such books as Stuart's on the Canon. I have read it since I wrote these sheets, and have been able to extract useful matter here and there; but though it once or twice alludes to the Bible as a whole, yet the ground of his answer (besides details as to particular objections) is present personal edification as it is. Now no man can get fully the real evidence for the Bible, unless he views it as a whole given of God. That is its value; and if God gives me His whole view of man from the creation to the eternal state—is that not instructive, the most instructive possible of all knowledge? And thus, like a dissected map, its completeness, the place of each part, the perfectness of each part in its place, is self-demonstrated for him who knows what the map is. Mr. Stuart might as well complain of the piece that contained Russia, because it was not the map of Andover in Massachusetts—as reason as to the suitability of Esther, because it was not moral instruction for a Christian, or did not help a preacher to make a sermon.

universally and fully known; half the first converts were Jews, of whom not one had a question as to what they were; and then the Apostles, addressing Jews and Gentiles together, appeal to these very books over and over again, as of unquestionable authority. A list by Paul would have been a very foolish thing, because he appealed to them as of already recognised authority. No doubt this was adding his to them; but, besides this it was drawing the authority of what he said from them, which was much more important, and a very much more solemn way of owning their authority. If faith in a book be not proved by Paul's writings what would prove it. A list would have been ridiculous, the whole book was perfectly well known. He calls it "the Scriptures."

And here I must beg leave to say, that Mr. Newman most grossly mis-represents what the Apostle says to Timothy. He makes him say, "Although now you have the Spirit to teach you, yet that does not make the older writers useless: for *'every divinely inspired writing is also profitable for instruction, &c.'*" (Phases, p. 142). Now Paul says nothing of the kind. There is no contrast of the Spirit with the Scriptures, but something totally different. The apostle is showing what is the especial safeguard of the Christian in the perilous times of the last days, and, besides his own instructions, he refers Timothy, in a particular manner, to the Scriptures (did he want a list?), to the written word of God, as able to make men wise unto salvation, through faith, which is in Christ Jesus. The Apostle is so far from contrasting it with the Spirit's teaching us, that though speaking of the Spirit, as announcing these perilous times, he refers especially to the Scriptures, without naming the Holy Ghost, as competent to make the man of God perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works. I am satisfied no one can profit by the Scriptures without the Holy Ghost; but here the apostle had occasion to bring in a safeguard for the church, *exterior* to her or any man's pretensions.

Mr. Newman gives us the beginning of the phrase—which he is very careful not to finish—in a translation of his own, without noticing in any way that of the authorised version; it would not, indeed, at all have suited him. Quoted, as it is there, in English, it would have utterly overthrown his state-

ment. Now although, I admit, people may raise a question on it, I beg leave to say, that I am thoroughly convinced the English translation is right, and that the passage (though I know some have so taken it), will not really\* bear the sense here put upon it. But Mr. N. might have spared himself the trouble of reasoning thus on the Old Testament—Christ certainly declares, in what amounts to a list, its authority. He could give it, indeed, such. Hence, when Mr. N. did not admit it as having such, as so quoted by Jesus in all its parts, he had given up Christ's authority altogether, even as a prophet. He might have saved himself the trouble of commenting on any further details, he was completely an infidel already. All the rest was totally illogical. He did not know what he was about, or he was indulging his "antagonist will" in the hope of troubling others who yet cling to the blessed authority of the life-giving word of God. No doubt the Scriptures are a means—but what a means of knowing God's mind is His own communicating it! *He who loves HIM who gives it, will love the communication.* He who knows his own weakness and ignorance will rejoice in that which gives him certain divinely sent knowledge of God and of all His ways. "The Bible was made for man."† No doubt—God be thanked. But *by* whom was it made? But to set man up in self-importance, and to put God aside, is the natural desire of an infidel—the uniform practice of Mr. N.

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ANOTHER general point now opens before us, though some particular objections connect themselves with it. The grounds of faith proposed in Scripture. Is moral truth to be received in obedience to an apparent miracle of sense, or are we to

\* "He," says Bishop Middleton (alluding to Mr. Newman's way of translating it), "who can produce such an instance, will do much towards establishing the plausibility of a translation, which otherwise must appear, to say the least of it, to be forced and improbable."

† "In Paul's religion, respect for the Scriptures was a means not an end. The Bible was made for man, not man for the Bible" (Phases, p. 142).

believe in sensible miracles because of their recommending some moral truth?\*" Such is the way in which Mr. Newman approaches the question. He proceeds to accuse the Bible of great inconsistency on this point. "In one place Jesus reproves the demand of a miracle, and blesses those who believe without miracles. In another, he requires that they will receive his doctrine (and submit to it as little children), because of his miracles" (Phases, pp. 145, 146).

Now, before going further, I would remark that that to which Mr. Newman objects here carries the moral evidence of its justice in itself in the simplest and plainest manner. If the moral excellence took effect on the conscience, so much the better. It ought to have done so—man was in an evil state if it did not. But then with such miracles as Christ did, men were left without excuse in not receiving such a doctrine. Thus Christ says, "Believe *me* that I am in my Father and my Father in me, or else believe me for the very works' sake." What can be simpler? Again, "If I had not come and spoken unto them they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did they had not had sin, but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father."

Mr. Newman has, however, stated a question which, as to the matter in hand, is perfectly absurd and irrelevant. Is he to believe miracles on account of morality, or doctrine on account of miracles? Neither. No doubt immorality of doctrine would tend to discredit a miracle; and if the miracle were certain, it could not accredit what was certainly wrong; and purity of doctrine helps to accredit a miracle, as a miracle confirms the authority of a teacher; but we are not called on to believe a doctrine because of a miracle, or a miracle because of a doctrine; we are called on to believe that Jesus is the Son of God, because he offered *both these proofs together*; so that all Mr. N.'s abstract reasoning on the difficulty of arriving

\* "Ought we in any case to receive moral truth in obedience to an apparent miracle of sense; or conversely, ought we ever to believe in sensible miracles because of their recommending some moral truth" (Phases, p. 145.)

at truth, or the grounds of truth is an irrelevant question of his own mind. Christ appeals to both kinds of proof as evidence of who he was and of the truth of what he said, "Which of you convinceth me of sin; and if I speak the truth why do ye not believe me?" Again, "I told you and ye believed not; the works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." Mr. N. then is astray as to the whole matter in hand. But there is another thing which Mr. N. of course keeps entirely out of sight; he continues after what I already quoted, "Now this is intelligible, if blind external obedience is the end of religion, and not truth and inward righteousness—an ambitious and unscrupulous Church that desires by fair means or foul to make mens' minds bow down to her, may say, Only believe; and all is right. The end being gained—obedience to us—we do not care about your reasons. But God cannot speak thus to man. . . It therefore peculiarly vexed me to find so total a deficiency of clear and sound instruction in the New Testament, and eminently in the Gospel of John, on so vital a question. The more I considered it, the more it appeared as if Jesus was solely anxious to have people believe in Him without caring on what grounds they believed, although that is obviously the main point" (Phases, p. 146). Indeed! Is the logic, which is to govern their principles of reasoning about it, the *main point* when God is there? for we are supposing, (Mr. N. as well as myself) the case to be that of God speaking to man, and our inquiry is—How is He to speak? He is mainly to explain to them the *logical* grounds on which they are to go! This is quite worthy of Mr. N.; but I avow I know not of whom else. The Lord does give them clear *grounds* of faith (see the close of John v). John Baptist's testimony—the Father's testimony—His works' testimony—the Scripture's testimony. But as to teaching them logic, I must leave it to infidels to count it the worthy occupation of God teaching in the world. Yet why He should teach this is hardly apparent on Mr. N.'s shewing, for "a question of *logic*, such as I have had before me, was peculiarly one in which the propagator of a new religion could not be allowed to dictate" (Phases, p. 147). But a man's reasoning cannot rise above what

is in his mind. Think of God being in the world to give "clear views" on "a question of logic," which is yet so the province of man's mind that he "could not be allowed to dictate"—and this man is to tell us the just grounds of faith!

Now I leave to every honest-minded reader, how much the life and words of the blessed Jesus resembled the conduct of "an ambitious and unscrupulous Church." It is a great thing, when we have to do with the vaporous reasonings of infidels, to get at things as they are—man as he is—history as we have it—Jesus as he was. They cannot bear facts; and if an "unscrupulous church" is not to be trusted, I avow (and Mr. N's. book has not enfeebled my conviction) scrupulosity is not the burden that weighs down an infidel.

But I say, that if God do come into the world, or if He send even a revelation into the world, other than a claim of law, His great end must be to *reveal Himself*. He has to do so because men are departed from Him, or (for whatever reason) are ignorant of Him; were it not so there would not be place for the revelation. Now He is the source of all blessing. He knows it; He would make man happy by it. The knowledge of Him, as the Lord states it, and of Jesus whom He has sent is eternal life. But He will have this of course real, moral, in the soul: hence, by faith. He is not thus revealed as God exacting, though He will judge all—but acting for us so as to take away every obstacle, while maintaining fully the highest standard of conscience existing to bless us in Himself—for He is love. Thus believing in Him I have perfect peace and living joy in Himself. Now, if He thus come to bless, and by such a knowledge of Him, what can He do but engage men to believe in Him? His words and ways are the revelation of this, as such. In mercy to men He appeals to them; and seeing how many obstacles there are to the simple perception of what is good and the embracing of it; we can understand that goodness adding sensible proofs by the exercise of power to overcome them, and shew by that power who it is that is really come. No doubt men ought to see the grace and truth in itself. So the Lord says, but condescendingly he adds external proofs to confirm the testimony

and help man's mind. On the other hand, if the conviction as to the glory of the messenger and truth of the message be produced merely by the miracles, the Lord rejects such faith because there is merely a conviction of the mind—the moral perception is wanting, which really recognises His person and receives the power of the truth. “When He was in Jerusalem many believed on Him when they saw the miracles which He did; but Jesus did not commit Himself to them, for He knew what was in man” (John ii.).

In fine, the ground Mr. Newman takes is this, that the question is, Are we to believe miracles for doctrine's sake, or doctrine for miracles' sake?

I say that Christ calls us to believe in His person and revelation by reason of both; and that the question Mr. Newman puts on the matter is absurd. The doctrine and works confirm each other. Which is the fact? For it is a question of fact.

Next Mr. Newman says (I would repeat it with reverence), that when God teaches, he should explain the logical grounds of faith to man without dictating; as that could not be allowed in the propagator of a new religion.

I say, that if God reveals Himself, He would give all that love could of the display of Himself in nature, conduct, word and work, which would not destroy the responsibility of man\*—that He would give the display of His nature in act, doctrine, and power. He would *give*, in a word, the grounds *for* faith in its object, not *of* faith. He would present what the conscience, heart, and intelligence of man ought to recognise as a revelation of who was there. That was what He—He alone—could do for man—what would be a revelation, what man wants; not an humble conversation on what grounds a man might believe, carried on by one not allowed to dictate. That He condescended, as we have seen, to plead with man on the grounds he had for faith, is most true. Nothing was too low for His love, if it might be a blessing to man—but that is another thing.

If Mr. Newman merely means that he is quite ignorant of

\* The question of the grace which overcomes an “antagonist will,” in quickening power, is not what occupies us here, but the revelation of the object of faith.

what the grounds of faith are, and wants instruction as to them—that I believe is true. He does not even know what the question is. But that is a strange reason for writing a book on it. His theory is—There can be no possible grounds for believing. Let me suggest, that when we seek a ground for faith, we must look for it in the proofs given of the thing proposed to us to be believed; not in discussing the abstract principles in which the human mind can believe, and neglecting the proofs of what it is called upon to believe; for the grounds of Divine faith can be given only by Divine testimony, by what God reveals; and hence known only in looking at that; not by settling whether one kind of proof is to be believed on account of the other, where both are direct proofs of something else, which confirm each other.

But further, if God presents Himself as the object of faith, He who is the sole and perfect source of blessing, our alienation from whom is our ruin, can He do anything else than call on men to believe on Him? Can He give reasons for doing it other than the adequate display of Himself? Having given them, to believe in Himself is everything as to human responsibility; and the necessary pursuit of Divine love. He could do nothing but call to this faith if He meant to bless. And what shall we say of the reasoning of one, who compares God calling unhappy man to come to Himself for blessing, to the act of “an ambitious, unscrupulous church, that desires, by fair means or foul, to make men’s minds bow down to her.” It may be said that I am begging the question, in saying, “God calling.” But this is a mistake, because we are inquiring what is suitable if God does address Himself to man. Mr. Newman says, “But God cannot thus speak to man.” I reply He must thus speak to man. He must claim obedience as necessary, in virtue of the revelation of Himself. He must call men to believe on Him if He means to bless. The Church’s pretension to do it sets aside God—God’s pretension to do it brings Him in. He must show that the rejecting of Him will be everlasting ruin.

If He be really God, it cannot be otherwise. If it be He, He cannot claim less than absolute obedience, nor do otherwise than call to believe in Himself. The taking any other ground

would prove it was not He, however He may condescend in grace as to the means of display and proof. Mr. Newman is blaming the character of address, as not suiting God, if He does speak. Hence His speaking is necessarily assumed. I repeat, if God speaks, He must do what Mr. N. blames; and that all Mr. N.'s reasonings are the very grossest absurdities possible; that is, that if He reveals Himself He is to discuss the logical grounds on which they are to receive evidence, instead of giving adequate evidence, and throwing on them responsibility in their conscience. The evidence offered is here avoided by Mr. N.; and he puts, as his argumentative ground, "an ambitious Church—Hindooism—Mahomedanism"—on the same ground as God, excluding the only real question, that is the *evidence attached to each*, to discuss the human grounds of judging, without introducing the object about which he is to judge. Now, though God in grace can afford every kind of evidence, and has done so, he cannot *subject* Himself to man's *à priori* judgment, but must place man under responsibility to Him, and call him to come to *Him* if He means to bless him. And this is what we find in the gospel. God, by positive truth, has met every kind of working of the human mind, groping after means of truth. He has, working in men, adapted His reasonings to their condition. But the thing revealed is always itself, and in its own divine perfection. The manner of revealing and teaching is grace; the thing taught is truth itself, and (blessed be God!) is grace also.

This is my answer to what Mr. Newman says of Paul's reasoning like Gamaliel, and talking of subjects such as Philo reasons about.\* I have no doubt that glimmerings of needed truth were apprehended through the wants of the natural mind; which, through some traditional rays of light, the creation through which it moved, its conscience, its sense of the want of something to meet a thousand questions which arose out of all this, and the heavings of an immortal soul within," felt that something was wanted to answer a craving, a void, which gave no clearness or certainty of what that

\* "Paul's reasonings are those of a Gamaliel, and often are indefensible by our logical notions. John also (as I had been recently learning) has a wonderful similarity to Philo" (Phases, p. 147).

answer would be. The revelation given in the Old Testament, the secondary effect of which was undoubtedly widely spread, furnished some clue to a large apprehension of the Divine nature—opened up inquiries to the mind which it did not satisfy either. These floated about in various forms, and may be resumed in the western world, in Plato and the Targums, or perhaps Philo. The revelation of God in the New Testament met all these by the perfect revelation of God Himself, in His own being, and in every relation in which He stood with creation. Hence, while it gave the whole positive truth as to God, it left no room for the inadequate or erroneous views current on the same subjects in various forms. It took all the elements of truth which floated in their minds and systems—*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*—and connected them in their true place with the centre of all truth. Chaos became perfect order, and associated with the vast expanse of heaven, with which it took its true place and relationship; while it left no room for the pride of man to pretend to have stores of wonderful knowledge—for he is proud of everything he discovers himself—for all true knowledge was a matter of revelation, and who can boast of that. Hence we find the hazy notions of the Platos, Philos, and Targums, absorbed into perfect truth, and the gnostic reveries and pretensions anticipated and judged, we get the *λογος* with Divine certainty and clearness; the *πληρωμα* in all its simple, Divine, clearly defined truth and perfectness; we get the *φως* and *αληθεια*, everything that man might indulge his imagination and his pride about, in the form of real truth—ininitely more knowledge, and certain, yea, Divine knowledge—but no room for speculation; and the perfection of the Godhead being revealed in Christ, all the development of ancient or modern gnostics is shut out by that all-important Divine word: “That which was *from the beginning*, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, which our hands have handled of the word of life. For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us.” Either the living person of the Son of God is not the object of faith, and the perfect revelation of God and the Father in Him not the

subject-matter of those who speak of development; or the pretence to add anything to it is the blasphemous denial of his perfectness. Infidelity is openly the latter; Puseyism and Popery have their choice to make between the two. In either case they are not Christianity. **THAT WHICH WAS FROM THE BEGINNING**, is the superscription of that book of Scripture which, above all, especially guards us against seducing spirits. Modern infidelity professes to be development; so does modern Popery and Puseyism; and strange to say, when Mr. F. W. Newman renounced Christianity, and became a developed infidel, he renewed, he tells us, happy intercourse with Mr. J. H. Newman, who is a developed Puseyite or Roman Catholic. Let the saint remember, that if he will be a Christian, he must hold to that which was from the beginning—the truth once delivered to the saints—and he may know, if he trusts an apostle, that he “*has everlasting life*” (1 John v. 13).

But it is well to remark some other points on which the chapter we are occupied with depends. Its title is, “Faith at second hand found to be vain.” Now the reader will observe that though “second-hand faith” seems to be a very uncertain ground of confidence, the real meaning of the phrase is this, That there can be no faith at all except by a revelation made to the individual who receives it; and that it can never pass any further. That is, that as regards the revelation of truth, or any revelation for men in general, none such can exist; for if Peter or Paul have received a revelation, it is for me a revelation at second-hand. That is, all revelation of truth must be a perpetual personal miracle, and exercise of God’s power, without, consequently, any exercise of responsibility whatever in its reception. The Scripture presents revelation as given, in order to be communicated for the good of others. Which is most rational, I go no farther here, if there is any real blessing:—to give a revelation so as to produce absolute divine certainty in the mind, with no possibility of communicating it so as to put man under the responsibility of receiving it, and thus, if a blessing, to require a renewed miracle to each person; or, to communicate divine truth by a chosen instrument, with sufficient evidence to place men under responsibility of bowing to it when it is presented

to them? But further, Mr. Newman's reasonings on it are nothing whatever to the purpose. He requires to be informed how Paul got it. Now this may be morally interesting in its place. But my ignorance of it is totally immaterial as regards my reception of it. The question is not, What has been the means of assuring him? but, Whether he has given adequate evidence of the truth he preaches, to bind me to receive it? It is evident that is the whole question with me. If any one has got possession of my father's will, leaving me an immense fortune, the question is not by what means *he* was convinced it was his, so as to keep it safe and communicate it to me; but whether I have and can produce in court now adequate testimony that it is his now it is in my possession. Mr. Newman's reasonings here are totally irrelevant. It is merely a denial of any revelation, and discrediting all by a point, difficult perhaps to solve for any of us whom God does not employ as instruments of communicating one, but perfectly irrelevant, when the question is, Am *I* bound to receive it? If I prove my father's signature, and the that of witnesses, how the finder was convinced is all one to me.

The meaning of any one's having a divine revelation is very simple. It is divine truth directly communicated to him by God, with divine certainty, whatever the means of such communication (and they were various) may be. With Moses it was face to face; with prophets, a vision or dream; in the New Testament, often, evidently, the Holy Ghost acting on the intelligence; in certain cases, though the coming of the word of the Lord was certain in the Old, the full bearing was not understood at the time of revelation. This difference may have its interest to a believer. It is nothing to an unbeliever; with him the question is, With what evidence is the truth presented to *him*? To say that God cannot communicate with certainty to the mind that it is Himself, is to say that He cannot do what man is perfectly capable of. To say that He cannot afford certainty when the truth is communicated to a third person, by adequate evidence accompanying it, is an absurdity worthy of an infidel only. But if he can, "faith at second hand" is not vain. It is founded, or may be so, on adequate proofs. Yet this is the proposition of the chapter.

Whether there are such proofs is a question of fact which Mr. N. leaves aside to inquire how Paul received the revelation, and knew it to be such, which has nothing whatever to say to the matter.\* Supposing prophecies clearly accomplished, and even finding a meaning by the event, while otherwise inexplicable. Supposing, in the subject of revelation, a perfection of individual walk wholly without parallel, the invention of which, even as a tale, would have been a greater miracle, man being what he is, than its existence, if a divine person was really there. Supposing this person, after accomplishing prophecies and working notorious miracles over the whole country, publicly and undeniably, promises to communicate, when gone, to others who had it not, a power more conspicuous than that exercised by himself, that a doctrine and practice, entirely beyond their age and country characterises these persons, their whole tone and conduct being founded on the communication they exercise, and that they perform publicly, in view of their enemies, notable miracles, which there is no gainsaying—that with a few words these men, once ignorant, confound all their adversaries, not by contentious learning, but by the power which, in the plainest

\* “What does he *mean* by saying that he has had a ‘revelation?’ Did he see a sight, or hear a sound? or was it an inward impression? and how does he distinguish it as divine? Until these questions are fully answered, we have no materials at all before us for deciding to accept his results” (Phases, p. 148). Paul did see a sight—did hear a sound—and tells us he did receive things from the Lord, which, I suppose produced impressions. But leaving this, which was the ground of his faith, properly speaking (and unless I had an equally strong impression on my mind with himself, it would be impossible for me to know *how* he discerned its divine character, and then I should not want his reception of it at all)—leaving this entirely illogical and irrational ground taken by Mr. Newman, I would ask, what he means by—“Until *these* questions are fully answered we have no materials before us for deciding?” Suppose Paul had opened my eyes, I having been born blind, or any one else’s, and had so reached my conscience that I could say, Here is a man who has told me all that ever I did, and shewn me a God that indeed searches the heart and tries the reins, and yet is perfect love, should I have no materials for judging whether he taught the truth and was sent of God, supposing, too, in *all his life* he approved himself as a minister of God; until I knew, to satisfy my curiosity, how he had got it? Was ever more consummate nonsense?

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terms, guides and fills their speech—that the promise of power from him gone away is thus demonstrably fulfilled—that ignorant fishermen whose provincialisms betrayed their country, now suddenly speak many tongues, so that men brought up in each understood them—supposing all this true, should I not have proof that the testimony about this admirable and unequalled Being was true—that is, I should have proof, moral, prophetic, miraculous, in my conscience, my understanding, that their testimony was divine—that it was a revelation, though many historic points otherwise cognisable might confirm it; for I suppose the thing not done in a corner. In what manner this wonderful Being now absent, has communicated to them what they preach about Him does not touch the question whether *I* am bound to receive it. That depends on the evidence offered to me, not on that afforded to them. Now, it may be said, “You are supposing all this.” I am: because the question is not whether Christianity is true, but whether, as a general proposition, faith at second hand is vain. That is, whether a denial of all revelation to man, as being an impossibility, can be reasonably maintained. Second-hand faith is the best and highest kind. It has an amazingly higher moral character, and so the Lord assures us in the case of Thomas (John xx).

I do not again go over in detail the case of Abraham, here again referred to. Mr. Newman’s argument is of no use whatever here, because Abraham went on the supposition of having a direct command from God; and St. Paul and St. James reason on that supposition as to the proof of faith contained in it, and on nothing else. He reckoned on God’s restoring him his son, says St. Paul. He shewed this faith in his act, says St. James. But Mr. N. is unreasonable, even as to that by which he seeks to act on the feelings of men to set them against the true God, the God of the Bible. There are cases, he tells us elsewhere, in which it is a mere “morbidity notion,” to complain of men’s being put to death. Men are to be put to death; and it is counted useful and proper as an example for the good of society. That is, there are motives which make it right that man should dispose of human life for the good of others. Mr. N. must think it to be approved of God—not perhaps as absolute good—but as needed and useful

to man as He is, and life is taken away accordingly. Now, if there are reasons why we should, there may be reasons why Abraham should have been ordered to do it. There was no malice, it was done because God commanded it,—in perfect obedience to Him. Now I believe, indeed no person can deny, that more good, incomparably and beyond all question more good, and of a more positive excellent kind, has been done by the example of Abraham's faith in this, and that for ages, than by the execution of a criminal for the space of a year after his suffering. No one ever had the idea, or could draw it from the history, that it was right or allowable for a man to kill his child of his own will. Quite the contrary. The sovereign claim of God, who forbids it to man, was enforced by it. There is this difference, that men cannot restore the life of a man whom they sacrifice to the good of society, whereas God could that of Isaac; and so Abraham believed. And, indeed, He could hinder his being even put to death, and did so as soon as Abraham's faith was fully proved in the way presented by Paul and James. Many prophetic accounts which Mr. N. refers to are evidently to me visions only, and demonstrably so meant, to represent the character of Israel to the Prophet's mind. I shall again omit noticing particularly some of the miserable insinuations which are worthy only of an infidel, or of a corrupt mind—if, indeed, they are to be distinguished, a conclusion to which, certainly, this book would not lead us.

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Some historical objections remain to be noticed. First, the well-known one of the conquest of Canaan. That, in the public government of the world, men have dealt thus and worse with conquered people, is certain; so that what Mr. N. considers as man *as God made him* has so acted—and God's government has so ordered it. This is Mr. N.'s notion. The fact of similar conquests is notorious; in history the only difference is that I hold—that, though such inroads may be used for judgment, as is shewn in Habbakuk, Joel, and frequently in the prophets (Job explaining, so to speak, the

secret springs of all this), yet that, it is the *sin of man* which has given such a character to the government of God.

Now in Israel's history God did not go out of this character of government. He merely took a nation, in which He shewed its direct operation and the motives of it—so that that government should be learnt by a law. So that man should say, "Verily there is a reward for the righteous, verily there is a God *that judgeth the earth.*" Israel, therefore, is put in relationship with God as a nation—and national laws given to them; as a whole, the law given to them was not a code of everlasting righteousness with a fully revealed God. Christ declares even the contrary. God was hidden behind the veil, and *said* that He would dwell in the thick darkness. Hence those who walked really with God, suffered in Israel as now in the world; a riddle too hard for them till in the sanctuary they learned the way of God in judgment. Grace, though secretly working and shewn in daily mercy, was unrevealed. Judgment and government were the principles on which God dealt, though patient goodness marked this government. The basis of it is laid in Exodus xxxiv. 6—9; and xxxii. 33. No doubt individuals saw beyond this to eternal things, as the Abrahams, the Davids, and a crowd of holy men in whom real faith was. But the principle brought out in God's dealing with the nation, was God judging in the earth. This it is that has produced confusion in the minds of many with regard to such a book as Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses. They could not but feel, that they are not to be heard who feign that the fathers did look for mere transitory promises; while on the other hand, the argument of Bishop Warburton's book is, in the main idea, incontestable. But all is simple, if we see that the earthly government, carried on under Moses, did find its public sanction in present earthly judgments, while individual saints, suffering under the sin of others, and even plunged in deep sorrow because God's people were under judgment for their sins, and the public glory of God and His worship cast down through it, still looked, by present personal piety in which their hearts were elevated to God, beyond it all and became more heavenly by this very means, and the non-

accomplishment of earthly promises. At the same time the great principles of everlasting righteousness were interspersed through the national enactments of the law, so that they should learn and be imbued with them, and they are brought out as such by the divine and perfect wisdom of the Saviour, while faith, as to the nation, as an object of promise, was sustained by the assurance of the coming of a Messiah, who, executing judgment against every oppressor and bringing in everlasting righteousness, would also accomplish, in grace, on God's part, the hopes of faith and the infallible promises of God in favour of the residue of the people whom He had called. And this is entirely to come: for now God is calling the Church exclusively to a heavenly place, "blessed with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ," that the purpose of God, for the administration of the fulness of times, might be accomplished, that is to gather together in one all things in Christ both which are in heaven and on earth (Eph. i. 8, 9, 10). This is not the time of judging the earth in connection with His people, though providentially, of course, all is under God's hand; but of grace, heavenly hopes, and suffering with Christ. Nothing can be clearer in Scripture than this. Christ did not judge the earth when He came, He refused to do it in the least thing; He was condemned by its judges wielding externally God's power and authority in the place of judgment, Jewish and Gentile. All judgment was set aside, and the *Just One* was the victim of man's judgment and the bearer of God's wrath. This was, indeed, morally the judgment of the world, and its prince, the enemy. But the execution of judgment is yet wholly future, and so is the resulting accomplishment of Divine purpose; and this is the true answer to Mr. Newman's cavils against a second fulfilment. The *purpose* of God declared in prophecy has never been fulfilled *at all*. Christ's sufferings have, no doubt, but nothing else save the consequent dispersion of his earthly people; but this is not God's purpose properly speaking. Particular local judgments have been executed, but neither are these his purpose. That remains wholly unaccomplished. God has not yet *shewn* Himself, according to his purpose, the Judge

of the earth; when the wicked shall be cut off, who are open adversaries of his power, a King will reign in righteousness, and the Prince of Peace will exercise his dominion in the world. Christ, at his first coming, declares that it was not to bring peace on the earth, but a sword. Shall then this blessed character of Prince of Peace remain unfulfilled? Certainly not. For the moment, sin had the upper hand in the world, because God was graciously doing a still greater work, and shewing Himself above all man's futile sin in making it the instrument of an eternal and heavenly salvation; but this Earth will be the scene of peace and blessing under the government of God, wielded by the hand of the Son of Man, whom He hath set over the works of his hands. Grace has made *us* His *joint heirs*.

Having given this general view of the connection of the whole subject, I return to the conquest of Canaan. The Scriptures are express in presenting it as an example of God's positive judgment after all patience had already been shewn to be useless, as in the case of Sodom and Gomorrah—of his power against the enemies of his nature, people, and purposes—and of his faithfulness to these last. Abraham was told that his descendants must go down and dwell in Egypt for a long period, for the iniquity of the Amorites was not yet full—and this took place. Israel was clearly informed of the cause why they were thus judged. "Not for thy righteousness, or for the uprightness of thine heart," but for the wickedness of these nations, the Lord doth drive them out before thee (Deut. ix. 5, and xviii. 12). This truth is expressed in the strongest possible manner (Levit xviii.), in warning Israel not to fall into the like abominations. "And the land is defiled, therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants." "Ye shall, therefore, keep my statutes that the land spue not you out also, when ye defile it, as it spued out the nations that were before you." Thus a people allowed to ripen up to their full height of wickedness, are taken as the occasion of shewing God's righteous wrath and power. Israel is fully warned and apprised of the principle on which it was done. It is a great public sample of God's full

judgment in the earth. They were to be destroyed by the judicial power of God. It was also, as the case of Achan fully shews, the occasion of shewing God's power and faithfulness, but his strict judgment of evil in the midst of his people. In the case which Mr. Newman cites, he carefully omits that, outside these specially guilty people, peace was to be offered to every city, and not one were to be touched if accepted. If they preferred being adversaries, then those who were thus hostile they were not to make slaves of (which would have been *their* desire and profit) but to slay them as adversaries; the women and spoil, who were not in this case, were given them. But this was totally forbidden as to the seven wicked nations. All, as a judged race, were to be dealt with in God's name. Now this imprinted a clear character on the act; for it is quite certain that, as to national habits and personal interests, they would have made slaves of them all. That these national habits were according to the rude feelings of that age there is no doubt; and God deals with them nationally according to their state; and this, though He leads them on in various parts of it *far* beyond all surrounding nations, checks their will and passions by the sense of responsibility, encourages by the favour of *their* God, and (gives enshrouded in their external and passing ordinances) the great principles of everlasting righteousness—love to God and one's neighbour, and maintains the great landmarks of society and family, as men speak now; yet all this is not to be confounded for a moment with the eternal ground of man's relationship with God. The moral law, as far as it went, availed to shew that man as a sinner could have none on that ground. It convinced *man* of sin, and revealed nothing else of God but that He was a just Judge who condemned it. For the wisdom of the infidel, all this is jumbled together without distinction.

We have a singular example of the perfect absence of all moral discernment in the reasoning of Mr. Newman, in his reference to the Lord's conduct in purifying the temple. A father chastises his child; and the profound wisdom of the infidel discusses whether it is a warrant for its brother to beat

it. "Could it authorise *me* to plait a whip of small cords, and flog a preferment-hunter out of the pulpit" (Phases, p. 151). How sovereignly ridiculous such a remark in a moral point of view! Yet Mr. N. is treating it as a moral question. Now there are cases where the offensive character of an act puts the scourge in everybody's hand; and it was really such in this case; making God's temple and God's worship an occasion of trafficking extortion as to the poor who had victims to buy. But this is by no means all. The Lord distinctly presents Himself as Jehovah; and (in one of the instances in which He thus cleared the temple), as at the same time the King, the Son of David, the Messiah, to whom such an office belonged. In the early case, in John, He says, "Destroy *this temple*, and in three days I will raise it up." He spake of the temple of His body. In the other, He sends for the ass, to accomplish the prophecy of Zechariah, saying, "the Lord hath need of him," and enters publicly into Jerusalem as the King Messiah. Think of Mr. N. asking if it would authorise him so to act. He must forgive me saying "such questions go very deep into the heart" of the moral, perhaps I should say, common sense of the writer.

I may now come to the second part of Mr. Newman's chapter—the discussion of the grounds of faith as he views them. Many general principles have been discussed in my introductory portion, to which they properly belong; but some details, and the answers to some objections and difficulties find their place here. Nothing can be more supremely absurd than one remark which is made as to the knowledge of God—a remark, however, which is the sum of Mr. N.'s book.

"But next, the analogy *assumes*, most falsely, that God, like man, speaks from without; that what we call reason and conscience is *not* his mode of commanding and revealing his will, but that words to strike the ear, or symbols displayed before the senses, are emphatically and exclusively revelation. On the contrary, of our moral and spiritual God we know nothing without, everything within. It is *in the spirit* that we meet Him, not in the communications of sense" (Phases, p. 152).

Was ever anything more futile, to say nothing of assuming

the whole question, and deciding it with an *αὐτὸς ἔφη*—"We know nothing without, everything within." A Pythagorean bean-worshipper could not be more certain of truth. But let that pass here, as well as the use of the Scripture language to a very different purpose from Scripture truth.

What is the sense of this contrast of *without* and *within*; "words to strike the ear," or "symbols displayed before the senses," in contrast with thoughts within. If words strike the ear, are they not then in an intelligent human being thoughts within. Has not God, by a most wonderful process, which no man can fathom, made the moving of the air by my lungs and lips, the producer of the highest and most wonderful thoughts in another man's mind. Senses, no doubt, are in exercise; but is that all? *Are* not minds and thoughts in communication? Yea, these thoughts created in me by this communication from another. This is really too futile, too absurd for a reasonable man.

But further. If God does not speak from without, but from within, on Mr. Newman's theory; reason and conscience must be God (for otherwise He must speak somehow *to* reason or conscience) and must be God in the highest way, for they have God's thoughts (have they all of them?) without His communicating them. This is just the grossest form of the desolating Pantheism from which Mr. N. pretends to deliver us. For either God is without, *i. e.*, outside reason and conscience, and communicates to them thoughts which they have not within them; or if they have them within themselves, without God's communicating them, they are God in the highest sense; they think the thoughts of God themselves without His communicating to them. Good reason had the apostle to say, "No man knoweth the things of God but the Spirit of God." Now if these things are communicated to reason and conscience by the immediate action of the Spirit of God, that is just inspiration. And when speaking of intellectual subjects, that is from without, though not by the senses, and not within. The use of anything which may act on the senses, is a mere question of means, by which God, in His wisdom, may see fit to act and produce impressions, man being so framed as to receive

them in this way. But without the inward power of the Holy Ghost there would by this be no certain revelation. One must be able to add, "I was in the Spirit—immediately I was in the Spirit." Reason and conscience are man—a part of his being. Hence, if they cannot have a revelation (i.e. knowledge which it requires a communication from God to possess) that is, unless it be really from without; or, in a word, if it be as Mr. N. alleges, from within uncommunicated, man is God. But then, what he says is a contradiction; for it is not then a revelation at all. But to talk of the communications of sense, as if ideas were not conveyed, feelings not produced by words spoken without, is a communication not indeed of sense but nonsense. If God speaks at all, He must speak from without, in any real sense of the word; if not, man is God—and to talk of revelation is absurd. The employment of the senses as a medium is the merest question of means. Immediate communications, i.e. from God, are inspirations.

Faith is *within* but not "from within,"\* for it must be in a revealed object, the evidence of which is adequate to convince. For I do not here speak of the effectual working of grace in life-giving power overcoming the "antagonist will," which produces faith. Faith ought to flow from adequate testimony. It is a moral question, because the will and passions indispose to receive *such* a testimony. Further, as to our responsibility, the evidence ought to be adequate and cannot be overpowering, though grace may lead the heart to receive it, the will being otherwise opposed. Hence, "to try people's faith,"† though we may all understand it, is an incorrect expression; and Mr. Newman's reasoning on it playing on words. For if faith is there, there is nothing

\* "All pious Christians feel, and all the New Testament proclaims, that faith is a moral act and a test of the moral and spiritual that is within us . . . . faith therefore is essentially *from within*" (Phases, pp. 153, 154).

† "It had always appeared to me very strange in these divines to insist on the convincing and stupendous character of the Christian miracles, and then, in reply to the objection that they were *not* quite convincing, to say that the defect was purposely left to 'try people's faith.' Faith in what? Not surely in the miracle, but in the truth as discernible by the heart *without aid of miracle*" (Phases, p. 154).

to try. It is the heart that is put to the test. Adequate evidence is offered, and man will not believe. That is the state of his will: the state of his heart is shown because, though perfectly certain, and adequate evidence be offered, he will not receive it; and when it is said, "overpowering evidence is not given," it merely means such is given as is sufficient if the will be not opposed, and hence detects its opposition if it is. To give what would destroy this test, would take away its moral character. Grace does not change this. It acts in disposing the heart; but this is not my subject now. "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light."

Mr. Newman then puts the case of two men,\* one simple-hearted, and thus easily deceived, the other acute and shrewd, being exposed to the juggleries of a Simon Magus. Now, I do not answer here, that this, as Mr. N. always does, excludes God's care altogether. But I take the mere human ground, and I say an humble godly mind would, in such a very serious matter, wait till it got clear light—would seek for God's guidance. Such a mind has principles to guide it, which the shrewd Demas has not. There are tests of holiness, of truth, of respect for the word of God, which enable "a sheep" to discern the voice of the Good Shepherd. It may not be able to say what another's voice is; but till it recognises the voice of the Good Shepherd, it fears to follow. A stranger will they not follow, because they know *not* the voice of strangers.

Demas has no such safeguard—he must judge the thing himself, for himself, by his own acuteness. If the pretender is cleverer than he, he is deceived. How often is this the case! Nay, in many cases he is pre-disposed by false motives towards error and deceit; for unholy motives and deceit coalesce. At any rate, he has no safeguard but his own acuteness; and he may easily fall. Now the godly, serious, simple-hearted man has. If it is not what his soul knows as truth, or according to it, he does not receive it. No new truth ever upsets old truth. It builds upon it—they mutually confirm each other. How many shrewd ones, like Demas, received false Christs and Barchochebahs! How many simple ones refused the Judases and Theudases, and received Christ! How many

\* Phases, pp. 154, 155.

clever, shrewd men, have received the most monstrous imposture ever palmed on infatuated man—that of Mormonism! A simple-hearted believer escapes, because he has got what guards him from the motives which lead a man to receive it. Mr. Newman's estimate of the capacity of shrewdness to escape is not borne out by a just moral estimate of what places a soul in safety—nor by facts.

A miracle is a confirmation of truth in Scripture. "Confirming the word by signs following," men are not called on to believe the miracle; but to believe because of the miracle, though not for its sake alone. Now this is a very different thing; because to be useful as a miracle, it must in general be incontestably self-evident to the persons to whom it is presented. This was the case with all Scripture miracles. I may have to judge an apparent miracle\* in certain cases, and show that it is only apparent. But to confirm as a sign, it must be at least apparent. That which has to be proved does not serve as a proof—as a sign given. On the other hand, I do not deny that professed religion may sink below the standard of natural conscience: the case supposed by Mr. N. in Spain.† When it does, natural conscience will judge it, perhaps be driven into infidelity by it. What then? I admit it freely and fully, have seen it in thousands myself. Strange phenomenon to accredit Mr. N.'s competent human nature, that of pleasure-hunting infidels, or communists and deceiving religionists! I, who believe in the power of sin and Satan, am not at a loss here, though I bow my head in sorrow. How Mr. N.'s "good God," or even his law of progress, has ordered all this, he must explain. But this fact has nothing whatever

\* There is this evident distinction between a mass of pretended miracles and Scriptural ones, that these were to convince where men were strangers to the doctrine, the others to confirm existing prejudices. Besides this, I may remark that in many instances there was no room for the power of the imagination in the patient—the cure being wrought by Christ's word when he was at a distance.

† "Suppose him to be a poor Spaniard, surrounded by false miracles, false erudition, and all the apparatus of reigning and unopposed Romanism,.....' You bid me not to keep faith with heretics: you defend murder, exile, imprisonment, fines, on men who will not submit their consciences to your authority: this I see to be wicked, though you ever so much pretend that God has taught it you'" (Phases, p. 155).

to do with the concurrent testimony of incontestable miracles wrought on thousands who profited by them and saw them—of doctrines of the simplest truth, and the most elevated knowledge of God, and of a life of perfect holiness, which, if it were imposture, would prove an imposture, better than all the realities that ever were. This is the case Mr. N. has to deal with. "He healed them all." Would this repeated over and over again not prove the existence of power? If not, what would? It was not a case of miracles arranged among favouring people, isolated instances or pre-arranged individual cases. They were public, when men pleased, where men pleased, and as often as they pleased. Along with this power, truth and goodness were there. If deceit can do these two things, it is not deceit at all, but the truest mercy that can be. If juggleries accompany conduct which shocks natural conscience, let natural conscience judge it. It is, as we have said, a sad case if there be but that natural conscience to judge deceit, for it is but negative. It rejects but possesses nothing. Our case is with positive holy truth which judges conscience, confirmed by signs which none could counterfeit.

Mr. Newman's historical reasoning only condemns his system. The positive and superior instructions of Christianity were soon, he tells us, corrupted, and polluted.\* How then is man able to get at truth for himself. He corrupts, on the contrary, what he has got. As to his account of Judaism,† the only thing to be said is, that it is as untrue as can possibly be, as every tolerably instructed person knows.

He tells us that "before Constantine Christians were but a small fraction of the empire" (Phases, p. 161). In the East this certainly was not the case, nor, indeed, in the West, though it had not prevailed as in the East. But how did the

\* "Hardly was it started on its course when it began to be polluted by the heathenism and false philosophy around it . . . . It became more and more debased . . . . It sank into deep superstition and manifold moral corruption" (Phases, pp. 159, 160).

† "It began in polytheistic and idolatrous barbarism: It cleared into a hard monotheism, with much superstition adhering to it. This was farther improved by successive psalmists and prophets until Judaism culminated" (Phases, p. 160).

Christian soldiers conquer the empire, if Christians were only a small fraction. Constantine was able to found his pretensions to empire on the strength of the Christian party. No doubt, as Mr. Newman says, he conquered the empire for Christianity, but whence came the Christians who conquered it\* if they had made no more progress than Mr. N. states. Mr. N's *assertions are not to be trusted*. "There is nothing in all this to distinguish the outward history of Christianity from that of Mohammedism." (Phases, p. 162). Now, I ask any one in the smallest degree acquainted with history if *this be true?* Christianity, unarmed and persecuted *for three hundred years*, had increased to such a degree that an ambitious chieftain could take up the profession of it to secure the empire for himself. No one can contest this, whatever judgment they may form of Constantine's sincerity, or Eusebius' account of his vision of the cross. Every one knows that all the progress of Mohammedism was by arms. In the thirteenth year of Mohammed's setting up for prophet, that is, the very year of the Hegira, or flight from Mecca to Medina, he and his friends entered into a covenant engaging themselves to fight, and paradise was promised to those who were killed. Six years after this his public warfare began by the attack on Mecca. Indeed, he began in a small way at once, and a battle gained in the second year of the Hegira, was, according to Sale, the foundation of his greatness. A person who can say that the first three hundred years of Christianity are not different from this does not deserve to be listened to. He who begins to consider its means of progress only three hundred years after it was established, is not much better entitled to attention.

Prophecy, St. John's gospel, tongues, and St. Paul's conversion, are next considered as to the evidence afforded by them—for this is our subject now.

It is well, as to prophecy, to notice a great principle called in question by Mr. Newman; what he calls "double

\* "They [Christians] had made no such rapid progress in numbers as to imply that by the mere process of conversion they would ever Christianise the empire. In fact, *it was the Christian soldiers in Constantine's army who conquered the empire for Christianity*" (Phases, pp. 161, 162).

interpretation." "No one dreams of a 'second sense,'" he tells us, "until the primary sense prove false." Now I meet this assertion by saying, that there cannot be a doubt that, from the fall of Adam there was one grand subject of promise and prophecy, of hope and expectation—the seed of the woman who should bruise the serpent's head—the seed of Abraham—the seed of David. To say that this was not produced in the universal mind of Israel, at all times with which we are acquainted (and with no nation are we acquainted so long, or so well at this early date), would be to deny the most certain fact, sustained by the most incontrovertible evidence. It is much more certain than that Mr. N. is author of "Phases of Faith," and was once a fellow of Balliol. The testimony of Josephus, Tacitus, and Suetonius concur, it is well known, as stating that through all the East a notion prevailed, that, at the time Christ arose, He should arise who would possess the empire of the world. In a word, so strong was the testimony and the expectation, that all over the East it had reached the Gentiles, and was well known enough in the West to be recorded by the two Gentile historians of those times. All prophecy must, if God's promise was such, and true, have centred here—and so, in fact, it does. Sometimes clearer—sometimes more obscure—sometimes given as a relief and encouragement to oppressed saints—sometimes breaking through the dark cloud of judgment, like the sun in a stormy day; but, from the 3rd of Genesis, to the last chapter of Malachi, beginning, middle and ending, every ray of light converged to this point, that Messiah was to come. This is the first, enduring sense, the key and object of all prophecy. All the rest is subordinate to, and conduces to this. I have no doubt myself that this is the sense of "private interpretation" in 2 Pet. i. 20. We have not God's mind in it unless we take his scope in the whole. No prophecy of Scripture is *ιδίως διαλύσεως*, its own interpretation. It must have its meaning as part of a great whole. Now, no doubt, partial temporal judgments were announced, which were parts of this great whole; and the prophetic word passed on to the grand summing up at the close, when all the parties to the wondrous drama that is enacting will meet in its eventful *dénouement* on the stage of this world. In this way only is

there a double sense. That partial displays of the spirit of that which is to be judged in its full manifestation may be dealt with as anticipative of the great final event, is an unquestionable scriptural principle. "Ye have heard," says St. John, "that Antichrist shall come, and even now are there many Antichrists, whereby we know that it is the last time." Here the manifestation of the same Spirit is taken as indicating the epoch, and accompanied by the clearest testimony that it is not the fulfilment. I believe that some passages, applied by some to previous events, are spoken of final ones—others, completely fulfilled in previous ones, have been applied to ultimate ones. Prophecy is much simpler, in general, than is supposed. But that characteristic evil may be partially, as well as fully developed, is undoubted; and as prophecies have generally a moral character, and those in whom the character is judged, a local habitation and a name, the principle of *application* to characteristic things or events, while fulfilment is to be sought at another time, is perfectly sound and easily intelligible. There has been mischievous spiritualising. But no one can doubt that Jerusalem, Babylon, and even Egypt, embody certain great principles and systems, which may be variously developed, and judged according to this development.

Now, this is not a question of a "second sense"; it is a sound and enlarged view of what is undeniable in principle, and unquestionably true in its application to Scripture. What the believer has to do is, to ascertain the principle involved, and the facts referred to in connection with it. The actual accomplishment of the prophecy is to be sought according to the plain testimony of the passage. And here I would add a remark or two. Nothing can be simpler or more natural than that some great characterising principle should be embodied in some system, and this centered in some place or people where it finds its development and full maturity, as we speak of Rome being this, and doing that, meaning the corporate system of papal power. Now Scriptural statements, as to these systems and places, are most useful, as guiding the mind in its judgment of the principles embodied. Prophecies declare the ultimate judgment of God on these systems, showing out the principles judged therein. When Christians apply these

prophecies to partial developments of the principles, it is not morally false, although, as an interpretation, it is inadequate, and may be mistaken as to the letter. But the soul is guided in the judgment of the real principles, by the actual judgment of it at the end. It does morally, what God will do in power; and while there may be mistakes in interpretation, there is moral rectitude of judgment. The ultimate judgment of God is the application of power to the judgment, and removal of the whole system, which is justly judged meanwhile in all its partial manifestations. Of course it is important, in interpretation, to keep to what is really and fully meant; without this, even our moral judgment will not be correctly formed.

The addresses to the churches call for even individual application and use of the judgment pronounced on what was locally verified in certain places as to which the Lord declared his mind, and the results which would follow from the neglect of it.

I may now turn to some particular assertions. "The three prophecies quoted (Acts xiii. 33—35) in proof of the resurrection of Jesus, are simply puerile, and deserve no reply" (Phases, p. 169). I doubt the application of Acts xiii. 33. to the resurrection. Raising up Jesus is in the same sense as raising up a deliverer. Why "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, nor suffer Thy Holy One to see corruption" does not mean resurrection I do not know. Mr. Newman should show us the puerility of it. In reading the Psalm, the application of which to Messiah is, in my judgment, incontestable, we have the plainest evidence that it is the resurrection. What should make flesh rest in hope, and lead to the presence of Him in whom is fullness of joy, "and at whose right hand are pleasures for ever more," if it be not the resurrection? The words themselves also depict it, and that it should take place without his seeing corruption, in the clearest way. A man's soul not resting in Hades, and his body not seeing corruption, can only be by a speedy resurrection. I am aware of the difficulties raised as to *Shachath* (שחַת), one of the words here used, but I see nothing in it to shake the certainty of the Septuagint, Vulgate, English

and other translations (maintained by the soundest Hebrew authorities), the context makes the meaning certain, and the whole psalm treats of the humiliation of Jesus in the most beautiful manner possible. The beginning of it is cited by Paul, as containing, among many others, the great leading principle of this humiliation. Though a divine person, He took upon Him the form of a servant; Messiah takes a place in which He calls Jehovah his Lord, and declares all his delight to be in the godly remnant of Israel.

I turn next to the quotation from Isaiah lv., and its application to the resurrection of Christ. This also is objected to in the supercilious language above quoted. If the sense and meaning of a prophecy is to have any influence on the interpretation of it, we are led here, at once, to the subject of which the Apostle speaks. The chapter is a summons, in the fullest largeness of grace, addressed first to the Jews, but so as to open it out by the terms of the invitation—every one that thirsteth—to all who sought after righteousness from God; and thus, in principle, though not in immediate address, let in the Gentiles, so that, according to the whole tenor of Scripture, we look for Messiah, and a change in the relationship of God with Israel. Still the address is to Israel. Thus it is the Apostle Paul constantly draws out this class of passages, showing the address to the Jew first, still a principle contained which let in the Gentile if he had faith and spiritual need. This is further developed in the following verses. The 4th and 5th proclaim some remarkable personage who is not named, but who is supposed to be known by the previous testimonies of God, who is to be a witness and a leader of the nations—translated *people*, in English, but which is in the plural *le-ummim*, (לְאֻמִּים)—and then the call and influx of the nations through his means is announced. But then, in verse 3rd, this includes an everlasting covenant to be made, particularly with the people of God (the Jews), that is, the assured mercies of David. These mercies of David are incontestably the establishment of permanent blessing in the promised seed of David, in whose time the righteous should flourish; in a word, in Messiah, the Christ. Hence the existence of Messiah in the power of an endless life, is most certainly announced here.

Nor is this a new thought; the Jews say, "We have heard out of the law, that Christ abideth for ever: and how sayest thou, The Son of man must be lifted up?" Yet, if it were Messiah (as a Jew under the law), known, as the Apostle calls it, "after the flesh," the Gentiles could not have been thus let in in *common with Jews*. Indeed, we can say—who know the need of redemption—"the corn of wheat" could have abode alone. Thus we get elements in the passage which show that, for their accomplishment, Christ must have been raised. An everlasting covenant in the accomplishment of the sure mercies of David, and Gentiles called, supposed (when duly weighed) a closing of the strict Jewish system, and yet a Messiah who was to abide for ever—a difficulty felt by the Jews, in the question above referred to when our Lord alludes to His rejection. Now Christ was rejected and put to death. Hence the Apostle introduces *to the Jews* (objects of this everlasting covenant and holding themselves to be such) the resurrection, as alone accomplishing, or rather securing the accomplishment of, the sure and abiding mercies of David. Nothing could more largely and perfectly bring together all the elements of dispensational truth, and give the key and keystone of the manner of their accomplishment. It is nothing but the miserable narrowness of mind of those who can see nothing of God's ways out of their own petty circle of ideas, which could make the objections which German sceptics, and their imitators, do. They comment on a book of which they know nothing; the object and import of which they have not even studied. An immense scope of connected thought and system reaching from Genesis to the melting away of time into eternity—all its parts hanging together, and developing every form of relationship between God and man, historically pursued, yet morally and individually realised—in which each part fits into the other, like the pieces of a dissected map, proving the perfectness and completeness of the whole. All this system, I say, making a complete whole, in absolute unity, yet written—for written it was, as the best testimony proves, at long intervals, over a space of some 1,500 years, pursued through every various condition in which man can be placed, of ignorance, darkness and light, with principles brought out

into intended contrast, as the law and the gospel, yet never losing its perfect and absolute unity, or the relationship of its parts, all this is passed over by these sceptics. They are not conscious of the existence of it. They have about as much knowledge of the Bible as a babe who took the dissected map and would put together two parts from the antipodes, because they were colored red, and would look pretty. That Mr. Newman, who does not believe it himself, and evidently did not at the period of his history, should have found difficulty in pointing out the sufferings of Christ in the Old Testament, is very natural. Had he as much faith as a Jew in the Bible, he would have had none.

Let the reader turn to Isaiah li. liii. Psalm xxii. Zech. xii. xiii. and, indeed, a crowd of other passages, which, having cited these, it is needless to enumerate, and he will be at no loss to find a suffering Messiah. Besides, a crowd of sacrifices (for, as I said, all the parts of scripture unite in one whole) shewing atonement for sin, which certainly the blood of bulls and goats could not effectuate, point to a suffering Messiah;—the portion of Joseph and David, which, though not direct proofs, all confirm by analogies which show the mind of God in quite as strong a way, *when we have the facts and doctrines as direct proofs*—the universal position of the saints—the expression of sentiment provided in the Psalms for those who were associated with Messiah, and for Himself, and so used in many instances by Him—all, as does the whole tenor of the Old Testament, point to the sufferings of Him who was to be “exalted and extolled, and very high,” but had “his visage so marred more than any man, and his countenance more than the sons of men.” I am not aware what Isaiah liii. has to do with a double sense.\* I know that the Rabbis have sought to apply it to Israel, to avoid its application to Christ; but this is a simple sense, and, to any one who reads the chapter, simply absurd. To make of “He” in the phrase, “He was wounded

\* “I still rested on the 53rd chapter of Isaiah, as alone fortifying me against the rabbis, yet with an unpleasantly increasing perception that the system of ‘double interpretation,’ in which Christians indulge, is a playing fast and loose with prophecy, and is essentially dishonest” (Phases, p. 169).

for our " etc. to be a personification of " our," both meaning Israel, and so on, is an effort worthy of the natural opposition of a Jew in raising an objection, and of a German sceptic, to be stopped by.

As to Daniel ix.\* some terms may fairly be contested in the English translation. The only just change, however, in the words which affect this point, confirm their application to the death of Christ. " Messiah shall be cut off, but not for himself," goes, I apprehend, beyond the force of the words of the Holy Ghost. It should be—" Messiah shall be cut off, and shall have nothing;" that is, shall then possess nothing of the kingdom and glory which belongs to Him in Israel. For the prophecy relates to Israel, and the accomplishment of prophecy as to that people, and the taking away their iniquity and re-establishing them in peace. Consequently, after this, the wars and troubles which are to come on till that which is determined be poured out are announced. Daniel never goes on to the time of peace, but only to the putting an end to evil.

De Wette's translation is " An anointed one shall be snatched away, and no one is there [or existing] who belongs to him." Now לוֹ אֵין is simply there is "nothing to Him." De Wette's is a paraphrase which, while giving the sense, fixes it to a person, " no one," and adds " here" (or existing); with this difference, it gives the sense so as to afford us the clear certainty of the grand meaning of the passage. His translation (it is a learned and a rationalist one) is, *wird ein Gesalbter weggerafft, und keiner ist vorhandens der ihm angehört*. The Hebrew is *yekarith Mashiach* (יִכְרַח מָשִׁיחַ), " Messiah shall be cut off," as simply as possible, *Messiah*, as all know, means *anointed*; *ve-aen lo* (וְאֵין לוֹ) " and there is nothing to him," *i.e.*, he has nothing. Now take this plain and simple passage in the best German renderings, and what has " evaporated?"—something perhaps of an effort to undo the application to Messiah, only that the text was so plain and strong that the Anointed One's cutting

\* "The prophecy in the 9th chapter of Daniel looks specious in the authorised English version, but has evaporated in the Greek translation, and is not acknowledged in the best German renderings." (Phases, p. 168).

off is impossible to be got rid of; and we have the fact of his having nothing as the consequence; his labouring in vain, as he says (Isaiah xlix), with regard to his then taking the kingdom and glory in Israel. That He *will* have it, Isaiah liii. and Daniel vii. tell us plainly. We know (as Daniel ix. teaches us) that He was cut off and that He got nothing. No one can deny that de Wette's is a paraphrase, and that "*ve-aen lo*" means "and had nothing." Interpreters have confined the passage to Christ's death, and its application to the Church now. Whereas I have not the least doubt (whatever the present efficacy of his blood) that the passage applies to Israel, their establishment, their treatment of Messiah, and their consequent sorrows, which we have before our eyes, till God take them up again in grace. But the cutting off of Messiah is as plain as words can make it. The word employed is that always used for "that soul shall be *cut off* from his people," or from Israel: just what happened to Messiah. De Wette always employs another word for the Hebrew one elsewhere.

I may just add, that *Messiah* (translated *AN anointed one* by de Wette here) is not used with an article in Hebrew, as far as I can find; and, when used without a possessive pronoun, is elsewhere always translated by De Wette with the article (*der Gesalbte*, the anointed). Here, as it must be applied to Messiah if so translated, he puts *ein Gesalbter*, an anointed.

In fine, the passage of Daniel is as clear as language can make it of the cutting off of Messiah.

I turn to Matthew's prophecy xxiv.\* The Lord gives in this chapter down to the end of ver. 31, the position of the testimony of his disciples, and in general of the elect remnant in Israel. As to testimony down to the end of ver. 14; from ver. 15—28, the position of the faithful remnant during the tribulation when testimony was useless, and they were to flee; and then from 29—31, the coming of the Lord and the gathering of the scattered elect of Israel from the four winds. I beg the reader to mark, I am stating the contents of the passage, and not

\* "The prophecies of the New Testament are not many. First, we have that of Jesus in Matthew xxiv., concerning the destruction of Jerusalem. It is marvellously exact, down to the capture of the city, and miserable enslavement of the population; but at this point it becomes clearly and hopelessly false" (Phases, 169).

interpreting them. That this applies to Jews is on the face of the passage from the reference to Jerusalem, and Daniel, the Holy Place, the Sabbath, etc.

From Matt. xxiv. 32 to xxv. 30, the Lord gives a practical comment on this solemn subject, and in these parables instructs the disciples as to their just position as Christians *during his absence*; verse 31 to the end takes up the consequence to the Gentiles of his coming to judge the earth. Thus we have, in connection with the Lord's going away what concerned the Jewish people—Christian responsibility, and the Gentiles in connection with their responsibility as to receiving the messengers of the kingdom, Christ's disciples (his brethren as he calls them here), when sent to them.

To return to the prophecy which regards the Jews:—The testimony of the disciples was to be carried on in the midst of difficulties and reach out to all the world for a witness to all nations, and then the end should come. This was the general history of their position. Whatever we may gather of dates from comparison of other passages, which is not my business here—it reached down from Christ to the end of the age. Remark here the end of the age is not only not the end of the world, but it is not the age of Christianity, but the end of the age of the temple standing under the law till Messiah came. This was the object of the question. Of this, whatever light may be given by the Lord, there can be no question if we read the passage. But in verse 15 a specific definite time is marked out by a particular event—the abomination of desolation spoken of *by Daniel the prophet*. This leads us at once, and in a positive manner, to the subject of which the Lord speaks. His own words, moreover, establish in the most complete and evident manner, that he is speaking of Jerusalem and Judea. Of this there can be no question.

Now Daniel speaks of 1260 days and 1290 days, at the end of which the Lord would interfere in favour of Israel, dating them from that to which the Lord here referred. Let the reader pay attention to this. Daniel declares that from the time the abomination is set up, there shall be 1290 days, and the blessing in 1330. Further, he connects this—indeed it is the grand subject of the three last chapters of his

prophecies—with the closing history of Israel. He speaks of a king who will prosper till *the indignation be accomplished at the time of the end*. It is indeed the grand topic of the book, and must have been: for the ultimate fate of Israel would have been the thought which governed the prophetic writing, whether it was God's love to Israel, or Daniel's, which was in exercise; and it was undoubtedly both. Hence we have the last beast destroyed in chapter vii. The image ground to powder in chapter ii., and the kingdom of blessing set up and filling the world. So, in the details in chapter viii., the prophet is shewn what is to happen in the last end of the indignation, when the king of fierce countenance is to stand up against the Prince of princes, and be broken without hand. He gives the series of Gentile monarchies from the first, which was set up in his days, in the setting aside the throne of God at Jerusalem established in the family of David, to which all the promises were attached, and he pursues them in two symbolical prophecies which gives the whole series (chapter ii. and vii.), on to the end, and the setting up of the kingdom of the Son of Man. Nothing can be clearer than what it professes to do. Objections to the execution of it will be considered hereafter, when we meet with them. This is not the point now. Then, in some particular prophecies, the grand crisis which settles the fate of Israel is discoursed of, in connection with particular nations and events besides facts then happening, which realised, and, at the same time, foreshadow the principles which would characterise the apostate Gentiles, who were the possessors of power and the adversaries of Israel—for all in Daniel relates to Israel. Now the particular prophecies which relate to the ultimate fate of Israel, though they may be linked on to those among the beasts which had their power established in the countries in which Palestine is situated, yet necessarily speak of and have for their object what closes the scene. That close is yet future, as is seen not only by the plain testimony of Scripture; but inasmuch we have the Jews yet as a nation with their ultimate fate unsettled. This is a living fact around us. That Daniel does go on to the end is unquestionable, whatever ideas we may have of the time he expected it to happen. We have alluded to the proofs

which, indeed, lie on the surface of his writings. His book closes with a promise that he shall stand in his lot at the end of the days. A promise which leaves no obscurity as to the period which he was *looking for* and referring to in his prophecy, be he right or wrong. The difficulty of interpretation arises precisely from the circumstance we have mentioned—i.e. that Daniel links (in viii. and ix.) the state of things at the end with the Grecian monarchy, which possessed the East, where all was certainly to happen, for that was where Canaan was situated; but he as certainly teaches that another monarchy was to arise which would take a great, and even principal, share in these events, and in interpreting, the difficulty is to allot its proper share to each of these powers. His introduction of the one certainly does not exclude the other, and many other prophecies declare that *all* the heathen shall come up against, or be in possession of, Jerusalem in the latter day. We have now, however, to do with the particular prophecy of chapter xii.

In the beginning of that chapter, Daniel speaks, just as the Lord does, of the time of trouble such as never was; when Michael shall stand up for the Jews. So that we have the grand final desperate trouble of Daniel's people; and yet at a time when the power of God interferes to deliver them. Just as Jeremiah represents it—"Alas, for that day is great, so that none is like it; it is even the time of Jacob's trouble; but he shall be delivered out of it. For it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord of Hosts, that I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him: but they shall serve the Lord their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them." This last prophet declares, moreover, that it shall embrace the whole nation of Israel, as well as Judah in a very particular manner; and that it shall be by a new covenant, and not by the old. And that as sure as the heavens stood, Israel should be a special nation, and Jerusalem be restored. All this, observe, refers to God's government of the earth and the nations. The heavenly blessing of the Church in no way meets it.

That is, we have in Matthew, in Daniel, in Jeremiah, a

time of unparalleled trouble at the close of Judah's history; and Judah delivered out of it, and full blessing brought in. The Lord declaring in Matthew that he referred to what Daniel spoke of; and all, in their prophecies, not merely in this, but in other prophecies, professedly referring to this closing scene, declaring that it would be by raising up the seed of promise in David's family, by the coming of the Son of Man, by God's interference in favour of his people, whom He never would give up. With this, all prophecy from Moses downwards coincides; and in many all the details are entered into. It is the grand subject, though many events leading to it or illustrative of the principles and motives of God's government, to be fully displayed in it, are noticed for the instruction of the people in them, and samples of God's ways.

Now, what Daniel spoke of in chapter vii., as arriving at this epoch of Divine judgment, when the saints would have the kingdom; namely, that the Son of Man would come in glory the Lord also expressly declares; and refers in a positive and most remarkable manner to another prophecy of Daniel, referring to the same epoch, and unfolding the special tribulation of which He spoke, and his coming in glory, which would be consequent on it. Every statement of Scripture in various parts of it, and by different prophets, concurs in this, and concurs in placing it in the grand closing scene of God's government *of the earth*, viewed as the scene of man's national responsibility, Israel being the centre, in God's view of it (see Deut. xxxii. 8), of all this government. The Lord (or Matthew, if Mr. Newman pleases), so far from confounding anything, gives warnings for the conduct of the disciples in their testimony in the midst of Israel, while carried on there; adding, that the testimony of *the kingdom* should go out to all nations, and that then—not before—the end of the age—not of the world, as every scholar knows—should come. Then with verse 14 he closes his general history and directions. This is beyond controversy; because the question of the disciples was as to the end of the age; and he says (verse 14) "Then shall the end come." Then he takes up a very particular point, which he definitely connects with Daniel's prophecy of what was to happen at this end of the age; that is, that at

that epoch, or twelve hundred and sixty days before the end, it would not be a time of testimony, but that they were to flee; the sign would be an idol set up in the holy place, which idol was to cause the desolation of Jerusalem. Now this has never yet taken place at all. Titus did destroy Jerusalem, but no idol was set up in the holy place, which caused the desolation. Michael, the prince, did not stand up for Daniel's people—and to this the New Testament writer refers; nor was any deliverance of Jacob wrought, nor did Daniel stand in his lot, nor did the sign of the Son of Man appear, nor did thirteen hundred and thirty days bring any blessing. That is, to the believer there certainly was not the accomplishment of the prophecy. No person writing, as Mr. N. supposes, after the event, would have written an account, of which the contradiction and falseness was in the hands of all, and of public notoriety. He could not pretend that the Son of Man appeared, and that the elect Jews were gathered—that the blessing of Daniel was arrived. If he lived after the event, he might have given a flaming description of Titus' siege, which history would have furnished him with; but at this point it becomes (to use Mr. N.'s phrase) "clearly and hopelessly false" in Mr. N.'s application of it. That is, it certainly was not written after the event. No man would write, in forging a prophecy, what was already clearly and hopelessly false at the time he wrote it. For as Mr. N. justly insists, (by putting it in italics) it is stated that "*immediately after that tribulation,*" etc. So that nothing but the utter nonsense of infidel credulous invention could have explained the twenty-fourth of Matthew as Mr. N. does. That infidels should be ignorant of the abundant confirmation given in the prophets of the real force of the passage, was only to be expected. They have never really examined the contents of the book. They are not capable, by their position, of getting beyond literary speculations.

It may be asked by some, if I give no place here to the destruction of Jerusalem? I think it had a very important one. It closed altogether for the moment the application of the passage to the testimony in the midst of Israel, to which it referred. God's ways were then to be looked for solely in the

Church, whose portion is in heavenly places; and hence, though providence ever governs all things, not the proper occasion of the display of God's government of the earth. It was, as Paul says to the Ephesians, the proof to principalities and powers in heavenly places, that the wisdom of God was "πολυποικιλην" very various in its character.

This interruption, as regards God's ways on the earth, is developed in Luke, who looks at all these dispensatorial questions in a Gentile point of view, when he says, Jerusalem should be trodden down of the Gentiles, till the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled—exactly the general instruction we have found in Daniel. Jerusalem would be set aside, and all God's dealings consequently with it, till the period allotted in the decrees of God for the Gentile supremacy was closed. Then the signs and judgments should take place. So Paul, in Rom. xi., "blindness in part" happened unto Israel till the "fulness of the Gentiles be come in." Till, during this time of dealing specially with Gentiles (though every Jew is equally received) all that have ears to hear were brought into God's fold; and then God would begin again with His earthly people in exercise, judgment, and deliverance, and so accomplish all his promises (on earth) in a restored people. The broken-off branches would be grafted in again into their own olive-tree, the fruit-bearing tree of promise springing from Abraham—of course, in the highest sense, from God Himself. Mr. Newman may seek, perhaps, to escape from the absurdity of supposing that a forger would invent a prophecy, proved (to be false) by well-known public events, though he does not dare to say it very clearly,\* by supposing that though it be said "immediately

\* Page 109. He cannot shake off the suspicion that Zacharias, son of Barachias, was Zacharias, son of Baruchus; slain in the courts of the temple during the siege of Jerusalem, by Titus (Phases, p. 129). The dream of Joseph is "reported to us by a person wholly unknown, who wrote seventy or eighty years after the fact." This would leave, at all events, several years' margin for the *immediately after*. The taking of Jerusalem was Anno Domini 70. If the reader asks what authority there is for this date of Matthew's gospel; there is none but universal testimony to the contrary. Matthew is quoted by Barnabas just after the siege of Jerusalem; but we must not expect any authority for sceptical statements. I opened Parker's "De Wette," to see why he

after the tribulation," yet that the author would have time between the tribulation and the "*immediately after*," to compose and publish his book, that thus he could give a history up to that, and to be mistaken as to what followed. Now, to say nothing of the *universal testimony* to the contrary (because suppositions are always more attractive to an infidel than history, because they are the fruit of one's own mind, which is a great point with them) the supposition is of this probable character, that a forger would commit himself to a very full and clear statement of what was immediately to occur; and thus determine his book to be a forgery as soon as it should be read. And this is only a trifling part of the difficulty; for we must also suppose that the book was received and read as true, without its being found out that it was falsified by facts—that such a thing as the coming of the great day of judgment should be announced, and not arrive, and nobody suspect that the announcement of it was false. That is, he leaves us with the choice of two cases—either that he forged a prophecy, false upon the face of it, and publicly known to be so, in respect of such an event as the non-arrival of Christ for the grand judgment; or that the pretended prophecy published "*very soon after*," preceded what was to happen immediately after, and committed itself to what would immediately prove it false in the most public way, and yet that thousands, who, by their existence, proved it was false, and knew that the great day of judgment had not arrived, immediately after believed it to be true all the same. And mark this. All testimony is directly contrary to the date necessary to Mr. Newman's system. He has nothing for it but its own probability. Yes, I am wrong there. There is his assertion, and yet scarcely that; it is insinuated. To insert the publication of the gospel between the destruction of Jerusalem and "*immediately after*," would have suggested the enquiry for some proof—a thing not to be had. Hence, where it suited him, there, "it is unreasonable to doubt that the detailed

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rejected Daniel. I find "It appears Daniel is not the author of the book." How? "From its legendary contents it is full of improbabilities." Other reasons, of which a word hereafter, about as solid are given. It is merely an idle opinion given as a proof.

annunciations of this twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew were first composed *very soon after* the war of Titus" (Phases, p. 170) after the siege. When a dream is in question—it is written by an unknown person seventy or eighty years after the epoch of the nativity. The former date would be either the year of the siege, according to the vulgar era, or (by the correction of chronology, generally received) four, or according to others, five years *before it*; but then seventy or eighty left margin for that, if the four years' error was known by the reader; and a loose period of five or six possible years after, left it possibly just at the critical moment, without too much danger of interfering with "immediately after." It is very nicely arranged.

One point remains—the expression, "this generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled." Now the whole state of things did, for the time, close some forty years after; and Israel no longer existed as the place of testimony. Still I have no doubt that this word has another force than this. "Generation" is habitually used in Scripture otherwise than for the period of human activity, or from the birth of a son to the birth of his son—the length of a man's active life; and it is peculiarly used in reference to Israel in the other sense, which the following quotations present:—"the generation of the wicked shall never see light"—"a crooked and perverse *nation* [the word is the same] among whom ye shine"—"this is the generation of those that seek thee." So, many others. That is, it is a class of persons having a given character, as well as those who have their common period of life together. If the reader turns to Deuteronomy xxxii., he will find in verses 5 and 20, the word used in this sense in immediate reference to Israel during its protracted rejection up to the end. "They are a perverse and crooked generation." "And he said, I will hide my face from them, I will see *what their end* shall be; for they are a very froward generation, children in whom is no faith." And then Moses speaks of the bringing in the Gentiles in a passage which Paul quotes, in reference to the very time: the Lord declaring that that generation should not pass—a declaration of which we see the accomplishment to this day. God has hid His face from them to see what their end shall be; yet they have not passed. There they are till every jot and tittle of Christ's word be accomplished.

The objections, then, to what Matthew says, are without foundation; the prophetic declarations in his twenty-fourth chapter, are distinctly referred to Daniel, the application of which leaves no doubt as to the sense and application of Matthew, and clearly establish its reference to the end of the age, of which indeed the Lord was speaking. On the other hand, the suppositions advanced to prove it forged, are the most absurdly improbable that can possibly be, besides being contrary to all historical evidence.

We have already seen the value of Mr. Newman's objections to the prophecies in the Apocalypse, to which he again briefly refers without adding any new matter. That not "one of these can be interpreted certainly of any [past] human affairs" may be granted, without the least detriment to the book; for (while I doubt not that some have had accomplishment by systems, having the principle judged in the book partially developed, and that certain objects of the prophecy have appeared—though not full grown—on the scene) I myself believe that its proper accomplishment is not yet arrived. I think the language of the Apocalypse proves it is not, because we have what the prophet had seen—the things that are—and the things after them. It is to my mind certain, that the things that are, are not yet passed, and hence the prophetic part beginning chapter iv., has not yet begun to be accomplished, though many things symbolised in it exist, more or less.

As regards the coming of the Lord, the purpose of God is *evidently* to make saints always wait for it as a present expectation; and this is shewn in never telling them the moment. Nothing can be more explicit than scripture on this head. St. Paul then made no mistake in expecting "the speedy return of Christ from heaven."\* He waited for God's son from heaven, and taught others to wait for it continually. He never prophetically announced the time. In each he was perfectly guided by the Spirit of God. That this was the Lord's mind as presented in Scripture, the following passages shew: But "let your loins be girded about; and your lights burning, and ye

\* "There is nothing in them to countenance the theory of supernaturalism in the face of his great mistake as to the speedy return of Christ from heaven" (Phases, p. 170).

yourselves like unto men that wait for their lord, when he will return from the wedding; that . . . they may open unto him immediately . . . And if he shall come in the second watch, or come in the third watch and find them so, blessed are those servants . . . Be ye therefore ready also: for the Son of Man cometh at an hour when ye think not." So again, "If that evil servant say *in his heart*, My lord delayeth His coming; and shall begin to smite . . . the lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for him . . . and shall appoint him his portion with hypocrites." Yet in the very same discourse, directly after, the Lord says, "While the bridegroom tarried, they all slumbered and slept. And at midnight there was a cry made," etc. That is, if the heart counted on delay, it betrayed its wickedness; yet the bridegroom would delay, so trying the faith of his own. Yet, adds Peter, the "Lord is not slack concerning His promise as some men count slackness; but is long-suffering to us ward, not willing that any should perish . . . for the long-suffering of our Lord is salvation." That is, the delay is not slackness in His promise to us, but God's patience with men prolonging the time of grace and salvation. But the same Apostle warns us that there would be scoffers, saying, "Where is the promise of His coming?" The Apostle then taught of the Holy Ghost, acted in the Spirit of Christ's direction to His disciples in the lively, and joyful, sanctifying, yea energising constant hope of His coming, and yet never predicted the time which *He* had put in His own power, who had said "Sit on my right hand *till I make* thine enemies thy footstool."

Mr. Newman, pressed by proofs, seeks to avoid the effect of what he does not, however, dare deny, while shewing his unwillingness to admit it, "That God had been pleased to reveal something of coming history to certain eminent men of Hebrew antiquity;" adding, "That is all."\* Now I call this profound immorality, and an absurd state to be in. Because,

\* "As for the Old Testament, if all its prophecies about Babylon, and Tyre, and Edom, and Ishmael, and the four Monarchies, were both true and supernatural, what would this prove? That God had been pleased to reveal something of coming history to certain eminent men of Hebrew antiquity. That is all" (Phases, p. 170).

to say of Divine communications to man, and in mercy—"That is all!" is, in the worst sense, immoral, and it is absurd; because to suppose that God should have revealed something about Moab, and Ishmael, and Tyre, and Edom, to some eminent men of the Hebrew monarchy, and nothing at all else, is unreasonable. To have given some local facts about some petty nations, and have concealed everything about all the temporal and eternal interests of men, His own government and salvation, is an absurd supposition. But farther, these eminent men to whom God has been pleased to give this, have said a great deal more on more important subjects, and give the particular revelations spoken of as minor parts of a vast scheme of government, ending with Messianic glory, with the same evidence of truth, the same power of testimony. As to the former, according to Mr. N., they are the confidants of God, and as to the rest impostors and deceivers; yet such as God chose as eminent men, to make them the special confidants of these particular revelations—and all this is logic and philosophy! But this is not our subject now. Mr. N. "receives this conclusion"—*i. e.*, of their inspiration on these points—"with an otiose faith." But his logic has failed him here; because then, at any rate, second-hand faith is not vain. Mr. N. may be indifferent, "otiose"; but that is not the point. Here is faith at second-hand: real and convincing to those concerned—of vast importance to sustain their hearts—to encourage them to trust in God, and to avoid the powerful current of all which was set in through the assurance of Divine interference in favour of the faithful, and the powerlessness of human resources; in a word, through the assurance that God governed and was to be trusted. This was the effect of faith, second-hand faith; *i. e.*, the truly excellent kind of faith subjectively. For while, for the purpose of testimony to others, eye-witness was the just means employed; yet, even as to the eye-witnesses, it was the spiritual sense of the value of these things that was real, moralising, efficacious faith before God. Even as to Israel, they happened to them for figures, and are "written for our admonition on whom the ends of the world are come." That is, the admission of this one paragraph totally sets aside the whole chapter. It is not true; it is totally untrue

(evidently untrue for one who has examined Scripture) that these prophecies have nothing to do with Christianity.\* They are part of one vast scheme. They are not Christianity, of course. We have the true light; but the first fresh dawn of mercy, and God's patient ways with ignorant man—always His ways—have not lost their interest for those who can see clearer.

We now come to the Book of Daniel in general.† The reader will remember the positive and direct proofs from different parts of the book, of the fact that Daniel distinctly refers to God's *final* dealing with the Jews. He must do so, if showing God's ways as to them in government. All the prophets who so take them up, do so; indeed, all do when rightly understood. Daniel positively declares it. And remark here, that we have positive historical and ocular testimony that he who does this must, whatever the final result be with this people, leave an immense gap unfilled up, because they have been set aside as a people for a long period. Again, Daniel gives us specifically the "times of the Gentiles," whether it be the apostate principles on which they would govern;—*i. e.* idolatry (chapter iii.); blasphemous insults against God (chapter v.); and setting up to be God Himself, as far as pretending to exclude all other (chapter vi.);—or general historical views on to the end, as the statue (chapter ii.), or the beasts (chapter vii.); or particular prophecies connected definitely with the end which was the grand epoch in view, as the Spirit declares to the prophet.

These particular prophecies, too (*i. e.* viii., and x., xi., xii., the last three chapters being one prophecy), refer to the Eastern or Grecian kingdom; for there the final scene was to be unfolded. Not that the Western power would not come in—that was the grand general power at the close; but another local one was also to be depicted.

\* "With Christianity it has nothing to do" (Phases, p. 171).

† "At the same time I had reached the conclusion that large deductions must be made from the credit of these old prophecies.

"First, as to the Book of Daniel: the 11th chapter is closely historical down to Antiochus Epiphanes, after which it suddenly becomes false. . . . . Hence we have a *prima facie* presumption that the book was composed in the reign of that Antiochus" (Phases, p. 171).

We may now examine chapter xi., to which Mr. Newman objects. Here we shall find exactly what I stated. The particular prophecy, as to the Eastern or Grecian power, taken up from its commencement and pursued quite to the end. The king of the north comes to his end, and none helps him; and Michael stands up at the same time, in the time of trouble which has no parallel—of which the Lord speaks in Matthew. Further, in chapter x., the messenger of God declares, “Now I am come to make thee understand what shall befall thy people in the latter days: for yet the vision is for [many] days;” and in xii. 4, “But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words, and seal the book, even to the time of the end;” so also in chapter xi. 40, exactly the prophecy in question: “And at the time of the end shall the king of the south push at him,” etc.; that is, at the king who does according to his will. So that we have in the writer’s mind details down to Antiochus Epiphanes, as I agree, and afterwards, right or wrong, other *details* as to what is to happen at *the end* in the *latter days*, those days in which Michael was to stand up, and at the close of 1330 days blessing comes in, and Daniel stands in his lot. But this leaves a great gap. No doubt. To be exact, it must do so, because, as we know, the Jews have been set aside for centuries. But let us see, with greater exactness, how and where the gap comes in, and is introduced. The prophet does pursue the history down to one, who, I doubt not, is Antiochus Epiphanes, that is the last king of any importance of Grecian Syria, and the great persecutor of Israel, who profaned the temple and destroyed, or at least sought to destroy, all the books of the law, and prohibited the Jewish worship. The ships from Chittim are introduced upon the scene, that is, the Romans—the power under whom the whole Jewish system was to remain in abeyance. But another important element was still more in the mind of the Spirit here; that is, the alliance of the local Gentile power with the apostates of the Jews. This, and the profanation of the temple, were to be, and will yet be, the special characteristics of the last days. This picture\* is fully brought out; that is, the intervention of the

\* I say picture; for I have no doubt that xi. 30, 31, 32, applies to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, the Maccabees, etc.

Western Roman power—apostasy among the Jews—profanation of the temple—and interruption of Jewish worship, and of all service rendered to the true God. This will be the final state of the Jews, as presented in Scripture, till delivered by the coming of the Lord. Hence the elements and vivid picture of it in these comparatively early days, is given to us. But there will be a remnant active and energetic then—but having also another *general* character, instructors of the people of the Jews in the truth. Still the people shall fall under their enemies [many] days. God shall permit even those who, having been faithful to God, might have hoped to escape, to be cut off also by their enemies; but it is for purifying and making white *even to the time of the end*. That is, we have just the gap onward, and that up to the very end. We have not here the Roman destruction of the Jewish polity in detail: that had been given at the end of chapter ix., and could not be the anticipative picture of the latter days, because the Jewish affairs are to take the form they had in Antiochus Epiphanes' time, that of the apostasy of the Jews, and their being linked up with the heathen. This was in no way the case in the time of Titus. The unclean spirit of idolatry was not entered in with seven others more wicked than himself, so as to make their *last* state worse than the first. They were empty, and swept, and garnished. They stumbled on the stumbling stone and were broken—in the end it will fall on them.

But we have the *general* desolation to the time of the end. *Then*, when that has been shown, we get a king doing according to his will, setting up idolatry, rejecting the God of his fathers, which Antiochus never did, disregarding all Jewish hopes as something which is supposed to belong to him, and exalting himself above every god, and distributing the land among his chiefs. The king of the south pushes at him—at *the time of the end*—that is, he who shall be in Ptolemy's geographical place; and the king of the north comes against him, that is, he who shall have Antiochus's geographical place; so that the wilful king cannot be Antiochus Epiphanes. Yet it is a full and minute prophecy of what is to be at the time of the end, when the great gap is over; and it goes on to state the course of the king of the north, and his ruin; and in

chapter xiih. the trouble that accompanies this period—the duration of the trouble, and the deliverance of Israel—the contrast of the wicked and the wise; all of which would come out at the time of the end, not before; when Daniel also, as we have seen, would have his share in the blessing in the end of the days. This part, it is which the Lord also quotes as to be fulfilled at the end of the age. There is then as much particularity as to the events at the end as there is as to those previous to, and during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes. With the speculations of interpreters in applying it, I have nothing to do: with Mr. Newman's objections I have; and they, as to the facts of the chapter, are totally groundless. As to the enduring days of desolation and captivity, we are witnesses of its truth, that is, the very part where Mr. N. says it breaks down. The fulfilment of all the rest cannot yet be proved, because it is at the time of the end, which we all know is not yet come. No one can say it becomes false: the triumphs of the Maccabees, and the long period of desolation and captivity are true; and that is what is stated. As to chapter vii., Mr. N. informs us that "the four monarchies in chapters ii. and vii. are the Babylonian, the Median, the Persian, the Macedonian. Interpreters, however, blend the Medes and Persians into one, and then pretend that the Roman empire *is still in existence.*" "The 7th chapter also is confuted by the event; for the great day of judgment has not followed upon the fourth monarchy" (Phases, p. 171). There is nothing like being bold enough—somebody will believe it, or at least, somebody will doubt—and nothing will be certain. "Interpreters, however, blend the Medes and Persians into one." Indeed! It is not very extraordinary; because, though distinct nations, they are blended in history—though "the highest came up last.\* But it is only interpreters who do this? What does Daniel do? He says, in interpreting *Upharsin*, "Thy kingdom is divided and given to the Medes and Persians." That is, he brings them in on the scene together. It may be said, "But Darius, who was of the seed of

\* Sculptured heads of rams have been found at Persepolis, with one horn higher than the other.

the Medes, was set over the realm of the Chaldeans.' One "interpreter" has used this to prove that it was still the *Babylonish* empire. Where was this distinct empire of the Medes to which the Persians succeeded as another empire? \* Cyrus, king of Persia, takes Babylon, and the temple is built by his orders. Darius may have ruled in Babylon till Cyrus had finished his conquests and had settled the empire, but the Persians were, at the epoch of the fall of the Babylonish empire, joint possessors with the Medes of the imperial power as a people.

Mr. Newman says, consequently, on his Median scheme, that the last empire is the Grecian. The ten horns have no kind of analogy with the Grecian kingdom, which Mr. N. supposes the prophet to be describing as a thing past. But not only so, Daniel himself most positively describes (for, unhappily, he is, as to this point, one of the interpreters," or, at least, the angel who explained the vision is) the Medo-Persian empire as one beast, and by the well-known Persian emblem; "The ram which thou sawest, having two horns, are the kings of Persia and Media. And the rough goat is the king of Grecia." That is, it is absolutely certain (for he says so) that Daniel considers the Medo-Persian as one empire, or beast; and that, consequently, the whole of Mr. N's argument is not worth a straw, unless it be to show that the prophet does really give ampler details of what was future, and is so yet, on to the day of judgment, than he does of what Mr. N. would make historical. For, if the Medo-Persian empire be one empire, that is, the second, then the Roman is confessedly the last, that with the ten horns. Now, even supposing the

\* I do not doubt that the Median branch had the supremacy at first. The prophecy so states it, as does profane history; "the highest came up last," and Cyrus succeeded to a Median prince, though, as to this, there is some confusion (but that is not the question here); because Cyrus took Babylon; and the Medes and Persians were, undoubtedly, at that time a united empire. Evil-Merodach was slain by Cyrus before the close of the Babylonian empire.

At any rate, as the kingdom, according to Daniel, was given to the Medes and Persians, *his* four monarchies cannot be made out by making of the Medes and Persians successive kingdoms.

unfounded assertion to be true, that the author of the book ascribed to Daniel, wrote in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, yet still the Roman empire (that which is given with far the greatest detail, and whose division into divers kingdoms is a matter of history) was future; that is, he acts, whenever you put him as to date, as a prophet, and commits himself fully to the details of future events, such as the subdivision of the Roman empire into ten kingdoms, its final blasphemous character, and judgment. Not only so; but the fact of the declaration of the writer, that the Medo-Persian kingdom is one only, considered as a beast, destroys the whole foundation of Mr. N's reasonings. He states that "he gives the Grecian kingdom, under which he lived, as the last, and then passes to the general judgment," the great day of judgment has not followed upon the fourth monarchy.\* Now, if the Medo-Persian be one only, then he gives a beast or empire after the Grecian, and that with *very* much greater detail than as to those which preceded, and the allegation is so far from having any foundation that we have historical proof that he is right; for another kingdom has succeeded the Grecian, divided into many horns—that is, he is a prophet. I need not say, that I agree with all existing testimony, that it was Daniel the prophet, the captive in Babylon, who wrote it. In fine, Mr. N. says the book of Daniel cannot be proved to have existed earlier. The reader will remember that this is casting off the New Testament altogether—that is, really, Christianity, because the Lord there cites his book as that of a prophet. But, as to other proofs, it is beyond all controversy, that at all times of which we have any evidence, this book has been received by the Jews as Daniel's, written during the captivity. The Talmud has put it among the Chetubim, or Hagiographa, with Chronicles, Psalms, Proverbs, etc. But none have called its inspiration in question. Josephus is very particular, he gives the number of the books of the Old Testament, and refers to Daniel as the most renowned of prophets. He moreover declares, that the Jewish canon was closed in the reign of Artaxerxes, that is,

\* "The four Monarchies in chap. ii, and vii. are the Babylonian, the Median, the Persian, the Macedonian."

with Malachi—so that he bears the strongest possible testimony to the date of Daniel as an authentic book.

It may be asked, "On what are the assertions founded of the recent date of the composition of the book?" The answer is, "On nothing." The objectors think there cannot be prophecy—hence, they argue, there is not. Hence, when an era is spoken of, the book must have been written after it. In this case, indeed, the book of Daniel must have been written after the division of the Roman empire; for he speaks of that, and *Josephus too*, for *he* speaks of the book of Daniel; but Mr. Newman cuts this all short by saying nothing about the passages which speak of the end; and by making, contrary to history and the positive assertion of the book itself, the Median and Persian two consecutive empires, and maintaining a profound silence on the ten horns.

Not only does Josephus present the number of the books of Scripture as composing a whole, divided into three parts, and Daniel as one of the most admirable among them, thus assuring us the Old Testament was a known volume, as we have it; but the wisdom of Jesus, the son of Sirach, refers to this volume, though not distinguishing the books, in the same threefold division—the law, the prophets, and the other books—that is, he shows the body of Scripture complete; not only so, but he refers to these being translated, declaring that the law, the prophets, and the other books had not the same force in the Greek tongue. That Daniel lived in the time of the captivity we have proof from Ezekiel, who names him by name, and who wrote at that period. The book of Daniel, moreover, had its place in the Septuagint translation. It is not, indeed, the one we have, which is Theodotian's; but there was one, of which fragments are now extant in the Chisian MS. Now this *translation* was probably as early as the beginning of Antiochus's reign, that is B.C. 175,\* Mattathias's revolt being

\* It is generally agreed now, that the Septuagint was made at different epochs: the law, in the reigns of Ptolemy Soter, and Philadelphus, or during their joint possession of the throne—according to Hody, about B.C. 280, in the reign of Ptolemy Evergetes. The son of Sirach seems to speak of an existing translation; and if so, of this, about B.C. 130. The other books we have no positive date for, unless it be Esther, in the reign of Ptolemy Philometer.

in B.C. 167. The book of Maccabees, probably from the contents dating about B.C. 130, refers to Daniel. In sum, if we receive the New Testament, we have the authority of the Lord himself for Daniel's being a prophet. Further, we have, for the historical truth of his existence as a remarkably well-known man at the period the book of Daniel refers to, the testimony of his contemporary, Ezekiel. We have Josephus, thoroughly versed in Jewish lore, bearing witness that Daniel was of special eminence among the prophets, and the complete volume of the books of Scripture, specifically noticed, saying that they had not a multitude of books, but twenty-two, now made twenty-four, from the separation of Ruth from Judges, and Lamentations from Jeremiah—that they were all completed by the reign of Artaxerxes, thus letting in Malachi and Esther, and no more—that there were indeed other books among them; but that they had not the same authority because there were no prophets to authenticate them.

Nothing can be simpler than this. Without entering into details which change nothing of the substance, we have, on clear and intelligible grounds, the Canonical Scriptures and the Apocrypha. The canonical books are divided into three parts,—the Law, Prophets, and Hymns; or, as the Lord says in Luke—the Law, Prophets, and Psalms. But this is not all: the first book of Maccabees refers to Daniel, and no doubt to the LXX translation. This book was written some hundred and thirty years before Christ. Jesus, the son of Sirach, refers to the canonical books, by their well-known tripartite division, and to a translation of them; that is, Daniel existed then, and was translated into Greek. The lowest date for this is B.C. 130. Some place the son of Sirach B.C. 200. The Septuagint translation, of which Daniel formed a part, was made from B.C. 280 by degrees. The revolt of Mattathias was more than a hundred and ten years after it commenced to be made. It is supposed by some that Esther was translated in the reign of Ptolemy Philometor, and this would tend to show that the translation was complete earlier. Now we have no authorities whatever to refer to during the interval between Malachi and the Septuagint translation. But we have the concurrent voice of all the authority

we possess that Daniel is authentic; and the fact of its being part of the Septuagint makes it to the very last degree improbable that its date could be any later one; while the Jews, who certainly knew their own canon, most undoubtedly received it as the book of the Prophet: Josephus, also, who was thoroughly versed in the question, giving, not his opinion, but clearly and elaborately the Jews' judgment upon it, and the very intelligible grounds of it. All other authorities agreeing, not merely as authorities, but referring to these very books as the known (settled by authority) and received books of the nation. We have not an earlier testimony than the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, for none exists; but we have a testimony to the earlier and universal reception of these books as Scripture; hence, it can be proved to have existed earlier, for it was *then fully received by all* as an authentic book, and translated as a part of Scripture, probably some time before the period referred to, certainly then as being fully acknowledged, which is exactly the same thing as to our present question, that is, that it was not written for the occasion, for it was then translated as a well-known book.

In order to connect the Pentateuch with the time of Hezekiah, Mr. Newman declares the first reference to be in Micah vi. 5.\* The reader may remember, that in another part of the book Mr. N. declares that it was never given out as an authentic book till found in the eighteenth year of Josiah's reign, that is, it is referred to by Micah about seventy years before it was brought out, and referred to as well known to the people. But Mr. N. is on slippery ground here. His friend, Mr. Theodore Parker, the translator of De Wette thus gives his author in English (vol. ii. p. 154. Second Edition, Boston, 1850). "About B.C. 790, we find that Amos unites the Elohist and Jehovistic fragments in Gen. xix. 29. Therefore he must have had the book of Genesis in its present form, (see ii. 9) he says, 'Yet I destroyed the Amorite before

\* "Next as to the prophecies of the Pentateuch. They abound, as to the times which precede the century of Hezekiah, higher than which we cannot trace the Pentateuch."

<sup>1</sup> "The first apparent reference is by Micah vi. 5. a contemporary of Hezekiah, which proves that an account contained in our book of Numbers was already familiar" (Phases, p. 171, and note).

them.' Accordingly, he seems to have been acquainted with the book of Numbers. About B.C. 785, Hosea affords us a trace of its existence (xii. 3—5). Here the allusions are obvious to the story of the birth of Esau and Jacob in Gen. xxv. 26 . . . . Again ix. 10. This refers to Numb. xxii. 3." I do not go any further. He refers to Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, whose "acquaintance with our present Pentateuch," he says, "is pretty clear." Moreover, I apprehend no unprejudiced, intelligent person can doubt the reference of Joel ii. 1. and 15, 16, to Numb. x. 1—10. Now De Wette, as do many others, places him in B.C. 810, some so far back as B.C. 870, 865, Mr. N., in his Hebrew monarchy, between B.C. 840—818; that is, mark, that the Pentateuch is quoted as soon as there is a prophet to quote it. But to apply these facts to Mr N's statements—if we take in Joel, we have prophecies referring to the Pentateuch about a hundred years before Hezekiah's reign, and nearly two hundred years before Josiah's. Omitting Joel, we have, at any rate, prophecies in B.C. 790, and 785, which, according to De Wette, prove that these prophets had two books at least of the Pentateuch in its present form.

Josiah, according to Mr. Newman, mounted the throne in B.C. 640. The law was found in his eighteenth year, that gives us B.C. 622; that is, according to De Wette and Parker, the prophets had the Pentateuch, as we have it now, about a hundred and seventy years before it was composed as it is now, and published, according to Mr. N., and the proofs of Dr. De Wette are founded on the newest and most accurate discoveries of Elohist and Jehovistic documents afforded us in the book which Mr. N. himself refers to. I should add, perhaps, to make every allowance, that Mr. N. places Amos in B.C. 770, so that, according to his showing, the Pentateuch, as we have it now, would have been quoted only a hundred and fifty years before it existed!

This paragraph of Mr. Newman's has puzzled me a little:—  
 "Next, as to the prophecies of the Pentateuch. They abound, as to the times which precede the century of Hezekiah; higher than which we cannot trace the Pentateuch" (Phases, p. 171). He adds, in a note, "The first apparent reference is by Micah vi. 5.

a contemporary of Hezekiah." The object of this is obvious: it is to prove that they were composed just then, and gave out history for prophecy. That is plain enough. A very strange thing to urge, when they were most certainly, as he tells us elsewhere compiled and published in Josiah's days, and never before. "As I considered the narrative, my eyes were opened. If the book had previously been the received sacred law, it could not possibly have been so lost that its contents were unknown, and the fact of its loss forgotten. It was, therefore, evidently *then first compiled*, or, at least, then first produced and made authoritative to the nation" (Phases, p. 137). But the former was a discovery. His eyes were opened. But I pass from that now: it lasted thirty-three pages, and that is something for a German discovery—provided, that is, that it suffices to raise a doubt. But, now, why this singularly vague expression—"as to the times which precede the century of Hezekiah." They contained accurate accounts, it is to be supposed, as to the times preceding his century. Now we have found, from De Wette, that these books existed, and were referred to as well-known public documents nearly seventy years before Hezekiah's *accession*, about eighty years before his sickness in the middle of his reign. Now, where are we to begin "Hezekiah's century"? If we set fifty years before, and fifty years after him, for his century, then we have prophecies existing twenty or thirty years before it, and so clear that Mr. N. takes them for histories. If we take B.C. 800 to B.C. 700, as Hezekiah's century, we have, according to De Wette and Parker, prophecies proving the Pentateuch to be well-known public books, appealed to by prophets in Judah and Israel in the first ten years of his century; and Joel, whom De Wette does not mention, but in whose prophecy the reference is equally clear, proving their existence before Hezekiah's century some thirty years, perhaps many more. Yet the Pentateuch, according to Mr. N., is full of prophecies as to the times in which it is proved to be publicly referred to as a well known authentic book already in existence. What does this prove? And why all this vagueness as to times, in Mr. N.? Why this omission of the testimony of the book he recommends, in which passages are given as a certain proof that the

Pentateuch existed long before Hezekiah's reign, Micah alone being referred to. A book, too, as infidel as Mr. N. could wish—nay, which is his grand armoury.

Of course Mr. Newman is not bound to adopt the opinion of the author he recommends; but is it quite candid to say the first apparent reference is Micah, without alluding to the citation of passages of the Pentateuch in Amos and Hosea, in the book he himself uses and recommends? But a doubt upon a doubt is a shocking thing when all depends on boldness of assertion to create one in the mind of the reader. But to return. How do we trace the Pentateuch to the "times which precede the century of Hezekiah," if, as the note to this passage states, the first apparent reference is in Micah, a contemporary of Hezekiah? This is what is not quite intelligible to me in this passage. It is true, that, vague as it now is, the passage in the text will, if not closely examined into, disarm the testimony of De Wette and Parker of its effect, because their proofs of the existence of the Pentateuch are within the century preceding Hezekiah; and the note, if we do not compare it with the text, will bring the proofs down to Hezekiah's own days, and cut off, for him who does not pay attention, about another century of proof. But this is, to say the least, a strange passage; not helped out by a declaration elsewhere, that they were compiled in Josiah's days, and could not at any rate have been known before. The fact is, the Pentateuch is referred to most distinctly in the earliest of the prophets, whom Mr. N. puts about B.C. 830, so that the only thing Mr. N. proves here, is, that the Pentateuch abounds in accurate prophecies, written, at any rate, a good while before the event.

But, if the Old Testament be attentively examined, we shall soon see that it is a continuous history, whoever was the means of making it so (God, as its divine Author, I doubt not) with moral and prophetic addresses joined to it, beginning with the Creation and ending with the re-building of the Temple and city, after their destruction by Nebuchadnezzar, but not setting aside the Gentile dominion, which had taken the place of God's throne in David's family in Jerusalem, a dominion which will continue till Christ takes his, and that at Jerusalem, again as David's son. But this continuous history is in each

successive book carried on with just so much reference to the previous parts, and especially to the Pentateuch, the foundation of all, as was real and true in the state of the time they refer to; the last verse of Malachi, throwing back (while announcing the coming of the great day of the Lord) the thoughts of the hearer to the days of Horeb and of the law. In 1 Samuel we have seven references to the Pentateuch, one to Joshua; in the second, two. That the law was forgotten in practice is most certain. But the whole of the Old Testament has the character of a successive history stamped on it in the very plainest possible way. This is its clear, natural intrinsic character.

Mr. Newman states that "no prophecy of the Pentateuch can be proved to have been fulfilled, which had not been already fulfilled before Hezekiah's day" (Phases, p. 171, 172).\*

\* Here we have slipped on from the times before Hezekiah's century to Hezekiah's day; that is, a margin of about a century is left. We have the Pentateuch cited 830, or at any rate, 800 years before Christ, according to De Wette. Hezekiah's accession was, say, 725. Now suppose a prophecy in the Pentateuch was fulfilled in 750 before Christ, it was twenty-five years before Hezekiah's day, and yet fifty years after the prophecy was certainly in existence. Hence it was better to leave the date as vague as possible: the consequence is, Mr. N.'s statement proves nothing—100 years is rather a long epoch to leave out and pass *sub silentio*, in order to escape the necessity of proving one's point; we have Hezekiah's day bold enough in Phases, p. 172; the times which precede his century, p. 171, as if it was the same thing; and in the note to p. 171, the first reference to the Pentateuch is in Micah, his contemporary (leaving out Joel, Amos and Hosea, preceding prophets by whom it is quoted), and that makes a bridge from the times preceding his century to his day. Had I not looked into De Wette, who proves in due form that the Pentateuch, as we have it, is cited "in the times preceding Hezekiah's century," I could never have discovered what this singular phrase was worth; or why Hezekiah's name was introduced for dating quite a different epoch from his own. But then it glides, with Micah's help, much easier into "Hezekiah's day" in p. 172.

I take the opportunity of this note to insert a statement from Lightfoot, in reference to the period at which the Magi came up, the sheet to which it properly belongs being already printed off. He supposes, as I have done, that the Magi came up some time after the birth of Christ, making the interval at least a year.

"Since, therefore, only fourteen years passed from the nativity of

This assertion is so flatly contradicted by the contents of Leviticus xxvi., and the well-known public history of the Jews, that it is needless to go further. It is quite clear, that Israel had not been scattered among the heathen before Hezekiah's reign; and quite clear they have since, and that God's sanctuary has been destroyed.

We now come to the Gospels. In the first place, though there is a remarkable similarity of spirit and doctrine in the Gospel and Epistle of John, they are very easily distinguished by any attentive reader. The presenting of the person in the way of historical fact in the one, and the deduction of the nature of God, Christ, and the new man, from that manifestation in the other, are respectively the characters of the Gospel and Epistle. This renders the Epistle much more abstract; and hence the connection of the reasoning is known only where the inward thread of Divine life, which links it, is known; whereas Christ in the Gospel is clearly and definitely presented—though the Divine glory of His person is brought out.

I do not the least agree with the assertion, that the divine nature of Christ is not clearly taught in the three first Gospels.\* Take the word Emmanuel, "God with us." Again, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus; for He shall save *His people* from their sins." I cite these as examples which present themselves at once: a multitude are found at the beginning and end of the Gospels, if we except the beginning of Mark, which commences with his service; and the same truth is found there in the course of that service—as for example, the comparison of the healing of the paralytic with Ps. ciii.—and of the feeding of five thousand with Ps. cxxxii. That the Holy Ghost selected for its communication by John what related to the Lord's

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Christ to the death of Augustus, etc., we must reckon that Christ was not born, but in the last years of Herod. Thus we conjecture:—

"In his thirty-fifth, Christ was born.

"In his thirty-seventh, now newly begun, the wise men came: presently after this, was the slaying of the infants,—and after a few months, the death of Herod."

\* "That the divinity of Christ cannot be proved from the three first Gospels, was confessed by all the early Church, and is proved by the labouring arguments of modern Trinitarians" (Phases, p. 173).

person is beyond controversy: *that* with the sending of the Holy Ghost, is the grand object of the book. Hence he has given what John Baptist taught his disciples, and not merely his public testimony. Moreover, there are but two verses in what John Baptist says, which can give occasion to any remark, chapter iii. 35, 36.\* The rest is a touchingly beautiful comparison by John of himself with Christ. Otherwise there is nothing but what is like John the Baptist's testimony. The testimony that he that believes has everlasting life, is the only thing that passes in its character the general spirit of John's teaching, that is, the witness to the person of Christ. But it is not in elevation of doctrine more than being Son of God—Lamb of God—Baptizer with the Holy Ghost—and this last belongs to the display of Christ's power after his departure, as much as having eternal life by Him, and more, and is immediately connected with the Father's having put all things into his hand. There is one thing very clearly proved by Mr. Newman's remarks in this page—his insensibility† to divine things; for it is notorious that John's gospel has delighted, fed, drawn out the heart and comforted the hearts of thousands, perhaps more than any other book of Scripture—for a simple reason, that it presents more of Christ himself, and more immediately Christ himself. Mr. N. finds it "monotonous."

I recall to the reader the very convenient form of Mr. Newman's book for administering doses of infidelity: as he is merely recounting the course of his own mind he can give a conviction as it formed itself without the least proof. Thus he has a "high sense of the lucid force with which he [Strauss] unanswerably shews that the fourth gospel is no faithful exhibition of the discourses of Jesus" (Phases, p. 174). What has produced this conviction we are left to imagine; of course it is supposed to be something. Before this, however, Mr. N.

\* "I saw it infallibly to indicate that John has made both the Baptist and Jesus speak, as John himself would have spoken; and that we cannot trust the historical reality of the discourses in the fourth Gospel" (Phases, p. 173).

† "The monotony also of the Gospel had also excited my *wonder*" (Phases, p. 172).

says, "It had become quite certain to me that the secret colloquy with Nicodemus, and the splendid testimony of the Baptist to the Father and the Son, were wholly modelled out of John's own imagination" (Phases, p. 174). How did it become "quite certain"? It is left to be supposed because it is "quite certain." One can only, to such kind of assertion, answer in the negative—that it is not "quite certain."

Such assertions have this immense difficulty standing in the way:—that it is "a splendid testimony" on subjects which Alexandrian philosophers have essayed to reach—the holiest and truest teaching on man's real condition, and what he needed—the profoundest knowledge and application of the Old Testament, and the connection between the universal principles it contains and the particular application in which a Jewish doctor ought to have understood them—and yet the clear distinction as to how, in their universality as applied by God in grace, they would reach to all (besides the positive revelation of what introduced the heavenly development of the character to which these general spiritual principles lead)—and that connected with what we know to be historically true, and prophetically announced, though contrary to all Jewish thoughts, and in its actual form only discoverable in prophecy by the key which the person of Christ gave to it: yet, with that key, as simple as possible,—that all this, and much more than this, in the compass of a few verses (and such is John iii.) was the invention of an impostor, and quite certainly such. It is a pity Mr. Newman does not tell us why. If imposture be such and so true, and has such a stamp of divine knowledge on it, what is truth? And what must the original have been? And besides, however profound, nothing can be simpler. There is nothing obscure and mythically mysterious about it.

It may be well here to say a few words on the manner in which the discourses of the Lord would be given to us, assuming the Holy Ghost to record them. For it is the character which would result, not the proof of the fact by evidence that I now seek. First, it is perfectly certain, that we have a very small portion indeed of the discourses of Jesus. The Holy Ghost would give us those which Divine wisdom

considered permanently useful to the Church in all ages—that which brought out great principles and abiding doctrines; and such is in fact the case. Take the sermon on the Mount, the thirteenth of Matthew, the fifteenth and sixteenth of Luke, and the discourses in John, and the like—all bring out some special view of Christ's person, God's ways with men, or the principles of His rule as Father. Even in the same discourse, He would give us, wherever it was recorded, that part which applies to the subject treated. Thus, supposing it had been said, "They killed at Jerusalem the Son whom the Father had sent"; I might say, if the guilt of favoured Jerusalem was in question, "They killed the Son at Jerusalem"; if the mere extent of their guilt in respect of the dignity of His person, "They killed the Son." If I sought to shew the slight of the Father and the contempt of His love, I might say, "They killed the Son whom the Father had sent:" and all these representations would be perfectly true, and in the pursuit of an object, such as God must have in recording these things, my leaving a part out which did not immediately bear on that of God, would only give a truer force to the words—more of the sense and meaning, according to the mind and teaching of God. Now each gospel might give only one of these much more pertinent and instructive but incomplete citations, and hence there would be a difference. But so far from there being an inconsistency, there would be a great help to understanding the mind of God in the word.

Would any man say of these, that any one was not a true account? It would be a great deal truer if the object be to communicate God's mind in the discourse to me, and what else can it be if God inspire the account of it? I repeat, we have not a hundredth part of Jesus' discourses. We have what the Holy Ghost was sent to give for the permanent good of the Church—the very words Jesus used, if needed for the divine teaching, perhaps the substance perfectly fitted for future ages, or some of the words which had a permanent application. Again, suppose there was a question of blaming me for taking some one to a distance, and it was affirmed that I had, on the contrary, said to him, "Come into the next room"; whereas I had said, "The next room is airy and will suit you—come into it." The report made to justify me is not literal, but it is exactly

true. Now I do not doubt that the Holy Ghost, by the Apostle, has given the discourses of Jesus, not necessarily in every case literally, but in the way alluded to in the example I have given, so as that they exactly communicate the mind of God in them, which He meant to be preserved in writing, and word for word when that was needed so to do. Many things may have been said, and undoubtedly were, by which what He said was adapted to the persons and circumstances which surrounded Him, but made no part of the truth to be conveyed. These would be only so far preserved as would be needed to give a perfect idea of what He said to them, and how. Hence the force of the discourse would be as the Holy Ghost used the mind and pen of John, or any other writer, exactly what the Holy Ghost meant to communicate. Now this is much more really a divine communication by the Holy Ghost, than a mere repetition by human memory of what the Lord meant only for the good of the individuals at the moment, or to suit what He said to them, and not for the permanent good of the Church, and the full revelation of Himself. I have His instructions with divine perfection, as He meant them to be given for the permanent use of the Church written by the power of the Holy Ghost. If the Holy Ghost employed John or Matthew to convey a particular part of the truth as to Jesus, as He undoubtedly did, their writings would necessarily take the form of the particular truth or aspect of Christ, they were employed to set forth. Thus Emmanuel shines through Matthew, and Jehovah King in Zion—in John, the Son's relationship in every way with the Father, both in nature and mission; Judaism is quite set aside. The vessel used was fitted for its use, but conveyed exactly what it was meant to convey. The form, as we have said, of the jet, was according to the fountain-maker's design, but the water which took that form was unmixed and pure.

Mr. Newman objects to John's account of the raising of Lazarus, and of the healing of the man born blind,\* on the

\* "How was it that the other writers omitted to tell of such decisive exhibitions? . . . When, where, and in what circumstances did John write? It is agreed that he wrote fifty or sixty years after the events when the other disciples were all dead" (Phases, pp. 174, 175).

ground of their not being mentioned by the other Evangelists, and John's writing long after. Now the miracles Mr. Newman objects to were immediately in connection with the subject the Holy Ghost employed John to treat of. One His Sonship in the direct way of power—and the other, the light-giving power which accompanied the recognition of His mission leading to the owning of Him as Son. Now I repeat here what I have already said, that the Holy Ghost must have an object in writing such histories. He is not, could not be, a biographer, to write a life with circumstances which there was no divine reason for communicating. He was revealing Christ under various characters of glory, Son of God, Son of David, Son of Man, Emmanuel. Now let us examine whether there is not such a definite bearing of the two miracles referred to, whether they do not bear the stamp of a Divine revelation of Jesus. From the fourth chapter, John's Gospel had systematically unfolded the new thing in contrast with Judaism. Spiritual worship of the Father instead of at Jerusalem or on Gerizim (chapter iv). Life-giving power instead of human strength using ordinances—judgment executed to secure Christ's glory in those who rejected Him; here He is the life-giving Son (chapter v). Then He is the humbled Son of Man instead of King Messiah in Israel—the spiritual food of faith while away, having come down from heaven and been crucified (chap. vi). Then, the time for his glory before the world being not yet come, the Holy Ghost is to be given to believers in witnessing his heavenly glory as Son of Man (chap. vii). Then He is the light of the world in contrast with the law; but his word is rejected (chap. viii). As is the evidence of his works (chap. ix), of which hereafter. He will at any rate have and save his sheep (chap. x). That closes the direct revelation of Christ in the Gospel. From chap. xi. we have public testimony given by God to Him who was rejected:—First, as Son of God, life-giving, resurrection-power was his proper glory, and Lazarus is publicly (there is no "Tell it to no man" here) raised. This sickness was not unto death, but for the glory of God, and that the Son of God should be glorified thereby. Hence all say, "If thou hadst been here he had not died." They knew his miraculous power of healing, but now close to Jerusalem the

most public testimony possible is given to his life-giving power as Son of God. How truly this is in its place is seen by this, that after this we have his glory as Son of David publicly proclaimed by his entry into Jerusalem, and the time come for his glory as Son of Man by the Greeks coming up; and then the Lord shews that to this the cross is necessary, and looks in spirit at the coming hour. Thus the peculiar bearing of this remarkable miracle is clearly seen—the public indication of Christ as Son of God who raises the dead. Now Matthew is employed by the Holy Ghost to present Christ in another way, that of Emmanuel—Messiah. Hence the Spirit does not give what was specially given to prove another point, but He does give with much more detail the riding in as Jehovah the King Messiah, with all that followed on it—in the judgment of Israel, chief priests, Pharisees, Sadducees, Herodians—every class, in a word, of those who rejected Him—and then shews from Psa. cx. that the Messiah ought to leave them, and to ascend up on high, because He was David's Lord as well as David's Son.

Again, in the case of the blind man, the same considerations apply. We have the contrast between the blind receiving sight from Him who is the true light of the world; and the judgment of those who set up to be lights, and that by the most ignorant believer who finds his place with the rejected Son of God. And mark the process: first, in the typical act, He puts clay on the man's eyes—a figure, I doubt not, from what the Apostle says, of Christ come in the flesh. But this operation in itself produces no effect; but the moment he washes in Siloam, which, says the Apostle, signifies “sent”—he sees. That is, the moment he, by the purifying Word and Spirit, recognises that Christ is the Sent One, all is clear. In result, the poor man, the subject thus of the delivering power of Christ, honest of heart, bears witness to the power of which he had experienced the effect, knowing Jesus only as a prophet; but having received in his heart the authority of his word and mission, he immediately receives Him as Son of God, and prostrates himself before Him. The rest are blinded, for the effect of his mission is, that they that see not might see, and that they that see might be made blind.

Now this unfolding of particular testimony to Sonship, in contrast with the blinding of the Jews, is John's subject all through. Matthew's is different, as is Luke's, who gives us the Son of Man, and what is suited to the display of that truth. But there is such total profound ignorance in all these infidel writers of the purpose of the author, that they do not understand the scope of a single passage. How should they? It is as if some wise housemaid should clean out a powerful voltaic battery, because there were dirty wire and plates and useless water in it.

And I beg the reader to recall, that if God was writing a book, He *must* have such objects. Adequate evidence of the facts proving his mission in Israel among the Jews was given in Matthew's Gospel among themselves, and I suppose (it is hardly to be doubted from the evidence we have) in their own tongue as well as in Greek, before the destruction of Jerusalem. John was employed when Christianity was now in one sense established, and no longer in the cradle of Judaism—to give the great leading truths concerning the person and glory of Jesus, and the presence of the Holy Ghost needed for its building up and consolidation, and the guarding it against the inroads of heretical pravity. Could any thing be more suitable, more timely, or more gracious on God's part. He preserves also an Apostle Himself, that, as external proof, we might have an eye-witness, and one most especially intimate with Jesus—one we may reverently call his bosom friend—to shew what really was the true doctrine of Christ when there was danger of departure from it, and need of building up in it; when it was no longer sufficient to believe that Jesus was the Christ in order to be preserved from the machinations of the enemy. And this is what we have in John. He is occupied entirely about the person of Christ, and the testimony of the Holy Ghost operating in the saints whether to convict the world by, or to build up the Church in, the glory of that Christ. Meanwhile if God chose fitting instruments, the Holy Ghost Himself, as Christ had promised, was the Author and Inspirer of all, whether in Matthew or in John, or any other. Now John *was* just the person fitted for this. The time was the

time it was required—the thing done exactly what was called for: just as the general course of Christ's working was recorded by Matthew; but in Matthew, as to hundreds of miracles in a verse or two, to introduce the true character of the kingdom of heaven, which was his subject—all his detailed miracles bearing on his subject, as the few John relates do on his; and Luke's, in an equally remarkable manner on his—the healing, cleansing, forgiving, and quickening of man lost in sin.

Hence nothing can be more out of the way than Mr. Newman's remarks. If John had in Asia Minor (if he was there), after the destruction of Jerusalem, and the dispersion of the Jews, given the general history of miracles and acts as a proof of the truth of his mission as Messiah to the Jews, then, though it would not hinder one taught of God from believing, there would be something plausible in what Mr. N. says, in objecting to a new history of miracles at so\* late a date. But this was already done; and that John should then develop Christianity doctrinally and in its spirit, relating only two or three miracles of Jesus, specially connected with this, is exactly in place and keeping. John's testimony as eye-witness was just as valid. These events must have been much more vividly impressed upon him than more recent ones. The Holy Ghost, while acting suitably as to his instruments, and for his purpose always acts in his own divine power.

Mr. Newman's low and disgusting introduction of John as a witness, is without sense or force. He puts a question † which only shews his ignorance of the matter. The Holy Ghost acted on his memory, "He shall bring to your remembrance."

\* Note, here, infidel candour. It suits Mr. Newman to accept the usually received date of John's gospel; and he says, "It is agreed that he wrote fifty or sixty years after the events;" but it is much more universally agreed that Matthew and Luke wrote before, though the precise year is not known—but this has no weight with him.

† These are the words: "O aged sir, we understand that you have two memories, a natural and a miraculous one . . . . Be pleased to tell us now, Is it from your natural or from your supernatural memory that you derive your knowledge of the miracle, wrought on Lazarus" (Phases, p. 176).

Does he mean to say that God cannot call to a man's memory what He thinks fit? Such a notion is ridiculous—a *man* can do it. But He puts the memory into activity, and recalls to it the images of what had passed before it. How many scenes and thoughts has the sight of a person called back to our minds? How well does the sinner know that when God acts convertingly on his conscience, all his sins come up fresh into his memory. Could God not do as much as to the life of His blessed Son, and control the memory in its activity so as to give what He wished—if He purposed to give a revelation by eye-witnesses? This is what Jesus said the Holy Ghost should do. Hence it is not a “romance,” but a history—a real history by eye-witnesses, and a real history of God himself through their instrumentality. It is much more incredible that He should have sent and given his Son, and not given such a history of Him, but left it unknown, or only traditionally guessed at in after ages.

Further, I repeat, miracles may arrest and draw attention to truth; and truth may arrest and fix attention on Divine power shewn by miracles; but the fact is, both were concurrent testimonies to the person and glory of the Lord Jesus Christ.\* On this point also Mr. Newman only shews he is far from the plain and very simple state of the case. Suppose the anxious father, who entreated deliverance for his son, found that the fever left exactly the moment that Jesus said, “Go thy way, thy son liveth”; and thus, giving ear to Jesus, found *that* truth, the entering in of which giveth light and understanding to the simple—would an infidel's scepticism, or the parent's conduct be most just?† In the main, the Gospels just give us an authentic history of those things and of plenty of scepticism too, which has not happily succeeded in any thing save confirming, in the state of the sceptic Jews, the prophecies and warnings which they disbelieved and rejected.

Suppose, on the other hand, one heard Him who spake as never man spake, and received precious truth in his soul, yet

\* Compare John vi. 14; vii. 40.

† Note, here, the clear proof of power in miracles done on one at a distance unconscious of what was said.

remained pondering as to who He should be who spake, and whether all his claims were real. And, as John's messengers saw that the blind received their sight, the lame walked, the lepers were cleansed, the deaf heard, the dead were raised, and, in the absence of all the pride and selfishness of religious grandeur, the poor had the Gospel preached to them; was it not a just means of receiving Him who spake grace and truth itself, and confirmed the word by signs following? Or must he have settled the knotty logical point whether miracles were to be believed on account of doctrine, or doctrine on account of miracles, before he did; or remained in torturing doubt if the Saviour he wanted was there, or in proud and indifferent ignorance? He had nothing to settle. Truth and power concurred in assuring his soul that Jesus was the Christ the Son of God. If he did not believe it, it was that his heart was so hard that it resisted both. We have lost the sight of the miracles and possess the truth more complete as a whole, and an historical testimony which nothing but folly and self-will can dispute; an historical testimony which makes the whole course of miracles more powerful morally, though less impressive, to the senses. Christianity exists. It arose from something. What it did arise from is believed by all the world except *voluntary* sceptics and mythical dreamers like Dr. Strauss, who will serve for a nine years' wonder for the Germans, as the Paulus school did before them.

It will be said, "But people believe Mahommedanism too"; so do I historically, though far less fully authenticated in detail than Christianity. The difference is this, that if the history of Mahommedanism be true, it is an imposture. If that of Christianity be true, it is incontestably divine. But you might better deny the history of Mahommedanism than of Christianity. I turn to the examination of St. Paul's testimony.

I think I never read more thorough nonsense than Mr. Newman's remarks on the tongues. The Irvingites were a convenient loophole of escape, indeed, as regards the remarkable testimony afforded by the tongues; but I cannot say that Mr. N. has managed it well, though in some respects subtly

enough. Indeed it was a difficult task. St. Paul's speaking tongues more than they all, is slipped in at the end as "hallucination." It was an awkward fact to deal with. And now let us examine Mr. N.'s dealing with the facts of the case. They were the same, he says, as the Irvingite tongues. St. Paul's "moral sobriety of mind was no guarantee against his mistaking extravagancies for miracle." So that the tongues which Paul spake were extravagancies like the Irvingite tongues. And "Luke (or the authority whom he followed) has exaggerated into a gift of languages what cannot be essentially different from the Corinthian, and in short from the Irvingite, tongues" (Phases, p. 179). So that Paul, in speaking the tongues he boasted of, was never understood. They were mere extravagancies, "hallucination"!

He, whether through delusion or imposture, encouraged others in the thought that they had these tongues, and only boasted of having more "extravagancies" than they, and of course different kinds of extravagancies; for he spake several tongues—a thing hard to conceive, that he should speak *several kinds* of jargons as if they were languages, and yet remain an honest man. Did he mistake his own diversified extravagancies for miracle? It is very credible for a sceptic, but for no one else, I should think. If it comes under the class of logic or philosophy, I know not; but it certainly seems an "extravagance" to a plain mind, that a man should speak a *number* of tongues which were no tongues at all, and never find out he was deceiving himself, nor think of deceiving others; but appeal to others who indulged in like extravagancies, and without smiling, like Cicero's augurs when they met each other. I have known some who held that Paul's tongues were simply languages that he had learnt and was thankful to use. Mr. Newman treats this notion as cheaply as it deserves, by not noticing it, and distinctly declaring the tongues to be an extravagance; whereas it is clear enough there is no extravagance at all in speaking a language we know to those whose language it is. Nothing more wise or simple. I say as cheaply as it deserves, because to suppose that people's speaking a language they had learnt at school

was a proof that the Holy Ghost had come upon them, is really not worthy of consideration. And not only on the day of Pentecost, but at Samaria, and at the reception of Cornelius, the speaking of tongues is advanced in a very specific and distinct way as a proof of the descent of the Holy Ghost, and in the last case as a warrant for receiving the Gentiles into the Church of God; God having given them the like gift as to the Apostles. Now, that a man's speaking a tongue he had learned in an ordinary way should be a warrant for so doing, is too absurd an idea to entertain for a moment. No: they were extravagancies or a miracle.

But there is this untoward difficulty in the way of their being fancied tongues, that all the different nations to whom the tongues belonged understood them. "Are not all these which speak Galileans? And how hear we every man in our own tongue wherein we were born?" And then Peter speaks to the Jews in theirs. Now this fact is the substantial point of the whole affair. It was that which struck the multitude. Three thousand people were converted by it. The Church begins its existence, and was formed in virtue of this multitude understanding what was said. Christianity was planted and rooted in the world by it.

It was *this* was the proof that the Holy Ghost was indeed come down. It marked and characterised the day of Pentecost. Mr. Newman says, it "cannot have been essentially different from the Corinthian." Surely not, but there was this difference, that there was nobody at Corinth who understood the strange tongue. It was not needed, and it was not for edification; and, therefore, with his usual "moral sobriety" Paul forbade the exercise of this gift unless there was an interpreter, because then, as is evident, it would edify.

He would not preclude its use, as it was a sign of Divine power, provided it was for edification—all was to be subservient to that.

Thus all was the very opposite of extravagance. An immense aid was given to the propagation of the Gospel, obvious to all, as well as a sign of Divine power accompanying it.

Now it seems to me, not only was such a miraculous aid peculiarly appropriate for a religion propagated by preaching; but, besides that, there was a very special and gracious meaning in this gift.

In Babel, where man had once been of one lip, and one language, God had confounded their pride, and men were shut up into a dissociable condition, used of God for providential purposes, but which set up barriers which precluded common communications. Israel had one of these tongues, perhaps, and, probably, the original one, and the true knowledge of God was confined to them. When Christianity came in, power was not yet going to set the world right, but grace was overstepping these barriers, and, with the overflowing love of God, saluting the heathen where they were, in their darkness and misery, without compelling them to bend their neck under the galling yoke of Judaism. What could be more expressive of this than speaking to every one of them in their own tongue? The barrier was gone—at least *God's* love had overstepped it, and visited every heart where it was at home, where judgment, indeed; on man's pride had placed it. Was there not something most beautifully significant in this? Surely there was. Hence it became a kind of distinctive miracle. So when Samaria was received, *they* spake with tongues. When God would outstrip man's tardy love, and He visited the Gentiles in the person of Cornelius, He put his seal on the Gentiles before the Church had put hers—an unusual act; yet surely the first place in grace belonged to Him: and how could the Apostle refuse those to whom God had given the same seal as to the Jews and the Apostles themselves? But when they were used for personal vanity, and not for edification—for of what is not man capable—then they are restrained; not absolutely, which would have taken away a just testimony to the Holy Ghost's presence, but unless there were an interpreter who could turn it to edifying, which was certainly the Holy Ghost's purpose. With Mr. Newman this is the same thing as Irvingite extravagancies;—what profound moral judgment, and estimate of facts!

But I must here, without any reproach to Mr. Newman, in a matter of memory, recall some facts, and rectify some state-

ments:—at Pentecost the languages were universally understood by those who spoke them—the Irvingite tongues never by any one; a notable difference. And this is so true, that after first trying their hand at making Chinese of it, it was suggested among them that it might be the tongue of angels, as it was said, “If I speak with the tongue of men and angels” —delightful idea!

Mr. Newman is not quite exact in his account of the report of the “Irish Clergyman,” or at least of what the “Irish Clergyman” saw, and heard. There *was* a pretended interpretation. Two brothers, respectable ship-builders at Port Glasgow, of the name of M'D—, and their sister, were the chief persons who spoke, with a Gaelic maid-servant, in the tongues, and a Mrs. J—, in English. J. M'D— spoke on the occasion alluded to, for about a quarter of an hour, with great energy and fluency, in a semi-latin sounding speech—then sung a hymn in the same. Having finished, he knelt down and prayed there might be interpretation; as God had given one gift, that he would add the other. His sister got up at the opposite side of the room, and professed to give the interpretation,—but it was a string of texts on overcoming, and no hymn, and one; if not more, of the texts was quoted wrongly. Just afterwards there was a bustle; and apparently some one was unwell, and went into the next room, and the gifted English-speaking person, with utterances from the highest pitch of voice to the lowest murmur, with all strange prolongation of tones, spoke through, if one may so express oneself, as if passing through, the agony of Christ. Once the Gaelic servant spoke briefly in “a tongue,” not, if the “Irish Clergyman” remembers right, the same evening. The sense he had of the want of the power of the Holy Ghost in the church, made him willing to hear and see. Yet he went rather as deputed for others than for himself. The excitement was great, so that, though not a particularly excitable person, he felt its effects very strongly. It did not certainly approve itself to his judgment; other things contributed to form it. It was too much of a scene. Previous to the time of exercising the gifts, they read, sung psalms, and prayed under certain persons' presidence; one of them, a very estimable person,

whom he has since seen free from all this, and a minister of an independent or some dissenting church in Edinburgh, then a church elder. This being finished, the "Irish clergyman" was going away, when another said to him, "Don't go, the best part is probably to come yet," so he staid, and heard what has just been related. He was courteously admitted, as one not believing, who came to see what was the real truth of the case. The parties are mostly dead, or dispersed, and many freed from the delusion, and the thing itself public; so that he does not feel he is guilty of any indiscretion in giving a correct account of what passed. It may be added, without of course saying anything that could point out the persons, that female vanity, and very distinct worldliness, did not confirm the thought that it could be the Spirit's power. The M'D—s. were, in ordinary life, quiet sober men, and he believes, most blameless. Their names were so public, that there is no indelicacy in alluding to them, but the "Irish Clergyman" did not think they had that kind of peace and deliverance from legal thoughts, which is the sign, in another way, of the Spirit's power. They never received the Apostolic pretensions of London and Albury, but repudiated in the strongest way, and on full inquiry, the blasphemous doctrine of the Irvingites as to the person of the Lord. Mr. N's reporter, the "Irish Clergyman," doubts that they were in the least aware of it at the time they professed to receive the gifts; but they certainly entirely repudiated it when he saw them afterwards.

It may not be generally known that the "gifts" among the Irvingites were founded on this doctrine of Christ's being a sinner in nature like ourselves. Mr. Irving's statement was, that he had long preached the "gifts"; but there were none, because there was nothing for the Holy Ghost to testify to; but that when he preached this doctrine, they came as a witness to it. His teaching, moreover, on the subject was confirmed by what was received as the prophetic power amongst them. I am afraid the tongues are not quite "exploded" yet, as they have allied themselves with other influences suited to the world; that is, the spirit of Romanism and Puseyism. At any rate, there is one consoling fact that as yet, in God's patient mercy, in spite of efforts from without

and provocations of many Mr. Newmans from within, the lapse of eighteen hundred years, instead of three, has not "exploded" the effect of Paul's "extravagancies" and "hallucinations," and Luke's "exaggerations." We possess the blessed testimony that the Holy Ghost has given to the glory of the Person of the Lord Jesus; and, despite their many sins, mercy is yet extended to the Gentiles.

The rest of Mr. Newman's remarks on the tongues are not worthy of an answer. The term "barbaric jargon" is avowedly used because it was not understood by the hearers. He that spoke was "as a barbarian." The rest is composed of a kind of sneer, which, in the presence of the proofs and facts, throws scorn on the sneerer, not on the things sneered at.

The next point noticed is, St. Paul's preaching a glorified Christ, not a lowly one. It is quite true; and equally true that he was not called to be a witness of Christ's oral teachings. So it is declared in his mission as distinguished from that of the twelve. He was to be the great witness of that part of truth which put Jew and Gentile on the same footing in a heavenly way, which could only be in connection with a glorified Christ. But if that be supposed to mean, that he attached no importance to the history of Christ's humiliation,\* nothing can be more false; only he takes it up, as he does all else, as a part of the vast counsels and plans and purposes of God. The following passages, not to speak of unnumbered ones which speak of the cross, will prove what I say:—John xv. 26, 27, it is said, "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, He shall testify of me: and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning." They were eye-witnesses of his life down here. As to Paul's ministry, it is said, Acts xxvi. 16: "But rise, and stand upon thy feet: for I have appeared unto thee for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness

\* "Paul shows total unconcern to the human history and earthly teaching of Jesus.... The Christ with whom Paul held communion was a risen, ascended, exalted Lord.... He surely therefore must have been wholly and contentedly ignorant of the oral teachings of Jesus" (Phases, pp. 180, 181).

both of these things which thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee." Here we have the two commissions clearly stated. So Peter calls himself a witness of Christ's sufferings, and a partaker of the glory to be revealed.

Paul not only speaks of "the gospel of the glory," but says, "for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus" his Lord; and seeks "the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his sufferings." He descends, so to speak, into the sufferings, because of the glory, and as the way to his high calling above. He does not speak of waiting for its revelation; and this was so very distinct, that Peter proposes, in Acts iii., to the Jews repentance, that Christ may return to them. Paul never. Peter's testimony had been rejected, and Stephen killed and received on high; and there was no thought then but of receiving Jew and Gentile through the ministry of him whom grace had called away from Stephen's martyr-ground and from the apostleship of Jewish hatred to Christ, to be the witness of better and heavenly things connected with that glorious Christ, by the vision of whom on the way to Damascus he was arrested, and his pride laid low. The Holy Ghost also opened his spiritual eyes on the Lord leading him to preach Him whom once he destroyed. Hence he boldly declares, after speaking of the "gospel of the glory," that he does not now know Christ, in the former or Jewish way, after the flesh; and that if any man were in Christ, there was a new creation—he belonged to what took him out of Jew and Gentile; as it had been said to him by Christ, when He appeared to him by the way, "Delivering thee from the people and from the Gentiles, to whom now I send thee." But this only fills up the perfectness of the Gospel revelation in its place. And the humiliation of Christ takes, in Paul's view, all its immense and vast importance in the counsels of God, and is not a mere personal history, perfectly interesting and divinely instructive as that is in its place; for the Gospel has a thousand aspects in one Divine truth.

Paul was eminently the vessel of the counsels of God in Christ. Does that make the personal history of Jesus less interesting, less profoundly, divinely, though humanly,

instructive? No; the heart goes back to study, in every detail, One who in every detail was Divine love and holiness, near enough to man's eye to study it for himself. But how does Paul speak of this? See the sweep of truth with which he brings Christ's humiliation in: "Now that He ascended, what is it but that He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that He might fill all things." What a place does his humiliation occupy here! Again, take his, so to speak, official exaltation: "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow."

Thus the history of Christ's humiliation was looked at by Paul through the Holy Ghost—not in the touching detail of Christ's individual life, but as one immense fact, and a cardinal one, in the vast scheme of God. This was exactly in its place, and in keeping with the service for which he was employed. John gives us the Divine nature—Paul the Divine counsels—Peter the walk of him who has a lively hope through the resurrection of One whose walk he had known and followed in its bright display on earth, towards the heaven, into which resurrection is meant to introduce us; all founding the accomplishment of blessing on the redemption which He has wrought out for us.

Mr. Newman next complains of Paul not affording us the grounds\* on which he believed the facts as to Christ's resurrection.

\* "But I now saw that this independence invalidated his testimony. ...It avails not to talk of the *opportunities* which he had of searching into the truth of the resurrection of Christ; for we see that he did not choose to avail himself of the common methods of investigation" (Phases, p. 181).

I have, in principle answered this. The business of a revelation is, to afford the objects of faith in such a full display as makes the evidence of it; not to discuss the logical grounds of its reception. Nothing can be more absurd, more demonstrative of the petty narrowness of mind which cannot discern the true character of what is before it, than the claim of such a logical discussion in Scripture. Moral appeals of the most touching character to all, the evidences given and slighted are indeed found. That we can understand. But I venture to say, there is not a right-thinking man in existence, who would not, if he had found in the New Testament a discussion on the logical grounds of evidence, have at once concluded that it was not, or at least that such a portion formed no part of, a revelation of God.

Even as to logic,\* I must beg to be entirely exempted from partnership in that of Mr. Newman. "Our" is a very comfortable, comprehensive word; as if his reasoning was the universal grounds of enlightened modern conviction. I must beg to think, poorly as I esteem men's competency in such matters, that this is far from being the case. Take the example Mr. N. appeals to—Paley. Paley has examined all these subjects with a clear and accurate mind: he has come, and written to show why he has come, to the full conviction of the authenticity and Divine authority of that to which Mr. N. denies both. What kind of logic had he?

But let us ourselves examine the evidence St. Paul affords in writing to the Corinthians. The question was, Will the saints rise again? The proof of the resurrection insisted on as evidence, is the fact of Christ's resurrection; for if there be no resurrection, then Christ is not raised; and the whole gospel, which is really founded on it, falls to the ground. Besides, therefore, a doctrinal statement, to which the evidence of his own mission, already afforded, gave authority, he appeals to historical proofs. And what are they? Some one

\* "How different was his logic [Paul's] from ours! To see the full force of the last remark, we ought to conceive how many questions a Paley would have wished to have asked of Paul; and how many details Paley himself, if he had had the sight, would have felt it his duty to impart to his readers" (Phases, pp. 181, 182).

apparition to an excited individual, whose imagination may have misled him? No; different and repeated manifestations of Himself to persons who very well knew Him; and that, besides its taking place often to those who were intimate with Him, on one occasion it took place in the case of some five hundred persons, of whom the apostle takes care to say, that the greater part are still living, to testify, if needed, to the truth of the statement. Now what so good evidence can you have of a person being actually there, as being repeatedly seen by those who knew him well, his daily companions.— And (if prejudice or feeling may be alleged as leading a dozen of them to concur in and continue a most elaborate falsehood, and suffer for it) having the certainty of the truth confirmed by his being seen by above five hundred persons at once, who were then most of them living to tell the story? It is difficult to imagine what “our logic” could have, in the way of evidence, more convincing.

St. Paul, it is true, does not discuss its validity; but *he produces what is valid*, and that is just what he had to do. We are discussing it now: we do not want St. Paul for that. When he wrote, they were living to be examined who had seen him. What other kind of evidence would Mr. Newman require? What other could he have? Would he require some palpable proof of its being real? Christ eats and drinks with them after He rose from the dead. Is he still unbelieving? Thomas, happily for us, had the same scepticism; and Christ's wounded side and pierced hands extorted the acknowledgment of the fact, and of the Divine Person to whom such a fact testified.

And remark here, we are discussing the nature of the evidence afforded.\* It will be said, “You should bring the proof of enemies as well as friends.” Were such adduced, it

\* Mr. Newman says, “He does not afford to us the means of sifting and analysing his testimony”; but he did, in the fullest way, to those to whom he wrote—giving the names of those well known, and adducing five hundred others who were, he declared, mostly then alive; so that there was the fullest means afforded to sift his testimony. As far as the lapse of eighteen hundred years allows, there is the amplest opportunity given now.

would have been equally alleged, they would not have known Him; and if convinced, were they to be excluded as witnesses, because they were honest enough to become friends? Must a man be necessarily a sceptic to have truth and sense? I judge a man honest who avows his convictions and suffers for them. I can produce thousands, aye millions, of sceptics, who are constantly making profession, for their ease' sake, of this and many things beside, which they do not believe. This was certainly not the course of those who received and professed the testimony of Jesus. But I do bring the best proof of that kind; that is, of thousands of enemies thoroughly convinced by the evidence they had where the facts occurred, so that they embraced and suffered for the truth of it.

Among them was St. Paul, who not for his conviction, but that he might be an eye-witness, did see Him when he was an enemy. He very modestly introduces this, with the expression of the sense of his own unworthiness; but declares expressly, as he does elsewhere, that he saw the Lord. St. Paul then produces five hundred witnesses, and declares they are alive. The simplicity of the proof needed no comment. It has the dignity of a plain, unanswerable testimony. It wanted no "extravagating,"\* no "revelling" in it. It carried its own weight. He adduces his own testimony in the same simple way—"Last of all He was seen of me also."

Mr. Newman asks, "Did he see Him as a man in a fleshly body, or as a glorified heavenly form?" (Phases, p. 182).

There was such a manifestation of glory as left no mistake with any present, though they were not intended to be eye-witnesses of Jesus, nor to hear his voice. The general blaze of glory and the sound from heaven confounded them, and they fell to the earth. Paul, to whom the Lord meant to reveal Himself, then saw the glorified Lord, and heard his voice speaking to him—answered Him, received his reply at large and in detail. He made no mistake as to the glorious

\* "Conceive, farther, how a Paley would have dealt with so astounding a fact, so crushing an argument, as the appearance of the risen Jesus to *five hundred brethren* at once! How would he have extravagated and revelled in proof! How would he have worked the topic! . . . Yet Paul dispatches the affair in one line" (Phases, pp. 182, 183).

light; and when One who gave such plain proof of glory, and whom he saw in a glory which surpassed the sun's brightness, declared to him himself that He was Jesus, Paul believed the glorious One he saw from heaven. Perhaps Mr. Newman might not have done so, might have been "disobedient to the heavenly vision;" but I know not that he would have proved his wisdom in his disobedience. And though Mr. N. does not like threats, there certainly is a day which will declare it, or the grace which has forgiven it—as the Lord grant it may be. But this was not all the evidence Paul had, nor all he refers to. A godly, sober man, well reported of by his enemies and the truth's, but whom he did not know, comes to him unsent for, and declares to him that he has had a vision, and that he has been sent to him by the same Jesus who had appeared to him by the way; and not only this, but that he had been sent to give him back his sight, which accordingly took place, and moreover that he should receive the Holy Ghost. Accordingly we find Saul, previously astounded by the vision, and the immense revolution it must have produced in his mind to find he was fighting against the Lord of glory, and that all the heads of his religion were the bitter enemies of the glorious Christ of the God they professed to serve—we find him, I say, boldly, with great force and conviction, proving that the Jesus whose disciples he persecuted was indeed the Christ, and soon naturally becoming himself the object of persecution, but persevering to the end.

Now was the glory seen by all; the confounding voice from heaven—the vision of His person by Saul—the detailed conversation in which he was convinced and his mission given to him, confirmed by the independent evidence of Ananias the righteous Jew—his receiving his sight and such spiritual power as confounded the Jews that dwelt at Damascus—all confirming the reality of the positive declaration of One whom he saw in glory, that He was Jesus—evidence which changed the man's whole life, of such a character as proved a man had "lax notions of evidence,"\* because he was convinced by it.

\* "How can I believe, *at second hand*, from the word of one whom I discern to hold such lax notions of evidence?" (Phases, p. 183).

I apprehend that when he had himself seen the Lord, talked with Him, received sight from Him, and power, he did not think much about notions of evidence, because he had a full revelation for himself. He might leave it easily to sceptics, and wonder at their notions, well convinced that "if his gospel was hid, it was hid to them that are lost, in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine into them." He had seen that Just One and heard the words of his mouth. He had told him who He was. All was confirmed by signs of power and holiness and truth. What needed he more?

And remark here, that all the testimony of the apostle bears the stamp of this for some thirty years after. His gospel is "the gospel of the glory of Christ." He knows Him only in this way, knows Him for himself—his doctrine, the union of the Church with Him who said, "*I am Jesus*, whom thou *persecutest*"—the deliverance from Jewish habits of thinking in so remarkable a way—the very hatred of the Jews perpetuated to this day—all bear the stamp of the origin of his mission by this vision of Christ. As to the character of his testimony, Mr. Newman does not deny it; but effects show, more or less, their cause. And then here it was exactly what was needed, if it be true; just the point of progress at which Christianity had arrived. The Jews who sent Saul had denied and rejected it. The time was come to bring in the Church as such, and the common place of the Gentiles dropping the privileges of the Jews, forfeited by rebellion persevered in against mercy; for they had "filled up their sins, and wrath was come upon them to the uttermost." The doctrine of Paul—of the reception of the Gentiles, and the building of the Church in union with its Head, Christ in glory—all flows naturally and necessarily from the vision on the way to Damascus. The sovereign grace which gave it to a Saul, stamped its character throughout.

My business is not with the logic of the apostle, but with his truth, with his testimony. I may look for it in Mr. Newman; and his reasonings, which expect logic from a

witness, instead of his testimony, are as illogical as they are narrow and petty in their scope of apprehension of the character and effect of the evidence.

Mr. Newman says, "Peter does not attest the *bodily*, but only the *spiritual* resurrection of Jesus" (Phases, p. 184). I can only say to this, that Mr. N.'s views of Greek are as narrow as of logic. Indeed, he must be a hardy man, and have very "lax notions of evidence," who could allege Peter as one who attested only the spiritual resurrection of Jesus. He it is who declared the twelve were witnesses of it, having eaten and drank with Him after He rose from the dead. They preached Jesus and the resurrection—that neither did his soul remain in Hades, *nor* his flesh see corruption. He it was who proposed that one of those who had constantly companied Jesus should be with them—a witness of his resurrection.

But will Mr. Newman say that *ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι* or *τω π.* means simply that His spirit was raised and not His body? Is that the simple force of the dative in Greek, viz., to be the direct object of the active power of the verb? Mr. N. knows just as well as I do that it is not; and that his remark has no solid foundation whatever. For if Mr. N.'s remark has any weight, it is that *ζ. π.* meant that his spirit was made alive. On the face of it this would be absurd, because the only thing put to death, if we so take it, was the flesh; for it is said, *θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί.* The inquiry as to the Messianic prophecies remains.

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One or two general remarks may be in place here.

The Rationalists, having not the least idea of God's thoughts and plan in Scripture, never of course can weigh the bearing of its parts in reference to it; hence their comments are the most childish things imaginable.

Their system—"our logic"—is this. They first settle, that there can be no prophecy nor miracle, consequently when certain facts are prophetically stated, it is an evident necessary proof that the book containing them was written after the event referred to. Then they discuss all the possible events alluded to, and each has his notion, so that you are in a sea of conjectures. Divers documents are discovered—good Hebrew and bad Hebrew—at any rate contradictory Hebrew is set in

movement to settle the dates; and Jewish malice against the Gentiles, and every other notion imaginable is referred to to explain what Hezekiah's, or somebody else's prophets mean. The false prophets were as good as their neighbours, only, not supporting the Levitical priesthood, they went to the wall. In my judgment, it is impossible to conceive any thing more puerile.

But there is one thing in "modern logic" that I confess is a riddle to me, *i.e.* why such amazing time and labour is spent—why year after year some new *Einleitung* appears—so that a man must have a good constitution to "keep up" with the ephemeral systems which teem from German imagination—and a memory (hopeless in attainment for most) to keep *in* all he gets through—why, I say, all this labour should be spent upon a book, of which the contents are but the lucubrations of a very ignorant age, a very prejudiced people, and upon productions which are the grossest impostures, pretending to be prophecies, but written *après coup*.

Think of persons writing long introductions to the Sibyl oracles, which they believe to be a fabrication—or even on the Koran, which is only an imposture!

Mahommedans, no doubt, discuss this; but at least they believe it. Targums and Talmuds expound or add to the law and the prophets; but their authors own what they comment on to be divine. It was reserved for rationalists to exercise their laborious ingenuity, one after another, in expounding and discussing the merits, dates, circumstances of publication, character, object, intentions, style, and import of what they believe to be a priestly and prejudiced imposture.

How mighty is the word of God! It not only flows deep, clear, fructifying, gladdening, saving, for him who drinks its exhaustless waters, but extorts the inevitable homage of those who deny it.

If I must go to Germany, I would say we had thought that our *Rhein Ström* was ours; but if its *Wegthal* serves as a barrier only between us and our enemies, our stream shall excite their wonder and admiration; and they will seek to profit for themselves and their glory of what they would deprive us of. Though dwelling on the other side of the barrier, they must

still speak the language of this. If the wickedness of Ashdod is come in, they half speak the Jews language.

But another difficulty presents itself here. The prophets delivered their prophecies to the people. They were published prophecies. "Hezekiah's prophets prophesied publicly in Hezekiah's time. Is it not a singular thing that they should have been able to impose histories as prophecies on those that heard them? They must have written them afterwards, we are told; because, after all, they do speak of certain events: but then how could they appear to be prophets to persons who knew the history, and who must have been glad enough to have shewn that they were not, from the way in which they denounced their conduct? Either the events are not so spoken of as to prove they wrote after them, or it is for a rationalist credulity alone to suppose that they could present them at the time as prophecies of the future.

But I turn to what is more important. The result of the rationalist system is, that they never examine the prophetic scriptures as a whole, and hence are totally incapable of estimating the value or real bearing of the parts. Mr. Newman has had greater advantages than they, and often seeks to use them against the Christian faith. It is a painful thing to see how often he speaks the language of Canaan, while he labours in the spirit of a Philistine. Still he has chosen to take up the rationalist system. Now, I affirm, that according to its own clear contents, be they true or false, all Scripture is Messianic, from Genesis to Revelation—from the promise that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head—yea, from "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (for according to Scripture all things were created by Him and for Him), until "Even so, come, Lord Jesus"—"the first and the last"—the testimony as well as the purposes of God refer to (have as their object) Him, who, the wisdom of God before the worlds, was all his delight in this, who first descended and then ascended that He might fill all things.

Now there are two great subjects of Scripture besides:—*i.e.*  
1. That which speaks of man's sin, and the change in him needed

\* "The really Messianic prophecies appeared to me to be far fewer than is commonly supposed" (Phases, p. 192).

to enjoy the blessing, and the redemption accomplished, that we may be with God, with all its varied effects and glories;—and, 2. The government of this world. Some true and devoted Christians have looked only at the first as the great vital necessity—as it is—but, having thus dropped the other when the Scriptures which applied to it were before their minds, they were bewildered as to the interpretation of them. There are the sufferings of Christ, and the glories that should follow. These glories include many parts, inasmuch as God, for the administration of the fulness of times, will head up all in Christ, of things in heaven and things on earth. Every\* family in heaven and earth comes under the name of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Now, no doubt the Lord Jesus suffered amongst the Jews; and this made one ground of Jehovah's judicial dealings with them, as Isaiah and Zechariah and the Psalms abundantly testify. But the *government* of the world is the great subject treated of in the prophetic books. And we are expressly told Deut. xxxii. 8, that when the Most High divided unto the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Adam, He set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the children of Israel. God made Israel the centre of his earthly government. The profane history of nations, in fact, centres round it, Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, all contend for it, are known in connection with it, or actually get their full imperial possession and character at the time they acquired possession of it—I do not say, by gaining possession of it, but at the epoch at which they did. Clouds of dark traditions, scarce pierced by modern researches, hang over all the rest, and obscure their history, while they reveal their existence.

In the neighbourhood of Israel all is light. Prejudiced; ignorant, barbarous as they may have been, they possess and shed the light of their history on all the nations around them. It is preserved almost with modern accuracy, when a few

\* In the English translation, it is *the whole* family; but, *πασα πατρια*, I apprehend, is every family, not the whole family. It is in contrast with the idea "Thee only have I known of all the families of the earth," addressed to Israel.

fragments scarce rescue from entire oblivion other ancient histories. We must disentomb the remains of the Thebes and the Ninevehs to get at the history of their ancient monarchs, to know their dynasties, and say even if there were two Assyrian empires, or one, while, by God's providence, that which gives some historic data to the glories of Mizraim and Ashur, confirms in its detail that of which we have already the minutest particulars in Israel's authentic history. We find, in pictures yet fresh on the lore-covered walls of the country of the Pharaohs, the very kinds of overseers over the Jews making their bricks, of which Moses speaks in the book of Exodus. Modern research alone has given the place and importance to these countries which the Scriptures had already assigned them.

Now, when is this great drama of this world's history to find its *denouement* and its close, according to the Scriptures? Not clearly till the end. It would be an absurdity to suppose such a thing—a denial of the terms in their proper meaning. Scripture places it at the end—speaks of the Lord coming in glory—of the destruction of the Assyrian—of the beast—of the false prophet—of Gog, and that by a grand day which should “burn as an oven”; a day in which the glory of the Lord should be revealed, and all flesh see it together, in which, by fire and sword, the Lord would plead with all flesh, and the slain of the Lord should be many; a day when a man should be more precious than the fine gold of Ophir; when God would punish the world for its evil, and the wicked for their iniquity; when the Lord would come forth out of his place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their iniquity; when the earth would uncover her blood, and no more cover her slain. Is it not equally declared, that when He came there was no man, when He called there was none to answer—that He should give his back to the smiters, and his cheeks to them that plucked off the hair, nor hide his face from shame and spitting—that his visage should be so marred more than any man, and his countenance more than the sons of men—even that Servant was to be exalted and extolled, and be very high—that He was to be despised and rejected of men, to make his soul an offering for sin, and bear their

iniquities—that they should look on Him whom they had pierced, and mourn for him? Accordingly we find, in the Psalms, the expression of the deep sense of these sufferings, as Ps. xxii, lxix, cii, and others.

Do not these scriptures, in their general tenor, confirmed as they are by hundreds of others and the constant course of God's moral ways in putting suffering on the path of glory—do they not most clearly point out two distinct scenes—a time when the great subject of prophecy, the Son of man, Son of God, should suffer—and a time when glories should follow, in respect of the *government of this world*—and that by judgment being in his hand?

See Psalm ii., compared with the general expression of feeling in the Psalms. Is not the first a declaration of Messiah, He who is King in Zion, and Son of God, set as God's King in spite of all enemies—Adonai laughing to scorn their efforts in the day of his wrath? Yet are not the Psalms, as a whole, the expression of the sorrows and sufferings of the righteous, and of Messiah with them? Is He not David's Lord, called to sit at God's right hand, till He makes his foes his footstool, and the rod of his power goes forth from Zion ruling in the midst of his enemies? Such is the uniform tenor of Scripture in every part. The first song we have after the Exodus (Hannah's, in the beginning of Samuel) sings with a heart confiding in goodness, after its sorrows, the same truths as to Christ, naming Him as the object of hope. Now, I ask, is the destruction of the Assyrian connected with deliverances in power and judgment, or with the suffering of Christ? \* No

\* "The Messiah of Micah however was not Jesus; for He was to deliver Israel from *the Assyrians*, and his whole description is literally warlike. .... This undeniable emptiness of Micah's prophecy extends itself also to that in the ninth chapter of his contemporary, Isaiah,—if, indeed, that splendid passage did not really point at the child Hezekiah. Waving this doubt, it is at any rate clear that the marvellous child on the throne of David was to break the yoke of the oppressive Assyrian with a battle of confused noise, and garments rolled in blood, with burning and fuel of fire. This has nothing at all to do with Jesus" (Phases, pp. 192, 193). The statement is incorrect. It is said, "*Every battle of the warrior is...but this shall be,*" etc. I need not dwell on this; but it shows that an ordinary battle was not in view.

one who has read Scripture can hesitate for a moment as to the answer. The destruction of this powerful enemy, no doubt, will be connected with Him who suffered, but not with the time of his suffering. The two parts of his history (not the length of the interval, *because that did not belong to Israel*, but to the Church) are as clear and distinct as possible. The argument, therefore, of Mr. Newman, that Messiah could not be Jesus, because the prophecies relating to Messiah are connected with the destruction of the Assyrian (Phases, pp. 192, 193), is worse than worthless. I am persuaded he knows better than his pages bear upon their face. That these testimonies of future glory and deliverance then given were comforts to the souls of believers, and sustained their faith in the midst of evil, and consequent judgments falling on the beloved people, I do not doubt; and they were, I doubt not, meant to be so; but the things they prophesied of were different from the present comfort conveyed, though rationalists cannot distinguish these things, nor suppose, with the evident reason for it in the history before them, that God was merciful enough thus to consider the broken-hearted faithful, whom He had taught to confide in Him.

*They* understood it; and, though with much obscurity of mind and many prejudices, gracious confidence in God was maintained; and, through all their darkest times, there were those who feared the Lord and spake often one to another, and who waited for redemption in Israel. I do not spiritualise it; I believe it. I do not believe Jesus has fulfilled the prophecies which speak of the revelation of his glory in judgment and government; but I am sure that that Stone on which those who stumbled have been indeed broken, as we know, will grind to powder those on whom it shall justly fall—that “Stone which the builders rejected, and which is become the head of the corner;” when Hosanna shall be sung, not only by babes and sucklings, to confound the adversary, but by a people to whom every promise shall be fulfilled, and by a world dwelling in peace under the blessing of Him for whose law the isles shall wait, and whose sceptre shall be their confidence and their blessing—the King of righteousness and King of peace.

I will now show that on this point Mr. Newman is as incorrect in detail, as he is narrow and superficial in his apprehension of the whole—more than narrow; for he connects parts of which the least attention or understanding would show the distinctness. Indeed, his remarks prove, either that he has not attended to what he is talking about, or that he is incapable of seizing its bearing. Not a prophecy connects the Assyrian with the sufferings of Christ. But Mr. N. refers particularly to the passage in Micah, which he declares cannot apply to Jesus. “The Messiah of Micah however was not Jesus; for he was to deliver Israel from the Assyrians, and his whole description is literally warlike” (Phases, p. 192).

We had better have the passage, it will help to show the value of “our logic,” and of rationalist comments in general. It is as follows:—“Now gather thyself in troops, O daughter of troops: he hath laid siege against us: they shall smite the Judge of Israel with a rod upon the cheek. But thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall He come forth unto me that is to be Ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting. Therefore will He give them up, until the time that she which travaileth hath brought forth: then the remnant of his brethren shall return unto the children of Israel. And He shall stand and feed in the strength of the Lord, in the majesty of the name of the Lord his God; and they shall abide: for now shall He be great unto the ends of the earth. And this man shall be the peace, when the Assyrian shall come into our land,” etc.; then we have victories attributed to the Jews; and they become the source of blessing to the earth—as a lion and yet as a dew among many people (Micah v). Now, whatever the explanation of the detail, which I do not think indeed exceedingly obscure, it is quite clear that the smiting of the Judge of Israel on the cheek is followed, not by the destruction of the Assyrian, but by their being given up for a period designated by “until she which travaileth shall have brought forth.” Whatever may be in the womb of God’s purposes, till it be accomplished, the Jews will be given up. There is one period or order of things; the Judge of Israel not warlike, but

smitten, and they given up in consequence. Then we have another, "He stands and feeds in the majesty of the Lord, for *now* shall He be great to the ends of the earth; and *when* the Assyrian comes into their land, this Man—this same Jesus will be the peace, and Israel great and glorious." Can any thing be plainer than the distinction of these two conditions of the Judge of Israel, and the two states of Israel—given up at one time—and at another defended in peace, victorious, and a blessing.

And this is adduced to show "that the Messiah of Micah was not Jesus, because he was to deliver Israel from the Assyrians, and his whole description is literally warlike"—"and Micah conceived of a powerful monarch on the throne of David;" but it is a singular sign of power that He should be smitten on the cheek, and Israel given up, none could say till when: till the birth of the fruit of some great purpose of God! Such interpretation entitles us to lay aside the conclusions and the judgment of him who has pretended to speak of the passage, and to put no further confidence in any thing he alleges about the Scriptures. The same train of reasoning applies to Isaiah viii. in even a stronger way. "Sanctify the Lord of Hosts Himself; and let Him be your fear, and let Him be your dread. And He shall be for a sanctuary; but for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offence to both the houses of Israel, for a gin and for a snare to the inhabitants of Jerusalem. And many among them shall stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken. Bind up the testimony, seal the law among my disciples. And I will wait upon the Lord, that hideth his face from the house of Jacob, and I will look for him." And then, he goes on to describe the misery of the great and final vexation of Israel, after He had already arrived, and then (by Messiah) their deliverance from every yoke, and His glorious reign, through this battle, not like that of ordinary warriors, but of fuel and fire. Can any thing more clearly distinguish the two dates—one, God's hiding His face from stumbling Israel—and another, the glorious subsequent deliverance by the Lord? But it is well to pursue the spirit of rationalism into some further details.

I admit that Psalm lxxii.\* has never yet been fulfilled. The son of David has never yet sat on the throne of His glory as such. We may leave it—as Mr. Newman himself must be a prophet to say that this prediction never will be fulfilled.

Isaiah xi. † “may be verified by Jesus hereafter.”

Well, I believe the greater part will; so here we have not much to contend about. Still Mr. Newman repents of the seeming candour of his acknowledgment, and so says it cannot be, for Judah and Israel had been reconciled long before the time of Augustus. When? A few of the ten tribes had from the beginning thrown themselves into the kingdom of Judah; but when were the ten tribes reconciled? I never heard of it; I thought they were carried away captive by Shalmaneser and others—that faith always owned them as a whole, from Elijah on his Carmel to Paul and James is true; but that is nothing to the purpose. Besides, the prophet is speaking of what they will do, when as tribes they are restored in blessing and power to their land. Then will there no more be these quarrels. The distinction of Philistines, Moab, and Ammon, are lost to Mr. Newman. They are not to this day by the Jew; and such distinctions are much more preserved than people suppose, and will, I doubt not, re-appear, and Israel will dispossess the people inhabiting these countries. These testimonies, as to the future, must have their credit, it is perfectly evident, from the general proof of the authority of the prophecy; no one can, as to the future, have any other proof unless he sets up to be a prophet himself.

\* “The 72nd Psalm, by the splendour of its predictions concerning the grandeur of some future king of Judah, earns the title of Messianic, *because* it was never fulfilled by any historical king. But it is equally certain that it has had no appreciable fulfilment in Jesus” (Phases, p. 194).

† “A Paraisaical state is to follow :—This general description *may* be verified by Jesus *hereafter* . . . Indeed the latter part of the prophecy is out of place even for so late a time as the reign of Augustus. . . . Take all these particulars together [verses 13—10], and the prophecy is neither fulfilled in the past, nor possible to be fulfilled in the future” (Phases, p. 194, 195). “Philistines, Moab, and Ammon were distinctions entirely lost before the Christian era” (Phases, 194).

I will not here discuss whether Zechariah ix.—xi. be really the prophecy of him whose name it bears. Many sincere Christians have doubted it, though not doubting its inspiration, partly on account of the word "Jeremiah," in Matthew. Mr. Newman says it is agreed to be really from a prophet of unknown name, contemporaneous with Isaiah. But we must never trust these kinds of statements of rationalists. "It is agreed," means merely, "it suits our views," or "our logic." Thus De Wette himself, in his last edition, translated by Theodore Parker—an authority logical enough, I suppose for Mr. N.—after stating the opinion alluded to, re-examines the language and allusions to previous prophets, and concludes, "These circumstances show that it could not have been written before the exile. . . . therefore it may seem the most advisable to suppose that those parts which seem to belong to an earlier period, were written with reference to the future, and that the form of a prediction was adopted in part." I have nothing to do with what it is "advisable to suppose," which is generally the just measure of rationalist proof; but the statement of De Wette gives a just measure of another thing; that is the value of such phrases as "it is agreed." Nor is this all—"The genuineness has been defended by Carpzov, Beckhaus, Jahn, Rosenmüller, Koester, Hengstenberg; Blayney also attempted it," so says Theodore Parker. It may be said, "Yes; but there are some of them at least twenty or thirty years past, some more." But then we have the awkward fact, that De Wette, in the fifth (and, I suppose, even in the fourth) edition, more modern, and, we must suppose, more mature than the first three, undoes the previous theory started originally by Mede. Not from orthodox prejudices, certainly; but, it must be supposed, from his more exact enquiry. Koester, others think, has demonstrated the genuineness of these chapters; that is, their being the work of Zechariah.

One thing is certain, that those who do not receive it as genuine, not only do not agree with one another, and demonstrate, each to his own satisfaction, what upsets the opinion of his neighbour, such as Flugge, Berthold, Hitzig, Credner, referred to by T. Parker, but they do not agree with themselves. De Wette, we have seen, concludes he was quite

wrong in referring it to an earlier date. So Hitzig once placed the whole in the time of Uzziah, but is now compelled to place it after that time. In a word, it is a mere collection of guesses, without any real foundation to build a sober judgment upon. For my own part, I have not a doubt on the subject. The mention of Jeremiah,\* in Matthew, creates a critical difficulty as to the quotation; but the solution which refers Zechariah to some unknown prophet of Isaiah's time, with the convenient formula "it is agreed," when nothing at all is agreed about among themselves, is, of all solutions, the most unfounded. Very few of the boldest agree in this.

The proofs that Zechariah wrote after the captivity, are, to my own mind, decisive—I mean, wrote these chapters—for none question his prophesying after it. In the first place, they have always been received by the Jews as his prophecy. They form part of the Septuagint translation, which, allowing the prophets to have been translated even a hundred years after the Pentateuch and Joshua, yet gives us Zechariah, as we have it, more than a hundred and fifty years before Christ.† Hody supposes the prophets translated in the reign of Philometer, that is, it was then publicly and universally received by the Jews, as we have it. But the internal evidence is to my mind demonstrative of its being written after the captivity. Chapter x. 6, to the end, clearly shows the condition of Judah and Ephraim. The cutting off the chariot from Ephraim, and the horse from Jerusalem, connected with the dominion of Messiah, is the taking away war from the earth

\* It is well known, that Lightfoot, and other learned men, as Surenhusius, consider this as a well-known formula of Jewish citation, that is, using the first book as the title of the part of Scripture, as the Lord does the Psalms—the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms. It appears that, in the Talmudist's age, Jeremiah had this place, and they give sundry reasons for its being there, on account of Kings ending in sorrow, and Jeremiah taking this sorrow up, etc. I am aware Stuart and others say this was only so in the Talmudist's age, not so early as Christ. I do not pretend to decide this question; but the expression, "Jeremiah, or one of the prophets," certainly tends very strongly to confirm the idea that it was so in Christ's age.

† The postscript to Esther, in the Septuagint translation, has led authors to ascribe this date to it. Hody refers to other circumstances in his account.

when the universal dominion of Messiah is established. The prophecy applies to the time "when the eyes of man, as of all the tribes of Israel shall be towards the Lord," that is, to a time when the glory and dominion of the Lord, yet future, shall be completely established. The conflict of all Israel would be with Javan, or Greece, a statement which would have no kind of sense on Mr. Newman's rationalist theory. What had Greece to do with the times of Shalmanezzer.\* Indeed, as to his account of the prophecy, the best answer is to ask my reader to read it through; the flippancy of Mr. N's assertions will be apparent to every one who does. . Obscurity we may doubtless find; but that it has "no remote or imaginable similarity to the historical life of Jesus," is an assertion which no reader of the eleventh chapter would have ventured, unless one who counted upon the credulity of his readers, or upon what is always an unwise thing, their confidence in the assertions of a rationalist. The accomplishment of the prophecy in its main intent, is, I have no doubt, future, as is that of all which completes and makes good God's government of this earth; and necessarily so, for the result of that government we all know is not yet come.

I turn to Isaiah l. and liii.† Mr. Newman's "pseudo-Isaiah," a title than which there cannot be a greater absurdity imaginable.

These famous rationalists, because the prophet places himself as if in Babylon,‡ or at least speaks of it as a present thing, have "agreed" that the author must have lived there, as if it

\* "The prophecy which we know as Zechariah ix.—xi. is agreed to be really from a prophet of unknown name, contemporaneous with Isaiah. It was written while Ephraim was still a people, i.e. before the capture of Samaria by Shalmanezzer, and chap. xi. 1—3. appears to howl over the recent devastations of Tiglath-pilezer. The prophecy is throughout full of the politics of that day" (Phases, p. 195).

† "Chapters l. and liii. of the pseudo-Isaiah remained; which contained many phrases so aptly descriptive of the sufferings of Christ, and so closely knit up with our earliest devotional associations that they were the very last links of my chain that snapt. Still, I could not conceal from myself, that no exactness in this prophecy, however singular, could avail to make out that Jesus was the Messiah of Hezekiah's prophets. There must be *some* explanation; and if I did not see it, that must probably arise from prejudice and habit." (Phases, p. 196).

‡ "This prophet writes from Babylon" (Phases, p. 196).

was not the style of the prophets in unnumbered other instances, and thus one of the most complete, perfect, and connected prophecies in existence, developing the present relationship of Israel with God; God's intentions as to their restoration; the witness against idolatry to which they were called; their rejection of Messiah; return in the latter days to idolatry; the Lord's judgment, and their final glory, unfolded in incomparable language, which does not for a moment, in point of style, admit the supposition of the Babylonish captivity as a date, has been foisted by some unknown author on the Jews, as that of Isaiah. The prophecy is the noblest incomparably of all Scripture. It is very little matter to us who believe it to come from God, whether Isaiah or any other prophet be its author, save collaterally, as shaking the general credibility of all testimony, but to suppose that nobody ever heard of the real writer, though his prophecy entitled him to the very first place, and hence that it was ascribed to a more obscure one, is perfectly incredible. Supposing I were to say Isaiah was the author of chap. xl.—lxvi. and that men have ascribed the former part to him, that it might get the credit of the great name of the author of the latter part, the only answer would be—"You may say anything."

The reader may judge of the candour of rationalist arguments from the following:—The one continuous prophecy of chaps. xl.—lxvi. of Isaiah, has given a colour to the style which is unique. Some expressions, such as "burden of the Lord" are not found in it. This could not be otherwise if the subject be considered. It is a long moral reasoning with Israel on idolatry (they being witnesses of Jehovah) in contrast with Babylon—on Messiah's rejection—their state in the end of time—the admission of the Gentiles—and their future glory. The burdens on particular places had no application here whatever. They would have been wholly out of place. This is a proof it is not Isaiah's! But there are peculiarities of Isaiah's language which are found to be such as are connected with essential and permanent subjects. How are these to be got rid of? "But these peculiarities, which it has in common with the genuine portion, and others adduced by Jahn and Müller, prove nothing." Will the reader guess why? "Their agree-

ment in this respect *cannot* have been accidental, and must be explained as an imitation of the genuine, or in some other way.\* Our logic! Here are the reasons given by the chief of the learned rationalist school:—"There is a difference in style." Of that in a moment. "There is a difference in the political relationship of the people." This is because restoration is predicted as if Jerusalem were already desolate. Were it even so, it would not be less prophecy—but the fact is, it proves nothing: the prophet, as is so constantly the case, transports himself into the times he speaks of. He does so as to John Baptist; he does so as to the times of Christ (chap. liii.); as to the times of the Jews owning Christ, in the same chapter. They say "He was wounded," etc., so chap. lxxv. the admission of the Gentiles, "I am sought," etc. So in what is confessed to be Isaiah—"To us a son is born, to us a king is given." This, therefore, proves just nothing. "The internal condition of the nation is different." The proof of this is Isaiah lvi. 10—12. "It has only overseers or watchmen to govern it." But in Babylon it had not even these, nor is there a word about government; besides, we have already seen the prophet supposes himself in the scene he describes, only that this proof contradicts the theory, because in Babylon they had nobody to govern them but Nebuchadnezzar and his successors. Moreover, the reader may see that the prophet refers to quite a new dispensation, in which those, excluded by the law and the Gentiles, would be admitted into God's house, chap. lvi. 3—7. "His house is to be called a house of prayer for all people."

It is said, that the idolatry mentioned "lvii. 3, seqq." may very properly be ascribed to the Babylonian Jews. In ver. 3 there is no idolatry mentioned at all; but this "seqq.," thus slightly passed over, has something rather awkward in it. In ver. 5 it is said, "Enflaming yourselves under every green tree." It is hard to suppose that the hanging gardens made for Nebuchadnezzar's queen were the resort of the "Babylonian Jews." But further—we have "slaying the children in the valleys under the cliffs of the rocks." I am afraid that this was beyond even the royal imitation of Median mountains, and

\* Parker's De Wette, 2nd Edition, ii. p. 368, note.

that this "seqq.," if we look beyond the four letters, is a very serious obstacle to this Babylonian "internal condition of the nation." But the writer slips off with an "especially" to Isaiah lxx. 3—11. But here other difficulties arise. Verses 1, 2 give the call of the Gentiles, which hardly suited Babylonish times. Not only so, but ver. 6, 7 declare that the Lord is going to judge them, and recompense them for their iniquity—a singular threat, if they were already Babylonish Jews. We are told that, in lxxvi. 1—3, "It is not supposed that there is an actual temple existing, where service is performed." "Where is the house that ye build me?" is the word. Not in Babylon, I suppose. But we have not our "seqq." here; which, however, I must beg leave to introduce, as having something to say to it. "A voice of noise from the city, a voice from the temple"—I suppose that implies "an actual temple existing." And yet we have the Lord coming to judgment and to plead with all flesh, yet rejecting the mass of the Jews, and only sparing a remnant; destroying these idolaters, Jew or Gentile, yet at a time when all flesh come up to worship Jehovah, and bring Israel as a clean vessel unto the house of the Lord; and the carcasses of the transgressors are found in the neighbourhood, as a spectacle to them who come up.

Now, what has all this to do with writing in captivity in Babylon, or even a return at that time from thence? Why do I cite these things? To show that rationalist statements must never be credited without examining for oneself; to show that they are most excessively "superficial," and their authors totally ignorant of the scope of Scripture, and indeed of the contents of the books on which they pretend to comment.

"There are references to earlier prophecies." God challenges the idolatrous prophets to utter a prophecy which should show their divine knowledge. He declares that He knows the end from the beginning, that his former words had taken effect. Well, I believe that; but how it proves that it was written when the Jews were in Babylon, or why Isaiah could not have said it, I am, I avow, unable to discover. The reader has only to examine the passages, to see that there is a general statement of the certainty of God's word, and the

folly of idolaters. No particular prophecy is referred to, though there were such, and had been many in Israel's history. Not a word of Samuel's fell to the ground; and a multitude of others had appeared, noticed in the historical books; to say nothing of Joel, Amos, etc.: so that this reference to God's prophetic word does not prove much.

Lastly, "There are predictions of a splendid future uttered with as much distinctness as if it were present, and not in harmony with the state of things in Isaiah's time and the actual result." Well, "There are predictions of a splendid future." But how does that show the Jews were in Babylon? "They *are* uttered with great distinctness." But why could not Isaiah, the son of Amoz, do that in Jotham's, Ahaz's, or Hezekiah's reign? But they "are not in harmony with the state of things in Isaiah's time."\* What are not? The "predictions of a splendid future, uttered with as much distinctness as if it were present"? But I suppose they were "not in harmony with the state of things in Isaiah's time," or it would not have been "a splendid *future*" at all.

You have now, reader, all the reasons alleged by the most learned rationalists—those Mr. Newman particularly refers his readers to—for stating, without leaving room for a question, that the last twenty-seven chapters of what we believe to be the word of God by the mouth of the prophet, are the production of a pseudo Isaiah. As to the style, which does resemble in many peculiarities, and must be disposed of by supposing imitation,

\* I dare say many of my readers will be utterly at a loss to understand the meaning of this argument. I must remind them, that rationalist writers always assume what they have to prove: viz., that there cannot be prophecy. Then, in order to prove that this part of Isaiah was not written by him, they allege that the description of blessing does not suit the time of Hezekiah, when such could scarcely be expected. It is clear, if it is a prophecy of Israel's portion at the end of time, after Christ's rejection, it is all one whether it is written in Hezekiah's time, or at some other moment. Having assumed that it is not, the rationalist seeks about to find some time when an impostor was likely to have spoken in this way, and to try to deceive the people with similar hopes—a notable employment for time and learning, and a convenient kind of logic, which assumes, without a blush, what the whole argument depends upon.

or in some other way, the following is the judgment of one who has examined it with the help of all the rationalist writers and the answers to them: "The argument has been completely taken out of the hands of those who regard the latter part of his [Isaiah's] prophecies as unauthentic."\*

I turn to what Mr. Newman says of the contents. We have more rationalist logic here, but which I shall notice without dwelling upon. "Still," says Mr. N., "I could not conceal from myself that no exactness in this prophecy, however singular, could avail to make out that Jesus was the Messiah of Hezekiah's prophets. There must be *some explanation*" (Phases, p. 196). That was settled, at any rate; the only business was to find it. Let me suggest one here to Mr. N., which he need not have been very long looking for. He had told us in the page before, that it is a pseudo-Isaiah; so that he was not one of Hezekiah's prophets at all. How hard to remember one's own system, if it is only *made up*! Mr. N. says that the prophet "introduces to us an eminent and 'chosen servant of God,' whom he invests with all the evangelical virtues, and declares that he is to be a light to the Gentiles. In chap. xlv. (ver. 1—also ver. 21), he is named as 'Jacob my servant' . . . Chap. xlix. 1—12 is eminently Messianic to the Christian ear, except that in ver. 3 the speaker distinctly declares himself to be (not Messiah, but) Israel. It is essential to understand the same 'elect servant' all along" (id. ib.) The word "servant" does give the running key to all this part of Isaiah. In chap. xlii. the servant is described as one in whom God's soul delighted, on whom He would put his Spirit, and he should show forth judgment to the Gentiles. It is the well-known passage universally applied to Christ, in which Israel is not mentioned; but some one on whom the Spirit should be, to show judgment to the Gentiles. In general, in this part of the prophecy, Israel is called God's "servant," though in this description Christ is introduced. From xlii. 19, Israel, "the people robbed and spoiled," is repeatedly referred to as Jehovah's servant, in contrast with the worshippers of idols; thus in this verse (19), then all through xliii. (see ver. 10,

\* Davidson on Biblical Criticism.

xliv. 1), "Israel my servant." All here is controversy with idols. Cyrus is introduced by name (xlv. 1.) Jacob is God's servant (ver 4). Babylon is judged (xlvi. xlvii.). Rebellious as Israel is, the Lord hath redeemed his servant Jacob (xlviii.). This closes that part of the prophecy, with the word repeated at the end of lvii.—"There is no peace, saith the Lord, unto the wicked"—Jew or Gentile (for in this part of the prophecy the Spirit opens out into larger spiritual views, without departing from God's actual government in Israel), he must come under God's moral judgment.

Chap. xlix. introduces an entirely new ground of controversy with Israel—their *refusing to listen to and receive the Christ*. Hence xlix. drops the question of idolatry. It introduces Israel, in a formal way, as God's servant on the scene. "Then," if Israel is he in whom Jehovah is to be glorified, "I," says some one, "have laboured in vain." If Israel is the one, my labour is fruitless. That this "I" is not Israel, as Mr. Newman would make it,\* is beyond all controversy. It is easy to say, after speaking of the servant of xlii., "In chap. xlv. *he* is named as 'Jacob my servant, and Israel whom I have chosen'" (Phases, p. 196). He is not named at all. It is easy to say, "The speaker distinctly declares himself to be (not Messiah, but) Israel, in ver. 3." Yes, the speaker in ver. 3 is Israel undoubtedly, and says so; but that is what makes the speaker in ver. 4 say, that he has laboured in vain; and if my reader desires a proof that it is so, he has only to read ver. 5— "And now, saith the Lord that formed me from the womb to be his servant, to bring Jacob again to Him, Though Israel be not gathered, yet shall I be glorious in the eyes of the Lord, and my God shall be my strength... Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel and his Holy One, to Him whom man despiseth, to Him whom the nation abhorreth," etc. Is this speaker Israel? Is it "in vain to call rationalists superficial"? I find them astonishingly so; that is all I can

\* "The appellations recur in xlv. 4, and in a far more striking passage, xlix. 1—12, which is eminently Messianic to the Christian ear, *except* that in ver. 3 the speaker distinctly declares himself to be (not Messiah, but) Israel" (Phases, p. 196).

say. We have, then, clearly some one substituted in the place of Israel as the servant of God in testimony; and the rejection of Him (for He was Jehovah, though he had got the tongue of the learned to speak a word in season to him that was weary, and hid not his face from shame and spitting), assigned as the reason for Jehovah's divorcing Israel. This is the subject of chap. i. The full result in final blessing for Zion and Israel, is pursued to lii. 12; the remnant who listen to the servant, at the end of the age, being marked out in the midst of the sorrow in l. 10. In lii. 13, the servant is introduced again; and it is showed that he whose visage had been marred more than any man's, shall in that day be acknowledged by Israel with profound and touching repentance, which referred itself to Him and to his rejection. He had, indeed, in his rejection, borne their iniquities. Then some truths in general terms are introduced, to allow of the bringing-in of the Gentiles; and Israel, as a whole, is judged for its moral state at the end—as, indeed, in the prophet's day. This is the general character of the prophet's reasoning to the end of lvii. In a word, Gentiles can come in; all will be judged by their works.

Chap. lvii. addresses itself specially to Israel; and goes on, after denouncing their sin, to their final glory, to the end of lx. In lxi. Christ appears as coming in his grace, as when on earth; but his character is pursued until He executes judgment, lxiii. 6. From lxiii. 7 to the end of lxiv. is a touching pleading of the prophet with God for the people of his holiness. In lxv. we have the answer of the Lord, unfolding the letting-in of the Gentiles—his patience with the Jews—their return to idolatry and extreme wickedness in the latter days—the sparing of the remnant—the rejection of the temple they would build, and their sacrifices, but the taking possession of it by the Lord in judgment—the full blessing of Jerusalem—the judgment of all flesh—and the bringing-in of the whole dispersion of Israel to worship—all flesh coming up, but recognising the judgment. In this we find the servants definitely distinguished—the remnant who hear and obey, and are faithful amid unfaithfulness (lxv. 8, 9, 13, 15); who are

then manifested as the elect people in joy, prolonging their days under the government of Him who will then no more allow evil to abide on the earth.

If any one be surprised that the Jews should turn to idolatry again, I reply, the Lord declared, that the unclean spirit which went out, and had left the house empty, swept, and garnished, would return with seven others worse, and the last end be worse than the first. Daniel xi. teaches, I doubt not, the same truth. Thus we have, first, Christ set forth as the true servant of Jehovah; then, in the order of God's dealings, Israel is found to be so; Christ takes their place, they refusing to hearken; He is rejected; and then, redemption being accomplished, and Gentiles let in, the remnant of Israel in the latter day enter into the position of servants.

Mr. Newman borrows the views by which infidel Jews seek to meet Christians; but the examination of the chapters leaves no ground for the argument to stand upon. "He was wounded for our transgressions" meaning, "we were wounded for our own," may suit a Jew or a rationalist, but I know not whom else. Still Mr. N. is forced to admit, "It still remained strange that in Isaiah liii. and Psalms xxii. and lxix. there should be *coincidences* so close with the sufferings of Jesus"; for, after all, whenever it was, they were written centuries before that great event. No doubt. "But I reflected, that I had no proof that the narrative had not been strained by credulity, to bring it into artificial agreement with these imagined predictions of his death" (Phases, p. 197). Had he any proof that it had? Not a trace of one. We have Mr. N.'s own answer to this question in the preceding page: "There must be *some* explanation."\* *Quod volumus facile credimus.* "And herewith," says Mr. N., "my last argument in favour of views for which I once would have laid down my life, seemed to be spent." Accordingly, he turns to arguments against these views. He continues: "Nor only so; but I now reflected that the falsity of the prophecy in Daniel vii. (where the coming of a Son of man to sit in universal judgment follows immediately upon the break-up of the Syrian monarchy), to say nothing of the general proof of the spuriousness of the whole

\* The italics are Mr. Newman's own.

book of Daniel, ought long ago to have been seen by me as of more cardinal importance. For if we believe anything at all about the discourses of Christ, we cannot doubt that he selected 'Son of man' as his favourite title, which is a direct annunciation to us that He based all his pretensions on the seventh chapter of Daniel, from which that title is adopted. On the whole, then, it was no longer defect of proof which presented itself; but positive disproof of the primitive and fundamental claim" (id., pp. 197, 198). This is a startling leap indeed; but I confess I am at a loss here to know the ἀφορμὴν, the starting-point of this amazing result.

In vain I seek for some proof here. "Our logic" does not condescend to give a hint here of any proof of what is asserted as to chap. vii. of Daniel, that the fourth beast is the Syrian monarchy. I turned to De Wette: "Chap. vii.," he tells me, "in Chaldee contains Daniel's vision of the four beasts, which signify so many kingdoms. They are the same as in chap. ii.; but their meaning is contested." Then the note tells us "the first is Babylonian. 2dly. Doubtless the bear means the Medo-Persian kingdom, though some think only the Median. In which case the three ribs are only emblems of frailty (?). Then some think the third Alexander and his successors; some, only Alexander. By the fourth beast some understand the Roman empire [a good many, no doubt]; some, Alexander's successors; some, Alexander and his successors." In conclusion, we are told, since the last explanation is *necessary* in vii. 7, therefore those which harmonise with it are the true ones; that is, the third beast is Persia. "Necessary" it is, no doubt, to the system—"there must be *some* explanation." Because as there cannot be prophecy (for a Jewish prophet cannot, even like an oracle, hazard a mistake), therefore the last event spoken of must be in the time Daniel lived; that is, as he certainly speaks of Antiochus Epiphanes, in his days. But then, if we examine the passage (which, indeed, for a theory which has settled all by begging the question, is not "necessary"), there seems to be no sort of applicability of the fourth beast to the Syrian monarchy. Four wings on a Grecian beast every one would understand. The division of the Grecian empire into four, is given by Daniel himself, in

chap. viii. What had they to do with Persia? Then, how does vii. 7 go on? It describes a fourth beast, dreadful and terrible, and strong exceedingly; and it had great iron teeth; it devoured and brake in pieces, and stamped the residue with the feet of it; and it was diverse from all the beasts that were before it; and it had ten horns. What has this really to do with the Grecian empire, Alexander and his successors? What are the ten horns? "Four" is intelligible; but who are the ten? But with Mr. Newman it is the break up of the Syrian monarchy; but there is no break up here at all. Quite the contrary. The other beasts broke up; their dominion was taken away, but their lives prolonged; but this was slain, destroyed, and given to the burning flames. And this mark is the judgment. There is no "break up," and *then* the judgment. The Son of man, then, takes not the judgment, but the kingdom. The ten kings were ten kings that *shall* arise. So that they were future in Daniel's time, which in the rationalists' theory they were not. And who were the ten up to Antiochus Epiphanes? There had not been even ten kings of Syria. In a word, the moment the passage is looked at, there is not the smallest possible ground for Mr. N.'s assertion.

The examination of the explanation in the latter half of the chapter, makes it still more absurd; for the fourth beast entirely occupies the scene. To make Alexander's successors a fourth kingdom, Alexander being the third, and leave out Egypt, Thrace, and Macedon, is itself an absurd idea for one who is supposed to have the history before him. Again, in what were Alexander's successors more destructive, more powerful, more all-subduing, than Alexander? Did the Syrian monarchs stamp with their feet more than the mighty conqueror of the East? Who is the little horn, who subdued three others? If it be Antiochus Epiphanes, how did he do that? If not, what are the three and a-half times? But the fact is, there is no breaking up of a monarchy.

I have already answered the rest of Mr. Newman's chapter. His supposition as to Newton's system of physical truth not being alleged as a proof of his going up to heaven one night,

is too absurd to refute; because the ascension of Christ is the proof and basis of all that morally affected man in his religion. It was the accomplishment and proof of the glory of his Person, as Mediator, on which the whole religion was founded. If that is not true, none is; it is all an imposture. This is not the case in what Mr. N. supposes; there is no analogy whatever. "Our logic" is no great thing here, either. Besides, a heavenly priest, a man always in heaven, gives its character to the whole moral system. The Person of the Lord Jesus Christ claims the adoring recognition of the soul—is entitled to it as Divine—as human by his work of love. This is neither history nor a proposition. Owning Him for what He is, is the first of all affections, the highest of all moral claims. Thus God Himself is known; to this He claims subjection. One thing is clear from Mr. N.'s statements as to himself—that he never knew the gospel. Indeed, he says, "Undoubtedly, I cannot prove that I ever felt as they now feel" (Phases, p. 201).

He adds, "My first business must be to save my soul from future punishment."\* That this may awaken the soul, is quite true; but our first business is to believe that Jesus is the Son of God. Once known, we bless God for present enjoyment and for present sorrow; for we know He loves and has saved us, and we rejoice in hope of his glory. But Mr. Newman knew nothing of this love to Jesus. Hence the doctrine of the coming of the Lord only "awoke now and then, to reproach and harass me for my unfaithfulness to it" (Phases, p. 204). What a wretched state! instead of looking for that bright and morning star, the loved object of one's soul, and saying, "Even so; come, Lord Jesus," while sure, if He tarries, it is his love, his long-suffering, not willing any should perish; so that we heartily acquiesce in the delay which his love counts as long as does ours. It is the word of his patience we keep. Mr. N. trusts much his moral powers; but he mistakes astonishingly when he talks of "conscience being

\* "2. Its theory was one of selfishness. That is, it inculcated that my first business must be, to save my soul from future punishment, and to attain future happiness" (Phases, p. 203).

benumbed by disuse," because Scripture is used.\* Does a holy rule benumb conscience? It awakens it from its torpor, and, "sharper than any two-edged sword," it brings it into the presence of God. That is not the way to "benumb the conscience, by disuse—it is its only true quickener.

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FACTS AS TO MR. NEWMAN'S CONNECTION WITH OTHER CHRISTIANS, WHILE STRIVING AFTER A PURE CHRISTIANITY, OR THE NARROWNESS OF DOGMATISM.

I TURN now briefly to notice some circumstances to which Mr. Newman refers in his narrative, which have importance only so far as they concern the alleged narrowness of which he accuses dogmatism. That those who were decided in not owning Mr. N. as having the faith of our Lord Jesus, were not very wrong, this book pretty clearly proves. But I must correct some things as to his reception, and the grounds of his rejection. Mr. N.'s account of what led to the "Irish Clergyman's" visiting Oxford, is inexact; but there is nothing that is of the smallest importance to any one. What led him to call in question Mr. N.'s claim to be amongst those who held the full truth as to the divine glory of the Lord Jesus Christ, was this:—A companion of the party who set out for the East (J. H—), returned while they were still in the East, his health suffering from the climate. The person (Mr. J. G. B—) to whom, as I suppose, Mr. N. refers, as "a most intimate spiritual friend," who wrote him word "that painful reports had been everywhere spread abroad against his soundness in the faith," and pointed out the channel, asked J. H— if he thought of returning. At least Mr. J. G. B— did write to Mr. N., stating the doubt as to his soundness in the faith; and he did so, from J. H—'s answer, which was, that it did not suit his health, but that, indeed, at any rate, he could not, for that Mr. N. denied

\* "The Protestantism which forbids us to trust our moral faculties, and pities those as 'without chart and compass' who acknowledge no infallible written code, can mean nothing else, than that 'the less occasion we have to trust our moral powers the better;' that is, it represents it as of all things most desirable, to be able to benumb conscience by disuse, under the guidance of a mind from without" (Phases, p. 207). Did the doctrine which "awoke only now and then, to reproach and harass me for my unfaithfulness," benumb his conscience?

the true divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. Mr. J. G. B— rebuked him for allowing himself to suppose such a thing, refusing to believe it. J. H— declared that, before they arrived at Bordeaux, on their way out,\* Mr. N. was seeking to persuade them of it. The consequence was, Mr. J. G. B— wrote to Mr. N., when in quarantine. The "Irish Clergyman" also wrote, and had a correspondence with Mr. N. Mr. N. admitted fully to him that Jesus was Jehovah. He pressed on him, that if so, the Jehovah of the Old Testament was the only true God. He seemed to be irritated with the conclusion, and though the "Irish Clergyman" pressed the passage, "He is the true God, and eternal life," declared that he would not go from the plain passage. "The Father, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom He had sent." He has not now (it is nineteen years ago) Mr. N.'s letter to him containing this avowal of Jesus being Jehovah, but he has in others abundant proof of it, which will be produced in a moment; he was, however, quite clear that he could not own him as holding the truth of God. Mr. N. states, that the "Irish Clergyman" declared that, in the passage alluded to, the Father meant the Trinity. The "Irish Clergyman," through mercy, has doubtless made progress in the truth, and if not kept through mercy, would be always liable to err, and to say foolish things; but he must certainly doubt that he said the Father meant the Trinity until he sees some proof of it.

Mr. Newman makes a great outcry against the Christians amongst whom he sought to enter, for their bigotry and narrowness. Of course, as Mr. N. now thinks God a very little matter, provided people are amiable; his denying Christ, or having a false one, and worshipping what was not the object of worship, was no matter, provided people were good friends. It is a current doctrine now, much in vogue. But there are still Christians who believe that God, in supreme love, became a man, and so died for them in love—that the first of duties, the truest affection, without which all others are vile, is to appreciate this, and Him who did it, as we ought—that the first of all obligations is to the Saviour—and that to slight that, and to attempt to sustain love in despite of that, is the chiefest

\* They had taken this route by steam from Dublin.

wickedness, and the worst of all dispositions. We owe something to Christ; and if He be dishonoured and slighted, I may seek to win, but I cannot be the loving companion of one who has denied my Lord deliberately. To me, to live is Christ. To own Him, and dishonour Him, is worse than heathenism: it is to own and acquiesce in his dishonour, when I know better.

The man who believes Christ to be God, and is the professed Christian companion of him who denies it, is worse than the latter. We may all, alas, err; but he who knows the truth, and accepts what he knows degrades Christ, is deliberately preferring ease and companionship to Him, though he may dignify it with the name of love. Every effort to recover is right; but a step in acquiescence is a step in disloyalty to One whom no one would have dared to dishonour if He had not come down in love. Efforts were made, and every pains taken—and that, until Mr. Newman called any further reference to the subject persecution. And the fact is, Mr. N. declared that he fully believed Christ to be Jehovah, and was admitted on that ground. He professes amazement at finding others had such a thought. He declared then, he held it fully, and instead of not being received—shut out in the cold way he speaks of, he was received, and expressed his entire joy in the happy fellowship he found.

My proofs will be very simple. I commit no indiscretion in giving them. As Mr. Newman has thought right to give an account of these circumstances, I am surely warranted in giving an exact one, and affording adequate evidence of it.

The points are very simple. Mr. Newman professes himself astonished that the saints he had to say to believed that Jesus was Jehovah. I shall show that he professed that doctrine himself. He complains of bigotry which rejected him. I shall show that he was received, and that he professed himself very happy among them.

One or two circumstances in addition may be added. The Christians, among whom he sought to be received, did ask him whether he believed Christ to be Jehovah, on account of what they heard, and of his urging the derivation, subordination, and inferiority of Christ in his Godhead, and insisting

that the Father was *the only* true God, though Christ was true God, and declining to say if he was derived in time or not. He replied, as I have said, to the "Irish Clergyman," who wrote to him on account of the first general report of his unsoundness, that he did believe Him Jehovah, but that his arguments from the Old Testament would never make him relinquish what he saw to be taught in the New—that the one God was the Father only. The "Irish Clergyman" never was satisfied, nor was Mr. J. G. B—. But to one in London, who conferred with him, he declared he believed Him to be Jehovah. I have the letter of this person before me; he says, "No doubt is entertained by him [Mr. N.] as to the essential nature of Jesus, he confesses him *Jehovah*, Lord of Sabaoth, God of God, and adores Him as Immanuel that bore the punishment of sin due to us—he foolishly, as I think, braves the name of Arianism!" This Christian received him, judging it was only believing, as the ancient fathers, "the Father to be the *fons deitatis*." With these expressions, the "Irish Clergyman," to whom it was addressed, did not meddle; his difficulty was in the heart of the matter, not in terms. Did his soul own Jesus to be, in the true full sense, God manifest in the flesh—not, as it is commonly slipped out of now also, the manifestation of God in the flesh—but *God* manifest? The "Irish Clergyman" was satisfied he did not, but that he believed that though Christ partook of the divine nature, by generation, not by adoption, he was an inferior God. And so he did, though he avoided owning it; hence the question put by the former, as to Jehovah, and his pressing, when he owned it, that Jehovah was God, and none else; and Mr. N.'s accusation of Tritheism, or Sabellianism, repeated in the work now replied to, in the very words of letters then written, and still in existence. But the Christian in London, with whom he was staying, was satisfied. He adds: "My laxity has not been condemned by the saints at P— to whom F. W. N— is gone, and by whom received in love."

From P— one wrote to the "Irish Clergyman," "I do not see that we can fairly charge with Arianism one who is willing to confess that Jesus is Jehovah of hosts, and that He is to be honoured even as they honour the Father, though I cannot help feeling afraid lest the doctrine of his Sonship, as the

Word, should not be sufficiently checked by such texts as Philippians, and, 'before Abraham was I am.'" He was thus received, and thus himself speaks in a letter addressed to the "Irish Clergyman," of those whose bigotry he now exclaims against:—"In truth, no one knows what we have lost in our various church systems, till he tastes the sweetness of the love of God, and savour of Christ, shed forth in a company of believers, professedly united as such. I greatly bless and thank God for bringing me hither, though for a little time, to receive and impart the consolations of Christ; and never have I been more drawn out into continual supplications than that the Lord will keep them meek, humble and loving, as now. I am so struck with the contrast between the congregation here, and that at B—," etc.

Mr. Newman was received, then; and, as it appears, abundantly happy with those amongst whom he came.

In Ireland, I apprehend, there were still difficulties; and he did not go there, and went, as he states, to another place in England, to be in fellowship there. There he was freely received, and stayed some time, the ministers being quite satisfied. Mr. N. wishes peace to this congregation; and he tells us how he came in among them, but not why or how he left them. All this part of the story is passed under silence. Did they suddenly become bigots, or under the power of dogma? How did he lose the comforts of fellowship with those on whom he confers his present blessing? Did he give it them in parting too? He glides from his reception here into his renouncing Calvinism; and the "phase of faith," or whatever it was, which made him part company with their good-will and simple kindness, is not told.

Yet surely at such a point, when he was really giving up Christian society—and we can now say, Christianity—some information of how he came to do so would have been important.

I think these Christians, estimable as they were, were quite wrong. I do not understand Christian communion where the true Christ is denied, neither in this case nor in any other. Some of my readers may learn, from this affair of Mr. Newman's, that such is not a new principle with saints; at least, not with some.

But Mr. Newman, after all, had said to some of those who received him, that he saw nothing in Scripture to forbid him to suppose a beginning to Christ's existence; and correspondence was renewed with those who at P— had received him; and in a very long *exposé* of his creed he states, "The ancient test was to confess Christ to be (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*) *made of the essence of the Father, and not made out of nothing* (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*); in short, begotten, not created. The modern test is to confess that *Christ is Jehovah*. I do not think that Athanasius ever dreamed of the distinction between Jehovah and Adonai being of importance to the doctrine of Christ's divinity, or cared any more to distinguish the two words, than did the writers of the New Testament. When H— urged me to this confession, I enquired whether Jehovah meant simply *very God*; and supposed it immaterial whether I confessed Christ to be Jehovah or to be true God, and was willing to adopt the former, to quiet any fancies that I took God in any lower sense than the essence of Godhead; and I truly believed and believe the Lord Jesus to be *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς*. But now I see I had better have kept to this ancient confession." And further on: "And now let me ask, Whom am I to believe to have died for me? Did MERELY the *man* Jesus die? as the Sabellians generally say (which convicts their system of practical Socinianism); or did the Word and Son of God die? Unhesitatingly I believe the latter. But can any one say that Jehovah died on the cross, and yet that Jehovah is but one individual? One Jehovah lives while one Jehovah is dead, yet there is but one Jehovah," etc.

I have no wish to drag the reader's mind into these already infidel questions. They show what the real value of the confession of Jesus being Jehovah amounted to.\* I cite them only for that purpose.

\* The reader may see the immediate consequence in Mr. Newman's mind, in page 93 of his book. "If Christ was one person, all Christ died. Did God then die, and man remain alive? For God to become non-existent is an unimaginable absurdity. . . . . At length I unawares dropped from semi-Arianism into pure Arianism, by so distinguishing the Son from the Father, as to admit the idea that the Son of God had actually been non-existent in the interval between death and resurrection." Mark, that Mr. N. had already taken this ground in his correspondence with those who had received him at P—, as may be seen in

But at this time, Mr. Newman was fully received into the congregation to whom he wishes peace in his book, with the approbation of their ministers. Hence, if others (and the "Irish Clergyman" did) who earnestly denounced this acquiescence in his doctrine, were bigots, he had, as he states in this book, "gained time and repose of mind." The result of his repose, and twelve long years of leisure added thereto (for this took place at the end of 1833, and he was among his new friends in the beginning of 1834), we have in this book—i. e. a total denial of all claim of Christ to be the Messiah.

The perusal of all these letters has awakened the hope that he cannot have been entirely deceiving himself as to the joy in Christ he then thought he possessed, nor his declaration that He was his all, his salvation, and his reward, as taught of the Spirit. God grant it may be so! and only a solemn example of the rapid downward course of one who, "leaning to his own understanding, is a fool." That it was intellectual dealing with Scripture, no one, as I judge, reading the letters, can doubt a moment. He *still* speaks of the doctrine of Christ's being the true God, being a mere intellectual dogma. Now this, on the face of it, is absurd. To say, that the question whether the One I worship is entitled to worship as the true God, is a mere intellectual dogma, is a contempt of all sense which needs no comment to put it in its true light. A person who thinks, as Mr. Newman, that he might worship Gabriel if he were as morally perfect as God, has evidently lost all spiritual sense of what God is at all.

For my own part, I hold what I held then. I believe that

the extracts in the text; and his admission (I suppose as an intellectual dogma) that he was Jehovah.

Mark, too, that this notion affects the existence of the soul—our soul, as well as the divinity of Christ. Certainly the difficulties of the "Irish Clergyman" and those of others, were not without foundation. He was telling them he believed Christ was Jehovah, yet at the very time held that about Him, which, he now admits, involved his absolute non-existence at death, yet justified it by patristic formulas of ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς. If some expressions lead to hope there was life, all this leads one sadly to fear that all was an intellectual dogma. Still I say, the Lord forbid! for his grace is our resource, as above all.

Christ, not opinion, is the centre of union; but I never meant, nor do I mean, that a true Christ and a false one were equally good as a centre, provided people are amiable one with another; for that means, that union is man's amiability, and the denial of Christ. What do I want of union, if it be not union in Christ, according to the power of life, through the Holy Ghost?

The business of those united is *Christ's glory*. If Christians ever unite on a condition of that not being essential, their union is not Christian union at all. I have no reason for union, but Christ, the living Saviour. I do not want any union but that which makes Him the centre, and the all, and the hope of it. We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren; but to make that a plea for indifference to Christ's personal glory, in order to be one with him who, calling himself a brother, denies and undermines it, is, in my mind, wickedness.

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I have nearly closed my task; for task it has been.

I somewhat fear I have tired my reader, and certainly I have tired myself. For the wide waste of infidelity—without an object and without an affection, without a link with God—is a wearying thing: the dreary waste “seems lengthening as I go.” I look upon myself as a mere “hewer of wood and drawer of water,” nay, as a mere “watchman” round the house of God. How often I have felt this, in respect of learned writers—that they were useful, no doubt; but just as supplying materials to negative the unfounded but constantly-renewed allegations of infidels (to whom it is so easy to allege a thing without feeling bound to prove it—to catch at anything as an objection, where there is sufficient obscurity to hinder any one giving a clear answer\*), while the faithful

\* The love of objections is one of the worst moral features possible. It is quite right to weigh them, and see that one is well founded in what the soul builds on. But there is moral proof in the power of an object to produce (where the soul is capable of feeling) affections which are the moral reflex, in a rightly-constituted mind, of the object itself,

feed on the green pastures of God within. I little thought it would come to my turn, without any pretence to learning, to

and which are thus the proof of power, because the fruit of power. Now where this is the case, the love of objections is only the proof of insensibility to the power which attracts and fixes the soul. It is moral incapacity to estimate what is excellent. The qualities displayed in the object do not convince and silence cavil. Why? Because the heart is incapable of estimating, by its own sentiments, these qualities; perhaps does not like their superiority. This is infidelity.

A true heart loves what is excellent, because it is able to appreciate it, or at least to discern it; it is glad it should have its superiority, because, appreciating excellence, it feels, in virtue of its own love of it, that it ought to have, and it desires that it should have, this place of superiority. This applies, in an infinite degree, to God in Christ; besides his immutable title to this place. Hence, for faith to be occupied with the positive object of it, is the best and truest means of proof. It carries its own unquestionable power with it.

There is another thing—that when the object is known and valued, the moral aim of the infidel is judged. “Their *device* is only to pull Him down whom thou wouldest exalt.” The sagacity, and here the spiritual sagacity, of affection easily detects this. “Give God the praise!” The modern compliment of infidels also—“As for this man, we know that he is a sinner,” will not hide it. There is a kind of reasoning which flows from being the subject of power, which infidel Pharisees cannot reach. Theirs only creates astonishment, by its evident nonsense, to the simple mind who knows the power. “Why herein is a wonderful thing, that *ye know not who he is*, yet he hath opened my eyes.” There is no mistake, then. Mr. Newman may ask, “What has this to do with Scripture, or an historical document?” *He is found there*. No doubt Mr. N. has not found Him there: he does not know Him. He says, indeed, to the evangelical—imitating language he has heard—that he has tried both; he has a double experience—the believer’s and the infidel’s. But this poor imitation of what converted persons, who have come to the knowledge of Christ, have said, is too miserably transparent to be anything but the shame of him who uses it. What did he experience at the first? The effect, on his own showing, of believing a lie—of supposing true what had no existence in truth. “A deceived heart hath turned him aside: he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand?” Let not the language seem hard. Mr. N. declares it is a lie; and that Jesus is not the Messiah (Phases, p. 225). What was his first experience?—“To any ‘evangelical’ I have a right to say, that while he has a *single*, I have a double experience” (id. p. 201). Now how can he tell what the effects, “the spiritual fruits,” of a living knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ are, since he does not believe there

undertake such a task. The mischief done to one I knew, led to my reading the book I have answered. The perfect horror

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is *such* a person at all. His only past experience was, as he avows, a wholly false one. I ever hope it may not have been. "Spiritual fruits," in his case, are not those of the true knowledge in power of the Lord Jesus. He never had such; for if he *really* knew Jesus to be the Son of God, it was and must have been because He was so—if He was so, He is so. Now Mr. N. declares it is, and hence was all a delusion. His "spiritual fruits" were the fruits of a delusion, of belief in an imposture. Think of a person coolly speaking of this in his own case! To what a state of moral reasoning, of moral susceptibilities, must he be reduced! "It was really operative," he tells us, "on my moral tastes, pursuits, and conduct" (Phases, p. 2). What was?

But I have said, infidels love obscurity. God allows, indeed, faith to be tested. We had seen self-boasting learning, at the end of the last century, relying on Hindoo Yugas of millions of years, and Chinese chronology of any length you please. Egyptian hieroglyphics being then illegible, the Zodiac of Dendera disproved the dates of the Mosaic account, by the long period of the earth's existence demonstrated by this very ancient monument. All here was obscure, and it suited infidel reasoning. Alas! Western astronomy and science examined Hindoo calculations, and proved that the observations must have been made—indeed, profess to be made (that conjunction being assumed to have existed at creation) in a certain position of the moveable bodies of the heavens, and all the rest calculated backward, like Scaliger's Julian Period, making the great Calpa, or epoch of similar conjunction; in fact, they were mere astronomical cycles. And still worse, hieroglyphics were read, and the Zodiac of Dendera was found to have been made in the reign of Augustus Cæsar. Chinese chronology has suffered the like diminution, the Emperor Hoangti (B. C. 213) having destroyed all records, that everything might be dated from him. It is ascertained, as far as obscure traditions allow, that the real Hindoo dates of historical events agree pretty much with Scripture history, and belong to epochs as recent as that history gives them. I do not here enter into details, of course. It seems ascertained that the most ancient Hindoo astronomical treatise is not above seven hundred and fifty years old (Hale's Chronology, vol. i. p. 195). It is of little moment. I refer to these circumstances to show the disposition of infidels to get into the dark to make objections. The light dissipates them: they turn to others undaunted and unashamed. Their will is engaged in it.

So now their researches into the historical origin of the books of the Old Testament. On these points they can throw doubts, as they do not own the authority of the New. And why? Because the books, though we can trace their existence as far back as we have any records,

I felt on reading it, led me to examine its statements more carefully, as I found it had done mischief to several. Its emptiness, and a tone I will not characterise, astonished me. It is cleverly written,\* so as to attract, and in some respects with very measured subtilty; but to a moral, spiritual mind, there are traits in it which are most deeply painful. It borrows, moreover, from old infidelity and new all it can pick, and dresses it up as the history of the progress of the author's mind. Certain elements in it are calculated to mislead, and just those which most show the want of genuineness of conviction of the writer. It has been impossible for me, of course, to write an apology for the Bible; I should not feel myself competent to do it. I have answered, in moments which incessant occupation scarce afforded me, Mr. Newman's book. The reader, and finally the Lord, must judge how rightly.

I close with noticing some instances of reasoning or sentiment which could hardly be taken up in the general argument, but which will help to characterise and give a just idea of the book.

Mr. Newman complains that Calvin "supposes God to have created the most precious thing on earth in *unstable equilibrium*, so as to topple over irrecoverably at the first infinitesimal touch . . . Surely all nature proclaims, that if God planted any spiritual nature at all in man, it was in *stable equilibrium*, able to right itself when deranged" (Phases, p. 98). Where is this proclamation? We see misery, degradation, idolatry,

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and they are confirmed by references to the history contained in them as authentic, by fragments of the earliest known authors quoted in such books, as Josephus, Eusebius, etc.—yet are themselves the only existing records of the times they belong to. They are, beyond all controversy, the most ancient records in existence. Hence, when their own intrinsic power is not perceived, and their coherence as a moral whole, as a key to the whole world's history before God, is not understood, ample scope is found for speculating in the dark and raising objections. Still even here God has confounded them by such means as Egyptian antiquities, where the details of Exodus are found painted in yet brilliant colours on the walls of long-lost buildings.

\* Strange to say, the English is often, to say the least, very incorrect; but as to this, I do not trouble myself.

a vast extent of prevailing wickedness—this Mr. N. avows. Did God create it so? If not, man has lost his equilibrium, and has not righted himself. Perhaps, indeed, Mr. N. thinks God created man wicked; for he avows that man has an “antagonist will.” If so, there was indeed no “unstable equilibrium,” no deranging any, and certainly no righting itself. If not, then the equilibrium was lost, and is not righted. Perhaps Mr. N. thinks an “antagonist will” to God no harm at all. But his eternal morality is then of a *very* singular kind.

“I saw,” he says further (id. ib.), “that the Calvinistic doctrine of human degeneracy teaches, that God disowns my nature (the only nature I ever had) as not his work, but the devil’s work. He hereby tells me that He is *not* my Creator.” This, if it have any sense, must apply to being born in sin; but sin is not my nature as a creation, but a certain state of my nature—its departure from God. And independent creation is sin in existence, because it is the creature God created, and is not dependent on Him. The sin is not the nature, *it is its* corruption and fall—the negative of its state as a creature, in the nature of things. God made man upright; but he sought out to himself many inventions. Mr. N., as we have seen, owns an “antagonistic will.” Does he mean to say, that God owns that as his work? God disowns man’s present state, not his nature. Mr. N. owns our state of sin. Does he think God owns or disowns sin? It is well our minds should recollect that sin, evil, and misery *are there* before the Bible begins to account for them. The infidel denies the scriptural account of the fall. How does he account for the evil which exists?

Mr. Newman insists much upon “eternal ethics,” in order to show that that outward government of God which He exercised over Israel, as Scripture teaches, could not be from Him. I say, *outward government of God*, for such it was, without a full revelation of Himself (the only true ground of all ethics, as the first of obligations), a government which He patiently exercised towards Israel for special ends; but which contained within it, as a kernel, which Christ was able to draw out, the eternal and immutable and perfect rule of right and wrong—

love to God and our neighbour. What, then, is Mr. N.'s measure of right and wrong? "I saw that it was an immorality to teach that sin was measured by anything else than the heart and will of the agent" (Phases, p. 78). It is not pardon, it is not patience, it is not judging, according to opportunities of light, them that are without law, them that are under law. No—the measure of sin is "the heart and will of the agent." That is "eternal ethics" in earnest. If such is the eternal law of ethics, let us now see the history of the knowledge of God—Mr. N.'s theological notions.

"The law of God's moral universe, as known to us, is that of progress. We trace it from old barbarism to the methodized Egyptian idolatry; to the more flexible polytheism of Syria and Greece; the poetical pantheism of philosophers, and the moral monotheism of a few sages. So in Palestine and in the Bible itself we see, *first of all*, the image-worship of Jacob's family, then the incipient elevation of Jehovah above all other gods by Moses, the practical establishment of the worship of Jehovah alone by Samuel, the rise of spiritual sentiment under David and the psalmists, the more magnificent views of Hezekiah's prophets, finally in the Babylonish captivity the new tenderness assumed by that second Isaiah and by the later psalmists. But ceremonialism more and more incrustated the restored nation; and Jesus [read here, an impostor] was needed to spur and stab the conscience of his contemporaries, and recall them to more spiritual perceptions; to proclaim a coming 'kingdom of heaven,' in which should be gathered all the children of God that were scattered abroad; where the law of love should reign, and no one should dictate to another" (Phases, p. 223).

Singular, that this systematic series of impostures should be the means of producing spiritual perceptions, and the knowledge of the true God; still more, that methodized idolatry, flexible polytheism, and poetical pantheism, should be the law of progress, of *God's* moral universe. The contemptibleness of such a passage vies with its cool wickedness,—"*The law of God's moral universe*—idolatry of the most wicked, polluted,\*

\* Mr. Newman, however, I perhaps should add, does not, apart from its accompaniments, and the immoral character of its deities, think so

and degraded kind!" But "we trace it from old barbarism." But how do we trace it *to it*? It is not "known to us." Be it so: ignorance has its convenience, even for an infidel, sometimes. But was "old barbarism" man's original state? Progress begins with something: old barbarism was brutal ferocity of manners, and grosser, though less developed, forms of idolatry—the worship of the serpent, of the sun and moon. Did God create man then in this "old barbarism?" If not, how came he there; what progress brought him to it? Is there no law of progress in God's moral universe but barbarism, and methodized worship of bulls, onions, and crocodiles? Is that all that Mr. Newman has to tell us of God's moral universe? He must have a strange idea of God. This, added to acquiring spiritual perceptions, and a law of love, by imposture, constitutes all he knows of God's moral universe, save

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very badly of polytheism. He says (Phases, p. 89), "It thus became clear to me, that polytheism *as such* is not a moral and spiritual, but at most only an intellectual, error." His indifference to the true God is a remarkable phenomenon. He had long ago been convinced "that the Spirit is evidently *God in the hearts of the faithful*, and nothing else." Now he "believed the Son to be derived from the Father, and not to be the Unoriginated," and was not a Ditheist:—"No doubt! yet, after all, could I seriously think, that morally and spiritually, I was either better or worse for this discovery? I could not pretend that I was." Perhaps so; but then your state had nothing to say to God. Had you been a Polytheist you would not have been morally or spiritually the better or the worse for it, for it is not a moral or spiritual error. Noble ideas you must have of God, certainly! Let me caution my reader here, that if he finds "the Spirit" used in such writers, he must not fancy it is in any Christian sense. This use of Christian language, which keeps up to the eye a delusive appearance, which hinders the mind being shocked, is perpetual in Mr. N's book. "I now," says he, "understood, somewhat better, his whole doctrine of 'the Spirit,' the coming of which had brought the church out of a childish into a mature condition." Now, when he wrote this phrase, he did not believe a word of the coming of the Spirit. It would be endless to *multiply* the instances of this kind of language, of, in a word, Christian language preserved, when he does not believe a word of it. This use of language which the author does not believe, does not startle, because it seems to belong to the period of his history which he is relating, but the book was written when he had discovered it was all false.

(I had well nigh forgotten) his good opinion of his own "higher spiritualism." Can any one be fallen lower in his ideas of God's moral universe, and its law?

But his facts are rather peculiar. He says, "In the Bible itself, we see, first of all, the image-worship of Jacob's family." This phrase, so singularly turned to bring in the teraphim of Rachel, ill covers its own deceit. I say nothing now of Moses' account of creation? It may be considered dogmatical, or mythical, or I know not what, and to be dated as of his time; but Mr. Newman accepts Moses' history of Jacob—necessarily, then, of Isaac and Abraham, to say nothing of Noah, or even Enoch. Whatever he accepts, it is totally false to say, "In the Bible we see, first of all, the image-worship." We do *not* see it first of all. Quite the contrary. No; not even in Palestine, which is foisted in, to save appearances. What we see in the Bible, is this:—the knowledge of one true God possessed by Noah; that knowledge of the true God lost, and men serving "other gods beyond the flood," that is, the Euphrates. One of these men called out by the true God's revealing Himself to Him, and this person worshipping the one true God "in Palestine"; as did his son; and as did Jacob, though, wandering back to the East, his wife, whom he married there, had brought with her her father's household images. Mr. N.'s statement of what we "see in the Bible," is a false statement; and he knows enough of the Bible—alas for him!—to know very well that it is so.

I do not know what he means by the incipient elevation of Jehovah by Moses. Moses' teaching is as clear, more full, more elaborate, more absolute as to the sole deity of Jehovah, than that of Samuel, and he too declares that he knew Israel would corrupt themselves.

That polytheism is a part of God's moral universe, is quite worthy of the heartlessness of infidelity;—that "old barbarism" should be its only idea of what man began with, without a thought of going farther as to man's connection with God, or an enquiry whether he was created in "old barbarism", is worthy of its "superficiality;" and the statement as to "Jacob's family," worthy of its truthfulness. I am aware this may be accounted hard; I ask, What else can an honest man, with his senses about him, think of this paragraph? There are cases where you may hesitate between indignation and contempt; but the

absence of both is a proof of want of moral sentiment in him in whom they are not found.

But take another example of the moral justness of the reasonings: we have seen Mr. Newman stating, in his attack on Calvinism, that "all nature proclaims, that if God planted any spiritual nature at all in man, it was in *stable equilibrium*, able to right itself when deranged."

Now I can understand, in physical nature, where there is no will, an action of attractive forces which keeps in order the movements of bodies in various and periodically contradictory directions, or self-correcting contradictory influences, because one will has imposed them all; but the application of this where there is a will, is wholly false; besides, "stable equilibrium," which, if "deranged" is, I humbly conceive, flat nonsense; because, if "deranged," it is not "stable;" nor, if deranged specially by the action of will is there any reason why it should necessarily re-arrange itself; indeed, it has proved itself unstable.

This is not the case with the movements of the moon's nodes, or mutation of the earth's axis, or other astronomical self-correcting motions. This is not derangement; it is the variety of order arising from one common principle; it is the proof of stable equilibrium. It is always going on, and always going on regularly, by the constantly operating effect of the same power.

But this is not all: I must cite another passage of Mr. Newman's, to show what the moral equilibrium of infidel thought is. "To me," I read (*Phases*, p. 101), "it appeared an axiom, that if Jesus was in physical origin a mere man, he was, like myself, a sinful man, and therefore certainly not my judge;"—singular, let me say in passing, that we can judge God or his revelation, by "a pre-existing standard of moral truth," and our "inward powers," and be incompetent to judge of man's state because we are sinful. Now, if the fact of Jesus being a man, made him necessarily a sinful man, what becomes of the stable equilibrium? Is a state of sin, moral equilibrium, and a stable one? Indeed, the whole phrase is worthy of attention, as showing the necessity to which infidelity is reduced when it has, by circumstances, got the external light which Christianity affords. Sin, is,

according to Mr. N., a necessity; at the same time, to maintain his system, man's state is one of stable equilibrium; yet he would not allow that God created man a sinner, nor will he admit the fall, save as a common necessity to all. What confusion, not merely of reasoning, but of all moral thought, is here, from abandoning the simple and clear testimony of Scripture, which *has* its witness in every conscience. The man who would recognise necessary sin, and a stable equilibrium, has, indeed, a harder task than a believer. Sin is here without the Bible; the infidel cannot get over that. Revelation tells us much about it; but it exists—revelation or no revelation. The infidel makes it a part of God's moral universe—the believer, of man's immoral corruption.

And then, in Mr. Newman's system, the deranged stable equilibrium is to be set right by an "antagonist will." This is hopeful.

See the kind of statements, too, indulged in:—"It is clear that Paul longed, above all things, to overthrow the wall of partition which separated two families of sincere worshippers" (Phases, p.225). Were idolaters sincere worshippers? Worshipers of whom? He taught that converted Jews, and converted Gentiles brought out of their corrupt worship of devils by the knowledge of Jesus, were to worship together. But an idolater is a true worshipper for Mr. Newman;—it is a part of the law of progress of God's moral universe, that men should worship demons, and stocks and stones!

Nor am I wrong in supposing this indifference to truth and error as to God Himself. That it is all one, if it be

"By saint, by savage, or by sage;  
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord."

"We now see stronger and higher walls of partition than ever between the children of the same God . . . . The cause of all this is to be found in *the claim of Messiahship for Jesus*" (Phases, p. 225); the italics are Mr. Newman's. That is, a worshipper of Jove, and stocks and stones, is a sincere worshipper; children of the same God with those who follow "a higher spiritualism." The only intolerable mischievous thing which makes barriers, is believing that Jesus is the Messiah.

It does make a barrier against such notions of God as would

make "old barbarism" the beginning of God's moral universe, and flexible polytheism its desirable progress; and which would call themselves, with perfect self-complacency, "higher spiritualism." Mr. Newman is astonished, too, at being treated as an infidel.

But how powerful, after all, is "Scriptural truth!"

"We trace the law of God's moral universe in the progress from old barbarism to the methodised Egyptian idolatry, flexible polytheism, and poetical pantheism" (Phases, p. 223).

In page 230:—"The great doctrine on which all practical religion depends—the doctrine which nursed the infancy and youth of human nature—is 'the sympathy of God' with individual man." This was succeeded by Paganism and Pantheism. "Among Pagans this was so marred by the imperfect characters ascribed to the gods, and the dishonourable fables told concerning them, that the philosophers, who undertook to prune religion, too generally cut away the root, by alleging that God was mere intellect, and wholly destitute of affections." No doubt. But where is the progress, which is the law of God's moral universe, which we trace from old barbarism upward to the higher spirituality? It would seem that the infancy was the best part of the progress, only, unhappily, it was at the beginning—I suppose before even the "old barbarism."

Would you know, reader, how this precious doctrine of God's sympathy with individual man was preserved and developed? Hear Mr. Newman's account of the book he is rejecting, traducing, and leading you to regard as an imposture. He continues:—

"But happily among the Hebrews the purity of God's character was vindicated; and with the growth of conscience in the highest minds of the nation, the ideal image of God shone brighter and brighter. The doctrine of His sympathy was never lost, and from the Jews it passed into the Christian Church. This doctrine applied to that part of man which is divine, is the well-spring of repentance and humility, of thankfulness, love and joy. It reproves and it comforts—it stimulates and it animates. This it is which led the Psalmist to cry, 'Whom have I in heaven but thee? There is none upon earth that I desire besides thee.' This has satisfied prophets, apostles, and martyrs with God as their portion. This has been passed from heart to heart for full three thousand years,

and has produced bands of countless saints" (Phases, p. 231). Now, in the first place, all these saints have fed undoubtedly on what Mr. Newman denies, and got this temper and character from believing it. They were prophets of—apostles to promulgate—martyrs for—the truth of <sup>th</sup>, which Mr. N. says, is a falsehood and an imposture—the cause of all the mischief—the Messiahship—and, when Jesus had appeared, the Messiahship of Jesus. This last has been for two thousand of these years the governing motive and principle of their lives and testimony. They have lived by it, and died for it. They have avowed this as the one thing which gave them full faith in this sympathy of God. This has produced all these admirable effects. Yet, according to Mr. N., it was all a mistake; and "more entangling to the conscience, and more depressing to the mental energies than anything in the Levitical law . . . . This gave a premium to crooked logic. . . . This perverted men's notions of right and wrong . . . This gave a merit to credulity" (Phases, p. 225).

But mark another thing. We have seen Mr. Newman obliged to confess, that this sympathy of the true God with individual man, was that which nursed the infancy and youth of human nature; that it was succeeded by Paganism and Pantheism, and then passed into infidel coldness in philosophy. But that one little, obscure, detested, despised, bigoted, exclusive people, who had impassable walls of separation from all others, and possessed and valued as inspired, the books which Mr. N. is attacking as an imposture of Josiah's reign—alone in the midst of the universal corruption, "methodised" or "flexible"—"happily vindicated the purity of God's character;" that through their means "the doctrine of his sympathy was never lost, and from the Jews it passed into the Christian church." Why, this is exactly the history the Bible gives. It verifies to a letter its whole contents; shews why, when the Pagan barbarism had destroyed the truth which had nurtured the infancy of man, Abraham was called out in order to vindicate the purity of God's character—how thus the doctrine of His sympathy was never lost,—why there was such a wall of partition raised up between Israel and the Pagan nations, by a system of ordinances "imposed

on them to the time of reformation;" while the great central principles of truth were preserved within. It shews that, at the same time, it was, as a whole, only a temporary provision for this particular purpose, in connection with the people thus kept apart to preserve this truth, and who did thus preserve it; and how, through the well-known history of Christ, and his rejection and death by the Jews (by which they forfeited, by their own act, the title to claim any thing exclusive), it passed by grace to every Gentile, who, through faith in Him, who was the deepest living expression of that sympathy, and accomplisher of that in which the whole power of it was shewn, believed in and came to it in truth.

The admissions of Mr. Newman—and history compels these admissions—are the extorted confession, not merely of particular acts, but that the whole system of Scripture is the undoubted truth of God, and that the notion of progress as applied to *moral condition*, for it is true in civilisation and science, is as baseless and unfounded as can possibly be. Indeed, this kind of statement awakens in my mind the longing hope, that he who makes them is so forced to be a witness to Scripture truth, that that truth, which I know to be eternal life, may have a hold within—deep as it may be covered, and hardily as it may be intellectually braved—which will produce a glorious testimony in the person of the author to God's patient grace, before the day which will prove all truth to the confusion of those who have denied it. The Lord grant it may be so!

Mr. Newman says (page 95), "In short, I could not find the modern doctrine of the fall any where in the Bible . . . that is, of a permanent degeneracy induced by the first sin of the first man; and when I studied the fifth chapter of the Romans, I found it was death, not corruption, which Adam was said to have entailed." A strange state of mind! The passage is, "As by one man sin entered into the world and death by sin. By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." Does not the Apostle state, in the Romans, that men were in a state of permanent degeneracy—in Ephesians, that all were by nature children of wrath; that there

is a law of sin in our members (Rom. vii. 23); and that the flesh lusts against the Spirit (Gal. v. 17)?

And why is it so carefully noted that Adam begat a son in his image after his likeness. But this is more a question of theology than of rationalism. I only note it as shewing how easily Mr. Newman disposed of Scriptural truth.

The best answer is to read what is said in Romans and elsewhere; and see whether permanent degeneracy is not taught, and as the fruit of Adam's sin.

I would just remark also the strange notions, the singular moral contradictions—and moral contradictions are serious things—which pass unnoticed in Mr. Newman's mind. From the want of all objective truth, not only is a worshipper of demons a sincere worshipper of God's family for him, but as to his own mind, he thinks falsehood can have the same happy effect as truth. Thus, in his early days (p. 2), when under evangelical influence:—"Such was the beginning and foundation of my faith—an unhesitating unconditional acceptance of whatever was found in the Bible . . . And as to my creed, I must insist that it was no mere fancy resting in my intellect: it was really operative on my temper, tastes, pursuits and conduct"—that is, a delusion and a falsehood was! And now that that he thinks it so, he tells us it took real effect on him; that is, believing a lie to be of God did. This is singular.

Again (p. 99):—"I was conscious that in dropping Calvinism, I had lost nothing *Evangelical*: on the contrary, the gospel which I retained was as spiritual and deep-hearted as before, only more merciful." As "*spiritual and deep-hearted*"! And yet it was all a falsehood and a delusion from beginning to end. It was an imposture carried on by an impostor who rode in on an ass—"a deed which he appears to have planned with the express purpose of assimilating himself to the lowly king here described" (Phases, p. 195).

What, then, is Mr. Newman's notion, a common notion, of truth—of love of truth? It is the total uncertainty whether any thing is true or not. The keeping the mind perpetually open, without any object acting on it at all. It is not as in the progress of sound science—the relinquishing hypotheses for the investigation of facts.

“They left off,” as he expresses it, “to dogmatise, and approached God’s world as learners.” They did well. But “God’s world” was *a certain existing thing which was to be learned*; a known existence, though much was yet to be learned about it. Now, when the love of truth is spoken of in this book, it is entirely a different thing. There is no existing truth to be investigated. *That* is the position of him who receives the Bible as the truth. Be he right or wrong, he approaches, not *GOD’S world* indeed, but *GOD’S word* as a learner. The man of science receives creation as existing—he investigates it. The believer receives the Bible as the existing revelation of God—he investigates it. Truth to the man of science is merely the ascertaining the laws of admitted facts, or the discovery of facts already existing. Now, the rationalist has no object before his mind. Mr. Newman, in order to discover what God is, works in the mine of his own intellect; and just as De Cartes would hold that such things *must* be, because nature abhors a vacuum—or others theorise on the fortuitous concourse of atoms—so Mr. Newman settles that God must be the projected image of man’s mind. It is just like the hypothesis which preceded Baconian science; an hypothesis—a theory; not an existing object already before us, investigated by our minds if capable of it. What then does all this love of truth amount to, when it is not mere hypothetical speculation about what must be? It is merely that a person is unprejudiced!

Mr. Newman would persuade us that he is the most unprejudiced person going, unless it be the whole company of his friends. I do not doubt their good opinion of themselves, or their disposition to state it. But I somewhat doubt about this entire absence of prejudice. I see marks of will working very strongly in Mr. N. I have noticed some. The joy manifested at the discovery of a difficulty, or a slur thrown by others on the credit of a book of Scripture; the plain proof often given that their “wish was father to their thought.” When a man speaks of being “justly encouraged to apply similar criticism;” when he thinks he has found a flaw—Is there no will there? When I read the passage I already ventured to translate,

“O mihi tam longæ maneat pars ultima vitæ,  
Spiritus et, quantum sat erit tua discere facta.”

Is there no will at work here? When I read:—“But as soon as it begins to discern error in the standard proposed to it, we have the mark of incipient original thought, which is the thing so valuable and so difficult to elicit.” Is there no love for getting rid of a standard here as well as love of truth? Now, I would remark here, that universal openness at all times to receive every thing is not the proof of love of the truth, but of *incapacity at all times to ascertain it*, and of perpetual uncertainty in consequence. Supposing the human mind by itself, or by divine aid, capable of ascertaining truth with certainty—love of the truth when it is ascertained, is shewn in holding it fast, because it is truth. Not to do this is merely, I repeat, to say that perpetual uncertainty is the only possible state; that is, that there is no such thing as truth for the human mind, and that the love of it is nonsense. Truth in this case does not exist for man; and therefore the theory, the notion of the love of truth, is a contradiction in itself. If there be truth as to anything, as to what God is, what Christianity is, when I have ascertained it, and know that to be the truth, I hold it fast because I love it.

In a word, either the truth cannot be ascertained, and then there is no truth for man, or it can; and then if we have ascertained it, we hold it against all cavils. It is true, our minds may be prejudiced, and we may also receive solid truth mixed with other things. Hence patience, discrimination, and readiness to hear become us; but not readiness to call in question what is certain. That is the love of doubting—not of truth. Further, if the positive proofs of a thing remain, the difficulties connected with it, are not disproof. They may be proof merely of my incapacity to solve them. But, besides, the proof of divine things is upon quite a different principle from that of human experience; and must be, because they are divine, and cannot be the subjects of human experience till received. And the kind of knowledge possessed about divine things is not reached consequently by human cavil. Thus Mr. Newman speaks of an “intellectual creed” being held to be an essential criterion of God’s people; i.e., such an historical proposition as “that the Jewish teacher, Jesus,

fulfilled the conditions requisite to constitute him the Messiah." Now such a conviction would not constitute a person a believer at all.

Mohammedans believe it; and they are not "the people of God." Thousands who would not understand Mr. Newman's phrase are devoted believers in Jesus. There has been an action on their hearts and consciences connected with his name, which is more certain to them than their existence—more powerful than the love of it. It characterises their life, fills them with joy in death; their whole life is formed by it. A person has been revealed to them whom they love, by whom they know God, and are at peace. I do not say *how*, for I am not writing on theology. Christ's account of it is—"They shall be all taught of God." They are quiet, sober, unenthusiastic persons, who know themselves, confess faults they hid or excused before, yet are happy and peaceful. They know in whom they have believed. And all this is identified with the word of God which has produced it, orally or in writing, and is recognised by it when studied. Now questions of historical conditions do not touch the ground on which this faith is built. Be it foolish or wise, that is not my question now. I only say, that historical questions and genealogies do not reach it; for it *never was founded on them*, but on something else. There may be complete ignorance of what the *difficulty* applies to, and yet a profound knowledge of the *person* it applies to; and such an appreciation of Him and all that regards Him, that difficulties of genealogies have no weight. He is a sinner and does not keep the sabbath—"yet He opened mine eyes," says the man. The disproof, in its nature, did not touch the *kind* of proof. The reasonings of learned men were lost upon him, because he was the subject of a power which it needed no learning to know the force of, when a person had been subjected to its influence. Such a believer reasons from the power, of which he is quite certain, to *judge* that which would call so certain a thing in doubt. And he reasons justly. Now that is the Divine way of teaching—God acts and makes Himself known in acting, and a man thus taught of God believes, and with Divine faith; that is, with certainty. He leaves intellectual propositions to those

who make them: he possesses the subject of them. This is not logical. No; not if you mean conclusions drawn from human knowledge. It is Divine teaching. I repeat what I said at the beginning, that God can act on man's conscience and heart so as to make Himself known, though the conscience and heart would have never so known Him if He had not acted on them. It is not a "pre-existing standard," but a susceptibility of receiving impressions with the certainty of what produces them, without the independent power of forming the ideas for itself, or of judging them by a complete measure already formed. I admit fully the conscience and the heart; and that there is a sense in all that there is a God. But then conscience always takes notice of the authority and just judgment of God, and judges self, or it is not conscience.

The question really is this, as I have already stated—Can God communicate his mind and thoughts to man with the certainty that it is He who does so? To deny it is an absurdity. It makes God inferior to men, who certainly can do so—almost to some beasts, who in a small measure can. But if man has been created with a capacity for receiving thoughts of and from God (and *of* and *from* have really the same force here, so far as that all that is *from* must be *of* Him), and that God can communicate such, is it not very much more than a probability that He would do this?\*

\* This does not prove as a fact, that He has; but it makes it unlikely that He has not. But while it cannot prove that God has communicated to man the knowledge of the things of God, it does prove that the supposition that He would not is a gross absurdity—is merely the desire not to have to say to Him in his own way; and in spite of the infidel effort which takes effect when the morality of religious pretenders sinks below the standard of natural conscience, the need of some Divine communication is such, that I may say, the universal feeling of man proves it by its cravings—cravings which are so strong, that in the long run the most absurd and corrupt pretensions to it are preferred to none at all. It is of this all forms of priesthood have taken advantage. And here I would notice a very remarkable circumstance—that, elevated and peculiar as was the priesthood among the Jews, they were not, as with false religions, the peculiar and chief communicators of Divine knowledge. The *prophets* had this office; and God's character was maintained independently of, and often reproving, those who might have made an interested use of their nearness to Him. In Christianity there

It does not at all follow that man would know by other means the same things. Nay, it is rather the contrary that would follow. Even in human intercourse, a person may communicate things to me which I fully understand and receive with certainty, which I did not know, perhaps never should have known—nay, take the full scope of human education, certainly never should have known—if they had not been communicated. Yet I have the certainty of them when they are. It is not the judgment I form of them; but that I am so formed, so circumstanced internally, that they carry conviction when announced.

But another point is clear—that is, that if God does communicate knowledge, it will be in its purpose the knowledge of Himself; that is, it will have a Divine character, be a Divine communication. If I am communicating algebra, the communication will be algebraic. If God communicates Divine knowledge, the communication will be Divine. Man may be (I do not doubt he is) such as can be acted on by such communications when God so acts; but the communication does not lose its own character—it cannot cease to be Divine, or it would wholly miss its object, it would cease to be what we suppose it. Yet, as such, God can (for I assume this now) make it accompanied with the certainty that it is He who does so. It carries, where He does, its own proof of the power and authority of the communication, so as to bind the conscience and soul of man. God is known in the obedience of faith.

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are no priests, save as all Christians are—and Christ above all. Judaism being law, and God yet much hidden from man, who could not come near under such a system, a priesthood was necessary, but betrayed the real state of things, thus expressed by the apostle—"The way into the holiest was not yet made manifest, while as yet the first tabernacle was standing." Christianity being grace, and having brought men to God, there is not a priesthood, but a ministry to make known that grace, and build up those who have received it in further acquaintance with it; while all believers are themselves in the presence of God, have access to the Father who Himself loves them, are brought to God. Hence ministry and the absence of a distinct priesthood essentially, as to this point, characterise Christianity. Priesthood characterises the religion of Judaism, though God interfered sovereignly by prophets in mercy.

The question of judging is out of place. "The entering in of thy word *giveth* light and understanding to the simple." Now God may, to put man to the test (I believe He has), communicate truth by means which have a permanent character, so that men should have them always before them. He may use *means* of doing so adapted to men's faculties, and, as means, within the scope of man's moral investigation; yet with fully adequate proof of the authenticity and power of the communication, and of who made it. Here it is that infidelity has its scope and play. Now such a communication puts man to the test, and, adequate evidence being given, demonstrates an "antagonist will"—the moral evil of his condition, that he does not like to come to or receive the knowledge of God as having authority. This will receive no communication from God, though there be one before it; but it proves its unwillingness to receive one.

Nay, there is more than this; because there is not merely adequate proof within the scope of man's intelligence in due moral exercise, but there is, in the Divine word thus communicated, a direct action on the conscience, which is its own witness. For conscience man has, whether he will or no; and Felixes will tremble before the word their will rejects and their passions slight; and they do tremble: for God will make Himself known to man in his conscience, if He pleases, and He does please; and every secret work shall be brought into judgment.

But if God can make Himself known to man, He alone really can. He has addressed adequate testimony to man's responsibility. But what shall change man's will? His people shall be willing in the day of his power. This is grace. God really reveals Himself in gracious, life-giving power; and the word, which is his, acquires at once the authority which a known God has over a soul to whom his holiness becomes true and his mercy precious. God is known. His word is *his* word. The permanent testimony delivered to men in every kind of condition, adapted to them, copied for three thousand years, and transmitted from man to man, may present difficulties. It may present such as arise from his own defective spiritual apprehensions and intelligence, and (which

in part answers thereto) the depth and vastness of the communication made, embracing all God's ways with man from first to last, and his counsels for the glory of his Son. It may present difficulties, which arise from the circumstances of its transmission by man during so long a period, considered as "committed" to him, though guarded by providence. But "Who has spoken?" is no longer a question. He who thus knows God, is called upon diligently to enquire what He has said—to use all diligence as far as he is capable—to see that man has not deceived him either by design or by carelessness—and he may count on gracious Divine aid in doing so. He has now, not perfect capacity, but a sense which helps him much in this, because he does know God. But these enquiries *suppose an existing truth* communicated, which is loved because it is *God's truth*. There is something (as the existing world for science) which enquiry is occupied about. The infidel's love of truth means, that he has no known truth to love—it is an immoral thing, a self-wasting affection, without an object. If man be framed to know God for his happiness, in what state is he till he finds Him? Yet that is what is called "love of truth above all." It merely means, subjecting everything as it occurs to the assumed competency of our own mind to judge of it. It has no object which is truth, which it values as such.

"Morality and truth are principles in human nature both older and more wide-spread than Christianity or the Bible," says Mr. Newman. Now, that man has a conscience, and judges right and wrong, is most true—knows good and evil, as the Scripture expressly teaches—and so it is, that the divine word addresses and acts on this. But it is not true that this is truth, or a standard of moral truth; because, though it recognises the authority of God, yet as we are sinners impressed with fear, we do not really know God thereby. It craves, though it fears that knowledge. It does judge men's acts, but it does not reveal God's nature, ways, thoughts and purposes. Revelation (and, O what grace to have it!) is the answer to its need. Conscience deals with man as man, and man subject to God in judgment; but it does not reveal God as God, though it dreads the authority it has despised. Now, if God does

thus reveal Himself (and how immense the privilege!) that becomes the standard of moral truth. Thus Christ was born under the law; but He was God manifest in the flesh. He became the standard of moral truth, and the pattern of divine ways in man. Others may have, through grace, and "partaking of the divine nature" followed Him: He may graciously call them his companions. The day that comes will mark out some one in this walk, *proximus at longo intervallo*. It was reserved for Mr. Newman alone, not to delight in the blest resemblance in those who followed Him, but to show his own state—to proclaim *his* capacity for discerning divine perfectness in man—to raise (what horror would it have occasioned him!) the devoted and gracious Fletcher to a level with Jesus.\* We may thank Mr. N. for this—a man's tastes show, not what that which he likes is, but what *he is*. A Rousseau could see further than this. We have a tolerable specimen of the standard of moral truth in Mr. N.'s mind. It is true that Fletcher was not, as Mr. N. makes the blessed Jesus, an impostor. That would make *some* difference in excellency, though it appears not a great deal with Mr. N.; for, after all, it is this imposture which, even for Fletcher himself "has vindicated the purity of God's moral character." But let us leave this miserable display of an infidelity *effæta veri*. The Christian does not reject the ascertaining the truth of Christianity. The proofs are there; and Mr. N., with his associates, who pretend to the "higher spirituality," will be judged by the positive proofs which have been afforded them, proofs to their conscience, proofs to their heart. Would that they would listen to them, and not merely to their understanding! But the Christian thinks that if God speaks, however he may condescend to man, He speaks as God; and, in examining a professed revelation, he must expect *this*, and hence it is not by a pre-existing standard of moral truth, nor by the inward powers of the

\* This is not so very surprising, in Mr. Newman's case; he says (Phases, pp. 101, 102), "But I now discovered, that there was a deeper distaste in me for the details of the human life of Christ than I was previously conscious of." In p. 210, he says, of Benson's life of Fletcher of Madely, "And at this day, if I were to read the book afresh, I suspect I should think his character a more perfect one than that of Jesus."

hearer that He will be judged. He will address the conscience which man by his appointment has, and the heart that needs Him. He will adapt Himself to it; but He will speak in His own character, and must, if He be God, *give* the standard of moral truth. He is it in Christ. The weapons of this warfare are not carnal, but mighty, through God, to the pulling down of strong holds, casting down reasonings, and every high thing that exalts itself against *the knowledge of God*, bringing every thought into the captivity of the obedience of Christ. He will not contradict what He *has* taught. He will act on the conscience He has given. If the Being, presented as Divine, is, in his own desires and character, below the standard of natural conscience, it may reject him, and man become an infidel. If I have the truth from God, I shall judge by it what pretends to be so. I shall not talk of the inward powers of the hearer, as a judge, when I am hearing God. I do not deny a conscience. I believe that there are obligations flowing unchangeably from relationships in which we are by nature (in that sense ethics are eternal), and from such as redemption places us in. But I deny a pre-existing standard of moral truth *possessed by man*, and his competency, or his inward powers, to judge God. Where is it? Conscience does recognise evil and good, and it bows, by its very nature, to God, when He speaks to it. I speak of the fact—but the subjection of conscience to judgment is not judging. It does more; nay, it is the opposite. It puts God in His place—judging puts Him out of it. Does His speaking enfeeble its sense of right and wrong? It adds divine authority as sanction, and enlarges vastly the knowledge of it by new relations of an Infinite character. But God has far more fully, nay only then really, His place; for He speaks in love, and that is what He is. The soul does not want to judge God, it is glad to know Him.

I have only one word to add—that difficulties which arise may exercise the heart as to its faith, but do not touch the consciousness we have of the knowledge of God where the will is not corrupted, nor, consequently, the authority of his word, nor its evidence. I have been conversing with a man, with my father, with intimate acquaintance of his and my history; he has told me things which, in connection with it, prove their own truth; and one comes and proves by

inferences, that from dates, and the like, he could not have been where I was. I cannot solve the difficulty, but I do not doubt my intercourse with him—perhaps I detect that he who would persuade me of the contrary, does not like that I should believe what he has told me—at any rate my certainty is unshaken. I solve the difficulty, if I can—if I cannot, I leave it unsolved. I have got the knowledge I want, and I know my Father's care and love. May you, my reader, thus know it. Let me only add a very simple but all-important remark. The question as to Christianity is not, if it be true (Mohammedanism is true), but, if it be from God. The kinds of proof and their effects will be quite different.

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## APPENDIX.

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### L

MR. NEWMAN refers to one subject on which I will touch, as generally useful. He objects to mediation as mischievous. Having never had any just conviction of sin, he does not feel the need of it. No one who has *for himself felt* what sin and grace are, can hesitate a moment as to the value of it. Let the reader consult Job ix., and he may see the working of a true yet vexed soul under God's hand. It is all well talking of awe and reverence, etc., and love, as Mr. N. does; but the denial of the need of a mediator, is the denial of a holy Judge, and of our sense of God's being so. But it is important to have a clear apprehension of the nature and work of the mediator.

Mr. Newman's objection to it is this—that all moral profit arises from being brought into the presence of God, and that the notion of a mediator is a hindrance to this. Now this is plausible, because moral profit does arise from being brought into the presence of God; but it is altogether a fallacy. For our sense of the need of a mediator arises from the effect of our being brought into the presence of God; or, what is morally the same thing, so true an estimate of what God is, as makes us feel the impossibility of our standing before Him.

In the passage I have referred to in Job, this is evidently seen, whatever temper he met it in. He could not answer God "one of a thousand." If he called himself "perfect," his own mouth would condemn him. If he would "leave off his heaviness and comfort himself," God would not hold him innocent. If he should "wash himself with snow water, and make

his hands never so clean, God would plunge him in the ditch." And he adds, "Neither is there any daysman betwixt us, who should lay his hand upon us both." Now I am not commenting here upon the spirit in which Job takes the matter up, for it was a wrong one: I adduce it to show that the sense of the need of a mediator arises from the conviction of sin, and does not hinder it.

This doctrine is sometimes used in a way calculated to give a false idea of God—not precisely as to the effect of the presence of God upon the conscience, but as hiding Divine love. The effect, as I have already said, of that presence is to present God as simply a Judge, and Christ is then looked at as one in whose love we can confide. But Scripture is not answerable for this. God is a Judge; but Christ is never presented as an Intercessor with a Judge. The scriptural doctrine of a mediator is quite different from this.

It not only leaves the full effect of God as light upon the soul, but brings it down close to the moral eye; and does it in the way of love, that we should be able to walk in that light. Christ is *God manifest* in the flesh. But while He is the light itself, this manifestation is love.

See how John puts this point—"That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of life (for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us). . . . This then is the message which we have heard of Him, and declare unto you, that God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." Here we have no hindering the full discovery of God to the soul: it is that discovery—"The darkness is past, and the true light now shineth." "The life was the light of men. That was the true light which lighteth [shineth upon] every man." And, it did tell upon men's consciences, the presence of that living Word; and if sin was confessed, attracted in grace; if sought to be hidden—vexed, irritated, and alarmed; humble and unassuming as was the garb in which grace, for love's

sake towards men, had clothed the light. So the truth. It is indeed grace in testimony; but it reaches the conscience, and judges all men by the revelation of God Himself.

What could have brought light and love (and that is, morally speaking, God) so near to man as the incarnation? It was in the way of reconciling, not imputing trespasses; but this was to engage man, away from sin (if that had been possible), by coming in grace and goodness towards himself. Mediation is, in this respect, the revelation of God Himself close to us, bearing directly on the conscience and heart of man; and so is the word of the Gospel now.

But there is yet more in Christianity, that we might be fully brought into the presence of God.

Christ has suffered in our place, the Just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God—not merely God to us down here. Looking at God as righteousness, as having “purer eyes than to behold iniquity” (and surely this does not hinder the effect of his presence as regards conscience), the just sense of sin would make us feel that we could not come into his presence, appear defiled before his holy majesty. There is no just sense of sin, no real effect of his presence on the conscience, till this is felt—no proper jealousy of right and wrong, till we estimate it thus, and bring God and ourselves together in thought, so as to produce it—ourselves, who owe everything to Him. But we could not. He ought not, in justice, to allow such in his presence. But Christ gives Himself for these sins; and, putting them away, appears in the presence of God in the efficacy of and in virtue of that work. I go into the presence of God with His full character maintained in holiness and love. He is more glorified in both in what has been done by Jesus about sin, than if there had been none; and it is Jesus’ glory in every way to have done it. I now appear, in virtue of, yea, being this Divine righteousness, in God’s own presence, through infinite love and righteousness, which I thus know, and never should have known else; for it is not mere human righteousness. God is known *as He is in glory*, which Christ alone could meet in face, so to speak; and I am there with the full light of it upon me, without fear, because in virtue of the redemption in which that glory has

been morally displayed and satisfied, and that as to and about sin itself now put away for me, and I appearing as made the righteousness of God in Him. My being there is that righteousness, the fruit of the travail of Christ's soul; and what that is, He alone can tell who knows what wrath is to Him who dwelt in the unity of love—what sin is to Him who was in the unity of the Divine holiness. There I am in a righteousness adequate for this glory—and so it is I judge sin now—a righteousness, as wrought out in Christ, competent to take, in righteousness, its seat at the right hand of the Majesty on high; for God being glorified in it, God's glory was its just reward: and this in the fullest sense connected with the person of Him who accomplished it. Now I find my place in God's presence in virtue of this. I *sit down* in heavenly places—not where the personal accomplishment places Him who accomplished it, as a just reward; but, morally, as fully in the presence of God. Yet, in fact, I am a poor, feeble, erring creature, rising above sin in a heavenly way in mind, through the Spirit. But, alas! by virtue even of that which I see, seeing the wretched inadequacy of all my steps down here. There is always feebleness, often failures. Here mediation comes in again—not to obtain righteousness, but to maintain a feeble, failing creature in the enjoyment of the place where our being made righteousness in Him places us. It is the reconciling the state in which I actually am with the position in which that has set me. It is the only thing which can maintain a poor, feeble creature experimentally up to the height of that Divine presence. To pretend to be there in the condition in which we actually are, would be mere madness, and prove we had never known it. We should even, as men, rather fall at his feet as dead. Yet if not, we must lose the full power of that presence to judge evil and good by, to know love by, to estimate the glorious counsels of God by. But Christ appears in the presence of God for us. His blood is on the mercy-seat. He is there in virtue of this blood-shedding, which places me there. I can abide there in peace, to learn it all. Am I to ignore, then, my feebleness and failing? No, I judge what I am by what I see of this glory, which is mine; and my feebleness and failure become the

occasion of the exercise of grace, which does not lower God to the level of my failures, but which meets the wants they prove in the way of mercy, and lifting me up out of them. We have a High Priest touched with the feeling of our infirmities, who was in all points tempted like as we are, without sin; so that we come boldly to the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need. Hence in this also mediation maintains for us the full display of God to ourselves, and alone can do so, and in the way of faith and grace, so as to be morally elevating while judging all inconsistent with itself. If Mr. Newman thinks he could stand in the presence of God's majesty as he is and what he is, and compare himself with it, he knows neither himself nor God. Divine righteousness sets me there according to God; constant mediation obtains all the grace I need in the actual state I am in, and maintains me—not hiding my actual worthlessness from myself—in the full enjoyment of Divine favour as known there—restores me if need be—maintains a just, practically holy, intercourse with that glory. Who has not this, has none. Hence it is said, "If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the *righteous*"—that never alters, "and He is the propitiation for our sins."

The first part of Christ's mediation is the *revelation* of God to man here, so that he might be directly in his presence. The second part is when righteousness has given man a place in God's presence in glory, and made him know it, and placed him in it through redemption—maintaining the intercourse of a feeble, failing creature with God in love, in the place where righteousness has placed him; that is, in the presence of God fully revealed, as Christ the righteous Son is there—keeping us, on the one hand, in the sense of that glory unobscured—and on the other, the true and sweet sense of a weakness which is the occasion of constant and unfailling mercy, which is working in it to bring us up to the actual enjoyment of such glory as that righteousness is entitled to. Such are God's wondrous, perfect, and gracious ways with us, which alone reconcile Divine perfection and human weakness, and find in the latter, and even in its sin, the occasion of the display of the former in its highest glory,—His ways in Jesus

Emmanuel, to whom—Lamb of God, who takes away sin—belongs all glory for ever and ever, the joy and crown of those who trust in Him, the everlasting delight of God the Father.

May he whom I now answer know how sovereign is God's goodness—how great the grace in Christ—by finding all his attacks and blasphemies against it forgiven, through the very grace which he has attacked and despised!

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## II.

I PASS by a multitude of passages I had marked as showing the excessive looseness of argument indulged in by Mr. Newman, and the marvellous absence of all spiritual apprehensions; thus, as to the last point, he speaks of his old belief as depending on the interpretation of "the Old Scriptures," and establishing "how much of the biography of Jesus in the New is credible. To judge wrongly about it may prove one to be a bad critic, but not a less good and less pious man" (Phases, p. 203), that is, the credibility of Jesus' history is absolutely devoid of any moral element whatever. "In point of fact, I never did look much to futurity, nor even, in prospect of death, could attain to any vivid anticipations or desires, much less was troubled with fears" (Phases, p. 203). Neither death nor Jesus could awaken a moral element of any kind in his mind, nor had the Lord's coming more effect, save to trouble his conscience; but none in the affections of his soul. It "awoke only now and then to reproach and harass me for my unfaithfulness to it" (Phases p. 204). What an expression of incapacity to receive a spiritual idea above the level of his own mind. "*If I am not* [to criticize Jesus by the received laws of human morality] then I have no ground for praising or admiring Him!" (Phases, p. 210). What a denial of any capacity in the human soul to receive a thought of excellency beyond its present acquirements and apprehensions, any above itself as it is. My delight is, to have some new excellency, which, as far as I know it, the human measure has never yet reached; but I leave all this, and the "clearly's,"

and "therefore," of which there is no proof, to touch on one subject, which, as a Scripture one, is important, and which will afford me an opportunity of referring more fully than I have done to one of the most interesting and important in its place of all the books of Scripture.

"The old Hebrews," says Mr. Newman, (*Phases*, p. 189) "believed only in evil spirits sent *by God* to do *his bidding*, and had no idea of a rebellious spirit that rivalled God. That idea was first imbibed in the Babylonish captivity, and apparently therefore must have been adopted from the Persian 'Ahriman,' or from the 'Melek Taous,' the 'Sheitan' still honoured by the Yezidi with mysterious fear. That *the Serpent* in the early part of Genesis denoted the same Satan, is probable enough; but this only goes to show that that narrative is a legend imported from further East; since it is certain that the subsequent Hebrew literature has no trace of such an Ahriman."

This is a curious passage, in point of argument, singular in its logic, but more singular still, in showing how a theory forced into one's service to get rid of truth, fades away, in spite of the effort, before the truth it seeks to get rid of. First, reader, you have it all clearly settled, "That idea was first imbibed in the Babylonish captivity." Now, if you believe this—though why we should we are not told—however, Mr. Newman says so, and it is not certainly second-hand faith with him, he believes it on his own authority—we may indeed be "peculiarly vexed to find so total a deficiency of clear and sound instruction on so vital a question" as "why we are to believe it;" as if one "were solely anxious to have people believe without caring on what grounds they believe, although that is obviously the main point;"—but if you do believe this, then you have a singularly nicely graduated logical progression, it was first imbibed then, and, "apparently therefore,"—"must have been"—so that now it cannot be otherwise than "adopted from the Persian Ahriman." So that now we have indeed got "further East." From the Hebrews to Babylon; and, since it certainly was imbibed in the captivity, it must have been from Persia. Well, I thought we had here got far East rapidly. But the reason puzzles

me. Mr. N. admits that *the serpent*, in Genesis, denoted the same Satan. But, then, why travel so far East for it?—we have it in the first literature of the Hebrews—why is its being in the Ante-Babylonish period a proof that it came from the farther East? Why might not Abraham have brought the same doctrine with him from Ur of Mesopotamia, if it was lost afterwards, or found it in Canaan. For, after all Mr. N.'s account is, that we have it in the earliest writings of the Hebrews, but not in the subsequent ones—a very curious reason indeed for its being first imbibed in the Babylonish captivity. This is what is called “modern logic.” But, then, other difficulties arise; the Pentateuch in which this history occurs, was first completed and published, as Mr. N. assures us, in the reign of Josiah, when it was pretended the book of the law was found. Now this was about a century before the captivity; but it is there the serpent, Satan, is found. Why it should then be imported from the farther East, or be first imbibed in the captivity, one is at a loss to tell. If we are to believe De Wette, as we have seen, it was certainly taught *two* hundred years before the captivity—at least two hundred years, for he says, the Pentateuch, as we have it, is quoted at that period, that is, by the earliest prophets whose writings we possess. But if we abide by Mr. N.'s theory “our logic” is in still greater embarrassment; the reason that its being in Genesis shows that it is a legend imported from farther East, is, that the subsequent Hebrew literature has no trace of such an Ahriman. Now, if the Pentateuch was first published in Josiah's reign, there was no subsequent Hebrew literature previous to the captivity, save, at the utmost, a small part of Jeremiah. All Hezekiah's prophets preceded the Pentateuch, as, of course, those of “the century preceding his reign;” and then, in what *is* subsequent Hebrew literature, Satan is certainly found. Thus Zechariah and Chronicles use the term unequivocally. Why then does Mr. N. say that “subsequent Hebrew literature has no trace of such an Ahriman”? It can only really be thus, that he forgot his theory; and his conscience, more true than his memory, in happy forgetfulness, recognised the Pentateuch as the genuine ancient, most ancient “literature” of the Hebrews, written long and long

before Hezekiah's prophets, time enough for the nation to have forgotten the doctrine of the Persian Ahriman, if they ever did.

But if we come to examine the facts, instead of what "apparently therefore must have been;" if they first imbibed it in the Babylonish captivity from the further East, where they were not that we know of, further difficulties start into view. Psa. cix. speaks of Satan: and Job very fully and largely indeed; where did these Scriptures get it? I am aware that Psa. cix. is decided by "learned Germans" not to be David's. But it has not yet, that I can learn, found its place among the "latest positive results of criticism," so as to fix a date for it. So that it stands either before Hezekiah's prophets, and Mr. Newman's date of the Pentateuch, and disproves his whole theory, or, if after these, subsequent Hebrew literature has such an Ahriman. No one that I find has placed it after the captivity. And Job? Where is he to go? Here the "latest positive results" are most untoward. De Wette, in his first four editions, had fixed the date of this book after the captivity. Whether his finding Ahriman in it had any influence in producing this judgment, I know not; at any rate, in his last we find:—"We cannot place its date so low as the Chaldee period, but near it; in the time when the kingdom of Judah was sinking into ruin." Ewald and Hirzel place it, one at the beginning, the other at the end of this century, i.e.; the seventh B.C. from Josiah to the captivity. That is, the fullest instruction we have, as to Satan, in the Old Testament, is, according to the latest authorities, before the captivity, and exactly in "the subsequent Hebrew literature, which has no trace of such an Ahriman." It "apparently therefore must" not have been adopted from the Persian Ahriman, or "Melek Taous."

There is, indeed, a way of getting rid of this, suggested in Parker's De Wette, vol. ii, p. 563.

"For the sake of the perfection of the poem, we could wish these historical passages were away. Accordingly they have been rejected by Hasse, Stuhlmann and Bernstein"—what lively jealousy for the reputation of the unknown author. But De Wette's conscience seems to have been growing as he

advanced in his inquiries and his years; he continues:—"But the prosaic style—the occurrence of Satan therein—the use of the name of Jehovah (while Eloha is elsewhere used in the book for its poetic effect), prove nothing against the genuineness of these passages."

But here we get a most curious discovery. Herder, Eichhorn, Stuhlmann and Bertholdt, think the Satan mentioned here, "is not the common Satan." Where did they get acquainted with this other, uncommon one? However, we are assured in the same note, that "this is contrary to all analogy." What the analogy is I must leave to the reader to discover in De Wette's *Biblische Dogmatik*. But I must say, if ever there was a specimen of incapacity to seize the purpose of a moral author—self-sufficiency and a total want of all intelligence—it is in the learned German's account of the merits and contents of the book of Job, as given in the American edition of De Wette.

Discussions as to the date of a book which affords none, which affords no direct proof of any, so that it is to be drawn from internal criteria, cannot be surprising; and such there have been amongst those, who fully bowed to the Book of Job as the word of God. It does not seem to me a very difficult question, but I should not presume to impose an opinion, or dogmatise upon it. That it is inspired Scripture no true believer doubts. It is cited in the New Testament, and certainly referred to by Ezekiel. When it was introduced into the canon is comparatively immaterial; I have not myself the least doubt of its antiquity. I am not Hebraist enough to pretend, in any way, to judge of the style, but many of those who are, have not found it an obstacle to their conviction. Besides, I confess I have not very great confidence in the decisions of sceptics as to Hebrew language. I open one writer of credit on these points, and he tells me, "In respect to the language, to the contents and entire spirit, the book belongs not at all to the golden age, but to the later period of Hebrew literature." I beg leave to demur to the contents and spirit; I cite as to the Hebrew. I open another book of credit, and I find:—"The nature of the language employed is of itself sufficient to shew that its origin must be referred

to a period antecedent to the composition of the psalms. In Job, the use of Aramaisms is strongly marked, evidently pointing to a period prior to David, in whose time the language was purer. Besides these Aramaisms differ essentially from the later ones, exhibiting an ancient and primitive character quite distinct from the corrupt and degenerate Aramaisms of a later age," and then several examples are given. Indeed, in a language of which so little remains as there does of Hebrew, it requires uncommon nicety of judgment and depth of knowledge, both of the language, and I may add, of cognate dialects, to judge from such a criterion, except in very clear cases, such as comparing the Pentateuch with the Chaldean period, or even with books written earlier than that. Gesenius mentions a fact which shews the full examination such a ground of judging of age requires:—"The ancient Hebrew agrees, in its grammatical structure, more with the modern Arabic than with the ancient." He states how this has arisen, which is not my present subject. He places Job in the golden age of the language in his grammar; in his history of the language next to Proverbs; in date of style between the golden and inferior style. It may be well to mention here, that it appears that modern German critics have abandoned their old notion of the Josiah-date of the Pentateuch, to which Mr. Newman's "eyes were opened," as "he considered the narrative." It is, even for them, at least as old as David and Solomon, for *opinionum commenta delet dies*, and that the greatest masters of the subject are clear that writing began two thousand years at least before Christ, or as another expresses it, "more ancient than any history is able to disclose. It was a privilege enjoyed by the Shemitish nations a long time before Moses made his appearance in history."

I cite the opinion of German rationalists.\*

I recall this, as attempts are made to becloud this point too. The result is this—we have Satan (according to Mr. N. himself, the believer cannot have a doubt of it) referred to in the earliest historical books, in the history of the serpent. He is very largely, and with very particular development and

\* I cite from English translations accessible to me at the moment—I have not the German originals.

purpose, introduced in the book of Job. He is spoken of in Psalm cix.: and in Zechariah and Chronicles, after the captivity. That is, from the beginning to the end of the Old Testament. So much for "no trace of such an Ahriman," and legends "imported from farther East." The latest authorities and best Hebrew scholars of Mr. N.'s views placing Job before the captivity; many making it very much earlier; some, indeed, the most ancient book in existence.

But the criticisms on the book of Job are useful to refer to in this way. When the discussion is on historical prophecy, many subjects come before the mind to which natural intellect can apply its powers, dates, historical facts, and the like. The results are just as false; and some unhappy English sceptic, unable to go at the pace at which light German wit and diligent German labour travels in doubt, finds his "eyes opened," some years too late, on something on which those of his more assiduous neighbours have already closed again; and we get some Josiah-date of the Pentateuch published in English, when no one of the originally opened eyes can see it any longer. But the moral scope of a book abides for every one to examine. Job pretends to no ostensible date. The ways of God are simply and directly in question; and here the glaring incompetency of these unhappy sceptics becomes too evident to bear the light. A converted child—nay, any one who had retained some respect for God—could judge the unimaginable flippancy, the utter incapacity to seize hold of the purport and connection of the Divine writings exhibited by these critics. "Elihu's speeches are spurious; they do not introduce God well; they subvert the scope of the book." I may feel unable to judge whether an Aramaism is an old one or a new—whether there are Arabisms in Job—or whether they are not such as have passed through an Aramæan crucible, and become genuine poetical Hebrew; but Elihu's speeches are before us all; and an English reader, if he has not the linguistic niceties, has the subject fully before him. It is a relief to turn to it. It has been, at least, a comfort to me, in my present task, to have an opportunity of occupying myself and my reader, from time to time, with the contents of Scripture. The reader of the book of Job is let in at once

into what was really going on, that he may know God's purpose and ways. Job is not. It would have destroyed the effect of the gracious, though painful, process. God takes notice of *his saints*—"Hast thou considered my servant Job?" Satan's attention thus attracted to them, in a way which shows that God, whatever Satan's malice, is the real source of all that is to follow, he becomes the accuser. Thus the great scene of which man (and we must add, the saint) was the object, really opens.

God, whose purpose is only disclosed at the end in the profit done to Job's soul (though his being the source of all is revealed), leaves Job, in a measured way, in the hand of the adversary for temptation and trial. Such is the scene and spring of action from within. But all comes on Job from without by apparently ordinary causes. The predatory hordes of Sabæans, Chaldeans, and the like, make razzias on his flocks and herds—a violent wind from the desert throws down his house when his children are feasting—and at last a disease of the country attacks his own body—rapidly accumulated no doubt; but all ordinary events, however trying. What was Job's own character? He was, in his general character, a godly, upright, gracious man, fearing God, eschewing evil, and gracious with those around him. Why should evils, if there be a Divine government, fall on such a one? If this world be simply the present manifestation of Divine government as such, then, indeed, it would be incredible. But though Providence overrules all, and God delights to bless even temporarily, and though in result, when He takes to Him his own great power and rules, the blessing of the righteous will fully arrive; yet now, in a world of sin, He is carrying on another purpose—the perfecting of saints for the full enjoyment of Himself. This, since sin and will are come in, is wrought in two ways—judgment of self, and submission to God.

Now Job needed, and God saw that he needed, this. He was gracious and pious, but he did not know himself; and he had never so seen God as to be brought to a real knowledge of himself in His presence. God deals therefore with him in a way to bring his sinfulness fully out, and then places him

with it manifested to himself in His own presence. Elihu's place we shall see in a moment. He gives the key to God's ways in grace, in order to the bringing-in of the soul dealt with into God's presence, as under discipline, not under judgment. Job had acted well, for grace had acted in him; but he did not know himself before God. Thus he speaks: "When the ear heard me, then it blessed me; and when the eye saw me, it gave witness to me. Because I delivered the poor that cried, and the fatherless, and him that had none to help him. The blessing of him that was ready to perish came upon me, and I caused the widow's heart to sing for joy. I put on righteousness, and it clothed me; my judgment was as a robe and a diadem. I was eyes to the blind, and feet was I to the lame. I was a father to the poor; and the cause that I knew not, I searched out." All very right and gracious; but was it all that was in Job's heart? What did the thinking of it do? What did it show? Men waited for Job, no doubt. But where was Job's heart? What was it? Well, God allows Satan, in his malice, to sweep all away; and here more good is displayed. He is patient in his sorrow: he blesses God, and bows his head to Him who gave and saw fit to take away.

But Job's heart was not yet reached. Its reflections on itself there was nothing to change. Men would have said, "What more can you want than grace in prosperity, and patience in adversity?" Such a knowledge of myself as makes God everything to me, and me morally capable of enjoying Him. Had God stopped here, though outwardly preparation had been made, Job would have been better pleased with himself than ever. Had God restored him now, mischief would have been done. Satan had done all he could. His friends arrive, and sympathy or shame (for God will have his blessed work fully done) reveals Job to himself; and he who has become the type of patience, curses the day in which he was born. The surface is broken through, and Job and his friends, too, come out in their reality. His friends take the ground of the present certain government of God manifest in all his ways; in which they are wholly and in every sense wrong. Did He directly govern, He could allow no sin at

all. He who could suppose this present evil world the expression of the just and adequate results of God's character in government, must have an awful idea of God Himself. They were pretty much on Mr. Newman's ground. They had a pre-existing standard of morals, and judged God and all things by it. God loved righteousness, and hated iniquity. Job was under his afflicting hand; consequently, he was a hypocrite. They pronounce, indeed, many "wise saws," common-place truisms, which explained nothing, and reached no man's conscience, not even their own—and hold their tongues, vexed that their wisdom is despised.

In Job two things are brought out—an unbroken, impatient will, which set up to judge God and say that he was more righteous than He; but, at the same time, a heart which had a sense of relationship with God, though in rebellion against Him, and writhing under his hand—a perception of qualities in God which showed a personal knowledge of Himself, which only longed to find Him, and knew when he did he should find Him such. He could not indeed. He was in one way, and who could turn him aside? But if he did, he would order his cause before Him. There was that confidence in Him, that he counted upon his heart towards Him. When he can get rid of the stupid importunities of his moralising and heartless friends, he turns to cry after God with an "O that I might find Him"! In justice, he sees it is no use. How can a man plead with God? But in heart he will trust Him if He slays him. Nothing can be more beautiful than the way he turns thus, casting aside his friends as he may, to throw himself into the arms of God, if he could only find Him. But all was not ready yet; the confidence would be sustained, but the will must be broken—self-complacency destroyed. In this process all manner of feelings come out—impatient anger presumptuously arraigning God, acknowledging present government in pious justification of his ways, clearly proving that it was no present adequate proof of what God thought of a man, a deep personal heart-sense of what God is, expressed in confidence in Him. The heart was fully exercised, its evil brought out, its good, its faith in God brought into play; but the riddle was not yet solved.

Elihu then comes in, an interpreter "one among a thousand," and brings in this truth—that God deals personally with man. A general superintending government no doubt there is—a God that judgeth the earth; but there is another kind of government—that of souls. He turns man from his purpose. He hides pride from man. He hideth not his eyes from the righteous. They are with kings; but He binds them in affliction and cords of iron, to show them their works, their transgressions that they have exceeded. He chastens, restores. He governs with a view to blessing—and souls in a moral relationship with Himself. He was not God to terrify Job; yet Job could not answer when God, acting in respect of an unjudged conscience and an unsubdued heart, was brought out.

Yet while judging the conscience, and shewing the sin of the will and pride of heart, such reasoning shewed God's active condescending, pains-taking grace to a soul that had the integrity that was found in Job. Thus God's *ways* were revealed by the interpreter, and self-righteousness totally set aside. Still one thing remained, where gracious ways had softened the heart of the wilful one for submission. God's own majesty was to be revealed to shew Job his utter folly—worms and sinners that we are. Hence God is displayed in majesty and power, and Job acknowledges his vileness, first by shutting his mouth before God—staying his presumptuous words, and then opening it in unfeigned confession before the gracious God who dealt with him, in whose presence he now stood in a truth and reality he had never been in before. "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee, therefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes." Then God can fully bless him, and pardon his friends, putting each in his place. These were, so to speak, the parties in question—self-righteousness referring to present government now; a saint, yet unsubdued and not knowing himself as a poor sinner before God—and the God of majesty with whom they all had to do. Elihu was but an interpreter by the way, and hence not seen when the judgment is to be pronounced. He answers to the intelligent spirit of Christ, acting by the word to teach God's

ways as the church ought to know them; and "we have heard of the patience of Job, and seen the end of the Lord—that the Lord is very pitiful and of tender mercy." Such, I apprehend, is the purport of this book. The most instructive revelation for every soul of God's ways with men. I do not doubt its application to Jewish history, for in the Jews God will ultimately display His government of the earth, as He has already to those who have spiritual intelligence to discern it. But that is but a large picture of man's heart and God's ways that we may learn them. There are higher revelations in the new no doubt. But the sovereign grace has not superseded these principles of intercourse of God with godly men—with the redeemed, and with men in general, which are brought out, independently of all particular dispensations, in this wonderful and most beautiful book. It carefully shuts out thus all special dispensational character or Jewish legal form of knowledge, or God's taking a people specially to Himself, while picturing the dealings developed in them. I have no doubt, from the kind of idolatry referred to the patriarchal manners and other characteristics of the book, that it is of Mosaic date at least; but however this may be, of its spiritual place and purpose in the holy book of God I have not the least doubt—a godly man, standing with God in government in the earth, and his acceptance before Him.

The reader will remark that sacrifices are introduced as the means of escape from the consequences of our folly and sin in respect of God. The book of Job is the testimony now, independent of all peculiar dispensational truth and blessings; and it was the testimony before there were any, of the great fundamental truths on which all relationship between God and man on earth rests, dispensationally brought out.

I would add, that I have no doubt that (1 Cor. vii. 37, 38), applies to the man's own state, and not in any way whatever to his daughters.

Mr. Newman speaks of the difficulty which scientific men have of determining what a miracle is; and that the course of nature must be known to know what a deviation from it is.

This fact shews how reasoners create difficulties for themselves. The object of a miracle is to shew the intervention of God. If God did, in favour of some one or many, in a day, what man would take ten years to do, but could do if he had time, it would be a miracle in the truest sense of the word. But if Lazarus was raised from the dead, did any one doubt it was out of the course of nature? If a blind man received his sight from clay and the pool of Siloam, did he doubt it? If a cripple of forty years old from his birth, not expecting it, could leap and walk in a moment, does Mr. N. think that he, or any one in his senses, would wait till science had settled the course of nature to know whether there was a miracle or not?

Let the reader remark, I am not now discussing whether these things happened or not—but the difficulty of ascertaining their character supposing they did happen.

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POSTSCRIPT.

One point yet remains of the general moral character of the system, which I would bring under the notice of the reader. The principle which Mr. N. sets forth as excellent, and the basis of all practical religion, is, the sympathy of God with individual man. "The Bible," he says (Phases, p. 188) "is pervaded by a sentiment, which is implied everywhere; viz., the intimate sympathy of the pure and perfect God with the heart of each faithful worshipper." Be it so. But sinners with "an antagonist will" are not faithful worshippers. The same will declares "there is none that understandeth, none that seeketh after God": and we all know that it is the case with a vast majority, and has been, if it be not yet, our own case. What is to become of these—in truth, of all? Mr. N.'s philosophical system leaves them to any possible desire which an antagonist will may have to approach one from whom as such it desires to be free, and whose presence awakens an uneasy conscience which would desire any thing rather than to be there. The mass of men—all really—are left in the hopeless condition of those who are not faithful worshippers and care not to become so.

God must reveal nothing, must sit in otiose indifference, till some one changes himself and come: no word may he speak

to engage him. It would be a revelation. Does Christianity leave sinners in this desolate state, and present a God, who, if love be in His heart, is helpless to shew it? It is just the contrary. There God is revealed as one who, in Christ, comes to seek, and save that which was lost. The Good Shepherd, at all cost to himself, seeks his sheep, gives his life for his sheep. Christianity does speak of more than "sympathy for the worshipper." It speaks of communion. But it is first of all the activity of God's love towards them that were perishing by their own fault far from Him, a love exercised towards them though their will was antagonist. It reveals a God of love, who cared for, thought of, those who did not care for Him; who has compassion on sinners, that they may become thankful worshippers. Judaism did own faithful worshippers, though at the outset it had, as a figure, sought out an enslaved and suffering people. But in Christianity God is fully revealed, not helpless to shew his love, but coming in goodness to the sinner where he is, that thus love may give assurance to the heart, and the work of redemption peace to the conscience, so that the sinner may have boldness to approach, because God came to him in grace, when he dared not, could not, come to God.

It is this which is the answer of the Lord to the Pharisees, who reproached him for receiving sinners and eating with them.

The shepherd sought his sheep from the earnest care of his own heart for it. The woman used all diligence to find her piece of money. The joy was the shepherd's, and the woman's. And how received when he turns to God? The returning prodigal had his father on his neck while in his rags, and the best robe to enter into the house. It was his father's joy to have him back there. Such is the God revealed in Christ. Where is Mr. Newman's? It is a philosophical God, to be found by philosophers. Trouble himself to seek you! How should a god reveal himself? It is an unplausible thing. And if I have found Him and found Him to be love. Silence!—To speak of Him would be a revelation; to listen, second-hand faith. Let others find Him if they care to do so. If not, nobody knows what will become of them. Nor does the philosopher mind that much more than the helpless careless God he professes to have found.

I leave to Mr. Newman to say, why he writes against a book, in which is found the basis of all practical religion, which is pervaded by it, and which alone, as he admits, has preserved and produced it.


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